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ABSTRACT
The Inner Experience of Older Individuals
by
Todd Michael Seibert
Dr. Russell T. Hurlburt, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Older individuals are susceptible to the development of numerous age-related 
neurodegenerative disorders including Alzheimer’s Disease and Vascular Dementia.  
This is continuing to become a more serious social, financial, medical, and psychological 
problem as the average life span continues to increase across the world.  Nevertheless, 
very little is known about the inner experience of older individuals.  This study used 
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) to investigate the inner experience of twelve 
older individuals with and without cognitive impairment.  Five of six unimpaired 
individuals were able to engage successfully in DES compared to only one individual 
with cognitive impairment.  The findings suggest that DES is extremely sensitive to 
cognitive impairment and older individuals may lack certain aspects of inner experience.  
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Approximately 4.5 million people in the United States had Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) 
in the year 2000 (Hebert, Scherr, Bienias, Bennett, & Evans, 2003).  Because human 
lifespan is increasing at a substantial rate and the risk of developing AD increases greatly 
with age, AD is quickly becoming a public health disaster (Lopez et al., 2000). Average 
life expectancy in industrialized nations is increasing at a historic rate (National Institute 
on Aging, 2000).  In 2003, the average life expectancy for individuals living in the United 
States was 77.6 years (National Center for Health Statistics, 2005).  This number is 
expected to climb quickly as medical science continues to make important advances in 
health care (National Institute on Aging, 2000).  It is predicted that life expectancy in 
industrialized nations will reach 82.9 years by the year 2050 (National Institute on Aging, 
2000).  
Approximately 0.7 percent of people who are 65 years of age have AD, 12 to 13 
percent of people at age 85 have the disease, approximately 23 percent at age 90, and 38
to 39 percent at age 95 (APA, 2000).  If there is no discovery of a cure for AD or a way 
to prevent AD, the number of individuals in the United States with AD in 2050 is 
expected to triple relative to 2000 to 13.2 million people (Hebert et al., 2003).  Currently, 
caring for individuals with AD costs an estimated $100 billion a year in the United States 
(National Institute on Aging, 2006).  This number is likely to increase substantially as the 
2baby-boomers move into advanced stages of aging (Graff-Radford, 2003; National 
Institute on Aging, 2006).   When one combines the rapidly increasing life span of 
humans and the prevalence of AD in relation to age, there is clearly a potentially 
disastrous situation in front of us.  In fact, AD is already being called “the disease of the 
century” (Whitehouse, Maurer, & Ballenger, 2000).
The need for effective treatment and management of the disorder is urgent 
(Parasuraman, 2004).  Fortunately, the scientific community has recognized the urgency 
of the situation and significant research has focused on the risk factors of the disease 
(Ballard, 2002).  Unfortunately, the scientific community’s understanding of the disease, 
specifically its ability to detect, prevent, and treat the disease, although recently much 
improved, has not increased in harmony with the number of those the disease affects.  
Cures for the disease have not been found and do not appear to be on the horizon.  
Small developments in the diagnosis and treatment of AD can have a substantial 
impact on the mental and physical health of individuals with AD, their families, as well 
as a major financial impact (Leifer, 2006).  Even a small slowing of decline could save 
billions of dollars.  Ernst, Hay, Fenn, Tinklenberg, and Yesavage (1997) estimated that if 
treatment could improve the scores of individuals with AD on the Mini-Mental State 
Exam (MMSE) (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) by 2 points, a modest increment, 
$7,000 per year could be saved per AD patient.  This translates to saving approximately 
31.5 million dollars currently and a projected 92.4 million dollars in 2050 in the United 
States alone.  Therefore, although a cure or prevention for AD is ideal, even small steps 
in improving diagnosis and treatment can have a tremendous benefit to the community as 
a whole.    
3Research has clearly shown that AD is a degenerative disease that develops far before 
it is readily apparent or diagnosable (Kawas et al., 2003).  Some studies suggest that both 
cognitive and neurological signs (i.e.,, neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques, 
sometimes called senile plaques) of AD can be present up to 50 years before it is 
diagnosed (Snowden et al., 1996).  Snowden et al. (1996) studied autobiographies written 
by nuns upon entering a convent at an average age of 22 years.  The researchers analyzed 
the last ten sentences of each autobiography and calculated the idea density (i.e., the 
average number of ideas expressed in every ten words) in these sentences.  The study 
showed that idea density in the nuns’ writing correlated highly negatively with the later 
development of AD.  In fact, low idea density was present in childhood in 90 percent of 
those who developed AD while low idea density was present in only 13 percent of those 
who did not develop AD.  Furthermore, individuals who eventually develop AD make 
significantly more errors on a test of non-verbal memory (the Benton Visual Retention 
Test) up to 15 years before a diagnosis of AD (Kawas et al., 2003).  LaRue and Jarvick 
(1980) found that certain subtests of the WAIS predicted dementia two decades before 
symptomatology arose.  Sixty-seven percent of individuals who scored in the bottom 
fourth of Coding eventually experienced dementia, 75 percent who scored in the bottom 
fourth of Vocabulary developed dementia, and 85 percent of those scoring in the bottom 
fourth of Similarities eventually experienced dementia (LaRue & Jarvick, 1980).  
Although these studies suggest that there are cognitive differences among individuals 
who eventually develop AD and those who do not, effective early diagnosis remains
elusive.
4Neurobiological evidence also suggests that the process of AD may be in place well 
before it can be clinically diagnosed.  The hippocampus and brain regions associated with 
the hippocampus are especially altered well before clinical diagnosis can be made (Braak 
& Braak, 1995), and multiple cortical and subcortical areas appear to exhibit dysfunction 
before AD can be diagnosed (Backman, Jones, Berger, Laukka, & Small, 2005).  
Furthermore, amyloid plaques may be present and continue to accumulate before the 
symptomatology of AD can be detected (Zamrini, De Santi, & Tolar, 2004).  Finally, 
evidence of inflammation associated with neuronal death is often observed before the 
development of neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques and well before clinical 
symptoms appear (Rosenberg, 2005).  Because the disease process begins before clinical 
symptoms appear, preclinical diagnosis is crucial so that treatments can be used to change 
the course of the disease’s progression (Desai & Grossberg, 2005).  
5CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Alzheimer’s Disease – History, Presentation, and Course
AD was first identified by Alois Alzheimer in 1907 when he published the case of 
Auguste D., a 51 year old woman Alzheimer treated in Frankfurt, Germany (Maurer, 
Volk, & Gerbaldo, 2000).  Alzheimer noted symptoms in the woman that included 
cognitive deficiencies that became progressively worse over time, disorientation to time 
and place, hallucinations, delusions, and a general inability to function in a socially 
appropriate manner (Maurer et al., 2000).  After 4 ½ years of being in Alzheimer’s care, 
Auguste D. died (Maurer et al., 2000).  At this time Alzheimer performed an autopsy and 
discovered that Auguste D.’s brain contained neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques 
(Maurer et al., 2000).  It was this key finding of neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid 
plaques that allowed for an enhanced understanding of this disease (Morris & Becker, 
2004a). Emil Kraeplin first coined the term “Alzheimer’s Disease” in 1910 (Maurer et al., 
2000).  
The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) classifies dementia of the Alzheimer’s type, or AD, as 
a memory impairment that must be accompanied by aphasia (language disturbance), 
apraxia (motor disturbance), agnosia (inability to identify objects), or deficiencies in 
executive functions.   Furthermore, cognitive difficulties must progress in a gradual and 
6continuous manner (APA, 2000).  The DSM-IV-TR also differentiates between early 
onset (appearing under 65 years of age, also called familial AD due to apparent 
hereditary nature) and late onset (appearing after 65 years of age, also called sporadic AD 
due to apparent non-hereditary nature) as well as with and without behavioral 
disturbances (APA, 2000).  AD is the most common form of dementia (APA, 2000; 
Misciagna, Masullo, Giordano, & Silveri, 2005; The Dementia Study Group of the Italian 
Neurological Society, 2000; Morris & Becker, 2004b; Leifer, 2003).    
The most used diagnostic criteria for AD are those developed by the National 
Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke-Alzheimer’s Disease 
and Related Disorders Association (NINCDS-ADRDA; Lopez et al., 2000; The Dementia 
Study Group of the Italian Neurological Society, 2000).  The NINCDS-ADRDA criteria 
are used to diagnose either probable or possible AD (Morris & Becker, 2004b; Lopez & 
Becker, 2004).  Probable AD is diagnosed when AD seems to be the only likely cause of 
the dementia (Morris & Becker, 2004b; Lopez & Becker, 2004).  Possible AD is 
diagnosed when it appears that AD may be present but the onset and/or course of the 
disease is atypical (Lopez et al., 2000) or the dementia could be due at least in part to 
another neurodegenerative disorder (Morris & Becker, 2004b).  The reliability and 
validity of these standards have proven to be excellent in a variety of studies (Mayeux et 
al., 1998).  
As mentioned above, there are many cognitive deficits associated with AD.  Some 
theorize that this is due to a general factor that is compromised in AD that affects 
cognitive functioning globally.  Many researchers identify slowing of processing speed as 
a likely candidate for this general factor, although there is substantial disagreement about 
7this issue in the literature (see Baddeley, Baddeley, Bucks, & Wilcock, 2001 for a 
review).  Auditory memory problems can often be accounted for by a decrease in the 
speed of processing of auditory information (Just & Carpenter, 1992).  Specifically, there 
appears to be a deficiency in processing the semantic component of words (Just & 
Carpenter, 1992).  
Still, the most identifiable deficiency in AD is memory impairment, not slow 
processing speed, although processing speed could be a mediating factor in memory 
impairment.  The one cognitive symptom that is required for a diagnosis of AD is 
substantial memory impairment (APA, 2000).  Accordingly, the most common initial 
clinical presentation of AD is subjective report of forgetfulness (Petersen, 2003).  The 
ability to form new memories is usually depleted first, but later in the course of AD 
retrieval of already formed memories typically deteriorates greatly (Kopelman, 1985).  
As AD progresses, virtually all areas of memory are impaired (Greene, Hodges, & 
Baddeley, 1995).  Nevertheless, in spite of the tremendous amount of research done on 
this topic, the exact cognitive nature of the memory impairment in AD is not entirely 
clear (Overman & Becker, 2004).  
The course and presentation of AD is highly variable among individuals and there is 
much debate regarding what deficiencies most typically manifest first in AD.  
Historically, episodic memory has been identified as the symptom that presents first and 
is the most readily noticed in early AD.  Nevertheless, many other symptoms appear to be 
present very early in the course of the disease, including problems with semantic 
memory, working memory, attention, inhibition, learning, and language.  Deficiencies in 
episodic memory are often the most pervasive problem in people with AD (Overman & 
8Becker, 2004; Collette & Van Der Linden, 2004; Rusted & Clare, 2004) and are typically 
the most severe cognitive deficits in the early stages of the disease (Overman & Becker, 
2004).   Tests of delayed episodic recall can often effectively distinguish between AD 
and normal aging early in the progress of AD (Germano & Kinsella, 2005).  Although 
individuals with AD often seem to remember the fact that a particular event occurred, 
they often do not remember it directly or ascribe any personal relevance to the memory 
(Overman & Becker, 2004).  Individuals with AD often exhibit difficulty remembering 
when they had initially viewed a picture or group of pictures, a key part of successful 
episodic memory (Rickert, Duke, Putzke, Marson, & Graham, 1998).     
It was once believed that difficulties in episodic memory were primarily due to 
retrieval, but research over the past decade has suggested that deficient encoding is the 
primary difficulty in episodic memory for individuals with AD (for a review, see 
Germano & Kinsella, 2005).  Still, the deficiency in episodic memory appears to be due 
to both encoding and retrieval problems (Overman & Becker, 2004).  There is evidence 
that forgetting is not increased in episodic memory, but rather information either does not 
enter memory or is not encoded properly in the acquisition phase (Perry, Watson, & 
Hodges, 2000).  
Semantic memory is also impaired throughout the course of AD (Garrard, Patterson, 
& Hodges, 2004; Overman & Becker, 2004) and is often present in the early stages of 
AD (Ramsden, Kinsella, Ong, & Storey, 2008).   Semantic fluency deficits can be a 
sensitive measure of early AD (Ramsden et al., 2008).  The reason for this difficulty is 
still debated among researchers.  Some argue that it is due to a break down of meaningful 
links between semantically-related information while others argue that access to the 
9memories themselves are compromised (for a review, see Findler, 2000).  Inhibition 
problems may be part of the reason for semantic memory deficits as well.  Individuals 
with AD exhibit increased difficulty in learning word-lists (for a review, see Overman & 
Becker, 2004) with high rates of intrusion errors (i.e., reporting words that were not 
present on the word list) when recalling lists of words as well as low rates of recognition 
(Overman & Becker, 2004).  High rates of intrusion also occur when freely recalling 
stories (Overman & Becker, 2004).  
Semantic memory problems associated with AD often occur in an ordered manner.  
Typically more specific information in semantic memory is lost or impaired first with 
more general semantic information following (Margolin, Pate, & Friedrich, 1996).  For 
example, studies have shown that individuals in the early stages of AD have significant 
impairment in object-naming tasks that require the retrieval of a specific referent (Martin 
& Fedio, 1983) and have difficulty making distinctions between words that are similar 
semantically (Warrington, 1975).   However, tasks requiring the use of knowledge of a 
more general nature, such as tests of vocabulary, remain relatively unimpaired in early 
AD (Martin & Fedio, 1983), although individuals with AD eventually exhibit dysfunction 
in this area as the disease progresses (Margolin et al., 1996).   
There is conflicting evidence regarding the existence, extent, and nature of implicit 
memory impairment in individuals with AD (Meirin & Jelicic, 1995).  A meta-analysis of 
research on implicit memory in AD suggests that there is a small decrease in implicit 
memory in individuals with AD (Meirin & Jelicic, 1995).  This meta-analysis also found 
that the level of impairment fluctuated as a function of the type of test.  Individuals with 
AD did not show impairment on word-based implicit memory tests that were perceptual 
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in nature (such as word-stem priming tasks) that did not exceed a ten minute gap between 
the initial presentation and the later retrieval phase (Meirin & Jelicic, 1995).  However, 
implicit memory was impaired when it involved conceptual tasks, free association, 
category generation, and tasks that were non-verbal in nature (Meirin & Jelici, 1995).  
Implicit memory seems to be relatively unaffected in Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), 
even in those who later converted to AD (Perri, Serra, Carlesimo, & Caltagirone, 2007).  
Memory difficulties in AD can also be viewed through the three stages of memory, 
sensory memory, short-term or working memory, and long-term memory.  There is very 
little research on sensory memory in AD.  However, there has been some research that 
has shown that electrical activity that is related to auditory sensory memory is impaired in 
individuals with AD.  Specifically, the amplitude of the event related potential elicited by 
tones that are related to auditory sensory memory are decreased in individuals with AD, 
suggesting a possible increase in the rate of sensory memory decay (Pekkonen, Jousmaki, 
Kononen, & Reinikainen, 1994).  
There is still debate regarding the nature of a decrease in working memory capacity 
and efficiency in normal aging (for a review, see Lund, 1997).  However, there is strong 
evidence that supports the existence of working memory dysfunction throughout the 
course of AD as well as very early in the progress of the disease (see Belleville,
Chertkow, & Gauthier, 2007).  Manipulation of information, divided attention, and 
inhibition, all key components of effective working memory, are impaired even in mild 
AD (Belleville et al., 2007).  Deficiencies in passive short-term storage of information is 
also found in individuals with mild AD (Belleville et al., 2007) although there is some 
conflicting evidence about this deficit (see Germano & Kinsella, 2005).  There is strong 
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evidence to suggest that the central executive portion of working memory is impaired in 
AD and is among the first cognitive functions to decline in AD, although the reason for 
this decline is not entirely clear (Germano & Kinsella, 2005).  
Manipulation of information in working memory via elaboration and rehearsal seems
to be especially impaired in individuals with AD.  People with AD do not seem to benefit 
from contextual cues at the time of encoding, including elaboration, rehearsal, and other 
encoding strategies (Findler, 2000; Sadasivan, 1989).  Furthermore, verbal memory 
deficiencies in AD have been hypothesized to be partially due to slower rates of subvocal 
rehearsal (Hulme, Lee, & Brown, 1993).  Vocal rehearsal was found to require more 
frontal lobe activation in individuals with AD compared to unimpaired older individuals, 
suggesting a decrease in efficiency and use of resources in AD when rehearsal is required 
(Woodard et al., 1998).  
One key component of forming successful memories is converting information stored 
temporarily in working memory to long-term memory.  There is evidence that this 
conversion is problematic in AD.  For example, the primacy effect is often reduced in 
individuals with AD, indicating that information can be stored for a short period of time 
but is often not successfully transferred from working memory into long-term storage (for 
a review, see Overman & Becker, 2004; Findler, 2000).  It appears that problems in 
episodic memory may be at least partially due to the inability to transfer information 
effectively from working memory to long-term memory (Overman & Becker, 2004).  It is 
possible that individuals with AD do not use techniques of elaboration properly, thus not 
allowing information to be effectively encoded and moved to long-term memory 
(Overman & Becker, 2004).    
12
Deficits in immediate memory are more noticeably compromised than problems with 
long-term memory in individuals with AD at the early stages of the disease.  However, as 
the disease progresses, long-term memories become substantially affected.  Still, 
problems with long-term memory can be seen early in the disease via neuropsychological 
testing (Ramsden et al., 2008).  Individuals with AD perform worse on tests of delayed 
memory than elderly individuals with no cognitive impairment as well as older 
individuals with other types of dementia, such as Vascular Dementia (VaD) and fronto-
temporal dementia (Braaten, Parsons, McCue, Sellers, & Burns, 2006).  Individuals with 
AD often make source monitoring errors when recalling information as well (Benjamin & 
Craik, 2001).  As mentioned above, problems with long-term memory seem to be at least 
partially due to difficulties transferring information from working memory to long-term 
storage (Findler, 2000).  
Another way to think of memory dysfunction in AD is to view it in terms of the three 
processes necessary to form successful memories; encoding, storage, and retrieval.  
Although the memory deficits observed in AD were once thought to be primarily due to 
retrieval, it appears that encoding problems play an even larger role (for a review, see 
Germano & Kinsella, 2005).  It appears that problems with memory that are presented in 
an auditory manner are largely due to encoding (Lund, 1997).  There is also some 
evidence that encoding of semantic information can be highly compromised, even more 
so than in some other types of dementia (Granholm & Butters, 1988).  Individuals with 
AD also seem to require deeper encoding to make full use of cues in cued retrieval 
conditions (Lipinska & Backman, 1997).  Nevertheless, the literature is highly 
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contradictory regarding the extent and nature of encoding deficits in individuals with AD 
at various stages of the disease (see Lund, 1997).  
There is also highly conflicting evidence regarding the existence of a reduced 
capacity to passively store information in AD (for a review, see Germano & Kinsella, 
2005).  Most research suggests that the primary deficits in memory in AD are due to 
problems with encoding and retrieval where storage is not a primary issue (for a review, 
see Germano & Kinsella, 2005).  
There is evidence that individuals with AD have difficulty with the retrieval stage of 
the memory process.  Some researchers have suggested that a primary difficulty in 
memory for individuals with AD is an inability to organize information in memory via 
effective retrieval strategies (Findler, 2000).  However, there is conflicting evidence 
regarding the extent and nature of retrieval deficiencies in AD.  Deficiencies in free recall 
are highly prevalent throughout AD while the evidence is mixed regarding the presence 
of a decline in recognition although some researchers suggest that cued recognition offers 
virtually no benefit to individuals with AD (Massman, Delis, Butters, Dupont, & Gillan, 
1992).  Retrieval deficits have been exhibited in both immediate and delayed word recall 
tasks (Overman & Becker, 2004). Still, other authors suggest that individuals with AD 
experience difficulties with both recognition tasks and retrieval tasks supposedly due to 
an inability to successfully consolidate information (Lezak, 1995) and utilize effective 
retrieval strategies (Ramsden et al., 2008).  
Perhaps one of the best representations of the retrieval process in individuals with AD 
is the word-stem completion priming effect in older individuals and individuals with AD.  
The word-stem completion priming effect occurs when individuals study a list of words 
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and are then given word-stems from the list.  People are more likely to respond with a 
word from the previously studied list than another word.  For example, if individuals are 
given the word stem “tru” and the word “trust” was presented in the studied list, it is most 
likely that individuals will complete the word as “trust” instead of other possibilities, 
such as “truck” or “trumpet.” Deficiencies in word-priming are thought to represent an 
underlying deficiency in retrieval (Fleischman et al., 1999).  
Individuals can either be given direct instructions to use the word stem to remember a 
word from the list (explicit instructions) or are simply asked to complete the word stem 
with the first word the comes to mind (implicit instructions).  When explicit instructions 
are used, older individuals typically remember fewer words from the list than younger 
individuals but under implicit instructions there is typically no difference (see Fleischman 
et al., 1999).  Priming in individuals with AD appears to be similar to normal elderly 
when AD is mild, but there is less of a priming effect as dementia severity increases 
(Fleischman et al., 1999).  This is thought to be evidence for a progressive retrieval 
deficit in AD that continues as the disease progresses (Fleischman et al., 1999).  
As mentioned above, memory is not the only impairment that occurs very early in the 
course of AD.  Executive functioning is well established as an early symptom of AD 
(Collette & Van Der Linden, 2004; Salthouse & Becker, 1998) and includes deficiencies 
in inhibition (Overman & Becker, 2004) and attention (Parasuraman, 2004).  Executive 
functioning difficulties have been demonstrated in pre-clinical AD and have been shown 
on a wide variety of measures in early AD, including dual-task paradigms and the Stroop 
test (for a review, see Collette & Van Der Linden, 2004).  Neuropsychological batteries 
have shown deficits in executive functioning in non-diagnosed individuals who 
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eventually develop AD relative to those who do not develop AD (Fabrigoule et al., 1998).  
Deficiencies in executive functioning specifically are suggested to be a factor that 
contributes to the existence of a number of other cognitive deficiencies (Salthouse & 
Becker, 1998).   
Two important cognitive functions that fall under the umbrella of executive 
functioning are attention and inhibition.  Deficits in attention have been established in 
normal aging as well as in AD (Pignatti et al., 2005).  However, normal older individuals 
show no more decrease in comprehension when there is distracting background noise 
than younger individuals (Van Gerven, Meijer, Vermeeren, Vuurman, & Jolles, 2007) 
and often do not exhibit deficiencies in dual-task paradigms compared to younger 
individuals (Baddeley, Bressi, Della Sala, Logie, & Spinnler, 1991).  In individuals with 
AD, attention is affected broadly and is often the first non-memory related cognitive 
function to noticeably decline, even before language deficits (Perry & Hodges, 1999; 
Parasuraman, 2004).  Many researchers feel that the deficiencies in working memory that 
are experienced in individuals with AD are due to problems with attention, making AD 
primarily a disorder of attention (Parasuraman, 2004).  
Attention deficiencies may progress in an ordered manner in AD with attentional 
switching abilities being decreased first and the ability to sustain attention being affected 
last (Norman & Shallice, 1987).  Compared to unimpaired individuals, those with AD 
show a steeper decline in the ability to switch attention in dual-task paradigms when there 
is especially high cognitive demand (Baddeley et al., 1991; Ramsden et al., 2008).  In 
fact, attentional switching seems to be differentially impaired to a greater extent than 
other forms of attention in AD (Ramsden et al., 2008).  This specific difficulty with 
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cognitive functioning and attention in conditions of high cognitive demand is interpreted 
by some as evidence for a decline in general cognitive resources in individuals with AD 
(for a review, see Ramsden et al., 2008).  This suggests that cognitive dysfunction that is 
related to attention will increase as the amount of information that needs to be processed 
and ignored increases.  
Visual-spatial switching is also compromised in AD (for a review, see Findler, 2000).  
Visual-spatial problems with attention in AD have been documented in a variety of ways, 
including visual-spatial attentional shifting, finding objects among similar objects in 
visual search tasks, abnormal eye movements in visual scanning tasks, focusing on small 
parts of the visual field, decreased examination of novel aspects of complex visual 
scenes, and decreased examination of facial expressions that show emotion (for a review, 
see Parasuraman, 2004).  Individuals with AD have difficulty focusing on visual 
information in the periphery of the visual field as well as switching attention to this area, 
especially under conditions that require a high amount of cognitive processing (Norman 
& Shallice, 1987).  Other problems with attention include a reduction in the speed and 
accuracy in letter search tasks that could represent problems with sustained attention in 
individuals with AD (Baddeley et al., 2001) and a relatively difficult time resisting 
distraction in general (see Germano & Kinsella, 2005).  
Inhibition is also compromised in individuals with AD, and is even commonly 
deficient in normal aging (Pignatti et al., 2005).  Deficiencies in the ability to 
successfully perform in dual-task situations in people with AD can be viewed as evidence 
for inhibitory dysfunction (Morris, 1996).  Furthermore, individuals with AD tend to 
make errors of intrusion in memory tasks, suggesting a deficiency in the ability to inhibit 
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incorrect responses (Overman & Becker, 2004; Finlder, 2000).   This suggests that at 
least part of the memory deficit experienced by those with AD is due to deficits in 
inhibition (Overman & Becker, 2004).  Also, although individuals with AD do not seem 
to be distracted by irrelevant background speech at a greater level than normal elderly or 
even younger individuals, when individuals with AD are tested on higher-order cognitive 
processes with the presence of significant irrelevant background speech, they show more 
slowing relative to unimpaired older and younger adults (Van Gerven et al., 2007). Still, 
the exact nature of inhibition difficulties is unclear as conflicting evidence has been 
produced, although problems with interference and semantic inhibition appear to be 
present in most individuals with AD (for a review, see Collette & Van Der Linden, 2004).  
Clearly, because memory is compromised in AD universally, so is the ability to learn.  
The inability to learn new information is a hallmark sign of early AD (for a review, see 
Germano & Kinsella, 2005).  Learning impairments are present in the very early stages of 
AD and continue to decline until they are entirely lost as the disease progresses (Martin, 
Brouwers, Cox, & Fedio, 1985).  These impairments are broad and occur across a wide 
range of modalities (Greene, Baddeley, & Hodges, 1996).  For example, Greene et al. 
(1996) found that individuals with AD exhibited a much flatter learning curve in both 
verbal and visual-spatial information requiring both recognition and recall at delayed and 
immediate intervals compared to older individuals without AD.  This deficit in learning 
appears to be primarily due to encoding deficits at the time of acquisition rather than 
problems with forgetting (for a review, see Germano & Kinsella, 2005).  
Some researchers view the hallmark symptom of episodic memory decline as an 
inability to learn from contextual information at the time of encoding (Germano & 
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Kinsella, 2005).  Impaired learning at acquisition appears to be deficient in the early 
stages of AD (Grober & Kawas, 1997) suggesting substantial encoding deficiencies in 
AD, although the reason for this acquisition deficit is not well understood (Germano & 
Kisella, 2005).  Individuals with AD often do not benefit from repeated learning trials as 
much as younger individuals or normal elderly (Findler, 2000) and repeated trials do not 
benefit normal elderly as much as younger individuals (Lund, 1997).  Deficits in learning 
seem to be largely due to both deficiencies in encoding and an inability to transfer
information from working memory to long-term memory (Findler, 2000).  Verbal 
learning in general seems to decrease with age (Van der Elst, Van Boxtel, Van 
Breukelen, & Jolles, 2005).  
Deficiencies in language are also a common component of AD throughout the disease 
and is also present to a lesser extent in normal aging.  Although many people associate 
AD primarily with difficulties with memory, linguistic problems are perhaps just as 
pervasive while declines in language functioning in the normal elderly population often 
appear insignificant and uncommon (Meguro et al., 2001).  Still, older individuals 
process both written and spoken language more slowly than the general population (Just 
& Carpenter, 1992).  The most common linguistic problem in AD is nominal aphasia, the 
inability to think of a person’s name (Kertesz, 2004; for a review, see Sabat, 1994a), and 
problems writing meaningful letters (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1991).  These three problems 
are typically the first linguistic problems to appear in AD (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1991).  
Nominal aphasia specifically has a clearly progressive pattern that begins early in the 
disease and declines steadily (Cummings & Benson, 1989).  
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There are often four phases of language disturbance in AD:  anomic (or nominal)
aphasia (difficulty naming objects in spite of intact speech fluency), transcortical sensory 
aphasia (poor comprehension despite largely intact speech production), Wernicke’s 
aphasia (difficulty understanding speech and producing meaningful speech), and global 
aphasia (aphasia in most or all domains; Mathews, Obler, & Alber, 1994).  Other 
common linguistic problems include the inability to complete sentences, difficulty with 
reading comprehension, a tendency to produce meaningless sentences (part of 
Wernicke’s aphasia), the inability to spell words correctly (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1991), 
and problems generating word lists that are lexically and categorically related (Barr & 
Brandt, 1996).  Some research shows that spelling problems develop in three ordered 
phases; lexical, then phonological, then peripheral (Lambert, Eustache, & Viader, 1996).  
This is important not only to the initial detection of AD but also may indicate how far 
along the individual may be in the progress of the disease.  Phonological and syntactic 
language functions are often relatively well preserved over the course of AD (for a 
review, see Sabat, 1994a).   
Difficulty with the expression and processing of emotion and anosognosia also occurs 
in AD.  Individuals with AD often have difficulty interpreting non-verbal signals of 
emotion in others, although this is likely due to cognitive declines that are not within the 
affective realm and not a direct compromise of affective processing (Zaitchik & Albert, 
2004).  Anosognosia, or the lack of awareness that one has a neurological disease, is 
common in individuals with AD and varies in degree among individuals (Morris & 
Hannesdottir, 2004).  Anosognosia is especially problematic in AD because individuals 
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cannot alter their potentially dangerous behavior in response to knowledge of the disease 
(Morris & Hannesdottier, 2004).  
Non-cognitive symptoms also appear in AD.  A number of disturbances in motor 
function are possible in AD, although the presentation of these disturbances often differs 
greatly among individuals (Kidron & Freedman, 2004).  Common motor disturbances 
include rigidity, tremors, seizures, motor retardation, disturbances in gait, apraxia, 
agnosia, and difficulties grasping and sucking (Kidron & Freedman, 2004).  Other non-
cognitive symptoms include changes in personality and behavior as well as deficits in the 
ability to perform activities of daily living (Desai & Grossberg, 2005).  The development 
of maladaptive behavior patterns can be especially dangerous for individuals with AD 
and problematic for caregivers (The Dementia Study Group of the Italian Neurological 
Society, 2000).  Psychotic symptoms are also present in a subset of individuals.  Sixteen 
percent of individuals with AD have delusions whereas 10 to 13 percent experience 
hallucinations (Allen & Burns, 1995).  Depression is also present in a majority of 
individuals with AD (Allen & Burns, 1995).   
The overall course of AD is highly variable among individuals.  Typically, 
individuals with AD will lose about 3 to 4 points from their scores on the MMSE for 
every year they have the disease (APA, 2000; Lopez et al., 2002; Hogan & Patterson, 
2002).  However, many researchers have suggested that in between the slow progression 
of AD there are periods of plateau where there is little noticeable cognitive decline.  After 
an initial plateau phase that often occurs after a subtle decline in memory, many 
individuals decrease at a steady rate, although this rate often varies among individuals 
(Haxby, Raffaele, Gillette, Shapiro, & Rapoport, 1992).  Rates of decline can be up to 
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four times different among individuals (Haxby et al., 1992).  There can be a number of 
plateau phases during the course of AD and typically plateaus occur before the decline of 
non-memory cognitive functioning (Haxby et al., 1992).  Although AD progresses 
somewhat idiosyncratically, it typically lasts from 7 to 15 years ending in death 
(Bouchard & Rosser, 1999).  
Symptoms that occur in the later stages of AD often involve a further decrease of 
cognitive abilities on a global scale as well as the presence of emotional difficulties such 
as depression and anxiety (Allen & Burns, 1995).   Psychotic symptoms including 
hallucinations and delusions often occur in the later stages of AD as well (Allen & Burns, 
1995).    
The Neurology of Alzheimer’s Disease   
Neurologically, AD is characterized by the presence of neurofibrillary tangles (made 
of phosphorylated tau protein; Desai & Grossberg, 2005), amyloid plaques (consisting of 
amyloid protein; The Dementia Study Group of the Italian Neurological Society, 2000), 
neuronal degeneration, loss of synapses (Desai & Grossberg, 2005; Gomez-Isla & 
Hyman, 2003; Lopez & Bell, 2004), and abnormalties in amyloid metabolism (Lopez & 
Bell, 2004).  A number of neurotransmitters are also depleted in AD.  These 
neurotransmitters include acetylcholine (AChE), glutamate, noradrenaline, and serotonin 
(Curran, Kopelman, & Rusted, 2004), although the AChE system typically exhibits the 
greatest dysfunction (Desai & Grossberg, 2005).  Depletion in AChE is the most 
consistently depleted neurotransmitter in AD and could be responsible for associated 
amnesia in the disease (Curran et al., 2004).  
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Neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques are considered the neurological 
hallmarks of AD (Citron, 2002) and must be sufficiently present upon autopsy in order to 
verify a diagnosis of AD.  Amyloid plaques are abnormal masses of tissue partially 
composed of amyloid that are present throughout AD as it progresses (Morris, 2004).  
Neurofibrillary tangles are dispersed throughout the brain in AD and are present in 
myriad cortical and subcortical structures that are responsible for cognition and memory 
function (Morris, 2004).  These neurological hallmarks of AD do not appear to exert a 
one-to-one effect on AD symptomatology and can affect the severity of AD differently 
for different people.  Individuals can have these neurological abnormalities without 
exhibiting cognitive or behavioral symptoms of AD (The Dementia Study Group of the 
Italian Neurological Society, 2000).  Fifty to sixty percent of individuals who meet the 
neurological criteria for a diagnosis of AD (i.e., exhibit sufficient neurofibrillary tangles 
and amyloid plaques) show no signs of significant cognitive decline (Desai & Grossberg, 
2005).  It is suggested that the amount of neurofibrillary tangles is correlated to dementia 
severity but that the presence of amyloid plaques does not correlate with severity of AD 
symptoms (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003).  Also, neurofibrillary tangles may be correlated 
with neuronal loss while plaques do not seem to exhibit this correlation (Gomez-Isla & 
Hyman, 2003).  
Inflammatory processes in the brain also occur over the course of AD (Rosenberg, 
2005).  Some researchers believe that inflammation is the key physical process involved 
in the development of AD and its related symptoms. The neuro-inflammatory hypothesis 
of AD states that declines in functioning and dysfunction of the central nervous system 
are due to inflammatory processes in the central nervous system (Rosenberg, 2005).  
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Inflammatory processes have been shown to be related to cognitive and functional 
difficulties in AD (Rosenberg, 2005).  Inflammation appears to be related to the presence 
of amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles and causes neuronal death (Rosenberg, 
2005).  
It appears that the earliest neurological abnormalities associated with AD occur in the 
medial temporal lobe, especially in the hippocampal formation and entorhinal cortex 
(Kato, Knopman, & Liu, 2001; Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003; Overman & Becker, 2004; 
Rosenberg, 2005).  These deficits are thought to be at least partially responsible for 
memory difficulties in AD (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003).  Eventually, the entorhinal 
cortex can exhibit a loss of 70 percent of its neurons (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003). The 
amygdala also typically becomes highly compromised in AD (Morris, 2004).  As AD 
progresses, degeneration spreads to cortical areas (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003; 
Rosenberg, 2005).  Affected cortical areas include the superior temporal sulcus, although 
this region is typically is not compromised until the moderate stages of AD (Gomez-Isla 
& Hyman, 2003).  As AD enters its later stages neuronal atrophy becomes spread 
throughout the brain (Morris, 2004).  
Risk Factors in Alzheimer’s Disease
  A number of risk factors exist for the development of AD, including increasing age, 
a family history of AD, genetic mutations in presenilin-1 and presenilin-2 (which are
related to abnormalities on the metabolic precursor of amyloid), and the existence of the 
apolipoprotein E-4 (APOE) allele (Graff-Radford, 2003).  Further risks include female 
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gender, history of head injury, low education, low intelligence, and small head size 
(Cummings, Vinters, Cole, & Khachaturian, 1998).  
Recently, substantial research has focused on the APOE allele as a risk factor for the 
development of AD.  Risk for the development of AD is increased by the APOE allele 
(Saunders et al., 1993; Bondi et al., 1995), perhaps by increasing the quantity of deposits 
of amyloid in the brain (Cummings et al., 1998).  The APOE allele appears to be the 
biggest risk factor for the development of AD (Leifer, 2003).  Individuals who are 
carriers of the APOE allele develop AD at a 29 percent rate compared to 9 percent for 
individuals who are not carriers of the allele (Cummings & Cole, 2002).    
Cognitive abnormalities can sometimes be observed in non-demented individuals 
with the APOE allele.  Individuals with the APOE allele have shown varied scores on 
tests of verbal and visual-spatial ability with some individuals exhibiting deficiencies in 
verbal processing while others exhibit deficiencies in visual-spatial processing (Jacobson, 
Delis, Bondi, & Salmon, 2005).  This suggests that individuals with the APOE allele may 
constitute two subgroups that have different deficits in verbal and non-verbal attention 
(Jacobson, et al, 2005) as well as in verbal and non-verbal learning and memory 
(Jacobson et al., 2005).  This finding is consistent with neurological studies that have 
suggested asymmetrical hemispheric degradation in individuals with the APOE allele and 
inconsistent findings regarding the presence of memory deficits in individuals with the 
APOE allele (Jacobson et al., 2005).  Further neurological abnormalities can be observed 
in non-demented individuals with the APOE allele.  An increase in hippocampal activity 
during memory tasks has been observed in non-demented carriers of the APOE allele 
(Dickerson et al., 2005).   Non-demented carriers of the APOE allele also perform worse 
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on tests of episodic memory than do individuals who do not have the APOE allele (Bondi 
et al., 1995).  This difficulty in episodic memory appears to reflect ineffective cognitive 
organization when trying to learn new information (Bondi et al., 1995).  Difficulties in 
executive functioning are also exhibited in non-demented APOE carriers, such as 
difficulties with divided attention (Rosen, Bergeson, Putnam, Hawell, & Sunderland, 
2002), inhibition, and switching attention (Wetter et al., 2005).  Also, individuals with the 
APOE allele exhibit deficiencies in working memory before dementia has developed 
(Parasuraman, Greenwood, & Sunderland, 2002).
Pre-Clinical Alzheimer’s Disease
AD progresses gradually; recently research has focused on potential transitional 
stages between normal aging and AD (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003).  Substantial 
research has focused on individuals in the preclinical stages of AD (i.e., individuals with 
subtle cognitive and/or behavioral abnormalities who do not yet exhibit AD 
symptomatology but who will eventually develop AD; Small, Herlitz, & Backman, 
2004).  Deficits are seen consistently 2 to 3 years before the development of clinically 
diagnosable AD (Small et al., 2004) and up to 50 years before diagnosis (Snowden et al., 
1996) and exist in multiple cognitive and linguistic domains (Backman et al., 2005).  A 
meta-analysis of studies assessing preclinical cognitive changes in those who would 
eventually go on to develop AD indicated that there is a global decline in cognitive 
functioning (Backman et al., 2005).  Large deficiencies in individuals with preclinical 
AD appeared in the realms of episodic memory, executive functioning and perceptual 
speed whereas moderate deficiencies were found in visual-spatial skill and attention 
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(Backman et al., 2005).  Likewise, factor analysis of the Personnes Ages Quid study 
suggested that deficits in a general cognitive factor were associated with the development 
of dementia 2 years later (Fabriogoule et al., 1998).     
Although there are a number of cognitive deficits associated with preclinical AD, the 
most apparent deficit is a dysfunction in both verbal and non-verbal episodic memory 
(Small et al., 2004; Backman, Small, & Fratiglioni, 2001).  Specifically, individuals with 
AD or those who are in the preclinical stages of AD appear to have difficulty transferring 
episodic information from short-term storage to long-term storage (Backman & Small, 
1998), although the increased ability of individuals with AD to recognize information 
relative to freely recalling information suggests a retrieval deficit as well (Jacoby, Toth, 
& Yonelinas, 1993).  The Bronx Aging Study also showed that individuals who went on 
to develop AD exhibited difficulties in both episodic memory and verbal fluency 2 years 
before development of the disease (Masur, Sliwinski, Lipton, Blau, & Crystal, 1994).  
Tests that assess episodic memory function, such as the Wechsler Memory Scale 
(associative learning;Wechsler, 1945), the Benton Visual Retention Test (Benton, 1963), 
the Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Vakil & Blachstein, 1993), as well as a number of 
word-list and picture recall tests may be especially effective in identifying individuals 
who are at risk for AD as episodic memory problems are often the earliest identifiable 
symptoms of AD (Small, Herlitz, Fratiglioni, Almkvist, & Backman, 2000).  
Other deficiencies are apparent in preclinical AD.  In one study low scores on global 
cognitive performance, short-term visual memory, and abstract reasoning were predictive 
of the eventual development of dementia up to 3 years before clinical symptoms emerged 
(Fabriogoule, Lafont, Letenneur, Rouch, & Dartigues, 1996).  Dysfunction in attentional 
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processes may also be present in early and preclinical AD (Parasuraman, 2004).  This 
attentional dysfunction may be due in part to problems with executive functioning, as 
difficulties with this area are common in preclinical AD (Fabrigoule et al., 1998).  Also, 
as is the case with individuals at risk for AD via the presence of the APOE allele, a 
number of studies have shown that preclinical AD may be characterized by discrepancies 
between measures of verbal and non-verbal cognitive function. Individuals in the 
preclinical stage of AD have shown substantially different scores on tests of verbal and 
visual-spatial ability (Jacobson, Delis, Bondi, & Salmon, 2002).    
Behavioral abnormalities can also be seen in individuals with preclinical AD.  
Individuals who eventually develop AD and related dementias appear to exhibit changes 
in their daily living activities such as shopping, taking care of finances, and using the 
telephone well before a diagnosis of dementia can be reached and before standardized 
tests could detect any cognitive or behavioral changes (Nygard, 2003).  Emotional and 
personality abnormalities may also act as an indicator of the eventual development of 
AD.  Individuals in the preclinical stages of AD appear to exhibit more depressive 
symptoms than others up to 3 years before diagnosis, especially symptoms that are 
related to motivational disturbances, such as anhedonia, and decreases in energy and 
concentration (Berger, Fratiglioni, Forsell, Winblad, & Backman, 1999).  Furthermore, 
individuals with preclinical AD may also exhibit anxiety, social withdrawal, introversion, 
self-centeredness, agitation, and apathy in very mild forms of AD when cognitive decline 
is difficult to detect (for a review, see Cummings, 2003).  
Scores on the MMSE seem to be slightly decreased in individuals with preclinical AD 
as compared to those who do not go on to develop AD (Berger et al., 1999).  One study 
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has shown that differences in the MMSE can be observed up to 6 years before the 
diagnosis of AD (Small, Fratiglioni, Viitanen, Winblad, & Backman, 2000).  
Furthermore, if individuals in the preclinical stages of AD report memory loss, perform
poorly on tests of cognitive functioning (such as the MMSE), and perform poorly on 
neuropsychological tests there is an 85 percent change that these individuals will develop 
AD within 3 years (Palmer, Backman, Winblad, & Fratiglioni, 2003).  However, there 
does appear to be a great deal of variability among individuals with preclinical AD 
regarding both rate and pattern of decline (Backman et al., 2005).  
Mild Cognitive Impairment  
Recent research has also focused on Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI).  MCI has 
been thought of as a possible precursor to the development of AD and a possible 
beginning point for the treatment of AD (Desai & Grossberg, 2005).  MCI has been 
conceptualized and called many different things, including incipient dementia, prodromal 
AD, and isolated memory impairment (Petersen & Morris, 2003).  MCI differs from 
preclinical AD in that preclinical AD does not necessarily encompass a noticeable 
cognitive impairment whereas MCI does involve a noticeable cognitive impairment.  
MCI is diagnosed if individuals have no loss in function, do not meet the criteria for 
dementia, but have scores on tests of memory that are more than one standard deviation 
lower than the norm (Desai & Grossberg, 2005).  
There appear to be three types of MCI: amnestic MCI, which includes a subjective 
memory problem and typically progresses to AD; multiple-domain MCI, which involves 
slight deficiencies in memory as well as non-memory domains (e.g. language, executive 
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function, activities of daily living, etc.); and single non-memory domain MCI, that 
manifests as a single non-memory related cognitive dysfunction (Petersen, 2003).  The 
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) refers to “age-related cognitive decline” (780.9), a condition 
similar to MCI that is a cognitive impairment not due to another condition that is 
objectively tested and typically includes subjective memory complaints.  An objective, 
universal definition of MCI has not yet been established, although it often includes 
subjective memory complaints, normal global cognitive functioning relative to age, 
maintenance of ability to perform tasks of daily living, and absence of dementia 
(Petersen, 2003; Petersen & Morris, 2003). 
AD is sometimes conceptualized as representing the end point on a continuum of 
aging, whereas other times it is thought of as being a separate disease that is not related to 
normal aging (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003).  MCI is often conceptualized on this 
continuum as a transitional phase between normal aging and AD (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 
2003; Petersen & Morris, 2003; Petersen, 2003).  A large proportion of individuals with 
MCI eventually are diagnosed with AD.  Approximately ten percent of individuals with 
MCI are diagnosed with AD every year compared to one to two percent of non-MCI 
individuals (Petersen et al., 1999).  Within 6 years, approximately 80 percent of 
individuals with MCI meet the clinical criteria for a diagnosis of dementia (Petersen et 
al., 2001).  
Neurological abnormalities can be observed in individuals with MCI.      Individuals 
with MCI exhibit a substantial (32 percent) loss of neurons in the entorhinal cortex, a 
structure that is very often compromised early in AD and throughout the progression of 
the disease (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003).  Individuals with MCI also have a tendency to 
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exhibit neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003).  
Individuals with MCI show increased hippocampal activation during memory tests, 
whereas individuals with AD show decreased activation (Dickerson et al., 2005).   This 
increased activation may represent the need to employ more coping strategies in order to 
execute successful memory (Dickerson et al., 2005).   
Still, it is often very difficult to distinguish between individuals in the very early 
stages of AD (i.e., preclinical AD and MCI) and normal adults (Morris & Becker, 
2004b).  Aside from obvious diagnostic and treatment issues that this raises, another 
implication is that it hinders effective research of AD.  Many studies of AD involve 
comparing a group of AD patients to a control group of “normal” adults on some 
objective measure and comparing the differences between the two groups.  However, it is 
estimated that up to 20 percent of older individuals in the “normal” adult control groups 
may be in the early stages of AD (Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998).  This obviously has 
major implications for the effective study of AD.      
Diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease
As treatments are being developed, interest in diagnosing AD in its earliest stages has 
increased (Frodl et al., 2002).  Recognizing AD in its earliest possible stages has become 
more important in recent years due to the development of interventions, especially 
pharmacological interventions, that are best utilized in the earliest stages of the disease 
(Wetter et al., 2005; Desai & Grossberg, 2005; Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003; Petersen & 
Morris, 2003; Cummings, 2003; Mohr, Dastoor, & Claus, 1999; Frodl et al., 2002; Morris 
& Becker, 2004b; Parasuraman, 2004; Leifer, 2003).  Effective early diagnosis and 
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discovery of the cause of AD may allow for reversal of the disease and limit emotional 
distress of individuals with AD and their loved ones (Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986; Leifer, 
2003).  For example, loved ones of individuals with AD often sense that something is 
wrong but are not aware why their spouses, parents, and siblings with AD are prone to 
emotional outbursts, intellectual confusion, and dangerous behavior (Cohen & Eisdorfer, 
1986).    Also, early and accurate detection allows for a more accurate prognosis, more 
timely education of patients and their loved ones and care givers, and appropriate 
planning for future care (Ikeda, 2004; Leifer, 2003).  
Although the ability to make a successful diagnosis has improved in recent decades, 
effective early diagnosis is still difficult (Lopez et al., 2000; Cummings & Khachaturian, 
1999; Miller, 2004).  AD cannot be officially diagnosed until autopsy because the 
presence of neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques must be confirmed before the 
nature of the individual’s dementia can be known for certain (The Dementia Study Group 
of the Italian Neurological Society, 2000), but preliminary diagnoses can be made.  Still, 
there are no objectively defined cut-off scores for AD in contemporary diagnostic 
systems (Petersen & Morris, 2003), there is no assessment tool that can provide a 
definitive diagnosis of AD (Sabat, 2001; Hannesdottir & Snaedel, 2002; Miller, 2004),
and the criteria for an inclusion diagnosis of AD have never been operationalized (Lopez 
et al., 2000).  Furthermore, there are no biological markers that allow for a definitive 
diagnosis of AD (The Dementia Study Group of the Italian Neurological Society, 2000).  
This is the biggest hurdle to accurate diagnosis (Gray & Della Sala, 2004).  The subtle 
early symptoms and insidious onset that characterizes the early progress of AD also 
makes early diagnosis difficult (Leifer, 2003).  
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Another issue in the early detection of AD is that the course and presentation of AD is 
highly variable both within and among individuals and is often unpredictable (Haxby et 
al., 1992).  In general, the presentation and course of AD is highly heterogeneous 
(Bouchard & Rosser, 1999; Lopez et al., 2000).  For example, different people will 
exhibit different symptomatology in the early stages of the disease and this 
symptomatology will progress and change in different ways and at different rates 
(Bouchard & Rosser, 1999).  Furthermore, the neurological abnormalities associated with 
individuals with AD can be highly variable (Lopez, 2000).  Functioning can change 
noticeably even on an hourly basis (Sabat, 2001).  
People in the early stages of AD often show little or no decline after an initial small 
decline, making AD hard to detect well after a slight decline is in place. Often the disease 
may have to progress to the intermediate stages before deterioration is obvious (Bouchard 
& Rosser, 1999).  Individuals in these early stages of AD often perform relatively 
normally on tests of general cognitive function for up to 35 months after disease 
symptomatology has begun (Haxby et al., 1992).  This plateau stage includes scores on 
the WAIS, which suggests that in the early stages of AD non-memory cognitive function 
associated with IQ remains constant during an initial decrease in memory ability (Haxby 
et al., 1992).  This makes AD especially difficult to detect in its early stages.    
It is also possible that individuals can hide this initial decline by utilizing coping 
skills that have the potential to mask the effects of AD for some time after the initial 
cognitive symptoms appear (Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986).  Hence, although an individual 
with AD may experience many of the initial cognitive declines associated with the 
disease, the use of coping mechanisms makes it difficult for others, whether family 
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members, loved ones, or clinicians, to detect.  Many individuals with AD report that they 
were effectively able to disguise their cognitive decline well after they knew there was a 
decline (Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986).  Individuals with AD report using strategies such as 
talking less, writing reminders, and limiting activities to those that were easily performed 
(Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986).  External cues such as notes and reminders appear to be the 
most effective compensatory techniques used by individuals with AD (Wilson & Hughes, 
2001).  As AD progresses, individuals often rely increasingly on others as coping 
mechanisms to provide memory cues (Dixon, Hopp, Cohen, de Frias, & Backman, 2003). 
A number of other factors can make diagnosis difficult and inaccurate.  For example,
symptoms of psychosis, aphasia, mental retardation, low education level, and language 
differences between the assessor and the individual with AD can all lead to a false 
positive diagnosis of AD (Canadian Consensus Conference, 1991).  AD affects elderly 
individuals almost exclusively and because older individuals are at high risk for a number 
of other physical, psychological, and sensory problems and also often experience side 
effects of medication, it is frequently difficult to gain an accurate psychological 
assessment of elderly individuals, especially if pre-morbid functioning cannot be 
accurately assessed (Miller, 2004).  Assessment instruments also present a problem in 
diagnosing AD as many standard cognitive assessments are not satisfactorily normed on 
extremely old populations (Miller, 2004).  Unfortunately, cognitive assessment tools have 
not been developed that are specifically designed for use in an elderly population (Miller, 
2004).  Due to all of these difficulties, the diagnosis of AD must rely heavily on clinical 
judgment (Petersen & Morris, 2003).  
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Recent studies have suggested clinical diagnostic accuracy rates of up to 
approximately 90 percent (Salmon et al., 2002; Graff-Radford, 2003; Cummings & 
Khachaturian, 1999).  Nevertheless, AD still often goes undetected until the moderate or 
late stages of the disease.  Between 24 and 72 percent of primary care physicians fail to 
diagnose AD when it is present (Leifer, 2003).  Many times mild or moderate cases will 
not be recognized upon admission to general medical hospitals (Cairns, Evans, & Prince, 
2004). Still, a wave of recent research in AD has led to a substantial increase in the 
reliability of diagnostic criteria of AD as well as increased diagnostic accuracy (Desai & 
Grossberg, 2005).  
Accurate diagnosis of AD typically involves many steps.  First, it is important that the 
individual’s pre-dementia intellectual functioning is established before assessment takes 
place (Morris, 2004).  The best tool to achieve this is the New Adult Reading Test 
(NART) (Morris, 2004) developed by Nelson and O’Connell (1978).  This test requires 
individuals to read familiar words, a task that is considered to be unaffected in 
individuals with AD (Nelson & O’Connell, 1978) and therefore useful for establishing 
some level of pre-dementia intellectual functioning.  A clinical interview and a thorough 
history are typically the next steps in the diagnosis of AD (Weiner, 1991; Leifer, 2003).  
Assessing onset of symptomatology, duration of symptoms, progress of symptoms, 
current medications during the clinical interview as well as performing a neurological 
evaluation are very important in accurately diagnosing AD as well (Duncan & Siegal, 
1998).  After the interview, the assessment process typically includes tests of at least 
memory, language, and one other area of cognitive function (Miller, 2004).  If an 
assessment battery tests memory, language, and another area of cognitive function and no 
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signs of dementia are revealed, then further testing typically does not add any useful 
information (Miller, 2004).  Because AD affects cognitive functioning in such a global 
way, a test of almost any domain of cognitive function can add to the diagnosis of AD 
(Miller, 2004).  Tests of memory are often the most useful in diagnosing AD, especially 
in the early stages of the disease, although accurate diagnosis of AD requires a 
comprehensive assessment (Miller, 2004).  Because language difficulties are also 
common in AD in early stages of the disease, tests of language function can be used to 
aid in the diagnosis of AD (Weiner, 1991; Miller, 2004).  A number of other areas may 
be assessed, including reading, writing, abstract thinking, judgment, and motor 
coordination (Weiner, 1991).  Office-based assessments ideally have been normed on 
extremely elderly populations (although many have not been) and typically consist of 20
to 30 questions that focus on basic cognitive functioning (Miller, 2004).  Finally, basic 
cognitive functioning is explored using the most basic questions about one’s self, 
common knowledge, and simple tests of memory (Miller, 2004).
A number of tests exist that attempt to quantify dementia.  The most commonly used 
include the MMSE, Global Deterioration Scale, Blessed Dementia Scale, Washington 
University Clinical Dementia Rating, Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, Sandoz Clinical 
Assessment-Geriatric Scale, and Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale (Weiner, 1991). 
The Wechsler Memory Scale is the most commonly used assessment for evaluating 
memory function in AD (Miller, 2004).  
The most used screening test (and “gold standard” for other screening tests) for AD is 
the MMSE (Miller, 2004; Leifer, 2003), developed by Folstein, Folstein, and McHugh 
(1975).  Although the MMSE is the most widely used instrument for screening for early 
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AD, it is not very sensitive when used by itself in diagnosing mild cases of AD (Leifer, 
2003) and it has a tendency to produce false positives and cannot be used alone to 
diagnose AD reliably (Miller, 2004).  False-positive diagnoses are the most common 
error made in assessing dementia in general (Miller, 2004). Scores below 23 out of 30 for 
individuals with a high school education on the MMSE are often indicative of the 
presence of dementia, while the same is true of individuals with a score of 18 or below 
who have an eighth grade education (Weiner, 1991).  
The Global Deterioration Scale (GDS) may also be used to diagnose AD and track its 
severity (Reisberg, Ferris, De Leon, & Crook, 1982).  The GDS rates individuals on 
seven levels of cognitive decline: none, very mild, mild, moderate, moderately severe, 
severe, and very severe (Reisberg et al., 1982).  Therefore, the GDS is not only useful for 
the diagnosis of AD, but also useful for tracking its progress (Reisberg et al., 1982).  This 
scale utilizes a clinical interview, the WAIS, and the MMSE in order to give patients the 
appropriate rating of cognitive decline (Reisberg et al., 1982).  A score of 3 (mild) often 
indicates preclinical AD or the presence of MCI (Petersen, 2003).  The Blessed Dementia 
Scale (BDS; Blessed, Tomlinson, & Roth, 1968) assesses general knowledge, 
concentration, and memory.  The BDS also contains questions relating to activities of 
daily living, changes in affect and habits, and personality.  The items consist of various 
difficulties that individuals with dementia might have, such as inability to remember a 
short list of items.  Patients or their caregivers either rate if this difficulty occurs never, 
occasionally, or daily or mark if the difficulty is present or absent. The Washington 
University Clinical Dementia Rating Scale (CDR) quantifies AD severity via interview 
(Hughes, Berg, Danziger, Coben, & Martin, 1982).  This instrument measures 
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functioning in six domains: memory, orientation, judgment and problem solving, home 
and hobbies, community affairs, and personal care (Hughes et al., 1982).  Each domain 
receives a rating of either none, questionable, mild, moderate, and severe regarding the 
presence of dementia (Hughes et al., 1982).  The CDR also yields a general score to 
reflect overall dementia (Hughes et al., 1982).  Scores of questionable dementia may 
reflect the presence of a preclinical form of dementia (Petersen, 2003).  The Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale (Overall & Gorham, 1962) is one of the most widely used 
instruments in psychiatric research.  It was originally 16 items, but was expanded to 18 
shortly after its development (Burger et al., 1997).  This scale assesses five major areas:  
thinking disorder, withdrawal, anxiety-depression, hostility-suspicion, and activity 
(Burger et al., 1997).  The Sandoz Clinical Assessment-Geriatric Scale is a rating scale 
that consists of 18 items (Patin, Hamot, & Singer, 1984).  Each item falls into one of four 
categories: cognitive impairment, behavioral impairment, somatic complaints, and
negative mood (Patin et al., 1984).  The items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale with one 
representing no dysfunction and seven representing severe dysfunction (Patin et al., 
1984).  The Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale (Rosen, Mohs, & Davis, 1984) 
evaluates dementia severity in both cognitive and non-cognitive realms.  The cognitive 
portion of the test is assessed using traditional testing procedures while the non-cognitive 
items are assessed via behavioral observation (Rosen et al., 1984).  It consists of 21 items 
that are rated on a 0 to 5 scale, 0 indicating absence of dysfunction and 5 indicating 
severe dysfunction (Rosen et al., 1984). Some researchers support the use of the WAIS as 
a complementary tool to the diagnosis of AD (Larue & Jarvick, 1980; Reisberg et al., 
38
1982), although some feel that it lacks sensitivity in detecting AD (Miller, 2004; Haxby 
et al., 1992).  
It is important that not only cognitive tests of AD are used and investigated; 
biological, neurophysiological, and neuroimaging techniques are investigated and should 
be used in the diagnosis of AD as well (Frodl et al., 2002).  New techniques include MRI-
volumetric measurement, biological correlates to AD found in cerebrospinal fluid, 
genetic testing for the APOE allele, and a variety of cognitive measurements (Frodl et al., 
2002).  Furthermore, the finding that certain characteristics of specific event-related 
potentials are different in those with AD and those who eventually develop AD compared 
to others (i.e., controls and those with MCI) has opened this area as a potential diagnostic 
avenue (Frodl et al., 2002).  Positron emission tomography (PET) is a relatively 
noninvasive procedure that could potentially aid in the diagnosis of AD.  PET measures 
the metabolic rate of cerebral glucose.  Individuals with AD sometimes have reduced 
metabolism of cerebral glucose in parts of the parietal and temporal and this pattern is 
sometimes observable well before AD can be diagnosed (Leifer, 2003).  
Differential diagnosis between AD and other dementias is often problematic as well.  
Vascular Dementia (VaD) is the second leading cause of dementia and is difficult to 
distinguish from AD due to general cognitive similarities between the two diseases 
(Misciagna et al., 2005).  While there may be some differences in the presentation of 
different types of dementia, differential diagnosis among these dementias remains very 
unreliable due to the overall similarity in dementia presentation and the heterogeneity of 
presentation among individuals with all forms of dementia (Miller, 2004). 
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Psychopharmacological Interventions
As the incidence of AD increases, so too does the effort to develop effective 
pharmacological treatments for AD (Lopez & Bell, 2004).  Although there are no cures 
for AD, there are a number of psychopharmacological treatments for the disorder.  These 
treatments have a number of potential benefits, including delaying the onset of AD, 
reducing the symptoms of AD, and aiding in helping in the biological difficulties 
associated with AD (Allen & Burns, 1995).  Specifically, acetylcholinesterase inhibitors 
(AChEIs)  appear not only to have beneficial effects in the cognitive realm for people 
with AD, but also can elicit improvements and/or stabilization in activities of daily living, 
behavioral disturbances, and delay in placement in nursing homes (Standridge, 2004).  
For example, Lopez et al. (2002) found that AChEIs may delay the deterioration of the 
ability to live independently.  In their study, 40 percent of people with AD who were 
untreated had been admitted to a nursing home after their study had begun whereas only 
six percent of patients treated with AChEIs had entered a nursing home during the same 
three year period (Lopez et al., 2002).  
Deficits and abnormalities in AChE neurons is a hallmark of AD and continue to 
worsen throughout the progress of the disease (Geula, 1998).  Individuals with AD can 
experience a 50 percent reduction of AChE (Carlsson, 1983).  These deficits are expected 
in AD as AChE is linked to memory function and memory function is severely impaired 
in individuals with AD.  AChE deficits are especially dramatic in the hippocampus and 
neocortex, key areas that influence memory, executive functioning, and various 
behavioral and emotional responses. (Ballard, 2002).  Abnormalities in AChE are 
associated with both the formation of amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles, the 
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neurological hallmarks of AD (Hogan & Patterson, 2002; Wright, Geula, & Mesulam, 
1993).  Hence, medications that increase the presence of the AChE in the brains of 
individuals with AD can help aid in many of the cognitive deficits associated with the 
disease (Hogan & Patterson, 2002).   
Currently, AChEIs are the most effective pharmacological treatment for AD and work 
by increasing the presence of AChE in the individuals with AD (Hogan & Patterson, 
2002; Ballard, 2002; Whitehouse, 1997; Allen & Burns, 1995).  AChEIs effectively 
increase the amount of AChE in the synapses of those with AD (Hogan & Patterson, 
2002; Leifer, 2003) by decreasing the rate that AChE is broken down in the synapse 
(Johanssen, 2004) by acetylcholinesterase (Hogan & Patterson, 2002). AChEIs were the 
first medications approved for the psychopharmacological treatment of AD by the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (Lopez et al., 2002; Leifer, 2003).  These 
medications are typically used as the first line of treatment for AD (Lopez et al., 2002).     
Currently there are three different types of AChEIs that are used for treatment of AD, 
rivastigmine, donepezil, and galantamine (Johannsen, 2004; Rosenberg, 2005).  These 
medications have similar global effectiveness and side effect profiles (Hogan & 
Patterson, 2002; Ballard, 2002).    These drugs have been shown to slow the degradation 
of global functioning, cognitive functioning, activities of daily living, and behavioral 
problems associated with AD (Johannsen, 2004).  The side effects include nausea, 
vomiting, diarrhea, muscle cramps, abdominal pain, dizziness, insomnia, and weight loss 
(Hogan & Patterson, 2002).  While these drugs do not reverse the progress of AD they 
can elicit some improvement in the early stages of treatment (Johannsen, 2004; Desai & 
Grossberg, 2005).  Unfortunately, not everyone with AD experiences benefits from these 
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medications, and those who do not respond cannot be reliably identified (Hogan & 
Patterson, 2002).  
Typically, these medications are most effective for individuals with mild to moderate 
AD and are typically prescribed for individuals only in these stages (Johannsen, 2004; 
Ballard, 2002) although they may have longer lasting effects that could benefit 
individuals in the more severe stages of AD (Lopez et al., 2002; Johannsen, 2004).  The 
beneficial effects of these drugs appear to sustain themselves for more than 5 years 
(Johannsen, 2004).  It is recommended that AChEIs be continued in patients with AD for 
at least 1 to 2 years before there is consideration of discontinuing the medications in 
order to ensure that the medications are not having a beneficial effect (Johannsen, 2004).  
Although monitoring the effectiveness of AChEIs is important to decisions regarding 
the continuation of pharmacotherapy it is difficult to track these drugs’ effects.      The 
MMSE is typically used to assess the effectiveness of pharmacotherapy slowing these 
declines (Johannesen, 2004).  However, the MMSE does not assess a number of areas 
that may receive benefits from medication, such as affect and activities of daily living 
(Johannsen, 2004).  Because AChEIs seem to produce benefits in a number of realms, a 
cognitive assessment such as the MMSE should not be used alone in the assessment of 
these drugs’ effectiveness.  Measures of everyday function and behavior should be used 
in conjunction with cognitive tests to monitor drug effectiveness in AD as AChEIs aid in 
slowing decline in these areas as well (Hogan & Patterson, 2002).  Also, the MMSE may 
not be able to detect subtle improvements that may be occurring due to the therapy 
(Hogan & Patterson, 2002).  However, because there is typically a 3.3 point decline 
annually on the MMSE, although this rate of decline is variable both within and among 
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individuals with AD that are untreated (Haxby et al., 1992), a lesser decline or no decline 
at all in individuals receiving pharmacotherapy would suggest effectiveness of the 
medication (APA, 2000; Lopez et al., 2002; Hogan & Patterson, 2002).  AChEIs have 
been shown to decrease the rate of decline on the MMSE.  Lopez et al. (2002) found an 
average decline of 2.5 points per year in those who were taking AChEIs as compared to 
the typical 3.3 point decline. Therefore, although the subtle effects of these drugs on the 
course of AD may be difficult to track, the global effectiveness of these drugs can be 
consistently monitored.   
AChEIs are not the only form of pharmacotherapy available to individuals with AD.  
AChEIs may also be used in combination with drugs such as memantine, an N-methyl-d-
aspartate stimulator.  Memantine by itself has been shown to slow the deterioration of 
both cognitive and behavioral functions (Desai & Grossberg, 2005) and when used in 
combination with AChEIs may be more beneficial than AChEIs alone (Standridge, 
2004).  Another line of pharmacotherapy is the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs 
(NSAIDs).  These drugs are anti-inflammatory drugs (such as aspirin) that appear to 
provide some protection against the development of AD (McGeer & McGeer, 2001; 
Rosenberg, 2005) as inflammatory processes in the central nervous system are associated 
with AD and neuronal death (Rosenberg, 2005).  However, the effectiveness of these 
drugs has not been confirmed by prospective studies (Desai & Grossberg, 2005).  It has 
also been suggested that inhibiting the production of butyrylcholinesterase (BuChE) as it 
is a substrate for AChE and increases over the course of AD may be worthwhile as a 
focus of pharmacotherapy (Ballard, 2002).  Medications that inhibit BuChE include 
cymserine, bisnorcymserine, and phenethylcymserine (Ballard, 2002).  Rivastigmine 
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inhibits both acetylcholinesterase and BuChE and may therefore be more effective than 
medications that inhibit either acetylcholinesterase or BuChE alone, although this claim 
has not yet been substantiated (Ballard, 2002). 
Other medications used to treat AD include neuroleptic and non-neuroleptic drugs for 
abnormal behavior associated with AD, antipsychotic medication for cognitive 
deficiencies, and benzodiazepines (Lopez & Becker, 2004).  MAOI’s and SSRI’s also 
have been used in the treatment of AD (Allen & Burns, 1995).  Vitamin E has been 
investigated as a possible treatment for AD due to its antioxidant properties.  Results on 
the efficacy of this treatment have been mixed, although vitamin E does have the 
advantage of being a safe and low cost treatment (see Leifer, 2003 for a review).  The 
American Psychiatric Association recommends pharmacological treatment for AD that is 
both individualized and multimodal (American Psychiatric Association, 2002). 
Non-pharmacological Interventions
Although psychopharmacological treatments for AD are the first line of treatment for 
the disease, psychological and behavioral interventions are important as well (Desai & 
Grossberg, 2005).  Psychotherapy of individuals with AD is a relatively recent 
phenomenon as researchers and clinicians have been very pessimistic regarding the 
ability of individuals with AD to retain information needed to benefit from psychotherapy 
(Davis, 2005).  In 1989, Riley noted that caregivers were typically the identified patient 
in cases of AD rather than the individuals with AD.  By focusing only on behavioral 
management, as psychosocial interventions for individuals with AD typically do, there is 
the danger of ignoring phenomenological aspects of the disease (Riley, 1989).  
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Psychotherapy itself is controversial in the context of dementia due largely to clients’
inability to remember information from session to session (Frazer, 2000), although it may 
be dangerous to presume that gains cannot be made in psychotherapy for this reason 
(Riley, 1989).  
One difficulty with using non-pharmacological interventions is that, due to 
difficulties in executive functioning, individuals with AD have difficulty implementing 
strategies that are designed to help them (Rusted & Clare, 2004).  Furthermore, the 
existence of anosognosia can greatly hinder the effectiveness of non-pharmacological 
treatments in AD (Cotrell, 1997).  Still, because there is often a “disability gap” 
(individuals with AD often exhibit greater dysfunction than is warranted by their 
neurobiological abnormalities), environmental factors are important to the functioning of 
individuals with AD (Bowlby Sifton, 2000).  A major goal of non-pharmacological 
interventions in AD is to reduce this gap (Bowlby Sifton, 2000).  
Unfortunately, few non-pharmacological treatments for AD have undergone 
randomized clinical trials to establish the efficacy of these treatments (Rabins, 2000).  
The efficacy of non-pharmacological treatments is based on case studies, naturalistic 
observation, and single-blind studies rather than randomized clinical trials (Rabins, 
2000).  A review by the American Psychiatric Association found no evidence for 
improvement in cognitive functioning via non-pharmacological therapies (Rabins, 2000).  
The same review suggested that some non-pharmacological therapies may be somewhat 
efficacious in treating non-cognitive, behavioral symptoms.  These therapies include 
music therapy, pet therapy, activity therapy, and regularly scheduled activity (Rabins, 
2000).  This review also suggested that a supportive, structured environment that engages 
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individuals with dementia in frequent physical and mental activities is more helpful than 
classic talk therapy.  
Everyday intervention with AD is largely environmental in nature.  Focus on 
activities of daily living, safety, caregiver issues, access to appropriate community 
resources, and psychoeducation are all key components of any intervention strategy 
designed to treat AD (Whitehouse, Mayeux, & Growden, 1989).  Simple reminders are a 
key component of memory loss intervention (Frazer, 2000).  Also, removing potentially 
dangerous objects and replacing them with safer things is also important.  For example, 
instead of having a stove, the individual with AD may have a microwave or a toaster 
oven (Frazer, 2000).  Environments of individuals with AD should match the severity of 
the dementia and provide relatively easy functioning within that environment (Chafetz, 
1991).  A number of principles of environmental construction can be used to aid 
individuals with AD and dementia (for a review, see Chafetz, 1991).  These are 
simplification of the environment (e.g. removing things that are unnecessary, making 
simple floor plans that are preferably only one level, etc.) while maintaining an 
appropriately stimulating environment, easy access to things needed for everyday living, 
protection from potentially dangerous objects and situations, providing access to safe 
outdoor environments, safe and easy to use furniture, limiting excess noise and light, and 
making locations within the environment as easy to identify as possible.  Pynoos and 
Regnier (1991) presented 12 guidelines for setting up the physical environments of 
individuals with AD to aid in their functioning including having written schedules, 
providing specific steps for everyday activities, using pictures to remind of the functions 
of different everyday objects, controlling the individual’s level of stimulation, adhering to 
46
a routine schedule, limiting challenging activities to appropriate levels with regard to the 
individuals abilities and frustration tolerance, limiting novel experiences, and using 
medication reminders.  
Treatment of AD often focuses on treating memory problems rather than emotional 
problems surrounding the disease. There are many simple things that caregivers can do to 
aid memory of individuals with AD.  These include maintaining a consistent schedule for 
the individual with AD, providing visual reminders of activities for the day, using notes, 
labeling objects either with words or pictures depending on the individual’s abilities, and 
using short sentences when communicating (Mace & Rabins, 1991).  Camp, Foss, 
O’Hanlon, and Stevens (1996) utilized spaced retrieval to aid individuals with AD reduce 
difficulties with memory and time orientation by involving implicit memory functions 
that are relatively maintained in AD. Spaced-retrieval involves teaching an individual a 
piece of information, then repeatedly questioning them about that information.  Each time 
the individual is successful remembering the information upon inquiry, the time between 
inquiries increases (Camp et al., 1996).  
Arkin (2001) helped individuals with AD improve biographical memory by having 
them repeatedly listen to audiotapes the stated facts about their life history.  Other 
treatments may involve memory exercises such as practicing digit span and reviewing 
biographical and geographical information (Fernandez, Manoiloff, & Monti, 2006).  
Because difficulties in encoding seem to be at the heart of the memory difficulties 
associated with AD, interventions that help individuals with AD encode information 
should be especially useful (Rusted & Clare, 2004). Recently, interventions have focused 
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on multi-modal encoding that can be used in the individual’s everyday life (Rusted & 
Clare, 2004).   
Camp and colleagues (Camp et al., 1993) have developed a model of memory 
intervention that utilizes principles of classical conditioning.    This model is based on the 
assumption that individuals with AD are not significantly impaired in the use of external 
aids for memory and are not significantly impaired in their implicit memory.  The model 
uses classical conditioning to change problematic behaviors of individuals with AD.  For 
example, a stimulus that typically elicits a negative or inappropriate response from an 
individual with AD is repeatedly paired with a stimulus that elicits a positive or 
appropriate response.  In theory this works because individuals with AD can rely on 
external aids to learn and because they can learn the association via the relatively 
preserved implicit memory system as opposed to the severely compromised explicit 
memory system.  Individuals can also be conditioned to utilize external aids such as 
calendars and reminder notes early in the course of AD so that they will continue to use 
these external aids throughout the disease.  
Often psychosocial interventions are maintenance interventions rather than methods 
to improve or reverse the disease due to difficulty learning new information.  It is 
difficult for individuals with AD to improve if they have difficulty learning new skills 
and behaviors (Weiner, 1991).  However, some evidence suggests that individuals with 
AD can improve.  For example, studies have suggested that simple environmental 
interventions could provide great assistance to those with AD.  For example, Dawson, 
Kline, and Wiancko (1986) showed that simply engaging individuals with AD in planned 
weekly interactions can elicit improvement on cognitive tests.  Furthermore, studies have 
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suggested that individuals with AD who were given small amounts of control over their 
environment helped increase health and mood.  Langer and Rodin (1976) performed a 
study in which one group of individuals with AD were able to choose how they arranged 
furniture in their rooms, what kind of plant they had in their rooms, and which of two 
nights they would see a movie.  The other group had no control over any of these 
decisions.  Those in the first group were not only happier, healthier, and more active, but 
experienced half as many deaths in the 18-month span of the study.  Unfortunately, the 
effectiveness of current environmental interventions is largely under question and have 
not surpassed the effectiveness of pharmacological interventions (Rusted & Clare, 2004; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2002; Weiner, 1991).  
An important aspect of AD treatment to some researchers is simply that the person 
with AD is not forgotten or ignored.  Kitwood (1990; 1997) stressed the importance of 
avoiding placing people with AD in an inferior position, a common occurrence in the 
treatment of AD that is part of what he refers to as “malignant social psychology.”   
According to Kitwood, this causes individuals to exhibit more cognitive and behavioral 
disability than can be accounted for by neurological dysfunction alone (the “disability 
gap” mentioned above).   Malignant social psychology occurs largely because caregivers 
often unintentionally focus on the shortcomings of the individual with AD and thus 
“position” them socially in a manner that is depersonalizing, unsupportive, and counter 
therapeutic (Kitwood, 1990). Sabat (1994b) provided evidence for this phenomenon in a 
case study that showed a woman whose symptoms were reduced in the therapeutic 
environment of a day care center but greatly worsened in the less therapeutic 
environment of her home.  
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Kitwood (1997) espoused a person-centered approach to the treatment of AD and 
focused on facilitating positive interactions with individuals with AD as a primary means 
of treatment.  These positive interactions include validating the individual, their reality, 
their feelings, recognizing the individual as a sentient being with real needs and desires 
and communicating this to them, consulting with the individual regarding their needs and 
preferences, working collaboratively on treatment and tasks, and helping individuals with 
AD in areas they need assistance by filling in the function that they can no longer 
perform.    
Another important intervention is helping individuals with AD function in meaningful 
ways, such as helping individuals with AD find ways to continue to engage in hobbies, 
activities of daily living, social activities, and household chores that are enjoyable 
(Bowlby Sifton, 2000).  Supporting positive behaviors that are maintained in individuals 
with AD in general can be an effective intervention (Bowlby Sifton, 2000).  Bowlby 
Sifton (2000) identified a number of functions that are commonly maintained in 
individuals with AD and identified ways to support these functions.  For example, 
procedural memory is often somewhat maintained in AD and can be especially aided by 
familiar, typically non-verbal cues as recognition is typically not as damaged as recall.  
Because humor is often maintained throughout AD and can aid in emotional well-being, 
it is important to support and encourage the use of humor by individuals with AD.  It is 
important to encourage the experience of positive emotions and the experience of positive 
emotional memories as these abilities are typically maintained in AD.  Because many 
social skills are over-learned, such as hand shaking, encouraging the use of these skills 
can facilitate social involvement, self-esteem, and dignity.  Providing appropriate sensory 
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stimulation is important to maintain contact with the external environment, promote brain 
activity, and provide sensory pleasure through things such as pleasant odors and textures.  
Exercise and movement are beneficial to many with AD as substantial motor functioning 
abilities are typically maintained in AD.  The ability to process and enjoy music is 
typically maintained in AD and can help support an individual’s connection with the 
external environment and provide a positive emotional experience.  Because long-term 
memory is largely preserved, positive memories can be aroused by encouraging 
individuals with AD to reminisce about positive things from their past (Bowlby Sifton, 
2000).    
Some interventions used with AD focus on the interaction between the individual 
with AD and their caregiver.  The manner in which caregivers interact with individuals 
with AD can either exacerbate or ameliorate some of the symptoms associated with AD 
and is thus a very important area of AD management (Weiner, 1991).  It is important that 
caregivers create a physical and interpersonal environment that allows individuals with 
AD to function at the highest level possible (Weiner, 1991).  It is also useful for the 
caregiver to accept an individual’s level of functioning rather than attempting to 
challenge or improve them (Weiner, 1991).  It is also suggested that caregivers aid 
individuals with AD by performing some of the day-to-day functions that the individual 
can no longer perform (Weiner, 1991; Kitwood, 1997).  
Weiner (1991) outlined a number of principles that are important in the management 
of AD, including correcting sensory impairment when needed, not confronting the 
individual with AD, simplifying communications and activities, structuring activities, 
using multiple cues when communicating, repetition of communication, demonstrating 
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appropriate behaviors, using both positive and negative reinforcement, reducing the 
individual’s choices, providing an appropriate amount of stimulation, avoiding behaviors 
that require learning new things, identifying and encouraging the use of skills that are still 
intact, expressing emotion clearly, minimizing anxiety, and using methods of distraction 
when problematic situations arise.  Bowlby Sifton (2000) also outlined a number of 
important things caregivers can do, such as helping individuals with AD begin an 
activity, provide appropriate cues, break jobs down into smaller steps, allow for choice 
that is not overwhelming, set up the individual to succeed, limit distraction, allow 
privacy, allow extra time to complete tasks, and provide a consistent routine.  
A number of classic “talk” therapies have been utilized with individuals with AD and 
dementia (Watkins, Cheston, Jones, & Gilliard, 2006; Riley, 1989; Frazer, 2000).  
Although many of these are individual therapies, group and family therapy may also be 
effective (Riley, 1989).  Different forms of psychodynamic therapy and different 
psychodynamic conceptualizations of AD have been used to treat AD ranging from 
focusing on providing attachment to a parental figure, facilitating emotional catharsis, 
facilitating psychological growth by utilizing weakened defenses caused by AD, and 
utilizing interpersonally focused therapy (for a review, see Frazer, 2000).  Rationale for 
psychodynamic therapy includes the maintained affect in individuals with dementia and 
the rapid development of transference (Frazer, 2000).  Furthermore, because defenses are 
weakened due to cognitive impairment, progress can be made quickly as unconscious 
material can be brought into awareness quickly (Frazer, 2000).  Psychodynamic therapies 
have been used with individuals with mild to moderate cognitive impairment due to 
dementia but not severe dementia (for a review, see Frazer, 2000).  
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Validation therapy, developed by Feil (2002), is also a therapy for AD that focuses on 
interacting and communicating with individuals with AD.  It uses a psychodynamic 
perspective to attempt to make sense of the seemingly random verbalizations and 
behaviors of individuals with AD (Frazer, 2000).  Although validation therapy has not 
been empirically validated, it is used by many therapists (Frazer, 2000).  It can be used by 
a number of people, and although it requires training, it does not require a college degree.  
The central tenet of validation therapy is to provide empathic listening and to maintain a 
respectful attitude toward individuals with AD (Feil, 2002).  Specific techniques of 
validation therapy are used for individuals at different stages of AD (Feil, 2002).    
Unfortunately, validation therapy has little scientific support (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2002).  
Although cognitive-behavioral therapy is often used to treat comorbid depression in 
individuals in the early stages of AD and dementia, it may be used to treat individuals 
with MCI independent of depression (for a review, see Frazer, 2000).  Cognitive-
behavioral therapy with individuals with cognitive impairment is similar to any other 
population where the focus is on psychoeducation regarding the relationship between 
behavior, cognition, and affect, recognizing and changing cognitive distortions and the 
settings in which they occur, recording behaviors and cognitions, analyzing the 
relationship between cognition and mood, and encouraging more adaptive behaviors and 
cognitions.  Sometimes additional structure is required both within and between sessions 
for individuals with cognitive impairment in order to make change more salient.  
Caregivers may also be involved in implementing behavioral interventions.   
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Person-centered therapy for AD has been increasing in recent years as researchers and 
clinicians are more thoroughly recognizing and attending to the emotional needs of 
individuals with AD (Kitwood, 1997).  Person-centered therapy attempts to focus on the 
person with AD rather than their short-comings and attempts to utilize their strengths 
(Innes & Hatfield, 2001).  Person-centered therapy is sometimes used to conjunction with 
visual art therapy, dance/movement therapy, and music therapy (Innes & Hatfield, 2001).
Many other therapies are specifically designed for individuals with AD.  
Reminiscence, life-review therapy, and sensory stimulation therapy have shown some 
benefit to individuals with AD (Bowlby Sifton, 2000).  Reminiscence therapy encourages 
individuals with dementia to retrieve autobiographical memories in order to gain a better 
understanding of self, gain personal meaning, and aid in accepting the final stage of life 
(Kasl-Godley & Gatz, 2000).  This intervention is usually conducted in groups with 
individuals with dementia and is often used to aid socialization (Kasl-Godley & Gatz, 
2000).  Life-review therapy has similar goals but uses a number of techniques such as 
writing autobiographies, taking trips to important places from one’s past, creating 
scrapbooks, and visiting or writing important people from one’s past (Butler, 1974). 
Stimulation therapy involves increasing the social and physical activity of individuals 
with AD (American Psychiatric Association, 2002; Rusted & Clare, 2004).  Reality 
orientation, where individuals with AD are routinely oriented to place, time, and other 
important aspects of their environment, is sometimes used to aid memory problems, but 
its effectiveness is questionable (Rusted & Clare, 2004; Zarit, Orr, & Zarit, 1985).  
Activity therapies involve focusing individuals with AD on external activities that are 
pleasurable and taking the focus away from themselves and their decreased cognitive, 
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behavioral, and emotional abilities (Weiner, 1997).  Activity therapies can demonstrate 
short-term benefit by distracting individuals with AD from their predicament (Weiner, 
1997).  Group therapies are also sometimes used with individuals with AD and are often 
successful (for a review, see Frazer, 2000).  Group therapy is the most common form of 
non-pharmacological therapy used to treat AD (Watkins et al., 2006).  
Although many individual “talk” therapies are available for individuals with 
dementia, some themes provide common foci across therapies with this population.  
These issues are loss, adaptation, and interpersonal conflict (Frazer, 2000).  Elderly 
individuals frequently experience the loss of close friends and family members through 
death and may also experience the loss of their own cognitive abilities.  In situations in 
which individuals are concerned about loss, it is important for the therapist to 
communicate to the individual that they are not alone (Frazer, 2000).  Furthermore, not 
only must individuals with AD adapt to the limitations of their own cognitive 
impairment, but they also commonly have to adapt to changes in residency and caregivers 
and their own role within the family (Frazer, 2000).  Therapists and caregivers may deal 
with the problem of adaptation by substituting their own cognitive abilities for those of 
the individual (Kitwood, 1997; Frazer, 2000) with AD and by identifying care giving 
staff that the individual is most comfortable with and allowing them to maximize the time 
they work together (Frazer, 2000).  Finally, due to cognitive impairment and lack of 
behavioral and affective inhibition, among numerous other difficulties, individuals with 
AD commonly experience a variety of interpersonal difficulties (Frazer, 2000).  
Successful interventions within the realm of interpersonal difficulties typically involve 
behavioral interventions that prevent situations in which problematic interpersonal 
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interactions occur, whether this be avoiding certain people or certain environmental 
settings (Frazer, 2000).  
Tracking Alzheimer’s Disease
Monitoring the progress and course of AD is important to determine individuals’ 
cognitive and behavioral abilities and to understand the course of AD.  Also, treatment 
effectiveness is important to monitor so adjustments can be made in treatment and the 
effectiveness of various treatments can be documented.  However, monitoring the 
effectiveness of treatment in AD is especially difficult due to its highly variable and 
unpredictable presentation and progress (Haxby et al., 1992; Bouchard & Rosser, 1999; 
Lopez et al., 2000).  Progress of AD is typically monitored using either screening 
instruments that are used in the diagnosis of AD, those that provide a broad picture of 
cognitive functioning (such as the MMSE), or extensive test batteries that allow for a 
more nuanced look at how AD is progressing (Gray & Della Sala, 2004).  It has been 
suggested that the progression of language deficiencies could be used to track the 
progress of AD as different language disturbances develop through the course of AD 
(Kertesz, 2004).  The tracking of motor disturbance has also been suggested as a possible 
method of tracking the development of AD (Kidron & Freedman, 2004).  
Some researchers pay close attention to the discourse of individuals with AD in order 
to determine the effectiveness of treatment.  For example, Watkins et al. (2006) observed
signs in individuals’ narratives that signaled the assimilation of and acceptance of their 
disease and the accompanying symptoms of the disease.  These researchers suggested
that a key part in treatment is promoting the conscious acceptance of the disease and its 
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consequences, and therefore statements that reflect this, such as commenting on the 
disease and its symptoms and communicating fear that one is losing one’s mind are seen 
as markers of improvement over the course of therapy.  Their findings have suggested 
that different therapeutic foci are most beneficial at different stages of the disease.  For 
example, if individuals have assimilated their memory difficulties, it may be most 
beneficial to aid them in gaining some control over their situation through planning.  If an 
individual has not assimilated their disease, a less directive focus on affect may be more 
beneficial.  
Inner Experience in Alzheimer’s Disease 
There is very little understanding of the subjective experience of individuals with AD 
(Lawton, Van Haitsma, & Perkinson, 2000).  Although it is difficult for individuals with 
dementia to communicate what is occurring in their inner experience, it can still be 
understood to a limited degree (Lawton et al., 2000).   Understanding of this experience is 
important for a number of reasons, one of which is to help caregivers can respond more 
effectively to their emotional needs and desires (Lawton et al., 2000). 
Good care for people with dementia requires a continuing search for means by which 
caregivers may comprehend the needs of such people and build this understanding 
into the way they give care. The emotional states of dementia patients are a neglected 
source of such cues.  (Lawton et al., 2000, p.117).  
Although there has been substantial interest in the study of the inner experience of 
individuals with AD in recent years, many researchers, caregivers, and individuals with 
AD are left to speculate on the nature of the inner experience of individuals with AD.  
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For example, support groups for caregivers of those with AD are often populated with 
questions such as “what’s going on in that head of his?” (Gubrium, 2000, p. 185). 
There were caregivers who anxiously sought answers and seemingly grasped at any 
understanding that became available.  Other caregivers came to support group with 
ready-made answers of their own, contributing to the local culture of knowledge 
about the inner world of the demented.  Some support groups touted rather definitive 
views of the demented and participants were continuously held accountable to these 
views.  (Gubrium, 2000, p. 186).  
Furthermore, support groups often seem to develop and maintain group myths about 
what the experience of AD is like.  Sometimes caregivers develop romanticized views of 
the inner experience of AD.  For example, some group myths have included views that 
individuals with AD experience more with feelings than with words, that as the disease 
progresses individuals with AD are more sensitive to touch, that they respond more to the 
tone of a loved one’s voice, that the individual just needs physical affection to “wake up,” 
and that they can communicate with their eyes and expressions (Gubrium, 2000).   Not all 
views are necessarily romanticized however. Other speculations that individuals who care 
for individuals with AD sometimes make are that AD is basically “brain failure” 
(Gubrium, 2000, p. 185), that there is no mind left in AD, and the individual with AD is 
“just a piece of meat”, that there may be no thoughts left, that the person still “has it up 
there” (Gurbrium, 2000, p. 187) but is simply more prone to confusion, that feelings are 
present but processing is decreased, that the person is an “empty-shell” bereft of thought, 
that the person is not really there anymore, and that their inner experience is confused but 
not meaningless (Gubrium, 2000).  
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Unfortunately, individuals with AD are also left to speculate the nature of their own 
condition.  For example, one individual with AD lamented, 
No theory of medicine can explain what is happening to me.  Every few months I 
sense that another piece of me is missing.  My life…my self…are falling apart.  I can 
only think half thoughts now.  Someday I may wake up and not think at all…not 
know who I am.  Most people expect to die someday, but who ever expected to lose 
their self first?  (Cohen & Eiserdorfer, 1986, p. 22).  
Unfortunately, not only must individuals endure the unspeakable hardships of AD but 
they must do so without a thorough explanation of what to expect experientially as the 
disease progresses.
Even researchers often seem in the dark and left to speculations regarding the inner 
experience of AD and dementia.  Sabat (2001) asked, 
How, then, can we come to a more detailed, richer understanding of the experience of 
persons afflicted with AD as they go about the task of living with and among others?  
That is, how can we see the afflicted as persons who have their own desires, hopes, 
fears, loves, identify the nature of those aspects of their lives, and thereby see them as 
being defined and understandable in terms of characteristics beyond their ‘presenting 
symptoms’? (p. 13).
The reason that caregivers, loved ones, researchers, and even those with AD and 
dementia must resort to unfounded speculations about the inner experience of AD is that 
very little is known about the inner experience of AD and dementia.  
What is the experience of AD like?…But what does it mean to lose one’s mind (as 
opposed to a brain)?  How can one tell when the mind is gone?  How is one to 
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conceptualize its subjectivity?  These are urgent questions because their answers 
organize thoughts, sentiments, and courses of action in relation to the individual 
question.  (Gubrium, 2000, p. 185).  
Although there is very little known definitively about the inner experience of 
individuals with AD and other dementias (as evidenced by the need for the speculations 
above), the inner experience of dementia has been a topic of interest for well over 100 
years. Esquirol (1838/1845, cited by Sabat, 2001, p. 313) hypothesized about the inner 
experience of dementia, stating that individuals with dementia have “few or no ideas.”  
Contemporary researchers continue to form hypotheses and make speculations regarding 
the inner experience of AD and dementia.  The notion that individuals with AD 
experience a general loss of self is perhaps the most pervasive speculation regarding the 
inner experience of individuals with AD (Ballenger, 2006).  However, this spectulation
has been changing recently as many researchers believe that selfhood is maintained well 
into the progression of the disease and perhaps throughout the disease (Shenk, 2005; 
Ryan, Byrne, Spykerman, & Orange, 2005).  Although there are clearly a number of 
losses of important aspects of the self associated with AD, there is also potential for 
growth in major aspects of the self, including the use of coping skills, creativity, and 
spirituality (Ryan et al., 2005; Kitwood, 1997).  
Nevertheless, the extent to which individuals with AD maintain their sense of self 
remains a topic of debate in contemporary Alzheimer’s research and is often the focus of 
questions surrounding the inner experience of individuals with AD.  Dementia has come 
to be thought of by many researchers as a loss of selfhood, although there is very little 
understood about self-awareness in dementia and there is likely to be high variability 
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among individuals with dementia regarding perceptions of selfhood and self-awareness 
(Lawton et al., 2000).  Because Western culture often equates selfhood with memory and 
language while ignoring non-cognitive aspects of expression, AD is often viewed as a 
loss of selfhood in this culture (Ballenger, 2006). This notion may also be partially 
present due to campaigns that used the idea to win support for AD (Ballenger, 2006).  
Cohen and Eisdorfer (1986) used the reports of individuals with AD and dementia to 
hypothesize that a key component of AD and dementia is the progressive “loss of self.”
Some researchers, however, have rejected the idea that dementia leads to a loss of 
self-hood (Ballenger, 2006).  Some caregivers reject the notion that their loved ones have 
lost their selfhood, believing that the self is still there, simply hidden behind the mask of 
dementia, and that sometimes dementia helps to reveal an individual’s true self 
(Ballenger, 2006).  The extent to which individuals with AD maintain a sense of self 
depends largely on the observer’s definition of self.  Although individuals with AD may 
lose key components of their selfhood, such as memory and communication, they may 
maintain other important parts of their selfhood, including their social selves (Sabat & 
Harre’, 1992; Kitwood, 1990).  Harris and Sterin (1999) stated that the nature of the self 
in AD is difficult to pinpoint as it is in a constant state of change due to ever changing 
needs and shifting roles that are part of the progression of AD.  
The primary method of drawing inferences about the nature of self in individuals with 
AD is closely examining the communication of these individuals in their natural 
environment, especially communication that seems to indicate the existence of a sense of 
self such as using personal pronouns and the communication of values, memories, 
experiences, and topics that are otherwise important to them (see Sabat, 2002; Sabat & 
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Harre’, 1992; Shenk, 2005).  The idea that an individual is still a person or has a self has 
been suggested as the central tenet of AD care (Ryan et al., 2005).    
Perhaps the leading researcher in the area of the inner experience of AD is Kitwood, 
who developed the Dementia Care Mapping (DCM) technique to evaluate the care given 
to individuals with dementia (Kitwood & Bredin, 1994).  DCM requires researchers to 
shadow an individual with dementia who lives in a residential care facility for at least 6
hours in order to understand the quality of care the individual is receiving and to gain an 
understanding of their daily experience.  This technique has led Kitwood to hypothesize 
that a key component of the experience of dementia is the loss of personhood, and a key 
component of care is aiding individuals with dementia to maintain their personhood 
(Kitwood, 1993; Kitwood & Bredin, 1992).  Kitwood and Bredin (1992) have identified 
three phenomena in dementia that are evidence for the maintenance of personhood.  First, 
there is sometimes a reversal of symptoms, even in the severely demented.  Individuals 
who have experienced a progressive deterioration of cognitive and behavioral functioning 
sometimes recover some of their lost skills.  Second, after progressive cognitive and 
behavioral deterioration, there is sometimes stabilization and a lack of further cognitive 
and behavioral deterioration.  And finally, research with geriatric rats show that, at times, 
changing the rats’ environmental conditions can reverse their neurological deterioration.  
Although the authors admitted that these observations are not adequate for a sound 
scientific theory regarding the maintenance of personhood in dementia, they did maintain 
that they are sufficient to show hope for the maintenance of personhood in dementia 
(Kitwood & Bredin, 2002).   
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Furthermore, Kitwood and Bredin (1992) hypothesized four “global sentient states” 
related to the inner experience of individuals with AD that are derived from various 
behavioral observations of people with dementia.  These states are: 
1. Sense of personal worth – Ageing involves losses and this attacks personal worth.  
Maintenance of personal worth after losses is associated with general well-being.
2. Sense of agency – This involves control of one’s environment.  This is lost as 
dementia progresses and as the ability to control one’s self and one’s environment 
diminishes.  
3. Social confidence – This is being comfortable with others and feeling as if you 
have something to offer socially.
4. Hope – Maintaining a state of hope is often very difficult in dementia.  
There are behavioral observations that are empirically measurable and are indicative 
of these states (Kitwood & Bredin, 1992).  These behaviors are divided into 12 categories 
as follows: the assertion of desire or will, the ability to experience and express a range of 
emotions (both positive and negative), initiation of social contact, affectional warmth, 
social sensitivity, self-respect, acceptance of other dementia suffers, humor, creativity 
and self-expression, showing evident pleasure, helpfulness, and relaxation.  
The study of inner experience in general is thought to be difficult empirically, 
especially in individuals with multiple cognitive deficits such as those that occur in AD.  
Kitwood (1997) suggested that empirical methods are not suitable to gain valid insight 
into the inner experience of individuals with dementia.  Instead, Kitwood (1997) 
recommended using more imaginative techniques to study the inner experience of 
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individuals with dementia.  Kitwood (1997) suggested six access routes that may be used 
to investigate the inner experience of individuals with dementia:  
1. Examining written accounts of individuals with dementia – There are many 
publications written by individuals with dementia that are designed to describe the 
experience of their dementia.  This can help researchers understand the difficulties that 
individuals with dementia face, not the least of which is the “struggle to remain a person” 
(Kitwood, 1997, Six Access Routes, para. 2).  The written accounts of individuals with 
AD regarding their inner experience will be presented later in this paper.  
2. Interviewing individuals with dementia – This may be helpful for gaining insight 
into the inner experience of dementia, but the researcher must pay close attention to 
nonverbal communication.  Researchers should also pay close attention to metaphor 
rather than focusing on the literal meaning of the content of the interview.  Interviews of 
people with dementia have uncovered insights into the inner experience of dementia, 
including the fear of losing control and meaning in one’s life and the need for 
reassurance.  
3. Paying careful attention to the day-to-day behavior of individuals with dementia –
Again, Kitwood suggested that researchers go beyond the literal meaning of everyday 
behavior and speech and interpret the metaphorical meaning of verbal and non-verbal 
behavior.  
4. Interviewing people who have experienced dementia due to illness and have 
recovered – Typically these reports come from individuals who have experienced the 
dementing effects of depression or meningitis.  One individual described the conscience 
experience of her meningitis-induced dementia has having a sense of “strangeness” and 
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“weirdness,” at the same time experiencing that “she both is, and is not, herself” 
(Kitwood, 1997, Six Access Routes, para. 14).
5. Using poetic imagination – Kitwood suggested that the researcher use his own 
poetic imagination in order to hypothesize about the experience of individuals with 
dementia.  This may be necessary because typical forms of verbal description may not 
capture the strange experience of dementia.  Kitwood provided his own example of using 
poetic imagination as an attempt to gain insight into the experience of individuals with 
dementia.  This is an excerpt from that example:  
You are in a swirling fog, and in half-darkness.  You are wandering around in a place 
that seems vaguely familiar; and yet you do not know where you are; you cannot 
make out whether it is summer or winter, day or night.  At times the fog clears a little, 
and you can see a few objects really clearly; but as you try to make sense of where 
you are you are overpowered by a kind of dullness and stupidity; your knowledge 
slips away, and again you are utterly confused.  (Kitwood, 1990, p. 40).  
6. Using role-play – Kitwood suggested that researchers role-play what it is like to 
have dementia in order to gain a better understanding of the inner experience of 
individuals with dementia.  The role-play will allow researchers to use their own 
dementia-like experiences from the past in order to create an “inner narrative” that is 
similar to the inner narrative of individuals with dementia.  
Using his own research and the research of others, Kitwood (1997) conceptualized 
the progressive experience of individuals with dementia as having three stages.  The first 
involves feelings typically of negative content that are associated with the perils of living 
with dementia.  The second Kitwood described as involving “global states.”  These 
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global states consist largely of “raw emotions” and confusion.  The third stage involves 
“burnt-out” states that may resemble a vegetative existence.  Individuals with dementia 
can pass in and out of these stages, back and forth, or may experience these stages 
simultaneously.  Kitwood also claimed that individuals with dementia tend to have 
extremely intense and “vivid” emotional experiences.  
Another analogy that Kitwood and Bredin (1992) drew regarding the experience of 
individuals with AD is that of a fluid, frozen, and shattered self.  These researchers 
suggested that the self remains fluid in childhood and moves into a frozen state in 
adulthood.  In individuals with dementia, their self becomes shattered and their 
subjectivity is fragmented.  In this state the individual needs others to help shape their 
reality as well as their sense of personhood.   
Sabat (2001) also investigated the inner experience of individuals with AD and 
dementia.  Sabat and colleagues’ primary method of inquiry was to interact with 
individuals with AD (Sabat, 2001; Sabat & Cagigas, 1997) while paying close attention 
to metaphor, individuals’ idiosyncratic use of language (Sabat, 2001), and non-verbal 
communication (Sabat & Cagigas, 1997) in order to draw conclusions about inner 
experience (Sabat, 2001).  This method can help increase understanding of AD and 
complement standard quantitative methods and can aid in treating AD by identifying and 
stressing abilities still present in individuals with AD (Sabat, 2000).  
Sabat and colleagues held that individuals define their reality through language and 
that autobiography is a public manifestation of the self (Sabat & Harre’, 1992).  They 
define three different aspects of the self: a singular point of view or consciousness (Self 
1), the attributes that an individual possesses and the beliefs the individual has about
66
those attributes (Self 2), and the manner in which an individual presents himself to the 
rest of the world (Self 3) (Sabat, Fath, Moghaddam, & Harre’, 1999).  According to these 
researchers, the use of personal pronouns is indicative of the existence of Self 1 (Sabat et 
al., 1999) and is therefore examined in individuals with AD to infer the maintained 
existence of Self 1 (Sabat & Harre’, 1992).  Through this method, Sabat and colleagues 
concluded that individuals with AD typically maintain Self 1 until the very final stages of 
AD (Sabat & Harre’, 1992; Sabat, 2000).  Individuals with AD often maintain their Self 2
deep into the progress of the disease as individuals are aware of many of the attributes 
they have as well as many of the attributes they have lost due to the progress of the 
disease (Sabat et al., 1999).  A person to interact with is required in order for the 
existence of Self 3 to be manifested and therefore this aspect of the self is affected
differently in AD depending on how those around them interact with them (Sabat et al., 
1999).  
Sabat (2001) drew further conclusions regarding the inner experience of individuals 
with AD.  He stated that individuals with AD, even in very severe stages, maintain a 
sense of self-worth and behave in ways that attempt to maintain this sense of self-worth 
even though there is typically a loss of the sense of self (Sabat 2001; Sabat & Harre’, 
1992; Sabat et al., 1999).  However, although there is some loss of the sense of self  in 
the severe stags of AD, sense of self is rarely totally depleted evidenced by the continued 
use of first person pronouns (Sabat & Harre’, 1992).  He also stated that individuals with 
AD engage in dialectical reasoning where they think of their past positive attributes, 
realize they no longer possess many of these positive attributes, and wonder what their 
life would be like if they did not develop AD.  This leads to tension and negative affect.  
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Sabat’s observations have further allowed him to hypothesize that the inner experience of 
individuals with AD typically includes great pride in positive attributes, embarrassment 
about the symptoms of AD, frustration when others focus on the symptoms of AD over 
positive attributes, and delight upon presenting themselves in a positive way (Sabat, 
2001).  
Watkins et al. (2006) also focused on the discourse of individuals with AD in drawing 
inferences about their inner experience.  These researchers suggested that individuals 
have many different internal voices and that some are stronger than others. Individuals in 
the early stages of AD may deny the existence of their disease by drowning out the voice 
or voices that tell them that something is wrong.  Therefore, a major therapeutic goal in
treating AD is to help these voices become louder so that individuals can process the 
meaning of their disease.  
Asp, Song, and Rockwood (2005) similarly paid close attention to the verbal 
communications of individuals with AD.  They showed that individuals with AD often 
ask for certainty after making statements, such as, “My daughter will be 65 next week, 
won’t she?”  These researchers suggested that when individuals follow statements with 
questions such as these that this indicates that they are aware of memory difficulties they 
are having associated with AD.  Therefore, these questions are positive signals that at 
least the individual that uses these words is not experiencing anosognosia and is aware 
that they are having memory difficulties.  
Gubrium (2000) suggested that we pay particular attention to the narratives created by 
caregivers and loved ones of individuals with AD and dementia in order to construct a 
hypothesis of their inner experience.  He stated that story-telling is one major way in 
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which we can understand the inner experience of others.  Narratives of older individuals 
are becoming a more common method to obtain subjective data of the reality of aging 
(Kenyon, Ruth, & Mader, 1999).  Although Gubrium (2000) was aware of the speculative 
nature and the potential dangers and inaccuracies that can come with relying on one’s 
theoretical account of another’s inner experience, he believed that these narratives and 
stories can provide important insight into the inner experience of individuals with AD 
and dementia.  
Cheston (2004) also relied on narratives created by individuals with dementia in order 
to gain an understanding of their experience.  Cheston (2004) asserted that in the early 
stages of AD individuals use narratives/stories to first distance themselves from their 
plight and then to relate experiences that are not entirely in their awareness.  Eventually, 
patients with AD use narratives/stories to integrate information regarding their disease 
into their awareness.  From examining narratives/stories in this manner, Cheston (2004) 
arrived at the following conclusion regarding the inner experience of those with AD and 
how these individuals come to be aware of their disease:  
The gradual emergence of awareness is a process that is analogous to entering a 
brightly lit room from a dark corridor: first people blink and look away, perhaps 
defending themselves from the harsh new light by placing their hand over their face.  
It is only over time that we can open our eyes fully (p. 108).  
Stiles et al. (1990) developed a systematic method to evaluate the experience of 
individuals with AD using narratives.  This method is called the Assimilation of 
Problematic Experiences Scale (APES), which uses the narratives of individuals with AD 
to gauge how aware individuals are of their disease.  Stiles et al. (1990) used this scale to 
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hypothesize five levels of awareness.  At first, narratives/stories are at Level 0 and are 
used to “ward off” awareness of dementia.  At Level 1, narratives/stories express 
“unwanted thoughts” about dementia.  That is, these narratives/stories act as a method to 
remove problems related to dementia from awareness.  Level 2 narratives/stories are used 
to express a “vague awareness” about the disease.  Level 3 narratives/stories are used 
more specifically to identify the problem of dementia and problems the individual has 
that are associated with dementia.  Here, individuals are trying to define the disease for 
the first time.  Finally, at Level 4, narratives/stories express “understanding/insight” and 
are typically coupled with more positive emotion and a more in depth examination of 
their disease and its related problems.  
Lawton, Van Haitsma, and Klapper (1996) developed the Apparent Affect 
Rating Scale (AARS) to assess the affective component of experience of 
individuals with dementia.  The AARS trains caregivers to observe individuals 
with dementia for a 5 minute period and record the amount of times the 
individuals display different emotions.  The caregivers are given a list of specific 
behaviors that indicate certain emotions.  For example, depression is indicated by 
crying, tearing, wiping of the eyes, moaning, sighing, frowning, and putting the 
head down while having no expression on the face.  If an individual is displaying 
these behaviors the caregiver records depression for the appropriate amount of 
time.  Although the researchers believe the AARS is valid and reliable, they admit 
that using behavioral observations to infer emotion is limited at times due to a 
lack of precise understanding about how behaviors reflect affective states (Lawton
et al., 1996).  
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Gil et al. (2001) focused on self-consciousness or self-awareness in trying to 
understand the inner experience of individuals with AD.  These researchers used 14 
questions designed to evaluate various aspects of self-consciousness of individuals with 
AD (identity, knowledge of cognitive disturbances, self-knowledge of affective state, 
bodily awareness, awareness of future plans, capacity to introspect, and moral 
awareness).  They concluded that although AD does not destroy self-consciousness, it 
does cause alterations in self-consciousness.  Knowledge of cognitive disturbance and 
moral awareness were correlated with dementia severity, suggesting deficiency in these 
aspects of self-consciousness.  Gil et al. (2001) suggested that it is possible that 
alterations in self-consciousness may be the central difficulty faced by individuals with 
AD.  
Perrin (1997) hypothesized that individuals with severe dementia experience the 
world as if they were in a plastic bubble of approximately three feet diameter.   
…from inside the bubble, the physical conditions of the general environment, along 
with the conversations and interactions of everyday social intercourse, are perceived 
in a distorted and muffled fashion and therefore fail to impinge appropriately upon 
the individual within. (p. 940).
Perrin suggested that individuals who care for people with dementia must physically 
remain within the bubble’s three-foot diameter and remain there in order to be effective 
caregivers.  
Some psychotherapeutic interventions designed specifically for individuals with AD 
have been designed based on assumptions regarding the inner experience of individuals.  
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Validation therapy (Feil, 2002) is based on eight assumptions that are related to the inner 
experience of individuals with AD:  
1.  Expressing painful feelings diminishes the experience of painful feelings.
2.  Painful feelings that are ignored will become more prevalent in experience.
3.  Memories with strong emotions are maintained in individuals with AD.
4.  Recalling early memories that are affect-laden is used as a coping mechanism 
when more recent memories begin to fail.
5.  When vision becomes poor, individuals with AD are able to use their “mind’s 
eye.”  When hearing becomes poor, individuals with AD focus on auditory stimulation 
that occurred in the past.
6.  All people, including individuals with AD, have multiple levels of awareness.
7.  Old memories are used when individuals with AD experience intense negative 
emotion.
8.  Affect that is experienced in the present will cause affect from the past to come 
into awareness.  
Thus, assumptions about the inner experience of individuals with AD currently inform 
intervention strategies.  
Data from cognitive and neuropsychological tests have been used to inform 
speculations regarding the inner experience of AD.  Overman and Becker (2004) 
suggested that because individuals with AD have impairment in episodic and 
autobiographical memory, their experience loses personal relevance.  Specifically, 
although individuals with AD might know that events in their lives and events in the 
history of their family have occurred, they lose access to the memory of actual 
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experiences and therefore lose touch with their past (Overman & Becker, 2004).  Their 
experience of the past is like facts read from a history book rather than like the 
remembrance of experience from their own lives.  
Much of the research of experience in individuals with AD and dementia has focused 
on the individual’s experience of care in residential facilities (see Cheston, Bender, & 
Byatt, 2000; Kitwood & Bredin, 1994).  A number of methods have been devised to 
assess the experience that individuals with dementia have regarding their care, including 
DCM, questionnaires, and structured and semi-structured interviews (Cheston et al., 
2000).  Nevertheless, due to severe deficits in cognitive and communicative skills in 
many individuals with AD and dementia, their experience and viewpoints concerning the 
caregiving process are often difficult to discern and are often ignored (Cheston et al., 
2000).
Unfortunately, in spite of the research efforts above, caregivers, loved ones, and 
researchers do not have any definitive answers as to what the inner experience of those 
with AD and dementia is really like.  Most individuals must resort to speculations and/or 
use subjective interpretations to imagine what the inner experience of AD and dementia 
is like because science has to this point failed at accurately describing the inner 
experience of those with AD.  This is due at least partially to the difficulty that 
individuals with AD and dementia have communicating their inner experiences with 
others or perhaps because there are few methodologies that systematically attempt to 
study the inner experience of people in a careful way.
It should be noted that there may be some discrepancy between the above 
researchers’ definitions of inner experience and definition of inner experience used in this 
73
study.  The researchers above seem to define inner experience in a number of ways, but 
largely as the experience of difficulties associated with depleting skills and their 
accompanying mood states.  They also seem to use the phrase inner experience to refer to 
general emotional experiences, such as anger, depression, confusion, etc.  The definition 
of “inner experience” in this study is literally the form and content of conscious 
experience.  Although anger, depression, or confusion may be a part of an individual’s 
experience at a given time, these words are far too broad given the author’s definition of 
inner experience.  In this study when the term “inner experience” is used it is referring to 
the literal and highly specific contents of consciousness that occur at any given moment 
in time.  For example, this may involve a phrase being spoken in the individual’s voice, 
in another’s voice, an inner seeing of something the individual may have seen in the past, 
an inner seeing of something the individual may have never seen, a physical feeling (e.g. 
a sense of heat in the chest, a tingling sensation in the back of the head, etc.), or myriad 
other things, or a combination of these things.  Nevertheless, the purpose of previous 
research and the present study is ultimately the same: to gain an in depth understanding 
of the inner experience, however defined, of older individuals with and without cognitive 
impairment, including AD, in order to facilitate early diagnosis, early intervention, 
effective treatment, and a public understanding of AD and dementia in order to increase 
the life satisfaction of those with AD and dementia and their loved ones and caregivers.  
The Inner Experience of Alzheimer’s Disease – The First-Person Perspective
As discussed above, studying the first-person accounts of individuals with AD is an 
important tool in the investigation of the experience of those with AD (Kitwood, 1997).  
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A number of individuals with AD have written accounts of their experience with the 
disease.  Although the majority of these writings do not focus upon the inner experience 
of AD the way that the present study does, these writings are still potentially useful in 
gaining some insight into the inner experience of these individuals.  This section will 
discuss a few of the major works of individuals with AD focusing on how these writings 
relate to the inner experience of AD.  
Cary Smith Henderson held a Ph.D. in modern American history when he was 
diagnosed with AD.  Henderson received a diagnosis of AD very early in its course and 
used a tape recorder to document his experiences through the moderate stages of the 
disease.  These experiences were recorded in his book, Partial View: An Alzheimer’s 
Journal (1998).  Henderson’s wife Ruth (who helped edit the book) stated that his 
recordings were surprising in that he revealed much more insight into his disease than he 
expressed in day to day life.  
Henderson described his experience with AD in a variety of ways.  He called it 
“somebody’s version of hell” (p. 4).  At one point he had difficulty calling himself a 
human being, difficulty considering himself alive, and stated that he was not a normal 
person.  His struggles with memory were apparent and poignant:  “I just had a brilliant 
idea, but before I could push down the little recording mechanism, it was absolutely 
totally gone” (p. 7).  He struggled to remember how old he was on his 62nd birthday, 
stating he should have been a year younger, and had trouble remembering where his long 
time home was located.  He stated that he had no ability to comprehend time and that 
every minute and every moment are “separate” (p. 41).  He expressed anxiety about his 
compromised ability to communicate:  “It’s kinda nice to talk to a dog that you know is 
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not going to talk back.  And you can’t make a mistake that way” (p. 13).  He said that his 
words became “tangled” easily and that they were forgotten easily (p. 18). Eventually he 
could no longer read nor write.  He stated that his difficulty reading was at least partially 
due to the experience that words move or waver and he “can’t catch them” (p. 23).  
Henderson described severe mood swings as well:  “Sometimes I feel on top of the world, 
a couple of days ago I did and today I just feel absolutely devastated” (p. 32). He stated 
that although he does not think very much, everything he does is “full of feelings” (p. 
56).  Paranoia is so prevalent in Henderson’s experience that he stated that it must be 
“basic to Alzheimer’s people” (p. 81).  
The variability of the disease in general was expressed when Henderson called AD a 
“come and go disease” (p. 36). He explained that his ability to think is easily 
compromised by the presence of others, even one other person.  He explained that taking 
social cues from others is very important when one is confused about how to behave in 
social situations.  He stressed the importance of humor, calling it the most valuable tool 
one can have to deal with AD.  He called music “the only real constant friend I’ve got” 
and music repeatedly gave him comfort throughout his musings (p. 17).  
In direct relationship to his inner experience, he stated that he could not “visualize 
things” (p. 8).    He stated that he had numerous problems surrounding bodily awareness, 
most commonly regarding the positioning and movement of his feet and the feeling that 
he was unbalanced.  He stated repeatedly that he felt severely restricted and that he was
“half a person” (p. 19).  Henderson made a plea specifically to understand the common 
inner experience of others who have AD:  
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It would be very interesting for Alzheimer’s patients to correspond with one another, 
not necessarily to learn very much, but to, just to see what other people are thinking.  
Well, if you’re like me, I’m not sure you’re thinking a whole lot, but you have a lot of 
feelings.  I must say a heck of a lot of feelings.  Everything we do is just full of
feelings…But I would sincerely like to share my—our—experiences and our feelings, 
and what I’m trying to do in this series of talks, if that’s what you want to call it, 
these are straight from the victim’s own words and whatever I say is sincere…I think 
we do have experiences which might be worthwhile, especially to anybody who had 
any reason at all in this world to want to know a little bit about Alzheimer’s.  I do 
suspect we do know more than we seem to know because it gets so hard to express 
what we know.  I’d just like to know from anecdotal experiences what people with 
Alzheimer’s had, to what degree are they clumsy, to what degree do they very quickly 
forget things, and to what degree can they make themselves useful…I’ve got lots of 
questions.  And I have very few answers…I really want to find out from other people 
what they have experienced.  (pp. 56-57).  
Larry Rose was diagnosed with early onset AD at the age of 54 (Rose, 1996).  
His symptoms seemed to come on without warning.  He was driving to his cabin 
in the mountains, something he had done countless times, when he became lost.  
He did not recognize where he was, could not remember the trip he had taken, and 
after several hours, had to stop at a hotel.  The next day when he made it to his 
cabin, he forgot for hours about a pizza he was cooking.  He had not noticed any 
forgetfulness prior to these two incidences.  Within the ensuing weeks, Larry was 
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at times not able to remember what year it was, how old he was, or what he had 
for breakfast. 
Within a year Rose began to feel anxiety, depression, and anger.  He also experienced 
isolation, repeatedly expressing wonderment at the fact that there could be so many 
people with AD in the world but that he never met one. When he did finally meet people 
with AD he stated that he felt much less alone and much less empty.  
Rose described his thoughts as being tangled and out of order.   He began to have 
tremendous difficulty making the smallest decisions, such as whether to wear boots or 
sneakers.  Eventually he began to experience anger, uncertainty, and fear that he 
described as a physical sensation in his stomach.  Rose also described many instances of 
joy, and especially humor, throughout his experience with AD.  He also stated that AD 
caused him to become more compassionate.  Like Henderson, Rose found solace in a pet.  
A little over a year after diagnosis, he bought a pig that he became very close to and 
enjoyed very much.  
The variability of Rose’s experience of AD was present throughout his account. At 
times he could travel long distances and arrive easily at his destination.  Other times he 
would get lost on his own street, forget what car he drove to get to his destination, or 
forget his phone number.  At other times he heard the phone ring, but could not identify 
what the sound meant although he knew he had heard the sound before.  He stated that at 
times he felt perfectly fine cognitively, but at other times he would become extremely 
disoriented.    
Diana Friel McGowin also suffered from early onset AD (McGowin, 1993).  It started 
when she began to notice problems with memory, make mistakes at work as a legal 
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secretary, and have difficulties with everyday activities such as cooking.  She initially 
attributed there problems to tension.  She sometimes became lost driving traveling roads 
she had traveled hundreds of times.  She told a doctor that she had to relearn directions, 
forgetting the meaning of left, right, up, and down.  She also had distortions in visual 
perception that caused her to lose her balance and began slurring her words when she 
spoke.  She quickly had periodic difficulty remembering the name of the street that she 
lived on.  One day she lost consciousness at work and this eventually led to her diagnosis 
of AD, although her primary care physician and neurologist did not initially diagnose AD 
or any other neurodegenerative impairment.     
Diana’s initial symptoms caused her significant anxiety.  She often tried to hide her 
symptoms from others.  When she did not recognize a co-worker she stated that she had a 
very bad headache.  When she did not recognize her cousin she again covered for her 
memory problems.  She pretended that she was a tourist and asked directions to places 
she had been many times.  Sometimes she had to ask for directions three or four times on 
one trip.  She visited a childhood friend whom she revered for his intelligence partly to 
see if she could successfully hide her AD-related problems from someone with high 
intellect.  Eventually she had to resign from her job and take a temporary job stating “I 
figured that no one would expect a temporary assistant to know her way around a 
building or office, nor recognize the employees on sight.  If I erred, it would seem 
natural, nothing amiss” (p. 30).  She also stated “I was playing a game of ‘I’ve got a 
secret’ with everyone, even with myself” (p. 48).
The course of McGowin’s AD was highly variable.  At times she was able to perform 
complex tasks with relative ease while at other times the simplest tasks could not be 
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performed effectively.  “One minute I was coping fine with my work.  The next, I had 
lost complete recall of whom I was speaking to on the telephone, and why” (p. 39). 
Emotionally, Diana experienced anxiety, anger, increased desire for sex, a loss of 
patience with others, guilt for no longer being able to work and hiding her diagnosis from 
some loved ones, depression, and paranoia.  She developed insomnia, lost a great deal of 
weight, and developed compulsive checking behaviors.  The desire for affection grew as 
the disease progressed and her sense of smell improved.  Eventually she felt worthless, 
especially in large groups of people.  Her love of music remained unblemished, however.  
She stated that counseling helped her cope with AD, but did not explain specific 
therapeutic techniques.  She started a support group for early onset AD, which was 
invaluable to her.  She repeatedly stated how helpful it was to have understanding of the 
experience of AD and the only people who can truly understand are others with AD.  At 
times she felt as if she was losing a grip on her existence.  This was partially due to the 
way others treated her, but also had internal sources: “I am painfully aware that less of 
me exists than the day before, for now, I can say, I am still here!  Diana McGowin 
exists!” (p. 116).      
Solace often came to McGowin through remembrance of joyful events from her past.  
She explained that memories from her past seemed especially vibrant and comforting:  
I can actually smell the aroma of the small town library where I spent so many 
childhood hours…Although I have not seen snowflakes for decades I can taste them 
on my tongue…I can experience the total, absolute quiet of a snowbound world.  
Even the bitter pain endured when warming my frozen fingers after walking to my 
piano teacher’s home becomes a bittersweet memory…Visions of first daffodils of an 
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Ohio spring float through my memory…My own voice echoes in my ears as I 
remember laughing with great glee while chasing fireflies.  (pp. 109-110).  
McGowin eventually renewed two lost friendships from childhood, and these became, 
in some ways, the most important relationships in her life after being diagnosed with AD.  
She intensely pursued a number of other past relationships as well.  She hoped that these 
people would see her as she was before she developed AD and allow her to see herself in 
that was as well. 
McGowin’s family was not emotionally supportive when she revealed her diagnosis.  
Many of them did not believe or comprehend the seriousness of it.  Others simply chose 
to ignore it.  Her own husband chided her to “rise above” the disease (p. 67).  Eventually, 
McGowin explained that the reason for their reactions was because of their differing 
understanding of the experience of the disease.  “It was as though I was standing at one 
end of a telescope and my family at the other, each peering intently into the instrument, 
each with a quite opposite perspective” (p. 97).  She did find solace in pets however, 
must notably her pet terrier.  
Surprisingly, McGowin stated that the medical and research community do not want 
individuals with AD to attempt to fight the disease or to communicate insights they have 
about the disease.  She stated that when individuals with AD are able to express their 
insight regarding the disease, that this challenges the scientific community.  By not 
giving up and slowly deteriorating into a vegetative state, McGowin stated that she and 
those like her are breaking the “mold” created by researchers of AD, and that this causes 
resentment in the scientific community.    
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Thomas Debaggio was diagnosed with AD at the age of 57 (Debaggio, 2002).  
Debaggio described his experience with AD in a variety of ways.  “I start thinking about 
something intently and then my thoughts wander through fields of memory and I bob to 
the surface suddenly and wonder for a moment who I am, and whether I have truly lost 
my mind” (p. 13).  He said that his mind cannot stay focused on one thing, that it “skitters 
from place to place” (p. 96).   “Clouded memories flit through my brain, wandering 
moments in a jumble of events only half-remembered.  Faces smiling and sullen rise 
through a mist of years” (p. 113).  He described images coming and going very quickly in 
his awareness.  At times he would have surreal experiences and feel as if he was in a 
different world that was foreign to him.  “My mind is becoming one-dimensional.  I have 
almost lost my ability to hold two thoughts simultaneously.  Along with this is the long, 
frustrating wait for the word I need in conversation” (p. 142).  He said that he became 
more aware of subtleties in his environment as his disease progressed.     
Debaggio stated that he was “ready to leap from one stone to the next in the crowded 
stream of consciousness.” (p. 46).  He hinted at the possibility that AD and its symptoms 
are often not directly in his awareness or at least not central to his awareness.  “This evil 
disease sleeps on the edge of my consciousness, always there to remind me of its wicked 
strength over me” (p. 46).   
Debaggio described a number of unusual sensory experiences that he had only after 
AD was diagnosed.  A number of these occurred before he went to sleep.  He saw 
…bouncy colored lights, mountains in fantastic colors, pictures that resemble the 
landscape of the moon seen from a slow-moving vehicle…Some nights the visual 
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pyrotechnics are so strong it is difficult to get to sleep, something that never happened 
to me before (p. 24).    
As I lay awake this morning in 4A.M. darkness, I was treated to a light show.  A
series of yellow images with edges torn in irregular patterns began to flash slowly 
before me as I stared at the wall opposite me.  They danced before my eyes as if they 
were projected on the wall but there was no source of light for them.  They could only 
be generated in my mind but they were as real as if Picasso was squirting the wall 
with random objects painted in yellow.  I lay there alone and insignificant and for 
several minutes the yellow-lit objects snapped on and off in different places on the 
wall (p. 184).   
Debaggio described similar visualizations, almost always late at night or early in the 
morning, throughout his account.  Eventually these images went away and were replaced 
by “a raw sheet-metal color that reminds me of a trashcan” (p. 99) but stated that 
sometimes he saw yellow before going to sleep.  Debaggio also had sensory experiences 
of the sidewalk moving as he walked.  He experienced other bizarre sensory experiences:  
Often when I awaken in the dusty morning light, the new day I see around me is 
patterned in tiny square checks through which I see the world.  I blink my eyes but 
the images before me remain.  It is as if I am looking close-up through an old screen 
door.  The precision of the tiny checks makes me think I am awakening in some kind 
of cell, a prisoner behind minute, rigid crisscross bars.  Before long the apparition 
disappears and the world becomes clear and normal as the sun comes up.  Is this 
another signal from the war in my brain where I am on the losing side in a battle with 
Alzheimer’s?  (p. 172).  
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In reference to verbal difficulties, Debaggio stated that “The words are under control 
but the letters that form the words squirm in their own directions” (p. 20).  He also stated, 
“Words slice through my mind so fast I cannot catch them and marry them to the eternity 
of the page” (p. 27).  “I have only a few seconds to capture a thought before it disappears 
from my mind.  Scraps of ideas flit like birds…Ideas evaporate like snowflakes on a 
warm roof” (p. 48).  Debaggio described these and similar difficulties numerous times 
throughout his account of his experience with AD.  He had difficulty writing lengthy 
passages, where he often got lost while writing and although he could see the words, he 
sometimes could not comprehend what they meant.  Within four months Debaggio 
noticed a lessened ability to recall words, a decreased vocabulary, and problems spelling 
and reading.  He had trouble naming the plants that he made a career of studying.       
Not long after diagnosis, Debaggio began having difficulties with spatial abilities, 
getting lost when attempting to travel to places he had been many times.  When sitting 
outside of his niece’s apartment, he began to think that he was not in the correct place.  
“My mind was flooded with images of another place nearby where she might be” (p. 
128).  Eventually, Debaggio had difficulty orienting himself to space or time, and had
difficulty with activities of daily living, as is expected as AD progresses.  He stated that 
before he had AD he would imagine a map when traveling to a particular destination.  
After AD, he was no longer able to use this ability.    
Debaggio’s handwriting deteriorated to the point that he could not read it.  The fine 
movements required for typing became extremely difficult as well.  He stated that his 
office became very disorganized and cluttered like his mind.  He quickly became 
obsessed with his disease and with death itself.  He stated that he became very emotional 
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as the disease progressed, only a few months after diagnosis.  Debaggio, like the other 
authors with AD, was very close to his pets.  He stated that his cats taught him patience 
and that one of the few joys he had remaining as AD progressed was playing with his 
cats.  
These first-person accounts of the experience of AD indicate a number of important 
points.  First, it appears that all of these individuals attempted to hide their symptoms as 
best they could due to the obvious anxiety and embarrassment that their new, unexplained 
cognitive difficulties caused.  Although this is an understandable reaction, these 
behaviors clearly make AD diagnosis more difficult.  Understanding the inner experience 
of individuals with AD is not only important to aid in the diagnosis of the disease, but 
also could help individuals in the early stages of the disease identify their own symptoms, 
relate them to AD, and seek help.  Second, the course was highly variable for all of these 
individuals.  The effects of AD seem to shift within moments, many times for no 
apparent reason.  Third, people around the authors of these accounts were often initially 
dismissive of their symptoms.  When first notified of the symptoms many loved ones 
encouraged the individual with AD to not worry about their symptoms.  Many times the 
same advice would be given by doctors before a diagnosis was made.  Fourth, all of these 
individuals experienced prolonged plateau phases where they experienced a stabalization 
of their symptoms.  Each author held out hope that something could be done about their 
condition and all attempted to be part of clinical drug trials, either hoping for a cure or 
being comforted by the idea that they were doing something for themselves and other 
individuals with AD.  Fifth, most of these authors found solace either in pets, music, or 
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both.  Sixth, each author had a strong desire to be understood and to understand the inner 
experience of others with AD. 
Many initial, highly tentative hypotheses about the inner experience of individuals 
can be made based on these first-person accounts.  For example, many of the authors 
reported thinking in words and images, suggesting that symbolic inner experience is 
maintained at least in some individuals with AD.  Also, there may be unusual sensory 
experiences that involve color or strong sensations. Furthermore, increases in emotional 
experiences may be part of AD.  Of course, these speculations should be taken with 
substantial skepticism as these speculations are based on only four individuals’ 
experiences and are dependent on the care with which these individuals observed their 
inner experience.       
Vascular Dementia 
Vascular Dementia (VaD) is dementia that is due to a cerebrovascular event or 
events.  Essentially, it is any type of dementia that is caused primarily by disease in 
cerebral blood vessels (Miceli, 2006).  This disease may be verified by 
neuropsychological evidence and/or evidence of a cerebrovascular event or events 
obtained from techniques such as MRI (APA, 2000).  Motor dysfunction (such as 
abnormal gait) and physical symptoms or cardiovascular problems (such as extremity 
weakness or abnormal reflexes) typically occur in VaD (APA, 2000).  Usually, lesions in 
the brains of individuals with VaD exceed what would be considered to be normal for 
their age and often exist in white matter and gray matter, as well as in sub-cortical 
structures (APA, 2000).   The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) specifies that for VaD to be 
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diagnosed there must be the presence of dementia, defined as significant memory 
impairment and either aphasia, apraxia, agnosia, or disturbances in executive functioning, 
evidence of cerebrovascular disease, and evidence that the dementia is caused by 
cardiovascular disturbance (APA, 2000).  
Many researchers have suggested that VaD represents a variety of conditions that 
have cerebrovascular pathology, as opposed to being a single entity (Libon, Price, Davis, 
& Giovannetti, 2004).  In fact, there are many subtypes of VaD, including vascular 
cognitive impairment – no dementia (a mild form of VaD still characterized by small 
deficits in a variety of areas including memory, executive function, and language; 
Nyenhuis et al., 2004); multi-infarct dementia (due to multiple cerebrovascular events; 
VaD was once classified as “multi-infarct dementia”); single-infarct dementia; and a host 
of others that are categorized by the location and type of the cerobrovascular event.  
There is also a category for mixed-dementia, which occurs when there is the presence of 
dementia due to neuropathology congruent with both VaD and AD.  
VaD is the second leading cause of dementia following AD (Roman, Erkinjutti, 
Wallin, Pantoni, & Chui, 2002; Skoog, 2004).  The prevalence of VaD is approximately 
1.5 percent in Western countries, and VaD accounts for approximately 20 to 30 percent 
of dementia cases overall (Skoog, 2004).  Risk factors for VaD are essentially the same 
as stroke, although increased age in combination with high stroke risk puts individuals at 
even greater risk for VaD (Miceli, 2006).  However, other risk factors include sex (male), 
ethnicity (Asian ethnicity increases risk), and lower educational level (Miceli, 2006).  
Cognitive difficulties associated with VaD include slow processing speed, reductions in 
executive functioning, problems with immediate memory (recognition is intact, but free 
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recall is compromised, primarily due to an inability to implement an effective retrieval 
strategy; Lezak, 1995), as well as behavioral and mood changes with a high occurrence of 
depression (Miceli, 2006).  
The presentation of VaD is highly variable among individuals and the cognitive 
deficits that manifest themselves in VaD are especially heterogeneous (Poore, Rapport, 
Fuerst, & Keenan, 2006).  The location of lesions in the brain largely determines the type 
of impairment that will be present.  In general, symptoms of VaD will correspond to the 
anatomical location of lesions in the brain (Roman et al., 2004; Cummings & Benson, 
1992).  Still, some individuals with VaD exhibit a more global dementia that is not 
necessarily location specific (Paul, Garrett, & Cohen, 2003).  Problems with executive 
function, attention, and processing speed are the most common and severe deficits 
associated with VaD (Almkvist, Backman, Basun & Wahlund., 1993).  
As with AD, there appears to be a pre-clinical phase of VaD.  Cognitive symptoms 
related to memory and executive function can often be found 3 years before stroke 
(Backman & Small, 2007).  This impairment is often very similar to the pre-clinical 
phase of AD.  One study found no difference on any cognitive measure between 
individuals with pre-clinical VaD and AD (Laukka, Jones, Small, Fratiglioni, & 
Backman, 2004).  This pre-clinical phase is likely due to problems in cerebral circulation 
that are typically present before stroke, the incident that brings on frank VaD (Backman 
& Small, 2007; Laukka et al., 2004).  
One of the primary treatments for VaD is reducing the probability of strokes and 
other cerebrovasuclar events.  Many studies have suggested the potential benefit of the 
use of acetylcholinesterase inhibitors (AChEI’s) for the treatment of VaD (see Bullock, 
88
2004), but this treatment has not yet been improved by the Federal Food and Drug 
Administration.  For example, galamantine is an AChEI that has been shown temporarily 
to improve cognition and executive function in individuals with VaD (Auchus et al., 
2007).  Donepezil, another AChEI, has also been shown to temporarily improve various 
cognitive functions including working memory and delayed recognition recall (Thomas, 
Libon, & Ledakis, 2005) as well as MMSE scores (Pratt & Perdomo, 2002).  A recent 
study supported the effectiveness of the use of reminiscence therapy with people with 
VaD for the reduction of overall cognitive problems that was maintained through a 6 
month follow-up (Tadaka & Kanagaway, 2007).  
The symptoms of VaD and AD are often very difficult to distinguish from one 
another.  There are many similarities between deficits in AD and VaD (such as 
dysfunction in memory, language, and executive function) that makes differential 
diagnosis difficult.  The highly variable presentation of VaD causes difficulty in studies 
that attempt to determine different presentations between the two groups (Braaten et al., 
2006).  Further complicating this issue is that VaD represents a wide range of conditions 
with variable neurological manifestations rather than a single neuropsychological 
disorder (Micieli, 2006).  Although VaD and AD are defined by different neurological 
abnormalities, both exhibit a substantial decrease in acetylcholine (Lojkowska et al., 
2003).  Furthermore, the presence of mixed dementia complicates differential diagnosis 
(Rockwood et al., 2000).  Overall, the utility of using neuropsychological tests to 
distinguish VaD from AD has been mixed (Villardita, 1993).  
However, there do appear to be some differences between the two disorders.  
Probably the most salient difference between individuals with VaD and individuals with 
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AD is that individuals with VaD tend to have more of a deficit in executive functioning, 
sometimes with no or little overt memory  impairment, while individuals with AD have 
more pronounced memory difficulties, especially episodic memory (Freeman et al., 
2000).  However, this finding is somewhat inconsistent (Oosterman & Scherder, 2006; 
Micieli, 2006).  A meta-analysis of WAIS subtest performance in AD and VaD 
demonstrated that individuals with VaD that is primarily due to sub-cortical lesions (one 
of the most common forms of VaD) performed worse on subtests that rely heavily on 
executive functioning (i.e., Digit Span backwards, Object Assembly, and Picture 
Arrangement), whereas individuals with AD scored significantly lower on Information, a 
test that relies heavily on semantic memory (Oosterman & Scherder, 2006).  
Another key difference between VaD and AD is that VaD typically has a sudden 
onset and progresses in a step-wise manner where decreases in functioning coincide with 
new cerebrovascular events (APA, 2000).   This is in contrast to AD, which has an 
insidious onset and typically advances as a steady decline after an initial plateau phase 
(APA, 2000).  Still, although this is one of the primary distinguishing factors that 
separate these two groups, there is substantial evidence that for many individuals VaD 
has a slow onset with a slow and steady progression (Paul et al., 2003).  
There are many other potential differences between individuals with VaD and AD 
that are not as salient.  Individuals with VaD sometimes show only mild episodic 
memory impairment or even a total absence of episodic memory impairment (Miceli, 
2006).  However, working memory is often compromised in VaD due to the executive 
component of working memory (Miceli, 2006).  Also, individuals with AD tend to have 
more difficulty with delayed memory and semantic fluency while individuals with VaD 
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tend to have more difficulty with immediate recall and phonemic fluency (Zakzanis, 
Leach, & Kaplan, 1999; Braaten et al., 2006).  
However, these differences are not consistently found in all studies.  In one study, a 
range of neuropsychological symptoms in individuals with VaD and AD were compared.  
The only differences between the presentations of the two groups were that individuals 
with AD had more sleep disturbances, appetite changes, and aberrant motor behavior 
compared to those with VaD (Fernandez-Martinez et al., 2008).  In another study no 
difference was found among individuals with AD and VaD on any neuropsychological 
measures that included tests of memory and executive function, among others (Misciagna 
et al., 2005).  At least one group of researchers has suggested that reliable differentiation 
between VaD and AD using neuropsychological measures is impossible (Almkvist et al., 
1993).  Overall, there is no consensus regarding neuropsychological differences between 
VaD and AD outside of the relatively more severe executive function dysfunction in VaD 
compared to AD and the relatively more severe memory dysfunction in AD compared to 
VaD, although this is not a universal difference.   
It is impossible to say definitively whether the inner experience of individuals with
VaD differs in some systematic way from the inner experience of individuals with AD.  
Because no research has been done to investigate the inner experience of either of these 
populations, no conclusions can be made at this point.  However, some speculations can 
be made:
1. The inner experience of individuals with VaD may be different than those with 
AD.  Because they have different underlying neuropathology, it is quite possible that they 
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have systematically different inner experience as well.  However, comparing these two 
groups may be difficult due to the presence of mixed-dementia.  
2. The inner experience of individuals with VaD will vary substantially from one 
another depending on the location of neurological damage, just as symptoms vary 
depending on location of neurological damage in VaD.  
3. Features of inner experience that are possibly affected by executive functioning 
could be substantially altered in individuals with VaD due to the relative decrease in 
executive functioning in many individuals with VaD.  For example, there may be content 
that is less goal-directed and/or future oriented than others as goal-directed behavior and 
planning for future events are primary components of executive functioning.  Likewise, 
the form of inner experience of individuals with VaD could be altered in ways that reflect 
deficits for executive functioning.  For example, inner experience could be substantially 
disorganized as executive functioning is important to intellectual and behavioral 
organization.  
In spite of these speculations, virtually nothing is known about the inner experience 
of individuals with VaD.  
Cognition in Normal Aging
“Normal aging” is commonly conceptualized as aging that occurs without the 
influence of neurodegenerative disorders such as AD, VaD, or Mild Cognitive 
Impairment (MCI).  Although major cognitive impairments are not seen in normal aging, 
aging still consists of a virtually inevitable cognitive decline (Christensen, 2001).  
Because there is such substantial variability in the type and amount of cognitive decline 
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among older individuals and because this variability increases as a function of age it is 
very difficult to obtain a uniform picture of normal aging (Christensen, 2001; Hedden & 
Gabrieli, 2004).  Furthermore, age-related cognitive decline is not linear and is domain-
specific.  Some areas of cognition improve over time, some do not decline significantly 
until very late in life, and some begin declining relatively early in adulthood.  Still, the 
most typical pattern is a slow decline until approximately age 70 with a sharper decline 
thereafter (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004).  
One of the most common problems associated with normal aging is the slowing of 
cognitive processing speed (Salthouse, 1985).  Individuals’ reaction times to external 
stimuli begins to slow fairly consistently after the age of 30 (Finch & Zelinski, 2005).  
Because there is a decrease in axonal myelin starting after age 30 and myelin is important 
to the speed with which action potentials travel through neurons it is not surprising that 
reaction time becomes slower at this point (Finch & Zelinski, 2005).  This processing 
speed deficit seems to increase steadily throughout one’s lifetime but with a sharper 
increase in older age (Christensen, 2001).  This slowing is most readily observed in 
cognitive tasks that are not automatic or overlearned (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).  
A decrease in some types of memory, perhaps most notably working memory (Haut, 
Chen, & Edwards, 1999), is natural with age.  Memory difficulties in normal aging 
appear to be primarily due to problems with attention which adversely affects encoding 
(Craik, 1986).  In tasks that require a high amount of attention older individuals have 
more difficulty encoding episodic memories.  When attentional demands are low, older 
individuals encode episodic information as well as younger individuals (Blanchet, 
Belleville, & Peretz, 2006).  Likewise, when to-be-remembered information is presented 
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at a high rate, age-related deficiencies in memory increase suggesting encoding slows as 
a function of age (Arenberg, 1982; Poon & Siegler, 1991). 
There appear to be storage and retrieval deficiencies that are related to age as well 
(Mejia, Pineda, Alvarez, & Ardila, 1998), although there is less of a consensus in this 
area.  Forgetting slopes appear to remain relatively stable as people age, suggesting that 
storage and retrieval are relatively free of age-related cognitive decline (Trahan & 
Larrabee, 1992).  However, free recall, compared to recognition, is much more 
diminished in normal aging compared to recognition suggesting some retrieval problems 
(Craik, 1987).  Likewise, the tip-of-the tongue phenomenon is much more pronounced in 
older individuals compared to younger individuals suggesting a retrieval deficit (Ramsay, 
Nicholas, Au, Obler, & Albert, 1999; Shafto, Burke, Stamatakis, Tam, & Tyler, 2007).  
There also appears to be a global slowing of retrieval in older individuals (Poon & 
Siegler, 1991). 
There is typically a global decrease in executive functioning in older individuals (for 
a review, see Treitz, Heyder, & Daum, 2007).  Problems related to executive functioning 
typically observed in older individuals include problems with inhibition (Pignatti et al., 
2005; Treitz et al., 2007), divided attention, attentional switching (especially when there 
is high cognitive demand; Baddeley et al., 1991; Ramsden et al., 2008), perseveration 
(Ridderinkhof, Span, & van der Molan, 2002), and task management (Treitz et al., 2007; 
Pignatti et al., 2005).  Significant deficiencies in executive functioning have even been 
found in individuals with perfect scores on the MMSE (Royall, Chiodo, & Polk, 2000).  
Decreases in executive functioning seem to progress in a stable linear fashion throughout 
aging (Royall, Palmer, Chiodo, & Polk, 2004).  As executive functioning is primarily 
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controlled by the frontal lobes decreases in executive functioning are expected as the 
frontal lobes are selectively atrophied in older individuals (Coffey, Wilkinson, Weiner, & 
Parashos, 1993).    
There is substantial variability regarding linguistic decline in older individuals.  
Although vocabulary tends to increase with age, other functions decline.  For example, 
the tip-of-the-tongue effect represents linguistic retrieval problems and is pronounced in 
old age.  Likewise, naming objects and word finding problems are somewhat common in 
normal aging (Balthazar, Cendes, & Damasceno, 2008).  Processing of both written and 
spoken language slows with age as well (Just & Carpenter, 1992).  Essentially, as 
individuals age their storage of lexical and semantic information increases but their 
ability to retrieve this information, produce it phonologically, and learn new linguistic 
information decreases (Shafto et al., 2007).    
Other common cognitive problems related to normal aging include a decrease in fluid 
intelligence, difficulty solving everyday problems (Poon & Siegler, 1991), slower 
processing speed of effortful non-automatic cognitive functions (Salthouse, 1985; 
Cronholm & Schalling, 1987), maintenance and manipulation of information in working 
memory (Ridderkinhof et al., 2002), attentional switching (for a review see Hedden & 
Gabrieli, 2004),  problem solving (especially complicated problems; Cronholm & 
Schalling, 1987), slower performance on mental rotation tasks (Inagaki et al., 2002), and 
the learning of abstract words and ideas (Trahan & Larrabee, 1992).  One study tested 
orientation, memory, language, attention, abstract thought, praxis, and perception in older 
individuals and found declines in all areas (Cullum et al., 2000).  Most individuals in this 
study exhibited at least some decline on at least three of these domains.  
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Not all areas of cognitive functioning are adversely affected by age.  Crystallized 
intelligence actually tends to increase with age, although it may decrease somewhat in 
extremely old ages (Christensen, 2001).  Many aspects of memory and knowledge tend to 
stay stable over time including sensory memory, remote memory, autobiographical 
memory, semantic knowledge, semantic memory, and vocabulary (Hedden & Gabrieli, 
2004; Poon & Siegler, 1991; Huppert 1991; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz, & 
Delazer, 2008).  Also, well-learned, implicit, and intuitive skills tend to be highly 
resistant to aging (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004; Poon & Siegler, 1991).  A variety of studies 
have also demonstrated that older individuals make very good use of cues and external 
aids to help memory retrieval (Bäckman & Small, 1998; Giffard, Desgranges, Kerrouche, 
Piolino, & Eustache, 2003; Karlsson, Adolfsson, Börjesson, & Nilsson, 2003).  However, 
internal aids to memory such as mnemonic devices are not used very well by older people 
in general (Wegesin, Jacobs, Zubin, Ventura, & Stern, 2000).    
Neurology in Normal Aging
The human brain goes through numerous natural and expected changes throughout 
the lifetime losing a significant amount of its mass and volume as people get older.  
Significant synaptic loss and loss of brain volume typically begins between the ages of 30 
and 55 (Finch & Zelinski, 2005).  This loss of brain volume typically accelerates as 
people get older.  There is an average of zero to two percent brain atrophy per year 
between the ages of 30 and 50 while the atrophy rate increases to three to five percent 
between the ages of 70 and 80 (Fox, Shahill, Crum, & Rosser, 1999).       
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However, the progressive loss of brain volume is non-linear and varies by brain 
region (Fox & Schott, 2004).  The largest age-related volume loss occurs in the pre-
frontal cortex of the brain (Coffey et al., 1993).  An average volume loss of 17 percent 
occurs in the frontal lobes from ages 20 to 80 (Haug et al., 1983).  Another estimate 
suggests that volume in the frontal lobes decreases an average of 8.9 percent per decade
over the age of 65 (Van Petten et al., 2004).  Likewise, glucose metabolism significantly 
decreases in the frontal lobes as people age (Haut et al., 1999).  The frontal lobes are not 
the only parts of the brain that are affected by aging, but it is the area that is consistently 
affected the most.  
Selective neuronal loss in the frontal lobes is also demonstrated on neurocognitive 
assessment tools.  West (1996) used these tests to develop a frontal lobe aging hypothesis 
that suggests that age-related cognitive decline is primarily due to atrophy in the frontal 
lobes and accompanying cognitive impairment associated with the frontal lobes.  Many 
researchers have replicated this pattern (e.g. Parkin & Java, 1999) and a meta-analysis of 
studies assessing age-related cognitive decline demonstrated that the primary cognitive 
decline in aging is due to frontal lobe dysfunction (Parkin & Walter, 1992).  Age-related 
frontal-lobe dysfunction is perhaps most apparent via the significant problems that older 
individuals have in tasks that rely heavily on executive functioning (West 1996).  
Manipulation and maintenance of information in working memory, skills that rely heavily 
on the frontal lobes, are also significantly depleted in older individuals who age normally 
(Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004).  Furthermore, tasks that rely heavily on the frontal lobes 
show more frontal lobe activation in older adults suggesting the need for increased use in 
coping skills in these tasks (Cabeza, 2002).  
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Methodological Problems in Normal Aging Research
There are many methodological difficulties that are unique to normal aging research 
that could lead to misleading results and interpretations of cognition in elderly 
individuals.  One of the primary difficulties is the fact that subtle changes in cognition in 
individuals with neurodegenerative disorders occur well before they can be reliably 
detected.  Therefore, individuals with MCI or pre-clinical dementia are often included in 
studies of normal aging thus causing an overestimation of cognitive decline in the normal 
elderly (Sliwinski, Lipton, Buschke, & Stewart, 1996).  Furthermore, it is estimated that 
up to 20 percent of older individuals in the “normal” adult control groups may be in the 
early stages of AD (Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998). Another difficulty is that results from 
longitudinal studies of aging and cross-sectional studies of aging yield results that are 
consistently and systematically different.  Results from cross-sectional studies typically 
indicate greater cognitive decline than in longitudinal studies (Finch & Zelinski, 2005; 
Christensen, 2001).  It is possible that longitudinal studies underestimate decline due to 
learning effects (Christensen, 2001) while cross-sectional studies are vulnerable to cohort 
effects that could affect results (Finch & Zelinski, 2005).  
Inner Experience in Normal Aging
There has thus far been very little research investigating the conscious experience of 
older individuals.  Most of the research related to the experience of older individuals 
focuses on things such as attitudes, aspirations, motivations, fears, and internal conflicts 
that could affect the conscious experience of older individuals but are not direct 
manifestations of conscious experience (for a review, see Abrams, 2007). For example, 
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Freud believed that individuals over the age of 50 are mentally inflexible.  Jung 
hypothesized that older individuals have little conscious conflict and do not limit their 
conscious experience to societally-imposed limits.  Erikson viewed the primary conflict 
of older age as a battle between despair and ego integrity where an individual finds 
happiness and comfort in finding meaning and spirituality.  Although none of these 
theorists sought to explain how these characteristics manifest in conscious experience, 
one might postulate a lack of variability in content or form of inner experience, little 
content in inner experience involving conflict or societal rules, or despair or spiritual 
content as a theme of inner experience, respectively.  Many other theorists have formed 
their own hypotheses regarding themes of experience in older individuals but do not 
address conscious experience directly.  
Although there are many different theories espoused by many different theorists 
regarding common characteristics and conflicts in the minds of older individuals, there 
are some themes that are common across many of these theories.  For example, 
psychodynamic theories of aging have many themes, including dealing with and 
integrating grief and loss, conflicts between attachment and disengagement as 
relationships are altered and lost, maintenance of self-identity, a changing self-identity 
that is based more on the past, maintenance of self-esteem and narcissistic gratification, 
and dealing with the inevitability of death (for a review, see Cath & Sadavoy, 1991).  
Many other theorists suggest that older individuals contemplate meaning and spirituality 
more than younger individuals and focus more on reminiscence than planning for the 
future.  Still, the fact remains that there has been very little empirical research and very 
little discussion that focuses on the manifest conscious experience of older individuals.   
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At this point only broader characteristics and conflicts like those discussed above have 
been studied. 
The research that does exist regarding the inner experience of older individuals has 
focused primarily on emotional experience.  The research in this area suggests that the 
ability to process emotional experience remains throughout normal aging (Abrams, 
2007).  Some research has demonstrated that the experience of emotions may change in 
later life however. In a study by Gross et al. (1997) older individuals reported fewer 
experiences of negative emotion and more control over their emotional experiences 
compared to their younger counterparts.  Furthermore, there is evidence that older 
individuals pay more attention to their positive emotional experiences than their negative 
emotional experiences (Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003).
One study investigated the experience of individuals who had aged normally when 
they were feeling particularly passionate about life (Abrams, 2007).  This study used 
retrospective interviews as an attempt to gain an unbiased depiction of the experience of 
being passionate about life in old age.  Although this study was not aimed directly at 
manifest conscious experience and most participant reports focused on general themes 
such as the importance of attitude and humor, some participants in the study described 
elements of manifest conscious experience. For example, individuals described the 
experience of weightlessness, lacking worries or cares, being lost in one’s inner world, 
and the absence of thought.  One theme that arose regarding conscious experience across 
the participants was having greater access to one’s feeling states when feeling passionate 
about life.  These feelings often involved self-contentment, exhilaration, self-
transcendence, and a feeling of increased connection with the cosmos.   
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Another study that investigated the inner experience of older individuals focused on 
daydreaming throughout the lifespan (Giambra, 2000).  This study used retrospective 
self-reports that asked people of various ages to analyze the frequency and characteristics 
of their daydreams.  The results from this study suggest that daydreaming decreases with 
age, with a sharp drop from the age group consisting of 76 to 81 year-olds to 82 to 87 
year-olds.  Likewise, absorption in one’s daydreams and the emotion contained in 
daydreams appears to decrease with age.  Many characteristics of images in daydreams 
also appear to decrease, including image generation, maintenance, and transformation. 
Inner Experience Research 
Unfortunately, the history of psychology is fraught with methodological difficulties 
pertaining to introspection and the study of inner experience in general.  Perhaps the 
earliest difficulty with introspection-based methodology involved the dispute over 
imageless thought between German psychologists using introspective techniques to study 
inner experience and American psychologists (led by E.B. Titchener) using similar 
techniques. Monson and Hurlburt (1993) showed that the debate between these two 
groups was over the interpretation of their findings not the content of their findings.  At a 
purely descriptive level, these two groups had discovered the same thing, namely 
thoughts that had no manifest imaginal content.  The difference between these two groups 
lies in the interpretation of the findings.  Unfortunately, because these introspectionists 
could not agree on such a simple matter, reports of inner experience and introspective 
methodology were largely discredited and careful scientific study of inner experience was 
mostly abandoned (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001).  
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The general lack of acceptance of introspective methods has remained for almost a 
century.  One reason that introspection is so important yet so controversial today is due to 
the paradox of introspection described by Schooler and Schreiber (2004).  While it is 
impossible to deny the existence of inner experience it is impossible to observe it directly 
and thus study it empirically.  Because inner experience is not fit for direct observation or 
empirical study, most psychologists have abandoned its study and introspective 
methodology in general (Schooler & Schreiber, 2004).
Fortunately, psychology can contribute a great deal to the understanding of why the 
original introspection movement failed.  Hurlburt, Heavey, and Seibert (2006) identified 
fifteen guidelines for effective introspective research.  These guidelines are informed by 
what psychology has learned about effective introspective methodology over the past 
century.  The guidelines include remaining skeptical about introspective reports, 
introspecting with little delay, introspecting very brief, concrete moments, disturbing 
experience as little as possible when introspecting, introspecting in natural situations, and 
not requiring too much of participants who are introspecting including asking participants 
to infer causation for the contents of their awareness.   
Although Hurlburt et al. (2006) may give the most thorough prescription for the 
successful investigation of inner experience, other authors have recognized the 
importance of some of the above guidelines.  For example, Hnatiuk (1991) believed that 
sampling methods used as a means of introspection can be especially useful because they 
require little delay between recording of the inner experience and the reporting of that 
experience thus minimizing inaccuracies.  Furthermore, reports of inner experience in the 
natural environment are often possible in sampling methods, and thus yield data that are 
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ecologically valid (Hnatiuk, 1991).  Klinger (1978) suggested that two keys in attempting 
to accurately study inner experience is to eliminate the use of memory as much as 
possible and to ask individuals to describe discrete experiences rather than provide 
generalizations.  
There remains a divide today among psychologists regarding the study of inner 
experience (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001; 2004).  On one side of the divide there are 
psychologists who believe that studying inner experience is quite easy and very 
important.  The belief that it is fairly easy to obtain accurate reports of inner experience is 
most readily observed in cognitive realms of psychology, especially cognitive 
psychotherapy (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001).  Cognitive psychotherapy is largely based on 
the introspection of the client, including things such as recording thoughts (i.e., inner 
experience) and questioning maladaptive beliefs.  However, if researchers are under the 
assumption that introspection is easy and that people can report their inner experiences 
with little or no difficulty, then scientists subject their research to a substantial amount of
potential error (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2004).   
Scientific studies of inner experience have found that people are often mistaken about 
their own inner experience when asked to describe it in a cavalier fashion without the use 
of systematic investigation.  One systematic investigation of inner experience showed 
that an individual had multiple simultaneous cognitions although she was not aware that 
she had multiple simultaneous cognitions before the study began (Hurlburt 1993; 
Hurlburt, 1997).  Hurlburt and Sipprelle (1978) presented a case of a man with free-
floating anxiety who had angry thoughts toward his children, but had no awareness that 
he had these thoughts prior to undergoing a thought sampling procedure.  
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The assumption that individuals can easily report their inner experience accurately 
without the aid of systematic methodology has permeated cognitive psychotherapy.  This 
assumption has come to dominate diagnostic methodology used today.  That is, the 
clinical interview is often used as the basis of clinical diagnosis, yet it is insufficient in 
gaining an understanding of the actual experience of individuals (deVries & Delespaul, 
1989).      
Hurlburt, Koch, and Heavey (2002) stated that there are four assumptions in the 
cognitive model that are related to introspection and inner experience: behavior and 
thinking influence one another, individuals have the ability to introspect their thoughts, 
individuals can introspect accurately, and individuals can change they way they think.  
These assumptions dominate current cognitive psychotherapy and potentially lead to 
misunderstandings regarding the true nature of people’s inner experience.
Whereas cognitive psychotherapy represents one side of the divide that says that 
investigating inner experience is trivially easy, the other side states that inner experience 
cannot be studied at all due to the fact that inner experience is not directly observable.  
This is most readily observable in the theoretical framework of behavioral psychologists 
and scientists who believe that psychology is limited to the study of behavior (Hurlburt & 
Heavey, 2001).  Many studies have suggested that it is very difficult for individuals to 
accurately describe their inner experience.  For example, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have 
shown that it is extremely difficult for individuals to draw accurate conclusions regarding 
the motives underlying their overt behavior.  These authors concluded on the basis of 
their studies that nearly all introspective reports are unreliable and cannot be used as a 
basis for scientific research due to their substantial inaccuracy.  Nisbett and Wilson’s 
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(1977) study has greatly influenced the side of the divide that denies the utility of all 
introspective research.  
Although Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) influential study discredits nearly all 
introspective reports, they did allow a small caveat with regard to the successful study of 
inner experience.  They stated that if individuals could be cued to pay direct attention to 
their inner experience as it was occurring and could be trained to accurately report on 
their inner experience at the point of this interruption then accurate reports of inner 
experience could be possible.  
There is one method that follows Nisbett and Wilson’s prescription and is also 
designed to incorporate what psychological science has learned about reports of inner 
experience in the last 100 years in order to avoid the pitfalls that destroyed introspection.  
This method is Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) developed by Hurlburt (1990; 
1993).  DES was created specifically to provide accurate descriptions of inner experience 
(Hurlburt et al., 2002) and to overcome the pitfalls that plagued, and eventually doomed, 
the introspective enterprise a century ago.  
DES has five main features that make it a useful methodology for gaining an accurate 
representation of peoples’ inner experience.  First, it simply asks participants to describe 
their inner experience rather than interpret it.  As Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have shown, 
individuals often have difficulty accurately giving reasons for their behavior or inner 
experience.  Second, experience is defined as broadly as possible and encapsulates 
whatever participants report to be directly in their awareness at a randomly sampled 
moment.  Whatever happens to be in an individual’s awareness is what DES is interested 
in.  DES is not interested in any pre-determined content or form of inner experience but 
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instead focuses on what is present in an individual’s awareness at a randomly sampled 
moment regardless of what is in awareness (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2004).  Third, DES uses 
random sampling in order to gain the most accurate contents of an individual’s everyday 
awareness.  Fourth, it investigates the participant’s inner experience in his or her natural 
environment, thus providing ecological validity to the method.  Finally, the DES 
procedure is not a hypothesis testing procedure and therefore allows for the pure 
investigation of inner experience, unclouded by preconceived theories about what a 
particular individual’s or group’s experience might be like.  
DES uses a beeper that randomly signals participants.  Participants are instructed to 
note any aspects of inner experience that were ongoing at the moment of the beep such as 
thoughts, feelings, perceptions, etc. and to jot down characteristics of those sampled 
moments in a notebook. During an initial instructional interview, participants are often 
given the metaphor that they should view the process of capturing what is in their 
awareness at the moment of the beep as taking a picture.  Just as a photograph captures or 
freezes a moment in time, so too should the beep capture or freeze a moment in 
awareness or consciousness. After six or eight samples have been collected in what is 
typically a two to three hour period, the participant meets with the investigator for an 
extended interview about those samples.  This interview typically occurs either the same 
day as the samples were collected or the next day in order to minimize the effects of 
memory distortion that come with time.  The interview itself is unstructured in that there 
are no specific questions or goals other than to allow the individual to describe accurately 
and fully the contents of their inner experience at the moment of the beep.  These 
interviews typically last about one hour.  The participant is in no way asked to interpret 
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their inner experience or intuit motives for their experience.  They are simply asked to 
describe its contents.  
This sample and interview process is then repeated the next day and then repeated on 
subsequent days until an adequate number of samples are obtained.  Typically 
participants collect approximately six samples each day.  Many times, due to the length 
of many interviews, not all six beeps are discussed during a given interview.   This 
procedure is typically repeated for about four to six days for a total of about 25 samples, 
although this number can vary substantially.  
Typically, participants in the DES method need some level of training in order to 
accurately describe their inner experience.  The requirement of a training period is not 
only intuitively supported in DES work, but also suggested by other researchers to 
increase the accuracy of introspections (Schooler & Schreiber, 2004).  Furthermore, 
participants are often initially unprepared regarding the level of detail of each sampled 
experience that the interviewer is investigating.  Therefore, participants are often unable 
to describe their experiences in adequate detail during the first interview.  For these 
reasons, the contents of the first interview day are often not used and the first day is 
typically viewed as a day of training.  However, some participants may be proficient 
enough during the first day that analysis of the first day is possible.       
DES has been used to shed light on a number of important psychological phenomena 
related to inner experience.  DES has proven to be effective in uncovering many 
cognitive peculiarities in many psychological disorders including anxiety, Asperger’s 
Syndrome, borderline personality disorder, bulimia nervosa, depression, hypomania and 
schizophrenia (Hurlburt 1990, 1993, 1997).  For example, DES has suggested that at least 
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some individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome think almost entirely in images or have no 
inner experience at all (Hurlburt, Happe’, & Frith, 1994).  Results from DES have shown
that at least one individual with borderline personality disorder had multiple, complex, 
simultaneous “cognitions” (Hurlburt, 1993; Hurlburt, 1997).  These studies suggest that 
individuals with different diagnoses have substantially different inner experience and that 
different diagnoses may have an inner experience with a specific “signature” (Hurlburt et 
al., 2002).  Even individuals who exhibit a seemingly mundane behavioral characteristic 
may have characteristics of inner experience that are linked to that behavior.  For 
example, Hurlburt et al. (2002) found that individuals who had a high rate of speech had 
complex inner experience compared to others that was characterized by the consistent 
presence of simultaneous, multiple cognitions.  
DES has identified a number of common forms of inner experience (Hurlburt 1990; 
1993).  The five most common forms are:  
1.  Inner Speech – The experience of speaking in one’s own voice (but internally) that 
includes characteristics of typical external speech, such as pitch, pauses, inflection, etc.  
This is a very common characteristic although there is a significant amount of variability 
among individuals, with some individuals experiencing no inner speech and others 
experiencing it very frequently.        
2.  Inner Seeing – The experience of seeing something internally that is not present 
externally.  The internal seeing may or may not have the characteristics of the actual 
external object.  Typically, the internal seeing has characteristics of external vision (this 
is generally supported by research, Schooler & Schreiber, 2004; i.e., center is more in 
focus and more attention is paid to the center, no obvious edge or border, etc.) but not 
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always.  The DES method has found that individuals can have no inner seeings or have 
over 50 percent of their sampled experiences contain inner seeings (Hurlburt et al., 1994).  
3.  Unsymbolized Thinking – The experience of having a thought without that 
thought being represented in symbols such as words or images.  The participant is 
typically sure that there was a thought at the time of the beep but states that it did not 
occur in words, images, or any other symbols.  For example, a participant might say that 
“I was having a thought about my mother and how good it feels to be at home with her 
but I wasn’t thinking of it in words or images or having a feeling about it or anything but 
I was definitely thinking it.”  Some individuals report never having this form of 
experience while others report it in more than 50 percent of their samples (Hurlburt et al., 
1994).  
4.  Feeling – The experience of having an emotion of any kind.  These are often 
located somewhere in the body but not always.  Again, individuals can report no 
experiences of feelings or over 50 percent of an individual’s samples can contain feelings 
(Hurlburt et al., 1994).  
5.  Sensory Awareness – The experience of either having an experience that is 
perceptual in nature (such as feeling heat on the skin) or focusing on the physical 
properties of an external object (such as paying particular attention to the blueness of the 
sky).  
There are many other forms of experience that are less common.  Here is a 
description of some of these forms:  
1. Worded Thinking – The experience of explicit words that are not internally or 
externally spoken, heard, or seen.  
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2. Inner Hearing – The experience of innerly hearing but not actually producing the 
sound.  
3. Imageless Seeing – The experience of innerly seeing something but the visual 
component of that something is not directly in awareness.  
4. Feeling (Fact of Body) – When a feeling is present but not actually in awareness.  
5. Just Doing (Talking, Reading, Laughing etc.) – Perfoming a behavior that is not in 
awareness.  
There is also a category called multiple awareness.  This is the experience of 
simultaneously having more than one experience where each experience is disconnected 
and unrelated to the other(s).  For example, experiencing two unrelated inner seeings 
simultaneously or experiencing sensory awareness simultaneously with unrelated inner 
speech.  
Other researchers have used various sampling methods to divide inner experience in 
different ways than those listed above.  For example, many researchers have studied the 
“directedness” of thought, operant vs. respondent thought, task-irrelevant vs. task-related 
thought, fanciful vs. realistic thought, and well-integrated vs. fused thought (Klinger, 
1978).  However, these conceptualizations of thought are largely theory driven whereas 
the forms of thought outlined by Hurlburt (1990; 1993) are based on observations that are 
independent of any particular theoretical framework.
DES is not the only sampling method that is used to excavate the inner experience of 
people.  Another method that systematically attempts to study the inner experience of 
people is the experience sampling method (ESM).  ESM was designed specifically to 
obtain ecologically valid data regarding individuals’ experiences across a wide variety of 
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settings (Hormuth, 1986; Punzo & Miller, 2002; Prescott, Csikszentmihalyi, & Graef, 
1981) and attempts to obtain a representative sample of a person’s or population’s daily 
experience and social settings (deVries, 1992; deVries, Dijkman-Caes, Delespaul, 1990).  
Although no single person can be credited with the development of ESM, Scollon, Kim-
Prieto, & Diener (2003) credit Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues with the earliest study 
that resembles the current use of ESM.  ESM has become increasingly popular since its 
initial development in the 1970s (Scollon et al., 2003).  
ESM requires participants to fill out questionnaires repeatedly in their natural 
environment when signaled by a quasi-random pager, adding ecological validity to the 
precision of questionnaires (Hektner & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).  ESM questionnaires 
can be tailored to investigate what the researcher is interested in investigating including 
mood, thoughts, behavior, environment, any combination of these, or any specific aspects 
of these.  
Although a number of experience questionnaires may be used, the one most 
commonly used is based on the MMSE and evaluates an individual’s cognition, mood, 
motivation, and psychopathology (deVries, 1992).  Typically, questions are rated by 
participants on a 7-point Likert scale (Punzo & Miller, 2002).  There are typically 40 or 
more items per questionnaire and participants fill out approximately 30 to 50 
questionnaires during the course of the study (Hektner & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).  
Typically, individuals are asked to record their experience from 4 to 20 times a day 
over a week-long period, although the frequency of beeps and length of the study may 
vary (deVries et al., 1990).  The participants’ questionnaire data are then analyzed and 
are often grouped so researchers can analyze experiences in specific environmental 
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situations, individuals, or individuals in specific environmental situations (Hormuth, 
1986).  
ESM has been used to study a wide variety of populations, environmental situations, 
and behavioral and psychological phenomena (for a review, see Hektner & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).  For example, Hillbrand and Bradley (1994) used ESM in a 
study that demonstrated that convicted sex offenders had significantly more sexual 
thoughts and thoughts involving anger towards women than did controls.  deVries et al. 
(1990) used ESM to perform a study where depressed individuals tended to experience an 
increase in rumination and a decrease in focused thoughts while in public.  A study 
conducted by Gauvin and Szabo (1992) used ESM where regular exercisers reported an 
increase in physical symptoms after a one week break in exercise.  ESM has been used to 
study the distance from which individuals use computers, read, and do other work 
involving close visual inspection (Rah, Mitchell, Bullimore, Mutti, & Zadnik, 2001).  
Prescott et al. (1981) used ESM to demonstrate differences between age groups and their 
experience, gender and their experiences, a relationship between subjective experience 
and setting (i.e., work, transportation, and recreation/home), and an interaction between 
age groups and these settings.  deVries, Delespaul, and Dijkman-Caes (1992) used ESM 
to study the relationship between depression and anxiety.  ESM has also been used to 
study patterns of experience, fluctuations in experience and symptomatology, and how 
these patterns and fluctuations related to psychological diagnoses (deVries et al., 1990).  
ESM has also made important discoveries regarding the relationship between 
schizophrenia and environment.  Individuals with schizophrenia felt best when they were 
with one to three other people, whereas they felt the worst when they were either alone or 
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in groups that contained more than three other people (deVries & Delespaul, 1989).  This 
is an important finding that can inform group treatment practices and the structure of 
residential treatment for individuals with schizophrenia.                
Participants appear generally to comply with ESM and find the difficulty of the task 
to be minimal (Punzo & Miller, 2002; Hormuth, 1986).   However, there is difficulty at 
times responding to the beeper on time or responding at all (Hormuth, 1986).  Because 
ESM requires participants to carry the beeper for all waking hours, individuals are often 
caught in situations when they cannot carry the beeper (for example, while swimming) 
(Hormuth, 1986; Prescott et al., 1981) or cannot respond to the questionnaire 
immediately (for example, while performing a difficult task at work) (Hormuth, 1986).  
Participants in studies using ESM typically do not respond to beeps 15 to 20 percent of 
the time (Rah et al., 2001).  
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1987) have argued for the validity of ESM.  They 
stated that ESM has shown that people’s experiences correlate in expected ways with 
environment and that people from varying clinical populations also vary in their ESM 
data.  That is, individuals in different diagnostic categories can be consistently 
differentiated through the use of ESM (deVries, 1992).  Furthermore, there is typically an 
average to strong relationship between data obtained from ESM and data obtained from 
standard summary questionnaires (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hormuth, 1986).  
Convergent validity has been shown via correlating data from ESM and physiological 
measures (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 1995).  Questionnaires, procedures for instruction, 
and data analysis have been validated on a total that exceeds 1,000 participants (deVries, 
1992).  
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Scollon et al. (2003) have catalogued the strengths of ESM.  These strengths include 
the ability to understand how behavior, affect, and cognition vary as a function of 
environmental circumstances, increased ecological validity, increased idiographic 
understanding, avoidance of many of the difficulties related to introspective reports based 
on memory, and the ability to supplement data obtained by more traditional means such 
as personality tests and self-report measures that rely on global recall.  Furthermore, ESM 
avoids error-prone retrospection and allows individuals more room in describing their 
experience than classic self-report measures (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 1995).  Klinger 
and Kroll-Mensing (1995) pointed out numerous weaknesses to the method, such as lack 
of motivation on the part of the participant, difficulty completing the task, limitation to 
certain populations, reduction in data quality as the study continues, participant selection 
of when to comply with the signal, inability of participants to respond to signal 
immediately, reactivity, differences in time frame for reporting, and a host of data 
analysis difficulties.   The authors concluded that ESM is beneficial and can help aid 
research, especially when researchers are aware of the weaknesses inherent in the 
method.   
Another method that is similar to DES and ESM is the thought sampling method.  An 
early version of thought sampling asked participants to record answers to questions about 
their external environment and mood in a notebook at random intervals (Brandstatter, 
1978; Hurlburt, 1979).  The thought sampling method signals participants to respond to a 
questionnaire regarding their inner experience and to spontaneously report their inner 
experience at the time of the signal (Klinger, 1978-79).  In many of these experiments, 
individuals repeatedly fill out the Thought-Sampling Questionnaire when prompted by a 
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random or quasi-random beeper.  The Thought Sampling Questionnaire measures 
experience on a number of dimensions including the sharpness, vividness, and detail of 
mental imagery, modalities of thought (verbal, imagery, etc.), spontaneity, fancifulness, 
controllability, time orientation, and extent of attention being paid to the external 
environment at the time of the beep (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 1995).  Furthermore, it 
allows for both free responses on the part of the participants with regard to their 
experience as well as experimenter-designed questions designed to assess specific aspects 
of experience that are of particular interest to the experimenter (Klinger & Kroll-
Mensing, 1995).  
This method may also call for individuals simply to record their experience when
prompted (Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980; Klinger, 1984; Davis & Johnson, 1983-84)
where experimenters later analyze the content of these reports to excavate features that 
are of interest to the experimenters.  For example, individuals in one study were
prompted by a quasi-random beep while taking an exam in order to study the experience 
of test anxiety.  When the beep occurred, the participants were simply instructed to record 
their thoughts on a sheet of paper (Klinger, 1984).  In another study, basketball players 
reported their last thought whenever they exited the game for substitution and at quasi-
random times while sitting on the bench (Klinger, Barta, & Glas, 1981). 
Think-aloud methods are also used to study the experience of people.  In this method 
individuals are simply asked to speak out loud what they are thinking, reporting on their 
inner experience as it is occurring (Klinger, 1978).  Individuals are often asked to 
perform a task (such as solving a puzzle or performing a logic problem) and to verbalize 
out loud what they are thinking while they are performing the task (Klinger, 1974).  
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Although this method has the advantage of immediacy, it has a number of disadvantages, 
including the fact that it feels unnatural to most participants, the participant is limited in 
what he or she can report at a given time, and that it may influence the content of 
individuals’ inner experience (Klinger, 1978). 
Diary methods are also used to collect reports of individuals’ experiences.  Diary 
methods are different from other thought sampling methods in that individuals can record 
their experience in general over a longer period of time (as long as a month) or at an 
instant as with other sampling methods (Hedges, Krantz, Contrada, & Rozanski, 1990).  
Diaries are often structured so that participants report on specific activities, cognitions, 
emotions, etc. that the researcher is interested in studying.  For example, Hedges et al. 
(1990) have developed a diary that asks participants to record when they were engaged in 
a number of behavioral activities (i.e., driving, eating, recreation, etc.) and cognitive 
activities (i.e., thinking, planning, daydreaming, etc.).  Participants using this diary would 
record how long they were engaged in the activity, where they were, and would make a 
new entry every time their activity changes.  Validity for this diary was established by the 
fact that observers keeping simultaneous diaries on a participant correlated highly with 
the entries made by the participant.  Furthermore, the entries of individuals working a 
white-collar job were much different during their time at the workplace than on the 
weekend.  
Articulated Thoughts During Simulated Situations (ATSS) is a thought sampling 
technique that was developed by Davison, Robins, and Johnson (1983).  ATSS requires 
participants to listen to a simulated recording of a conversation and to imagine that they 
are actually involved in the social interaction that they are hearing.  They are told that the 
116
experimenters are interested in what is in their awareness as they imagine they are 
involved in this social interaction.  Participants listen to these recordings for 15 to 25 
seconds and are then given 30 seconds to write down what was in their awareness during 
the previous segment.  This process is repeated at the discretion of the experimenter.  
Time-budgeting studies are similar to the methods listed above, although they are 
geared more toward a person’s behavioral activity rather than mental activity.  In these 
studies, participants typically use diaries to record how often they are engaged in a 
particular activity, how long they are engaged in these activities, and the environment in 
which they engaged in these activities (deVries, 1992).  
The above methods have collectively yielded some important results to introspection-
based methodology in general.  First, participants find the tasks minimally intrusive and 
not very difficult (Hormuth, 1986; Hurlburt, 1979).  Second, the results of experience 
sampling studies often show that individuals’characterizations of their experiences before 
undergoing these studies often differ substantially from the actual data produced from the 
study, suggesting that individuals are not very good at giving general characterizations 
regarding their own experience (Hurlburt, 1979).  Furthermore, thought sampling 
methods can be both therapeutic for participants and “microdiagnostic” in that they can 
discover specific cognitive activity that is related to symptomatology (Klinger & Kroll-
Mensing, 1995).  
One thing that sets experience sampling procedures apart from classic assessments is 
that they do not rely on recall and generalizations, processes that are highly prone to 
distortion (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 1995).  Furthermore, participants may vary greatly 
in the way they interpret items on a self-report inventory thus producing data that do not 
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represent the experiences of individuals in a consistent manner (Klinger & Kroll-
Mensing, 1995).  
Of course, determining the reliability and validity of sampling techniques is limited, 
as it is with more traditional methods of inquiring about inner experience (i.e., depression 
inventories, personality tests, etc.; Hurlburt, 1997).  In these measures it is impossible to 
directly validate individuals’ reports of their inner experience.  That is, validation of an 
internal, non-public event simply cannot occur.  Rather, the method of reporting inner 
experience can be the only thing validated, not the inner experience itself (Hurlburt, 
1997).  However, this is true whether the method is sampling inner experience, asking 
questions about inner experience in an interview, personality assessment, depression 
inventory, etc.  Nevertheless, Hurlburt and Heavey (2002) have established that 
independent observers reliably agree in their classification of the five major forms of 
inner experience discovered by DES.      
One sampling procedure has been successfully used with an elderly population.  
Hnatiuk (1991) used ESM to sample the experiences of widows between the ages of 69 
and 94. Part of this study assessed how acceptable the procedure was to these individuals.  
Nearly 80 percent of the participants reported that it was either a positive or neutral 
experience and only one of the participants stated that the process changed her day to day 
behavior.  Furthermore, a large majority of the sample was able to complete the study, 
although attrition rate was a bit higher in this population as compared to others.  Those 
who remained in the study completed the records involved with ESM tasks at the same 
rate as different populations in other studies although many did not follow the procedures 
as they were instructed (i.e., did not take pagers into the community with them, did not 
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complete records at the time of the beep, etc.).  Finally, the women’s reports were found 
to be highly reliable from sample to sample and were found to exhibit high validity.  This 
suggests that elderly individuals are capable of successfully completing and participating 
in thought-sampling procedures.  
The Importance of Understanding the Inner Experience of Older Individuals     
The current study was cross sectional in nature and used DES to investigate the inner 
experience of individuals over the age of 65 with and without cognitive impairments.  
DES was used for four primary reasons:   
1. DES is not theory driven and is therefore interested only in the experience of 
individuals.  DES does not look for anything pre-determined about experience, allowing 
results to drive theory.  This allows for an unbiased look at the experience of older 
individuals with and without cognitive impairment.    
2. DES researchers believe that the use of questionnaires with the lack of an extensive 
interview may not capture individuals’ inner experience accurately.  Hurlburt et al. 
(2002) argued that individuals may have difficulty accurately reporting their inner 
experience because of their beliefs about their experience.  For example, Hurlburt et al. 
(2002) stated that individuals typically do not believe that they have unsymbolized 
thinking at the beginning of the DES procedure.  However, after undergoing repeated 
interviews, many individuals report inner experiences that seem to be congruent with
unsymbolized experience as DES defines it.  
3. DES does not require individuals to wear the beeper for as long a period of time as 
do other sampling methods.   Individuals must carry and respond to the beeper for 
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approximately 2 to 4 hours a week and engage in an expositional interview that is an hour 
long each week.  Other methods require the beeper to be worn all day for a number of 
days. 
4. DES also has a definitive time frame across studies (i.e., the moment of the beep), 
a major advantage over non-sampling methods (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1988; see Hurlburt
et al., 2006). 
The present study used DES to investigate the inner experience of people over the age 
of 65, some with diagnosed cognitive impairment, some with undiagnosed cognitive 
impairment, and some with no cognitive impairment.  The study was primarily 
exploratory in nature.  DES has never been applied to older individuals as a group or with 
any older individuals with noticeable cognitive impairment.  One of the study’s goals was 
to discover if individuals with cognitive impairment could engage meaningfully in the 
DES process and if not why this was the case.  This could lend insight into the 
development of cognitive impairment in older individuals and could potentially provide 
new ideas regarding the diagnosis and treatment of cognitive impairment in the elderly.  
The study also sought to uncover a “cognitive signature” (a pattern of inner experience 
unique to a particular group of people) in individuals over the age of 65 if one exists, as 
well as differences between older individuals who are and are not cognitively impaired.  
Cognitive signatures have been found in a variety of populations using DES and it is 
possible that one exists in the populations used in this study.  Such a discovery could 
potentially aid in the understanding, diagnosis, and treatment of the cognitive impairment 
in the elderly.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
Participants
There were a total of 12 participants in this study, all of whom were at least 65 years 
of age.  Six of these individuals demonstrated no cognitive impairment and were not 
diagnosed with any form of cognitive impairment.  The other six individuals had some 
form of cognitive impairment; two were diagnosed with VaD, two were diagnosed with 
MCI, one was diagnosed with AD, and one was not diagnosed but exhibited impairment 
on the MMSE and throughout the DES interviewing process.  An attempt was made to 
find individuals with mild cognitive impairment so that they would have a good chance 
of being able to engage sufficiently in the DES procedure.  All of the cognitively 
impaired individuals could be classified as being mildly or moderately impaired.  The 
individual with AD had the lowest score (19) on the MMSE.  The undiagnosed individual 
had a score of 21 on the MMSE (mild to moderate).  The individuals with MCI received 
scores of 23 (mild to moderate) and 27 on the MMSE (mild).  The two individuals with 
VaD received 29’s on the MMSE suggesting very little cognitive impairment.  The other 
6 participants received scores of 30 out of 30 on the MMSE suggesting no cognitive 
impairment.  
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Participants were recruited from a variety of places and in a variety of ways.  Eight of 
the participants came from the Las Vegas, Nevada area, three came from Pennsylvania, 
and one came from Ohio.  Some responded to newspaper advertisements, some were 
involved in dementia support groups, some came from assisted living facilities, and some 
were acquaintances of the author.   
All individuals reviewed and signed the informed consent form.  Caregivers were 
consulted as needed.  The study was explained to all of the participants before they 
signed the consent forms.  All participants received $10 per interview.  
Materials
A small, portable beeper (Hurlburt, 2006) was used by each participant.  The beeper 
randomly emits a 700-Hz tone through an earphone that each participant wore.  At times 
participants used an external speaker rather than the presence of earphones due to hearing 
aids that made it impossible to insert the earphone or for variations in procedure (see 
individual participant descriptions for details).  The average time between random beeps 
was varied depending on the participant and the procedure, although the most common 
interval was an average of 30 minutes (with a maximum interval of one hour; see 
individual participant descriptions for details).  Most participants were given a small 
(3X5 in) notebook.to jot down notes regarding their inner experience at each beep, but 
again, this varied by participant.    
The MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975) was administered to all participants to assess the 
level of cognitive ability.  The MMSE is a short test (5 to 10 minutes) that assesses very 
basic cognitive functioning, such as orientation to space and time, attention, memory, 
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language functioning, simple reading, and simple arithmetic skills.  The maximum score 
on this test is 30 points, representing no cognitive impairment.  Cut off scores for “mild”, 
“moderate”, and “severe” impairment vary as a function of educational level.  
Procedure
All participants agreed to one of three levels of consent.  Participants either consented
to participate in the study but refused videotaping of the interviews (N = 3), they 
consented to be in the study and to be videotaped but that the videotape could not be used 
beyond the scope of the study or the DES lab (N = 1), or they consented to use of the 
videotape and agreed that the video could be used for instructional purposes beyond the 
confines of the DES laboratory (N = 8).  All participants’ confidentiality was assured 
commensurate with their level of consent.  Individuals in the study with a possible 
cognitive impairment were given the MMSE as a screening tool to make it likely that 
they could adequately participate in the sampling procedure; an MMSE score of 15 or 
higher was used as the cutoff although no participant scored below 19.  A score of 18 or 
below indicates the clear presence of dementia in individuals with an eighth grade 
education (Weiner, 1991).     
All participants participated in the DES procedure described by Hurlburt (1990; 1993; 
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006) with small variations in some instances, described below in 
the summary of each participant.  Essentially, participants wore a beeper that beeped at 
random intervals.  Participants were asked to “freeze” their inner experience at each beep 
and to jot it down in a small note book.  Participants typically collected four to six beeps 
and were interviewed regarding the details of each of their beeped experiences within 24 
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hours.  Some participants were interviewed directly after the beep sounded to minimize 
difficulties related to memory.   The purpose of the interview was to gain an 
understanding of the contents of each of the sampled moments.  This interview 
essentially involved asking one question: “What was in your inner experience at the 
moment of the beep?”  This question took a number of forms throughout the interview, 
but all were designed with one purpose in mind: to aid the participant in communicating 
the contents of their awareness at the moment of the beep.  Discussion of the interview 
method, with annotated examples, is in Hurlburt and Heavey (2006), Hurlburt and 
Schwitzgebel (2007), and Hurlburt and Akhter (2006).  Interviews typically lasted about 
one hour.  Please see the transcripts of excerpts from interviews from this project below 
for examples of sampling interviews.  
This sample/interview procedure was then repeated up to six times.  These interviews 
were videotaped depending upon the level of consent of the participant.   Descriptions of 
each sample were written by the researchers.  The salient characteristics of the inner 
experience of each participant were identified.   Each written description was coded by 
the author and this project’s advisor, Dr. Russell Hurlburt, according to applicable forms 
of inner experience identified by Hurlburt (1990; 1993; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  
Although there were some initial disagreements about coding in a small minority of 
samples a consensus between the two raters was reached for all samples.  This study was 
prepared to discover some never-before-described forms of inner experience as well, 
discussed below. Although salient characteristics are typically of the form of experience, 
salient characteristics that were content-related were also identified.    
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Results
The results of the study are presented in the following chapters.  Each participant was 
given a separate chapter and a pseudonym and all potentially identifying information was 
altered.  Chapters 4 through 9 present participant summaries of the six seemingly 
unimpaired individuals.  Chapters 10 through 15 present participant summaries of each of 
the six impaired individuals.  These chapters are arranged in order of apparent cognitive 
impairment based on MMSE scores from least impaired to most impaired; pseudonyms 
were selected so these chapters would be in alphabetical order.  Chapter 16 presents 
across participant results and discussion as well as diagnostic and treatment implications 
of the results, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 4
UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “ANNA”
Anna was a 71 year-old female who completed high school and has taken many 
college classes, although she never completed a degree.  She had no evidence of 
cognitive impairment and scored a 30 on the MMSE indicating that she likely has no
cognitive impairment.  She contacted the researchers after reading about the study in a 
local newspaper.  Anna was not familiar with the DES procedure prior to the study.  She 
was fairly adept at becoming acclimated to the DES process.  As is typical of DES 
participants of any age, she gave somewhat unreliable reports of her experience on the 
first sampling day (samples from day one will not be included in the analysis) but by day 
two gave reports that appeared very reliable.   During and after day two, Anna was very 
confident in the reports of her samples.  Therefore, 23 samples from sampling days 2 
through 6 will be analyzed.  
A summary of Anna’s experience frequencies is shown in Table 1.  Although the 
forms of Anna’s experiences were sometimes difficult to classify due to their complexity 
and idiosyncratic nature, feelings were the most prominent form in Anna’s experience, 
present in 48 percent of her samples.  Other forms in Anna’s experience were sensory 
awareness, (39 percent), unsymbolized thinking (35 percent), inner speech (22 percent), 
and inner seeing (17 percent).  Anna also experienced laughing (4 percent), just doing (2 
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percent), and had no experience in 4 percent of her samples.  She experienced multiple 
awareness in 54 percent of her samples. 
Table 1
Percentages of characteristics in Anna’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic Percentage
Feeling 48
Inner Seeing 17
Inner Speech 22
Just Doing 2
Laughing 4
No Experience 4
Sensory Awareness 39
Unsymbolized Thinking 35
Multiple Awareness 54
Number of samples 23
Total number of characteristicsa 48
Characteristics per sample 2.09
aTotal number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly 
experienced (in this case, Just Doing, Laughing, No Experience and 
Multiple Awareness), and counts uncertain instances as .5.  
     
      The “Percentage” column in Table 1 refers to the percentage of samples that 
contained each of the form categories.  Forms that appeared to be ambiguously between 
two categories were counted as .5 in each category.  Also, if it was not clear if a certain 
experience was present at all or not right at the moment of the beep, it was counted as .5.    
Feelings
Feelings were the most common form of experience for Anna and were present in 48 
percent of her samples.  These feelings often had a physical component (74 percent) that 
sometimes also had a mental component (35 percent).    
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Below is an example of a feeling that occurred in isolation that had both physical and 
mental components:  
Beep 2.2 – Anna was sitting at the computer while a song by a female singer was 
playing.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was feeling sad, experienced primarily as a 
lump in her throat and also probably as a feeling of heat behind her eyes and cold on her 
forehead.  She was not certain about these two aspects of the experience, but said that she 
was 70 percent sure that they were there.  The sadness was about being old, about the 
things that she had done when she was younger (as at the time when this particular song 
might have been popular). Also, although Anna wasn’t paying particular attention to the 
music that was playing, she was somehow aware of the music and this music may have 
brought on the experience of sadness. 
     On one occasion a feeling was entirely mental:
Beep 4.2 – Anna had finished writing her description of beep 4.1.  She had just sighed 
and turned her attention back to the computer with relief.  At the moment of the beep, 
Anna was experiencing relief/accomplishment at getting all of her experiences down in 
the notebook for beep 4.1.  This was experienced as the release of the ideas/experiences 
of beep 4.1 (see below) and/or the words associated with the ideas/experiences of beep 
4.1 from herself into the external world.  The ideas/words were somehow visually present 
but not explicitly seen.  There also may have been an experience of getting ready to not 
think, but it is not certain the extent to which (if at all) or how this was present at the 
moment of the beep.  
     Anna had only one feeling experience that was entirely physical and occurred without 
the presence of other forms of awareness:    
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Beep 3.3 – Anna was lying on the bed and talking to her partner Sarah about the progress 
that Sarah’s academic department has made.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was 
feeling proud of Sarah for helping the program progress so much.  This pride was 
experienced physically as a release of tension that is somehow similar to sighing, 
although actual sighing was not taking place at this moment.  The feeling of pride may 
have included a feeling of pride in herself for being partnered with a women who was 
achieving such an accomplishment; it was not clear whether Anna actually recalled 
feeling that at the moment of the beep, or was presuming that it was there.
     Anna had two feelings that contained a visual component.  One of these is beep 4.2 
above where ideas and or words were somehow visually present.  Below is the other 
occurrence of a feeling with a visual component that also includes an instance of sensory 
awareness and an ambiguous experience that is either sensory awareness or just doing: 
Beep 5.5 – Anna was tossing a salad and talking with her friends.  One of her friends had 
just asked Anna if she grew the vegetables for the dinner in her backyard.  Just prior to 
the moment of the beep Anna had sarcastically said “I hand picked all the veggies” and 
everyone was laughing, including Anna.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was aware of 
the colors in the salad, an instance of sensory awareness.  She was also experiencing a 
very slight pleasure at the way the colors in the salad looked.  Anna may have 
experienced this pleasure partially as a vibration in her vision, but she was very unsure 
when talking about this aspect of her experience.  Also in Anna’s awareness was both the 
experience of her own laughter and the laughter of her friends. 
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Sensory Awareness
     Of Anna’s 23 samples, 39 percent contained sensory awareness.  Beep 5.5 above 
contains a clear instance of sensory awareness (noticing the colors in the salad) as well as 
one that was ambiguously between sensory awareness and just doing (awareness of the 
laughter).  Here is a sample that contains four different sensory awarenesses (sensation of 
tapping, seeing finger tap, hearing finger tap, and seeing time change):  
Beep 5.2 – Anna was setting the timer on her oven.  She was in the process of using the 
oven keypad to get the appropriate time (1 hour and 30 minutes). At the moment of the 
beep, she was tapping the keypad 30 times in quick succession to get the minute part of 
the display to 30 and was very close to 30. Anna was focused on this process.  She was 
feeling the physical sensation of tapping the key pad on the end of her finger, seeing her 
fingers tap on the keypad, hearing her fingernails make a clicking noise on the keypad, 
and seeing the timer display change as she pressed the numbers on the keypad.  
Unsymbolized Thinking
     Unsymbolized thinking was present in 35 percent of Anna’s samples.  Here is a clear 
example of unsymbolized thinking with a feeling:
Beep 4.4 – Anna was playing poker on the computer.  She was thinking about going to 
California next week.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was cognitively wondering if 
she could arrange going to California with the interviewers so to not break DES 
arrangements.  She was also experiencing a feeling of mild anxiety about possibly 
breaking DES arrangements.  The anxiety was very mild and was experienced both 
physically and mentally.  The physical experience was located in the upper chest, neck, 
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and head, was well below the skin, and was similar to the heat of blushing, but not 
exactly.  There was a rising to this experience, as it originated in the upper chest and rose
to the head.  The mental component of the anxiety was not explicit, but somehow 
affected Anna cognitively, although Anna was not entirely sure about this component of 
the anxiety.
Inner Speech
     Anna had inner speech in 22 percent of her samples.  Below is an example of inner 
speech with an instance of sensory awareness:  
Beep 6.5 – Anna was having difficulty getting the lid on a to-go cup of coffee.  At the 
moment of the beep, Anna was innerly speaking in her own voice “Damn to go cup, lid 
doesn’t fit.”  She was also feeling the pressure on her hand as she was trying to screw the 
lid on the cup.  
Inner Seeing
     Seventeen percent of Anna’s samples contained inner seeing.  Here is an example of 
an incidence of inner seeing:
Beep 5.4 – Anna was cutting her friend Jane’s hair and was simultaneously having a 
conversation with her.  Anna was talking, but she had no idea what she was saying—the 
words were apparently just rolling out of her on autopilot, as were the actions of cutting 
the hair.  Rather than pay attention to either of those activities, at the moment of the beep, 
Anna was innerly seeing a vegetable chopper that she owns.  The inner seeing was very 
sharp and was floating with no background like a hologram or a projected image.  The lid 
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of the imagined chopper was down; she could see the transparent plastic bottom and the 
top part of the chopper. Anna was somehow aware of the chopper from different angles, 
but was not actually seeing it from different angles at the moment of the beep.  Anna’s 
interest in this seeing was in the mechanics of how the chopper works rather than in how 
the chopper looks.  
     Here is another example of an inner seeing accompanied by a feeling and an 
unsymbolized thought:
Beep 4.1 – Anna was playing poker at the computer.  Earlier that day, she had been 
playing Canasta with some friends.  One of her friends (Jan) had made a mistake and had 
repeatedly criticized herself and her Canasta partner for it.  At the moment of the beep, 
part of Anna’s experience was a mixture feelings and thoughts related to the incident that 
were somewhat homogeneous in that they were all mixed together to form a mostly 
uniform experience. The predominant part of this experience was Anna’s questioning of 
whether or not she was too tough on Jan.  The word “tough” or “too tough?” was present 
to Anna visually and was experienced as a grayish/pinkish/beigeish color that had 
jaggedy edges, was not overwhelmingly large, was flat, was pliable, and was clear.  Anna
was very specific about the jaggedy edges of the experience; when drawn, she 
commented that the drawing was too jaggedy and that the jags weren’t sharp enough.  
Anna knew that the visual experience meant the word “tough” or “too tough?” at the 
moment of the beep.  There also may have been a cognitive component to this experience 
where Anna was questioning if she was too tough on Jan.  Also at the moment of the 
beep, Anna was experiencing doubt/indecision about whether she did the right thing in 
confronting Jan.  This was experienced as an “icky,” sour, almost nauseous feeling in the 
132
upper chest and throat region.  She was also simultaneously thinking cognitively that she 
did the right thing by confronting Jan. Also at the moment of the beep, but not as 
predominant, was the thought that Jan was a jerk.  This thought was not in words.  There 
may also have been the experience of simultaneously loving Jan but thinking she’s 
annoying as well, but this was not entirely clear.  
Multiple Awareness 
     Multiple awareness was very common for Anna, occurring in 54 percent of her 
samples. Beeps 5.5 (where Anna was noticing colors in the salad and experiencing 
pleasure) and 5.2 (where Anna was experiencing four sensory awarenesses while setting 
the timer) above are examples of multiple awareness.  Beep 4.1 above where Anna was 
experiencing the word “tough” or “too tough” visually while simultaneously experiencing 
the feeling of being icky and the unsymbolized thought of Jan being a jerk is another 
example of multiple awareness.  
     It is notable that Anna did not begin reporting multiple awareness until the third day of 
sampling, but by day six all six of Anna’s samples contained multiple awareness.  This is 
most likely due to Anna’s training and increased sensitivity to her experience.  
Unusual Aspects of Experience
     A substantial number of Anna’s experiences were very unusual either in complexity or 
form and are worth describing here.  Below is a description of an experience that 
contained a substantial complexity of inner seeings:
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Beep 3.4 – Anna was talking with Sarah.  Sarah had said shortly before the beep that 
Anna had not changed very much since they met.  Anna was in the process of saying “I 
wasn’t the P.T.A. lady when I met you,” meaning that she had changed a lot prior to 
meeting Sarah, and was laughing at that thought.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was 
recalling how she has changed over her life.  This recollection consisted of the inner 
seeing of numerous freeze-frame pictures of herself (Anna estimated about 50 of them) 
that were experienced in extremely rapid succession like fast time-lapse photography.  
Anna could describe some of the inner seeings.  One inner seeing was of an actual 
photograph of her when she was about 19 years old taken from the side and wearing a 
full-length white polka dot on blue dress.  One of the last inner seeings was of Anna as 
the P.T.A. lady that she was before she met Sarah.  The inner seeings often showed Anna
having a facial expression that was indicative of her emotional state at that phase of her 
life.  For example, one showed a very fearful expression as she was generally very 
anxious at that stage of her life.  The inner seeings also showed Anna as she was at that 
particular time of life, with variations in a number of aspects of her physical appearance.  
Many of the inner seeings were of Anna’s face from an extremely close range that 
showed Anna’s face from just above her eyes to about her chin.  There was also a 
knowing that her children were related to some of the pictures.  There may have been 
other knowings around or during the experience of the inner seeings, but this is highly 
speculative as it was not discussed in detail.  It was not clear if the inner seeings 
proceeded in chronological order or not.  It should be noted that Anna did not mention 
these freeze-frames until well into the conversation about this beep and that when she 
first mentioned them she used many subjunctifiers.  However, after this initial 
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uncertainty, Anna was very confident about the existence and nature of these freeze-
frames.  Anna was also aware of her laughter.  The laughter blended in with the 
recollection of change.  
     Anna also had two instances of feelings that had visual components.  These examples 
are listed above in beep 4.2 where she was somehow visually experiencing ideas or 
words, and beep 5.5 where pleasure involved vibration in her vision.  Visual components 
to feelings are highly unusual.  
     Some of Anna’s experiences of inner seeings also had the uncommon feature of 
movement and analysis.  Beep 5.4 above where Anna was innerly seeing the chopper is 
one example.  Here is the other example:    
Beep 6.4 – Anna was at the computer working on an article that she is writing.  She was 
reading a part of the article where she had written about a helicopter-carrying ship.  At 
the moment of the beep she was re-reading “which would divide and slide open and 
allow a helicopter pad to be raised to deck level.”  At the moment of the beep, Anna was 
innerly seeing the scene she was re-reading.  She was innerly seeing a colorful scene 
including the deck of the ship splitting and the helicopter pad rising.  There was no 
helicopter on the pad.  Anna was also in the process of gradually changing the 
perspective from which she was seeing the inner seeing.  The perspective started from 
above and then went below the deck, as if she had gone through the deck of the ship.  The 
inner seeing under the deck was of the elevator.  There was also a light green light under 
the deck.  From this perspective she was primarily interested in how the elevator worked.  
Also at the moment of the beep, Anna was thinking about what was in Harold’s 
imagination (Harold is a character in the book).   There were no words in this thought, 
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but rather the understanding of the concept.  Anna was also seeing an after image of the 
last few words she was reading.  They appeared as if they were coming toward her off of 
the computer screen and were fading away.  
     Anna also had at least one experience that seemed to be somewhat undifferentiated or 
lacking some aspect of experience.  This was beep 4.2 that contained ideas and words 
that were somehow present visually but lacked actual visual qualities so that Anna could 
not “see” these ideas and words.    
Discussion
     Anna had many features of inner experience that are noteworthy, such as a high rate of 
multiple awareness, visual components to some feelings, motion and analysis in some 
inner seeings, complexity in some experiences, and a lack of common aspects of 
experience at times.  It is unclear if any of these aspects of Anna’s experience are related 
to age or a process of degeneration of her inner experience.  The complexity of her 
experience suggests that her experience is quite rich and not degenerating at all, although 
it is conceivable that an inhibitory or attentional deficit could create rich and complex 
inner experience.  Overall, Anna was a very convincing participant and even when her 
experiences were very complex and/or unusual she typically demonstrated a high level of 
confidence in her reports.     
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CHAPTER 5
UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “BENJAMIN”
Benjamin was a 68 year-old male with no diagnosed or notable cognitive impairment.  
He scored 30 out of 30 on the MMSE suggesting that he had no cognitive impairment.  
He was an acquaintance of one of the researchers and agreed to undergo the DES process.  
He did not receive education after high school and currently does work in genealogy, 
writing independently as well as in partnership with professors from a small rural college.      
Benjamin seemed fairly adept throughout his first day of sampling at narrowing his 
experience to the moment of the beep.  He was able to make distinctions between events 
and experiences that came slightly before or slightly after the beep.  However, Benjamin
did exhibit enough inconsistencies during his first day to eliminate these samples from 
the analysis.  All other beeps will be considered in analysis, a total of 19 in five days.  
Beeps 4.2 and 4.4 were excluded because they occurred while he was writing 
descriptions of the previous beep.  
As shown in Table 2 below, Benjamin’s most common form of experience was 
sensory awareness, present in 84 percent of his samples.  Other forms that Benjamin
experienced were unsymbolized thinking (42 percent), unvocalized inner speech (29 
percent, (see below for a description of unvocalized inner speech), and worded thinking 
(5 percent).  Benjamin also was just talking in five percent of his samples and had no 
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experience in five percent of his samples.  Benjamin had multiple awareness in 79 
percent of his samples.  
Table 2
Percentages of characteristics in Benjamin’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic Percentage
Just Talking 5
No Experience 5
Sensory Awareness 84
Unsymbolized Thinking 42
Unvocalized Inner Speech 29
Worded Thinking 5
Multiple Awareness 79
Number of samples 19
Total number of characteristicsa 45.5
Characteristics per sample 2.39
aTotal number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly 
experienced (in this case, Just Talking, No Experience and Multiple 
Awareness), and counts uncertain instances as .5
      As in Table 1, the “Percentage” column in Table 2 refers to the percentage of samples 
that contained each of the form categories.  Forms that appeared to be ambiguously 
between two categories or if it was not clear that they were present at the moment of the 
beep were counted as .5 in each category.  
Sensory Awareness
     The most salient feature of Benjamin’s sampled experience was the frequent presence 
of sensory awareness which was present in 84 percent of his samples.  The only samples 
that clearly did not involve sensory awareness were one sample when Benjamin was just 
talking and another when he had no inner experience.  Below is an example of sensory 
awareness (with an unsymbolized thought):  
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Beep 6.2 – Benjamin was in his garage.  He was thinking about cleaning the earpiece of 
the beeper.  He was considering possible ways to clean it.  At the moment of the beep, 
Benjamin was thinking about water and alcohol as a means of cleaning the earpiece.  This 
experience was not in words.  Benjamin was also noticing the colors outside as he viewed 
them through the garage window.  He was noticing mostly green, but also pink, white, 
and yellow.
     Benjamin often experienced multiple sensory awarenesses at one time.  He 
experienced 28 clear instances of sensory awareness with an additional six potential 
sensory awarenesses contained in 17 samples.  If the unclear instances are counted as .5, 
Benjamin averaged 1.8 instances of sensory awareness in the 17 samples that contained 
sensory awareness.  The most sensory awarenesses that he experienced at one time was 
four.  Below is an example of a sample containing four sensory awarenesses and an 
unvocalized inner speech:     
Beep 2.1 – Benjamin was in his house playing Sodoku on a hand held electronic device.  
He was having some difficulty with the game, but had just figured out many of the 
numbers.  At or very near the beep, Benjamin had five overlapping experiences.  First, 
Benjamin was innerly saying “I got it now,” referring to figuring out the numbers on 
Sudoku.  This was experienced internally as if he was externally speaking, but the words 
came significantly faster and did not have qualities such as volume and pitch.  Second, 
just after this inner saying had begun, Benjamin became aware of his sister Laura 
speaking on a phone in another room in the house.  Right at the beep, Benjamin was 
hearing Laura speak, but was not comprehending what she was saying.  Third, a 
motorcycle was approaching on the street in front of Benjamin’s house.  Benjamin was 
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hearing the sound of the motorcycle at the moment of the beep.  Fourth, Benjamin was 
aware of the smell of chicken being cooked.  Finally, Benjamin was faintly aware of the 
sound of traffic passing by his house.  The sound was a whooshing sound.  
     Benjamin’s sensory awareness was typically auditory in nature.  Of the 34 possible 
instances of sensory awareness 27 were auditory in nature.  Every time Benjamin had an 
instance of auditory sensory awareness it consisted of his simply hearing something in 
the external environment.  Three of the other instances were visual, two were olfactory, 
one was tactile, and one was gustatory.  
     A frequent theme of Benjamin’s auditory sensory awareness was traffic.  He 
experienced 11 instances of sensory awareness related to traffic spread across 50 percent 
of his samples.  Benjamin’s awareness of the motorcycle passing in beep 2.1 above is an 
example of traffic-related sensory awareness.  On six occasions Benjamin was hearing a 
voice (always either one of his sisters or the television).  The words being spoken were 
never comprehended, but the voices themselves were in Benjamin’s awareness in these 
instances.  On three occasions Benjamin was hearing sparrows.  Beep 2.1 above, is an 
example of both hearing traffic and a voice.  
Unsymbolized Thinking
     Unsymbolized thinking occurred in 42 percent of Benjamin’s samples.  Here is an 
example (with sensory awareness):
Beep 5.1 – Benjamin was sitting outside on his glider.  He was reviewing notes written 
by an acquaintance who is in ill health.  At the moment of the beep, Benjamin was 
thinking about the health of this man.  There were no words or images accompanying this 
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thought.  This thought was not strong in Benjamin’s awareness, but it was definitely 
present.  Benjamin was also faintly aware of the sound of sparrows tweeting.  There may 
have been more than one, but Benjamin was not certain.  He was simply hearing the 
sparrow(s).  
Unvocalized Inner Speech 
     Benjamin frequently experienced a form of inner speech that was similar in many 
ways to typical inner speech (i.e., words were present, it was experienced as being 
produced by Benjamin, the words came in sequential order, they were meaningful, etc.) 
but also differed substantially from typical inner speech in two important ways:  
1. The speech was not vocalized - Benjamin was confident that specific      vocalized 
qualities such as inflection, pitch, and volume were not present in these experiences at the 
moment of the beep but that it was still as if he was innerly speaking words. Benjamin 
did not report this lack of vocalization until sampling day four but once he recognized 
that these experiences were not vocalized he stated that similar experiences in the prior 
four days also were not vocalized.  It is likely that Benjamin did not report this until day 
four because prior to this day Benjamin was simply asked if these experiences had 
auditory qualities, which he affirmed.  When Benjamin was asked specifically if these 
experiences had volume, pitch, and/or inflection he said that they did not.  Benjamin also 
may have had a presupposition that his internal worded experience had to be vocalized, 
but once an alternative possibility became an option this pre-supposition disappeared.  
Regardless, Benjamin’s reports that his worded experiences prior to day four were not 
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vocalized were very believable as were his reports about his worded experiences on and 
after day four.    
2. These experiences occurred almost instantly - Benjamin stated very early on that 
his worded experiences occurred very fast.  He later consistently reported that they 
happened “almost instantly.”  However, the words themselves were not experienced as 
being rapid.  That is, whereas the words were experienced as being produced at a normal 
rate of speech the entire spoken sequence was apprehended as occurring almost instantly.
Here is an example of one of these experiences:  
Beep 4.5 – Benjamin was walking through his kitchen to go outside.  At the moment of 
the beep, Benjamin was innerly saying, “Gonna go sit on the glider.”  The words 
occurred very fast, almost instantaneously.  It was as if Benjamin was speaking the words 
and the words were definitely present.  However, there were no vocalized qualities to the 
experience.  The words had no volume, no pitch, and either no or flat inflection. The 
experience was apparently “spoken but not auditory.”  Benjamin also may have been 
hearing his sister Stephanie laugh at the moment of the beep, but the laughing may have 
ended just before the moment of the beep.
     Benjamin often stated that his unvocalized inner speech was frequently directly 
preceded by unsymbolized thinking.  Benjamin viewed his unsymbolized thinking as a 
thought that had not yet been fully formed.  He described unvocalized inner speech as the 
fully realized form of the thought and often discussed the transition from unsymbolized 
thinking to unvocalized inner speech.  Although Benjamin is very adept at making subtle 
distinctions in the temporal progression of his experience, it is still quite possible that this 
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is more of a generalization about his inner experience than anything that was caught 
exactly at the moment of the beep.  
Worded Thinking
     Benjamin had one sample that contained worded thinking along with sensory 
awareness and a possible unsymbolized thought (wondering about the title):  
Beep 2.2 – Benjamin was listening to classical music on the radio but was not aware of 
the music at the moment of the beep.  Benjamin was mulling over who the composer of 
the music he was, trying to think of many possibilities.  At the moment of the beep, 
Benjamin was thinking that it was Rossini.  The word “Rossini” was definitely present at 
the moment of the beep, but it had no auditory or visual qualities. It also was not 
experienced as being spoken, but was simply present in Benjamin’s awareness.  There 
also may have been a wondering what the title of the piece was that was connected to the 
Rossini experience, but Benjamin was not entirely certain.  Benjamin was also aware of 
someone yelling somewhere in front of his house.  The Rossini experience began slightly 
before the yelling, but both appeared to be present at the moment of the beep.
Multiple Awareness 
     Multiple awareness was present in 79 percent of Benjamin’s samples.  All of the beeps 
mentioned above are examples or clear instances of multiple awareness except for beep 
4.5, where Benjamin was innerly saying “gonna go sit on the glider” and may have been 
hearing his sister laugh.  Beep 4.5 is a questionable occurrence of multiple awareness 
because he may have been hearing his sister laugh in addition to having an unrelated 
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occurrence of unvocalized inner speech, but it is unclear if the awareness of his sister 
laughing was actually present at the moment of the beep.  The only samples that clearly 
did not contain multiple awareness were one where Benjamin was just talking, one where 
he had no inner experience, and one where he had one sensory awareness.  Here is the 
one instance where Benjamin was experiencing only a sensory awareness: 
Beep 4.3 – Benjamin had just finished writing his response to 4.2.  At the moment of the 
beep, he was quickly going over it to make sure that there were no major errors.  He was 
not comprehending what he was reading.  He was also hearing his sister Stephanie
talking on the phone.  He was not comprehending what she was saying or hearing any 
words in particular.
Discussion
Benjamin was very adept at focusing on and describing the moment of the beep.  He 
made very small distinctions between what came before, at, and after the moment of the 
beep, seemingly on the order of tenths of seconds.  He was also quite skilled at 
distinguishing between things that were not in his awareness and things that were faintly 
in his awareness.  Benjamin was an excellent participant in every conceivable way.  
Benjamin’s experience is notable in seven ways: (a) the frequent presence of sensory 
awareness, (b) the frequent presence of auditory sensory awareness, (c) the frequent 
awareness of traffic-related awareness, (d) the presence of inner speech that was 
unvocalized, (e) the nearly instantaneous nature of unvocalized inner speech, (f) the 
frequent presence of multiple awareness, and (g) the limited range of form Benjamin
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experienced.  These characteristics suggest the following things about Benjamin’s inner 
experience and his engagement in the DES process:  
1. He is unusually aware of sensory information coming from his environment, 
especially information that is auditory in nature.  
2. He is pre-occupied with traffic. In fact, when the interviewer suggested that 
Benjamin may be pre-occupied with traffic, he stated “No, I’m obsessed with it.”  
3. He lacks some aspects of experience that are typically present in the inner 
experience of others.  For example, inner speech is a very common form of inner 
experience and typically has qualities of vocalization.  However, Benjamin’s unvocalized 
inner speech lacks vocalized qualities such as volume, pitch, and inflection.  This 
unvocalized inner speech is also nearly instantaneous and therefore lacks the temporal 
dimension that inner speech usually has.  
4. He lacks a wide range of form in his inner experience as his only forms of 
experience were sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, unvocalized inner speech 
and a single occurrence of worded thinking.
5. He may be especially adept at describing the fringes of his experience and that 
auditory awareness is frequently at the fringes of his experiences.  This sometimes 
seemed to be the case, but it was almost as common that Benjamin’s auditory sensory 
awareness was quite prominent in his experience.  
145
CHAPTER 6
UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “CLARA”
Clara was an 81 year-old woman with no apparent cognitive impairment.  She scored 
30 out of 30 on the MMSE (suggesting no cognitive impairment) and had a Master’s 
degree in a health-related field.  She was referred to the researchers by a family member 
who had gained knowledge of the study.  Clara was not familiar with DES prior to 
sampling but was very adept at DES from the first day with the apparent ability to narrow 
her experience to the moment of the beep and report it reliably and accurately.  
Therefore, her samples from the first day were counted in the analysis below.  Thirty-five 
samples were discussed across six sampling days.  
As shown in Table 3, Clara had a wide range of forms of awareness in her samples.  
Overall, 33 percent of her samples included unsymbolized thought, 30 percent of her 
samples included inner speech, 26 percent included inner seeing, 16 percent included 
feelings, 11 percent worded thinking, 6 percent just doing, and 3 percent each for 
imageless seeing and sensory awareness.  Nine percent of her samples included multiple 
awareness.  Below is a more in-depth look at each of these forms: 
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Table 3
Percentages of characteristics in Clara’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic Percentage
Feeling 16
Inner Seeing 26
Imageless Seeing 3
Inner Speech 30
Just Doing 6
Sensory Awareness 3
Unsymbolized Thinking 33
Worded Thinking 11
Multiple Awareness 9
Number of samples 35
Total number of characteristicsa 43.5
Characteristics per sample 1.24
aTotal number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly 
experienced (in this case, Just Doing and Multiple Awareness), and 
counts uncertain instances as .5
     
      As in Tables 1 and 2, the “Percentage” column in Table 3 refers to the percentage of 
samples that contained each of the form categories.  Forms that appeared to be 
ambiguously between two categories were counted as .5 in each category.  For example, 
in the fifth sample from day six, it was ambiguous if Clara’s experience was an instance 
of inner speech or worded thinking.  Therefore, this sample was counted as .5 inner 
speech and .5 worded thinking.  Also, if it was not clear if a certain experience was 
present at all or not right at the moment of the beep, it was also counted as .5.    
Unsymbolized Thinking 
     Clara had 11 instances of unsymbolized thinking and one instance which may have 
been unsymbolized thinking. If one counts the uncertain instance as .5, then 33 percent of 
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her samples included unsymbolized thinking, as shown in Table 1.  Here is an example of 
unambiguous unsymbolized thought: 
Beep 4.3 – Clara was standing in her living room.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
thinking about whether to clean the bathroom or to dust the living room.  This was a 
wondering about the next course of action she would take that contained no words, 
images, or symbols.  It was a “mental thought.”
     The one sample where it was unclear if Clara was experiencing an unsymbolized 
thought occurred in beep 2.6.  It was not clear if this beep contained symbols (i.e., words) 
or not:
Beep 2.6 – Clara was sitting in her apartment and looking out the window. She had 
moved to Las Vegas within the past year.  At the moment of the beep, she was wondering 
why she was not adjusting to living there better than she has been.  This was experienced 
as an unworded thought process that was accompanied with the definite presence of the 
word “adjusting,” although no spoken words or images of the word were actually 
experienced.  
Inner Speech
     Clara experienced inner speech on ten occasions and one additional occasion where 
she may have been experiencing inner speech.  If the questionable occasion is counted as 
.5, she was experiencing inner speech in 30 percent of her samples, as shown in Table 3.  
Here is an example of an unambiguous instance of inner speech:  
Beep 6.5 – Clara was thinking of how she could talk a family member into letting her 
have her car for the weekend while the daughter was out of town.  At the moment of the 
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beep, Clara was innerly speaking “Can I talk Lisa into letting me have the car this 
weekend when they go out of state?”  The beep came near the word “car.”  Clara was 
producing this speech internally in what was experienced as her own voice.  
     The one occasion that was uncertain was when Clara was uncertain if there were vocal 
qualities to her experience, making it possibly more of a worded thought than inner 
speech:  
Beep 4.5 – Clara was standing in the living room after she had finished cleaning.  At the 
moment of the beep, Clara was innerly saying to herself “Why am I so slow getting 
things done now.  Is it part of old age or having less to do?”  Clara was sure that words 
were present, but she was not sure whether or not these words were experienced vocally.  
Either the words were present and were heard vocally or the words were present without 
any vocal qualities.  Clara was also sensing an emotion of frustration.  This frustration 
was a mental process and was not independent of the verbal experience.  
Inner Seeing
    Clara was innerly seeing on nine occasions, or 26 percent of the samples.  On eight of 
nine occasions, Clara’s inner seeings were in black and white.  On the other occasion, it 
was in brown and white. Here is an example of an inner seeing in black and white:  
Beep 3.5 – Clara was sitting in her front yard watching traffic and thinking about an 
experience she had had the previous week.  She had been at the DMV, and because she 
had a walker, she had been instructed to go to the beginning of the long line of people.  
At the moment of the beep, she was innerly seeing a long line of people.  This line was 
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on her right and the people were facing largely away from her at a diagonal, left to right.  
There was no background.  This seeing was clear and detailed, but in black and white.  
     Here is another example of an inner seeing, this time in conjunction with inner speech:
Beep 5.2 – Clara was sitting outside knitting.  She was innerly speaking in her own voice 
“Flowers, leaves, and green grass in March.”  The beep came on the word “grass.”  She 
was also innerly seeing a small group of flowers standing in a dirt bed.  She was not 
certain what kind of flowers they were, but they were small and similar to pansies and 
viewed from a perspective that was within a few feet.  The inner seeing was in black and 
white.
     Clara had one example where the inner seeing was not in black and white but was in 
brown and white with an inner speech:
Beep 5.6 – Clara was outside knitting.  The previous day she had gotten copies of 
pictures of her brothers.  These copies contained four pictures on approximately an 8x11 
inch sheet.  At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing this sheet that was very 
similar to how it exists in reality.  This experience was very clear.  Clara could make out 
the details in each of the four pictures (such as who was in each picture, the positions of 
the people, and some of the surrounding details).  This experience was in brown and 
white (as the reproductions were in real life).  Also at the moment of the beep, she was 
innerly speaking in her own voice “The picture of my brothers were reproduced and they 
came out better than the originals.”  Clara was not sure if this was the exact phrase she 
was innerly speaking, but she was certain that the beep came on the word “reproduced.”  
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Feelings
     Clara had five samples with feelings and another sample that may have involved a 
feeling.  If this sample is counted as .5, then 16 percent of Clara’s samples involved 
feelings.  A clear example of a feeling was presented in sample 4.5 above where Clara
was experiencing frustration at being slow.  Here is another example (accompanied by 
inner speech): 
Beep 5.3 – Clara was outside knitting.  She was innerly speaking in her own voice “Why 
am I living alone?  Some of the relatives think it’s strange that I can do it.”  The beep 
occurred on the word “alone.”  She was also aware of being angry at the moment of the 
beep.  This anger was a mental process with no symbols or physical sensation.  The inner 
speaking was more prominent in her awareness than the anger.  Clara estimated a ratio of 
85 to 15 between the inner speaking and the anger.   
     The one instance where it was uncertain whether or not Clara was experiencing a 
feeling was in beep 4.2.  This beep was accompanied by inner speech that may or may 
not have had a separate experience of a feeling: 
Beep 4.2 – Clara was in the kitchen.  At the moment of the beep she was innerly saying 
“Now I have to do the dishes.”  The beep came between the words “to” and “do.”  Clara
was also aware of feeling compelled to do the dishes.  However, this feeling did not seem 
to be separate from the words and did not exist independently from the words.  
Worded Thinking
     Clara had three unambiguous instances of worded thinking and two instances where it 
was not clear if she was experiencing worded thinking.  If these two ambiguous instances 
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are counted as .5, Clara had worded thinking in 11 percent of her samples.  Below is a 
clear instance of worded thinking: 
Beep 6.1 – Clara was thinking about the shootings that occurred at Virginia Tech earlier 
that day.  At the moment of the beep, she was thinking, “How useless it was. (pause) The 
poor parents.”  The beep came during “the poor parents.”  These words were in her 
awareness, although they were not spoken, heard or seen.  The entire phrase occurred all 
at once.  That is, the phrase “the poor parents” appeared simultaneously, not in a 
sequence where “the” came first, “poor” second, and “parents” third.  
     The two instances where it was uncertain if worded thinking was present occurred in 
beeps 2.6 (where Clara was wondering about not adjusting to Las Vegas) and 4.5 (where 
Clara was wondering why she is getting slow) above.  It was not clear if beep 2.6 was an 
unsymbolized thought or worded thought and it was not clear if beep 4.5 was an 
incidence of inner speech or worded thought.  
Just Doing
     Clara had two instances of just doing, constituting six percent of her samples.  Below 
is an example of one of the two occurrences of just doing:
Beep 6.2 – Clara was staring at a picture of her and her husband.  At the moment of the 
beep, she was not aware of any inner experience other than the seeing of the picture.  She 
stated that she had been staring at the picture for approximately 20 minutes, as if she had 
been locked onto the picture.  Clara found this weird and surprising; she believed she had 
never done this before.  She attributed it to the shock of the Virginia Tech killings.
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Imageless Seeing
     Clara had one experience of innerly seeing (in conjunction with two feelings) where 
there was nothing actually being seen, a phenomenon DES calls imageless seeing.  As 
seen in Table 1, this makes up three percent of her samples.  Here is her one instance of 
imageless seeing:  
Beep 2.5 – Clara’s friend Joan had sent her a picture of Wayne, Clara’s recently deceased 
husband.  Clara was in the process of writing a thank you note to Joan, and paused while 
she considered what to write.  At the moment of the beep, Clara was somehow 
visualizing Wayne’s face as it had been shortly before he died.  However, there was no 
actual face being innerly seen, although it was understood to be a seeing phenomenon.  
There was also a feeling of sadness that was connected to this visual experience; this 
sadness was somehow experienced in her head.  She was also thinking/feeling irritated at 
Joan for sending the picture—an irritation that, if expressed in words (which it was not) 
might be something like, why did she send it, she should mind her own business, I don’t 
want a picture like this, butt out!  This negative thinking/feeling, contrasted with her 
general sense that she should say thank you for sending the present, had brought the letter 
writing to a temporary halt.     
Sensory Awareness              
     Clara had one instance of sensory awareness, constituting three percent of her 
samples.  Here is the one example of sensory awareness that was accompanied by a 
feeling:  
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Beep 3.4 – Clara was experiencing pain and numbness in her hand due to arthritis.  At the 
moment of the beep, she was aware of the fingers of her right hand being in a curled 
position and numbness throughout each of the fingers.  She was also frustrated by the 
pain which was an intense emotional experience.  Clara stated that she felt like she 
wanted to cry, although the literal experience of wanting to cry was not in her awareness.  
She was not sure if this part of the experience was in her head or contained in her body.  
Content Themes
     Clara also had some themes involving the content of her experience.  For example, 
Clara was judged to have had from 9 to 12 samples that involved negative content.  Of 
those that have been discussed above, six had negative content: beep 2.5 where Clara was 
innerly seeing her husband’s tombstone and feeling sadness, 2.6 where she was thinking 
about not adjusting well to living in Las Vegas, 3.4 where she was experiencing pain and 
frustration, 4.5 where she was feeling frustrated, 5.3 where she was experiencing anger, 
and 6.1 where she was thinking about the Virginia Tech shootings and thinking about the 
poor parents.  
     Clara was also judged to have had seven, possibly eight samples with family-related 
content.  Family-related content was counted when she was clearly having an experience 
that involved a specific family member. This most commonly involved her husband or 
her daughter, but others involved other family members as well.  Of those discussed 
above, three had family-related content: beep 2.5 where she was thinking about her
husband, beep 5.6 where Clara was innerly seeing pictures of her brothers, and beep 6.5 
where she was thinking about her daughter’s letting her drive.  
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     Clara had four, possibly five samples that contained content related to death.  Three of 
these involved her husband and two involved the shootings at Virginia Tech that occurred 
on sampling day six.  Beeps 2.5 (when Clara was visualizing her husband’s face as it 
looked before he died) and 6.1 (thinking about the “poor parents” of the victims of the 
Virginia Tech shooting) discussed above are two examples.  
     Clara also had three beeps thinking about the beeper specifically.  Here is an example:
Beep 2.1 – At the moment of the beep, Clara was drinking coffee and was aware of 
waiting for the beeper to go off and wondering if it would go off.  This was a mental 
process that did not contain any words, images, or symbols, nor did it contain any 
emotional or physical experience. 
Discussion
     Samples from the first sampling day   
     DES reports often exclude discussion of the first sampling day on the logic that the 
first day is typically required as training in the method.  Clara, however, seemed to grasp 
the method immediately, so we have discussed all her samples including the first day’s to 
this point and have included Clara’s first day in the analysis below.  The only moderately 
large change that would occur by not counting day one is that Clara’s inner seeings 
would drop from 26 percent to 14 percent because five of Clara’s nine possible inner
seeings occurred on day one.  
     Missing features of inner experience 
A substantial amount of Clara’s experience was missing an important feature.  
Specifically, all nine of her inner seeings lacked color other than black, brown, or white.  
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Also, she had three, four, or five instances of worded thinking which is similar to inner 
speech in that it is a clear verbal experience, but it has no auditory qualities.  Also, in 
Clara’s experience the words were present simultaneously rather than in a sequential
manner that occurs in inner speech.    She also had one instance of imageless seeing, 
which can be conceptualized as an inner seeing that does not have visual qualities.  The 
meaning of experience that is lacking in common features is unclear.  However, one 
interpretation is that it somehow represents a deficiency in inner experience.  
Unfortunately it is difficult to determine if this is the case.  It is quite possible that Clara
always had inner experience that was missing common features and therefore does not 
represent deterioration in inner experience.  Nevertheless, this is a somewhat unusual 
occurrence that is shared with some other participants in this study.
There have been very few investigations regarding color in mental imagery.  
However, since the 1940’s psychological researchers debated the extent to which people 
dream in black and white versus color.  Many researchers attempted to estimate the 
percentage of time people dreamed in black and white and color based on interviews (for 
a review, see Schwitzgebel, 2002).  Fifty-six percent of respondents in a poll by America 
On-Line in 1999 stated that they dreamt in color while 31 percent stated that they dreamt 
in black and white or both black and white and color (Schwitzgebel, 2002).  Prior to the 
early 1900’s, dreams were largely assumed to be in color, but, according to Schwitzgebel 
(2002), this trend changed due to the presence of black and white media (newspapers, 
then TV) in the culture.  Schwitzgebel (2002) speculated that this could be due to black 
and white media actually changing the way that people dream, but concluded that it is 
much more likely that the reports of people’s dreams changed rather than the dreams 
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themselves.   He also offered the possibility that the color or lack thereof in dreams is
undetermined and not explicit in the dreams themselves.  Schwitzgebel (2002) only 
briefly discussed the possibility of black and white inner seeings while awake, but did
suggest that this phenomenon as at least a possibility.  
Although there are no investigations about the presence of color in the visual images 
of older individuals there have been discussions regarding color in the visual images of 
children.  Investigations into the presence of color in early childhood memories have 
found a range of approximately 10 to 40 percent of memories where colors are directly 
mentioned (for a review, see Clark, 2004).  In one study where participants were directly 
asked if color was a part of their childhood memories only 34 percent of the memories 
contained color (Howes, Siegel, & Brown, 1993).  Clark (2004) estimated that 
approximately 1 out of 6 reports of childhood memories contain color when it was not 
directly asked for.  This may be important to the current study as it suggests the 
possibility that children may have to develop the ability to have color as a component of 
their mental images.   This would make color in imagery a developmental process that 
could increase with age, but then decline in some individuals as they reach old age.    
Although color in the mental imagery of older individuals has not been investigated, 
many aspects of mental imagery in older individuals have been investigated.  Perhaps the 
most attention has been paid to mental rotation in both younger and older individuals.  
Older individuals consistently perform more slowly in mental rotation tasks relative to 
their younger counterparts (Dror & Kosslyn, 1994).  For example, it appears to take 
longer for elderly individuals to form, maintain, and manipulate mental images (Dror & 
Kosslyn, 1994; see Palladino & De Beni, 2003).  Older individuals also appear to 
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generate different types of mental images that younger individuals.  For example, 
Palladino and De Beni (2003) had participants generate a mental image for each word on 
a 40 word list.   The participants had 40 seconds to generate each image.  Older 
individuals tended to generate images that were less specific and more self-referential 
(i.e., their images were of things they have actually observed) than younger individuals.   
Older individuals also had more irrelevant information in their images compared to 
younger people, but each group had the same amount of relevant details.  However, older 
individuals produced less details overall than younger individuals when time constraints 
were reduced to 20 seconds (Palladino & De Beni, 2003).  
The possibility that images change as a function of one’s age has been considered by 
Fodor (1981), who suggested that children could think in images while adults think in 
words.   Also, various studies on imagery suggest that more detailed images take longer 
to construct (see Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Schwartz, 1981).  Furthermore, there is 
evidence that the vividness of an image is inversely related to the time one is allowed to 
form that image (Campos, Perez-Fabello, & Gomez-Juncal, 2006).  This suggests that the 
quality of images (in this case, vividness) may not be present instantly but rather take 
time to develop.  
One might infer from the above investigations that more detailed images take a higher 
level of mental effort.  Assuming that an image in color is more detailed than one in black 
and white, this might suggest that it takes more mental effort or cognitive resources to 
have a color image than a black and white image.  Therefore, the exclusive presence of 
black and white images opposed to color images in Clara’s awareness could be due to a 
deficiency in cognitive functioning.  
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Content of inner experience 
Clara had some themes in the content of her experience.  It is not clear if this is 
significant or not.  It is possible that Clara experienced a limited range of content, 
although the rest of Clara’s content appeared typical in terms of range.  It is also possible 
that Clara ruminated about some of these topics.  The negative content may represent that 
Clara was depressed and there is some research to suggest that people who are depressed 
tend to ruminate (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993).  
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CHAPTER 7
UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “DOLLY”
Dolly was a 67 year-old woman with a Bachelor’s degree in Liberal Arts.  She 
exhibited no cognitive impairment and scored 30out of 30 on the MMSE suggesting no 
cognitive impairment.  She was referred to the study by a daughter of another participant.  
Dolly was not familiar with DES prior to the study. Dolly was quite adept at narrowing 
her focus to the moment of the beep and describing inner experience early on in the 
sampling process.  Therefore samples from her first day were included in the analysis.  
There were seventeen samples discussed across three sampling days.  
As shown in Table 4, Dolly had a wide variety of forms of experience in her samples.  
Overall, 50 percent of her samples included unsymbolized thinking, 26 percent included 
feelings, 18 percent had inner speech, 12 percent contained feeling fact of body, while 
sensory awareness, just doing, and no experience were each involved in six percent of the 
samples.  Multiple awareness also characterized six percent of the samples.  
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Table 4
Percentages of characteristics in Dolly’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic Percentage
Feeling 26
Feeling Fact of Body 12
Inner Speech 18
Just Doing 6
No Experience 6
Sensory Awareness 6
Unsymbolized Thinking 50
Multiple Awareness 6
Number of samples 17
Total number of characteristicsa 16.5
Characteristics per sample 0.97
aTotal number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly 
experienced (in this case, Feeling Fact of Body, Just Doing, No Inner
Experience, and Multiple Awareness), and counts uncertain instances 
as .5
As in Tables 1 through 3, the “Percentage” column of Table 4 refers to the percentage 
of samples that contained each of the form categories.  Forms that appeared to be 
ambiguously between two categories were counted as .5 in each category.  For example, 
in beep 1.2 below, it is unclear if the experience is an instance of unsymbolized thinking 
or a feeling. Therefore, this sample was counted as .5 unsymbolized thinking and .5 
feeling.  Also, if there was substantial skepticism that a certain experience was present 
right at the moment of the beep the form of that experience was scored as .5 as well.     
Unsymbolized Thinking
Dolly’s most common experience was unsymbolized thinking.  Unsymbolized 
thinking was present in 50 percent of Dolly’s samples.   Below is an example of one of 
Dolly’s unsymbolized thoughts: 
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Beep 3.2 – Dolly was sitting at the computer doing research on video cameras she was 
considering buying.  She was looking at different models of cameras on her computer 
screen.  At the moment of the beep, Dolly was wondering what camera to buy.  This was 
a mental process that contained no words or images.  She was also aware of what was on 
the computer screen.
     Dolly had three instances where it was not clear if she was experiencing an 
unsymbolized thought or a feeling.  Here is an example of one of those instances:  
Beep 1.2 – Dolly was using color blocks on a piece of paper to work on her brochure.  At 
the moment of the beep, she was thinking why making the brochure was so hard today 
and was experiencing frustration.  She does not think there were words associated with 
this experience but was not entirely sure.  This was more of a mental experience than a 
physical feeling.  
Inner Speech
     Dolly had inner speech in 18 percent of her samples.  Here is an example that also 
includes a feeling:  
Beep 2.1 – Dolly was sitting outside drinking coffee.  At the moment of the beep, she 
was innerly saying “I enjoy the outside quiet.”  This inner speaking had the same 
characteristics as external speech. The beep sounded right after the word “quiet.”  Dolly 
was also enjoying the external quiet as well as the internal quiet at the moment of the 
beep, but it was difficult to say how this enjoyment took place.  She also said she was 
experiencing inner quiet although she was speaking to herself; even so, she understood 
this inner speaking to be somehow quieter than her inner chatter had been earlier.  
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Feelings
     Dolly had one, possibly two experiences of feeling in addition to the three that were 
not clearly a feeling or an unsymbolized thought.  Here is the one clear example of a 
feeling:  
Beep 1.1 – Dolly was on her computer, working on designing a brochure.  At the moment 
of the beep, she was feeling frustrated: she did not like the design although she had been 
working on it for a long time, and would have to change it again.  This frustration was 
experienced as a pressure that pushed inward in the middle of her torso below her heart.  
This was a somewhat intense emotional experience.  
     The uncertainty in the second occurrence is because Dolly was not certain if the 
experience was at the moment of the beep or not.   
Other Forms of Awareness
      Dolly also had two instances of feeling fact of body, one sensory awareness, one just 
doing, one sample with no inner experience, and one instance of multiple awareness. 
Discussion
     Samples from the first sampling day
     Although the first day of DES is typically not counted, Dolly was fairly adept at 
narrowing her focus to the moment of the beep and reliably describing her inner 
experience on the first day of sampling.  However, Dolly did have some inconsistencies 
and presuppositions during her first day, so although her first day has been included in 
the discussion thus far and in the table above, there is reason for some skepticism.  
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However, the difference between an analysis that includes the first day and an analysis 
that excludes the first day is not large.  The only notable differences are that three of 
Dolly’s seven clear instances of unsymbolized thought occurred on day one and two of 
the three experiences that were between an unsymbolized thought and a feeling occurred 
on day one.  If day one were to be excluded, her percentage of unsymbolized thought 
would move from 50 percent to 27 percent and the percentage of feelings would move
from 26 percent to 14 percent.     
Conclusion
       Perhaps the most important aspect of Dolly’s experience is that it was fairly clear and 
substantially varied.  Dolly also was able to perform the DES task well, even on the first 
day.  Overall, her inner experience and ability to perform the task was similar to that of 
young adults.  
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CHAPTER 8
UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “ELLEN”
Ellen was a 68 year-old woman.  She contacted the researchers after reading about the 
study in a Las Vegas newspaper.  She was not familiar with the DES procedure prior to 
the study.  She received 30 out of 30 on the MMSE which does not indicate the presence 
of cognitive impairment.  
On Ellen’s first sampling day she, like many other first-day participants of any age, 
had apparently not adopted a careful understanding of “the moment of the beep.”  This 
was evidenced by Ellen’s difficulties discussing the form of her experience in her 
samples as well as her uncertainty about the actual content of her experience at the 
moment of the beep.  She was also contradictory at times during her reports and was 
often unsure if what she was describing was at the moment of the beep, before the 
moment of the beep, or after the moment of the beep.  Therefore, samples from this day 
will not be analyzed.  
Ellen improved during her second sampling day, but she still had substantial 
difficulty.  Her ability to focus on the moment of the beep and to understand what is 
meant by inner experience improved, but her focus was still not entirely clear.  For 
example, she was uncertain at times when exactly the beep came in her awareness and 
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often tried to resort to logic to determine when the beep sounded.  Furthermore, Ellen
changed her responses dramatically on at least two occasions.  
Ellen continued to struggle somewhat throughout her six days of sampling.  She 
became less contradictory as time went on, but continued to have persistent difficulty 
with questions about form.  She periodically seemed disorganized in general and in her 
responses to the beep.  It is also notable that she routinely became frustrated with the 
detailed nature of the interviewers’ questions, which she expressed directly.  She also 
stated on one occasion that she felt as if the interviewers did not believe her due to their 
persistent questioning.  Overall, all of Ellen’s 21 beeps from day two to day six will be 
analyzed, except for beep 6.4, which Ellen did not respond to.   Many of these beeps 
involved contradictions or substantial changes during the course of the description of the 
beep.  Therefore, additional skepticism is needed for many of Ellen’s samples.  Below are 
examples from early in the interview process and on the last day that demonstrate both 
Ellen’s improvements and continued uncertainty even on the last day of sampling:    
Beep 2.3 – Ellen was sorting through a number of papers related to a car she had 
purchased.  She was searching for a particular piece of paper and was looking at a sales 
slip.  It was difficult to pinpoint Ellen’s experience at the moment of the beep.  At first 
she stated that she was worried and that there was tension in her upper body, but she 
could not state where.  She then thought that this worry was in her head, experienced as 
tightness behind her eyes.  She later said that she may have been somehow experiencing 
tension, but this was not in her awareness at the moment of the beep.  She stated at this 
point that what was in her awareness was that it was not self-evident that this was the 
paper that she needed, that she was frustrated with herself and concerned that she would 
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have to continue searching.  She reported that there were no words or images in this 
experience.  At this point, Ellen was very frustrated by the questioning process.  
Therefore, questioning about this beep was stopped.  A clear understanding of Ellen’s 
experience at this beep could not be discerned.   Beep 2.3 was scored as a possible feeling 
or unsymbolized thought.
Beep 6.1 – Ellen was driving, but apparently little or no attention was devoted to this 
task.  At the moment of the beep she was thinking, “I think I would call myself a liberal 
democrat.”  At first, Ellen could not discern whether or not this thought was in words; 
perhaps “a liberal democrat” was in words but the rest of the thought was not.  
Eventually, Ellen believed that the entire sentence was present in words, but these words 
were not heard or spoken and all the words were in her awareness simultaneously rather 
than being spoken in a sequence.  Although Ellen was certain of this by the end, her 
initial uncertainty leaves room for skepticism.  Beep 6.1 was scored as a possible worded 
thinking and a possible inner speech. 
As best could be ascertained given the uncertainty about her samples, Ellen’s primary 
form of experience was unsymbolized thinking, present in 69 percent of her samples as 
shown in Table 5.  Other forms of experience were feelings (18 percent), inner speech 
(14 percent), inner seeing (11 percent), worded thinking (7 percent), feeling fact of body 
(5 percent), imageless seeing and inner hearing (1 percent each).  Multiple awareness was 
present in 24 percent of Ellen’s samples.  
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Table 5
Percentages of characteristics in Ellen’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic Percentage
Feeling 18
Feeling Fact of Body 5
Imageless Seeing 1
Inner Hearing 1
Inner Seeing 11
Inner Speech 14
Unsymbolized Thinking 69
Worded Thinking 7
Multiple Awareness 24
Number of samples 21
Total number of characteristicsa 33.5
Characteristics per sample 1.60
aTotal number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly 
experienced (in this case, Feeling Fact of Body and Multiple
Awareness), and counts uncertain instances as .5 or .33.  
     
      Like Tables 1 through 4, the “Percentage” column of Table 5 refers to the percentage 
of samples that contained each of the form categories.  Forms that appeared to be 
ambiguously between two categories were counted as .5 in each category.  Forms that 
were ambiguously between three categories were counted as .33.  Also, if there was 
substantial skepticism that the form of experience was actually present at the moment of 
the beep then the experience was also counted as .5.  
Some experiences may have appeared ambiguously between two or three forms of 
experience because Ellen had difficulty accessing her experience.  That is, some of these 
experiences may not represent an actual ambiguity between or among forms of 
experience, but when forced to code these experiences the most accurate way is to 
represent them as ambiguously between two or three forms as that is the best that could 
be discerned from her descriptions.  Here is an example of one of the three instances that 
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Ellen’s experience was coded as three possible forms of experience (unsymbolized 
thinking, inner speech, and inner hearing):  
Beep 5.6 – Ellen was watching Jeopardy.  The question involved a novelist from 
Minnesota.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was trying to think of the novelist from 
Minnesota.  At first, Ellen said she was thinking the words “novelist from Minnesota,” 
but she had some difficulty describing the nature of this experience.  She was not sure if 
she was hearing the words or saying the words internally; then she was not certain if the 
words were present at all; she later said that she was saying the words to herself.  Due to 
Ellen’s difficulty accessing her experience additional skepticism is needed for this 
sample.  
Unsymbolized Thinking
     Unsymbolized thinking appeared to be present in 69 percent of Ellen’s samples, by far 
the most common form of experience for her.  There were 12 of 21 samples where it 
appeared likely that unsymbolized thinking was present at the moment of the beep.  Here 
is an example where an unsymbolized thought was likely present at the moment of the 
beep:  
Beep 6.3 – Ellen was having a conversation on the phone with her friend Jane.  Jane had 
just said something regarding a 14.99 percent interest rate.  At the moment of the beep, 
Ellen was thinking that 14.99 for a couple of hundred of dollars does not sound right.  
There were no words in this experience.  This experience was a process of inner 
calculation.  
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     Ellen may also have been experiencing unsymbolized thinking on six other occasions, 
but either her uncertainty or lack of reliability in her report was substantial enough to 
warrant significant skepticism. Beep 2.3 above where Ellen was searching for paperwork 
regarding her car is an example of one of these ambiguous instances.    
Difficulty Apprehending Experience 
     Ellen had substantial difficulty apprehending her experience throughout sampling.  
Difficulty apprehending experience was present on 13 of 21 samples with the possibility 
of an additional four samples.  If the uncertain instances are counted as .5, Ellen had 
difficulty apprehending experience on 71 percent of her samples.  Difficulty 
apprehending experience was present in all of the samples presented above except for 
beep 6.3, where Ellen was unquestionably internally calculating.  Here is an example 
where it was not clear if Ellen had difficulty apprehending her experience. 
Beep 6.2 – Ellen was listening to the McNeil report on the radio and looking at a tote 
bag.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was wondering if she dropped her eraser upstairs 
where she stores her tote bag.  This wondering did not contain words.  Ellen was also 
visualizing the spot where she leaves her tote bag.  She was innerly seeing the bottom 
part of the corner of her bedroom wall and part of the floor.  She may also have been 
innerly seeing the tote bag leaning against that wall, but was not sure.  She saw 
something against the wall, but it was not very vivid.  The entire inner seeing was dark 
and unclear. The thought seemed to have started before the inner seeing, and then 
continued so that both thought and inner seeing were present at the moment of the beep.   
This example is considered not clear because although Ellen is convincing that she was 
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experiencing an inner seeing at the moment of the beep she had some uncertainty about 
one of the substantial details of the inner seeing (i.e., the presence of the tote bag). 
Symbols
     Symbols (i.e.,, words or images) occurred possibly in 7 out of 21 samples.  However, 
every time a symbol may have been present, there was substantial reason for skepticism.  
Ellen reported a possible four inner speakings.  However, in all of these situations she 
exhibited substantial uncertainty regarding the presence of the experience itself or the 
presence of the actual words in the experience.  Ellen reported three possible inner 
seeings.  In two of these, Ellen had substantial difficulty describing the details of the 
inner seeing, and in the other she was very uncertain if there was an inner seeing at all.  
Perhaps Ellen’s most certain occurrence of symbolic experience (inner speech) occurred 
in beep 6.1 above where she was thinking the words “liberal democrat” but even then it 
was uncertain if the experience was actually in words.  
Content Themes
     One theme that ran through many of Ellen’s samples was negative or anxious content.  
This content was sometimes in the form of a feeling, but often seemed to be more 
accurately characterized as unsymbolized thinking.  She was judged to have experienced 
annoyance in two samples directly.  In one sample she was annoyed but this was not 
directly in her awareness.  She also had experiences of worry, frustration, angst, 
insecurity, self-consciousness, and self-criticism.  Overall, these experiences were present 
consciously in 8 of the 21 samples and were present once where it was not directly 
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apprehended.  Below is one example of self-criticalness and one of annoyance, 
respectively:  
Beep 3.3 – Ellen was backing out of a parking space in a parking lot.  Another car was 
going to pass her, driving toward her from her right.  She was looking at this car.  Ellen
initially stated that at the moment of the beep, she was determining if she should wait or 
pull out, but she wavered in her certainty as to the existence of this experience at the 
moment of the beep.   She also said that she was judging or criticizing herself, telling 
herself to just make a decision as to whether to pull out or not and to quit dawdling.  She 
stated that this self-judging was automatic and that there were no words in any of these 
experiences.  The only aspects of this beep that Ellen seemed confident in were the actual 
external events occurring at the beep and that there were no words in her experience at 
this beep. Ellen went back and forth in her descriptions of what was in her awareness at 
the moment of the beep.  This raises skepticism about any and all of the specific contents 
reported at the moment of this beep.       
Beep 5.5 – Ellen’s dog was whining.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was feeling quite 
strongly irritated about the dog being spoiled.  Ellen initially said that this irritation was 
throughout her body, but later said that it was more mental than physical.  She was also 
trying to decide if she should get the dog a treat.  There were no words or images in this 
experience.  The irritation had begun before she considered getting the dog a treat, but 
both were present at the moment of the beep.  Although the exact form of the irritation is 
uncertain it appeared that Ellen was somehow experiencing irritation at the moment of 
the beep.
172
Discussion
Perhaps the most notable aspect of Ellen’s experience with DES is that she had 
substantial difficulty apprehending her experience, especially the forms of her 
experience.  She did not evidence general difficulty with communication and received a 
perfect score on the MMSE.   However, when describing her beeps Ellen often appeared 
to be having substantial difficulty and seemed disorganized and frustrated at times when 
describing her inner experience (evidenced by her frequent contradictions), but this was 
not evident when speaking with her casually.  
Ellen’s difficulty apprehending her experience could be due to many factors:  
1. Ellen’s inner experience is somewhat undifferentiated and/or unclear – It is 
possible that Ellen’s experience is such that it is so diffuse and/or unclear that it is 
difficult to determine exactly what is occurring at the moment of the beep.  Evidence for 
this exists in the fact that Ellen often wavered on her descriptions of her experience, 
especially regarding form and was clearly frustrated throughout the interviewing process.  
It is possible that there is no clear form in Ellen’s experience, and, at times, no clear 
content.  This appears to be the most likely candidate for Ellen’s difficulties.      
2. Ellen’s lack of symbols in her inner experience makes it difficult to describe –
Participants often have difficulty describing unsymbolized thought early in the 
interviewing process, but typically improve over the course of the DES process.  It is 
possible that Ellen has predominately, if not entirely, unsymbolized thought, but for some 
reason did not benefit from training in describing this experience.  However, because 
Ellen exhibited no other cognitive deficiency and participants typically benefit from 
training, this is not a likely candidate.  
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3. Ellen does not have adequate ability to introspect – Ellen’s frustration and her non-
verbal behavior suggested that it was very difficult for her to go through the interviewing 
process.  This may be due to a decreased ability to introspect, and hence increased 
frustration, effort, and difficulty describing her experience.  However, because Ellen did 
not exhibit any particular difficulties in higher-order thinking, as might be present in 
someone who could not introspect adequately, this appears to not be a strong explanation.    
4. Ellen cannot focus on the moment of the beep – Ellen’s contradictions suggest that 
she may not be able to narrow her experience down to a single moment.  This may cause 
a difficulty in describing experience.  Forms of experience may change over a period of 
time.  If Ellen is reporting on a longer period of time (say, a few seconds for example) 
and is experiencing many forms of experience during this time, this may make her 
experience difficult to describe.  However, Ellen did not exhibit any problems with 
attention either informally or on the MMSE, so this is not very likely.    
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CHAPTER 9
UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “FAY”
Fay was a 70 year-old woman with a Bachelor’s degree in political science.  She 
contacted the researchers after reading about the study in a local newspaper.  Fay was not 
familiar with the DES procedure prior to the study.  She had no psychiatric diagnosis at 
the time of the study.  She received a perfect score of 30 on the MMSE which does not 
indicate the presence of cognitive impairment.    
Fay’s first day of sampling was very difficult.   She had more trouble than most 
describing her inner experience although she appeared to have adequate intellectual 
ability.  She was very easily led by the interviewers and often changed and contradicted 
her reports as the interview continued.  She also had difficulty reporting her inner 
experience rather than external circumstances that may have been related to her inner 
experience.   For example, in Beep 1.1, she stated that she was thinking about a church.  
When queried further, Fay repeatedly referred to the church itself and why it had been 
closed rather than reporting her inner experience.  This pattern repeated itself throughout 
each of the beeps on the first day.  
Similar difficulties occurred during the second sampling day, although they appeared, 
perhaps, to have lessened somewhat.  Fay’s conception of the moment of the beep 
appeared to shorten slightly, but was still substantially larger than what DES defines as 
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the “moment” of the beep.  Fay also was better able to discuss her inner experience more 
efficiently with fewer intrusions of discussions of external reality, although this was still 
a problem.   Fay also had difficulty operating the beeper.  Some of her samples on this 
day were caused by her turning the beeper on and off, causing it to beep.  Below is an 
example of a sample from day two that was obtained via proper DES procedure:
Beep 2.1 – Fay was at her rental property.  She reported having three experiences at or 
near the moment of the beep.  She frequently wavered regarding which of the three 
components was in her awareness.  Fay reported that she was innerly seeing herself 
holding a broom and moving from the front door of her property toward a dust bin.  This 
seeing reportedly contained movement.  However, Fay was not sure of the viewpoint 
from which the seeing was being perceived, making the interviewers skeptical about 
whether an actual inner seeing was involved.  Fay also reported that at or near the 
moment of the beep she was innerly seeing a property manager whom she had not hired.  
The inner seeing reportedly was of her face, from the front, in color with medium clarity.  
The face was expressionless.  Finally, Fay stated that she was innerly seeing the property 
manger she had hired.  This was reportedly a full-body image from the front.  
Throughout this beep, Fay gave clues to suggest that she may be describing reality 
rather than her actual experience.  For example, when asked if the two images of the 
property managers were separate or on top of one another she said “They’re separate.  
They probably don’t even know each other.”  As a result, the interviewers were not 
confident about determining whether Fay was experiencing three, two, one, or no inner 
seeings at the moment of the beep. 
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Although Fay appeared to be adequately intelligent (evidenced by her eloquence and 
substantial vocabulary), she continued to have substantial difficulty focusing on the 
moment of the beep and describing her inner experience during the third and fourth days 
of sampling.  During discussion of every beep on days three and four, Fay described long 
conversations that were either imagined or remembered (in her inner world or part of her 
inner experience) as well as real conversations.  She could not describe at all where in the 
conversations she was at the moment of each beep although the question “what was in 
your awareness at the moment of the beep” was posed numerous times in a variety of 
ways.  When Fay was prompted to describe only the moment of the beep she would 
invariably describe entire conversations rather than a moment within that conversation.  
Likewise, Fay was repeatedly told that the interviewers were only interested in her inner 
experience rather than background information or facts of reality.  Still, Fay would nearly 
always describe facts of reality and background information in conjunction with events 
that were in her awareness.  This made it extremely difficult to ascertain what Fay’s 
experience was at any of the beeps on the third and fourth days.  
On day five, the standard DES procedure was altered and Fay was interviewed 
immediately after the beep in an attempt to minimize any potential interference that 
memory disturbances may have played in Fay’s difficulty with the DES process.  The 
investigators stayed in a back bedroom of Fay’s house while she wore the beeper and 
went about her activities in the rest of the house. When the beep sounded, she came 
immediately to the researchers and the expositional interview was conducted on the spot.  
This procedure seemed to help reduce slightly Fay’s reference to external reality when 
describing her inner experience, but it did not eliminate it entirely.  Fay continued to have 
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difficulty describing the form of her inner experience.  Also, her descriptions continued 
to be contradictory at times.  Below is a sample from day five:
Beep 5.3 – Fay was playing Scrabble on her computer and at the moment of the beep Fay
apparently somehow thinking about the word “slotter.”  Fay’s descriptions of this thought 
process were inconsistent, so it is impossible to know exactly what was in her awareness 
at the moment of the beep, but the general idea was wondering whether or not “slotter” 
was a word; that she would play it and find out whether or not the computer would reject 
it or not; that she could remember that the word had been played in some past Scrabble 
game, but she couldn’t remember the outcome of the protest.  These sub-thoughts may 
have all been parts of the same thought process that were all present at the moment of the 
beep, or they may have been explicit thoughts that were in the vicinity of the beep but not 
simultaneous, or they may have been ways of describing her activity, none or which was 
actually present in her experience at the moment of the beep.  The interviewers pressed 
her on those issues.  For example, the interviewers asked twice if there were words in her 
experience at the moment of the beep and both times she described external reality (i.e.,
the words on the Scrabble board and that she didn’t know if “slotter” was a word or not) 
instead of answering directly about her experience.  Thus Fay’s reports of her experience 
seemed discursive or wandering; however, there did seem to be limits on how far that 
wandering could go.  For example, Fay confidently and believably said that she was not, 
at the moment of the beep, thinking of other computer Scrabble systems and their ways of 
responding to incorrect words, but may have been thinking about that near the beep.  This 
may be evidence that Fay has some reliable access to her experience at the moment of the 
beep.  However, the investigators’ overall impression was that Fay did not, even when 
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interviewed immediately after the beep, distinguish adequately between what was in 
experience at the moment of the beep and what were the characteristics of the situation 
surrounding her at the moment of the beep.   
Discussion
It appears that none of Fay’s samples can be considered reliable due to her substantial 
inconsistency, seeming inability to focus on the moment of the beep, and reliance on 
external reality throughout the sampling process.  This unreliability continued even when 
the retrospection of the sampling procedure was minimized as much as possible—
conducting the expositional interviews within a minute of the beep.  There are many 
possibilities for Fay’s difficulties:  
1. Fay has undifferentiated inner experience - Fay reported throughout the DES 
process that she was having many possible inner experiences at the moment of the beep.  
Although this may signify an inability to focus on the moment of the beep, it may signify 
undifferentiated experience.  That is, Fay may have a vast array of content in her inner 
experience at any given time that does not occur in temporal order.  This may make it 
difficult to express exactly what was in her experience because so much was in her 
experience, especially if her experience is predominately non-symbolic.  Given Fay’s 
overall command of language and seemingly high intelligence, this appears to be a likely 
candidate.      
2. Fay lacks inner experience or has no inner experience – If Fay has no inner 
experience or very little inner experience she may rely on discussions of external reality 
and may not fully understand the DES procedure, as the target of DES is inner 
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experience, something that she may not have.  It is common that individuals with no 
inner experience, rather than reporting that they have no inner experience instead discuss 
external reality rather than internal experience, as Fay did.   Individuals that seemingly 
have no inner experience are also often inconsistent, as Fay was.  This suggests that no 
inner experience is a fairly strong possibility in Fay’s case.     
3. Fay cannot introspect – Evidence for this hypothesis can be found throughout Fay’s 
descriptions.  In nearly every sample, she spoke more about external reality than inner 
experience.  If she cannot introspect, then she could not describe inner experience.  
Skepticism for this lies in the fact that Fay did not exhibit any other deficiencies in 
cognitive or social abilities, other than somewhat diminished eye contact.  This is still 
certainly a possibility, but does not appear as likely as some others.   
      4. Fay does not have the cognitive abilities to focus on the moment of the beep – It 
did not appear that Fay could narrow the window of her inner experience to a discreet 
moment, evidenced by her continued discussion of events that happened vaguely near the 
beep and the vast array of content she discussed at each sample.  Fay did not appear to 
have difficulties with attention or other cognitive abilities, however.  She scored 30 on 
the MMSE; she has and uses a wonderful vocabulary, and evidences a mastery of skills 
both in real life (she manages several properties) and in recreation (she successfully plays 
competitive Scrabble).   So a general cognitive deficit seems unlikely.
5. Fay has rigid pre-suppositions about what inner experience is – Evidence for this 
hypothesis is shown throughout the interviews as the nature of Fay’s descriptions 
changed very little from the first day to the fifth day, which is somewhat unusual as 
participants become trained in the DES process.  Fay did not exhibit any rigidity in any 
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other way, however, and does not seem to have difficulty learning in any other area.  
Therefore, this possibility is unlikely.    
6. Fay actually experiences entire conversations in a moment – Many of Fay’s beeps 
revolved around the inner experience of conversations.  She could never pinpoint the 
exact point in the conversation that she was experiencing.  However, the fact that Fay 
seemed to not distinguish very well between internal experience and external reality 
suggest that there is much more involved than simply unusual inner experience in Fay’s 
case.  Therefore, this possibility is somewhat unlikely.    
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CHAPTER10
IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “GARY”
Gary was a 70 year-old male with a diagnosis of Vascular Dementia (VaD), which he 
received in 2003.  He received a score of 29 on the MMSE, missing only one item in the 
recall section which suggests that he has little or no cognitive impairment.  He was 
recruited from a local support group.  Gary was not familiar with the DES procedure 
prior to sampling.  During the initial interview, after the initial introduction and 
explanation of the DES task, Gary was given a “practice beep:” he was given the beeper 
that was set to beep within 10 minutes after being set.  He was instructed to wear the 
beeper and walk, with his wife who had accompanied him to the interview, the 100 yards 
to the University Student Union and have a cup of coffee; when it beeped, he was to 
respond as instructed and return to the interview site.  He followed those instructions 
adequately, and his performance in the interview seemed to indicate that he understood at 
least preliminarily what was asked of him. However, because Gary was new to the 
procedure and this beep was for purposes of training only, the contents of the beep will 
not be analyzed.  The first real sampling day and its interview were scheduled for the 
following week.
When Gary arrived for the first interview, he reported that he had forgotten to bring 
his notes about the beeps to the first interviewing day. Gary’s wife reported that Gary had 
had a small stroke between the initial training day and the first day of interviewing.  She 
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stated that he had “really gone down hill” but that we probably would not notice 
anything.  Eventually, it was determined that Gary had not had a stroke, but had had a 
transient ischemic attack (TIA).  A TIA is a cerebrovascular event that occurs when 
blood flow to part of the brain is blocked temporarily.  Although an individual may 
experience stroke-like symptoms, blood flow eventually returns and there is no 
permanent damage to the brain (Weigh et al., 1999). For training purposes, we 
interviewed Gary about the beeped experiences as best he could remember them.  
Because these beeped experiences were not discussed in the standard manner, they were
not be included in the analysis.
For sampling day two, Gary had some difficulty operating the beeper.  He had 
apparently missed a beep and confused the battery-saving “chirps” with beeps.  He also 
had some difficulty understanding what was meant exactly by “inner experience” and 
“moment of the beep.”  He had collected two beeps the morning of the interview and two 
beeps two days prior to the interview.  Therefore, this interview was again used only for 
training purposes.  
Gary substantially improved his undertaking of the DES process for the third 
interview day: he remembered his notebook, and was responding to beeps, not chirps.  
Therefore, beeps will be analyzed starting with this day (day three) and will go through 
day six for a total of 18 beeps.  
Gary’s responses throughout the interviews included frequent generalizations.  For 
example, when asked about his at-the-moment-of-the-beep experience, he frequently 
used phrases like “I usually…” and “In general…” Such locutions frequently signal that 
the participant is not describing actual beeped experience, and thus skepticism about his 
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reports may be warranted.   In such cases, the interviewers took great care to try to focus 
Gary on the moment of the beep rather than on generalizations.  This rarely, if ever, 
changed Gary’s descriptions of the experience at each beep; that is, he dropped the use of 
the phrases “I usually...” and “in general” and averred that the description adequately 
conveyed the beeped experience.  We eventually came to believe that it is likely that 
Gary’s “I usually…” and “in general” reflected simply a style of communication rather 
than a suggestion that he was indeed generalizing.  That is, we came to believe that his 
descriptions usually conveyed his experience at the moment of the beep although some 
additional skepticism was warranted in certain instances. 
As shown in Table 6 below Gary had a fairly wide range of experiences.  Worded 
thinking was the most common form of experience and was present in 69 percent of his 
samples.  Other experienced forms were inner seeings (22 percent), feelings (14 percent), 
unsymbolized thinking (8 percent), and sensory awareness (6 percent).  Multiple 
awareness was present in 24 percent of Gary’s samples. 
Table 6
Percentages of characteristics in Gary’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic Percentage
Feeling 14
Inner Seeing 22
Sensory Awareness 6
Unsymbolized Thinking 8
Worded Thinking 69
Multiple Awareness 24
Number of samples 18
Total number of characteristicsa 23
Characteristics per sample 1.28
aTotal number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly 
experienced (in this case, Multiple Awareness), and counts uncertain
instances as .5
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As in Tables 1 through 5, the “Percentage” column in Table 6 refers to the percentage 
of samples that contained each of the form categories.  Forms that appeared to be 
ambiguously between two categories were counted as .5 in each category.  Also, if it was 
not clear if a certain experience was present at the moment of the beep it was also 
counted as .5.    
Worded Thinking
By far the most common characteristic of experience for Gary was a verbal inner 
experience that somehow had no auditory qualities that resembled worded thinking.  This 
type of experience was present in 69 percent of Gary’s samples.  These experiences 
typically contained some qualities of speech, such as words appearing sequentially, with 
pauses and inflections at appropriate places, but the words were not innerly heard nor 
innerly spoken.  Nevertheless, the words were clearly present to Gary.  Although this 
experience involved a stream or sequence of specific words, Gary could often not 
pinpoint the exact word that was in his awareness at the moment of the beep (that is 
frequently true as well for those who experience clear inner speaking).  Sometimes there 
was a visual quality to this verbal experience, as if Gary were seeing the words, usually 
moving left to right.  The worded part of the experience also typically occurred slightly 
faster than the rate in which words are normally spoken.  Here are some examples of this 
type of experience:
Beep 3.1 – Gary was at home reading the newspaper.  He had just turned to a page with 
an article about a pastry chef with an accompanying photograph and had just read the 
caption to the photo.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was wondering if his daughter’s 
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roommate knew the pastry chef and if she had worked with him.  This thought was in 
words, but had no auditory qualities.  This worded experience started with “I wonder if,”
but Gary was not sure of the exact words after this introduction, although he was certain 
of the subject of the experience.  The thought was experienced very quickly (less than a 
second) and was almost simultaneous with the beep (Gary could not discern whether it 
occurred a moment before, a moment after, or at the exact time of the beep).  
Beep 4.2 – Gary was gathering things that he needed to leave his house and was talking 
to his wife Alice.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was wondering if he had everything 
that he needed to leave, if Alice had everything she needed to leave, and was thinking 
about a doctor to whom he owed money.  These thoughts were in words, perhaps 
somewhat like speech but with no auditory component, and were faster than regular 
speech, but also perhaps somewhat visual.  The sentences seemed to interrupt each other, 
and the entire rate might have been a bit faster.  For example, before Gary could complete 
thinking “Do I have everything I need?” another thought, such as, “Does Alice have what 
she needs?” would interrupt the first thought.  Then a third, also worded, thought would 
interrupt the second before it had completed, and so on.  The impression was of a jumble 
of thoughts, all of which were incomplete.  
Beep 5.1 – Gary was eating breakfast and reading a newspaper article about the 
possibility of deleting the motto “In God We Trust” from U.S. currency.  At the moment 
of the beep, Gary was thinking something very similar to, “How are other people and 
religions going to react to this newspaper article?”  There were words present in this 
experience but there was no auditory quality to the experience, although the experience 
did have aspects of speech (such as the question mark at the end being implicit in the 
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experienced word), the words were sequential, but a bit faster than if actually spoken.  
This aspect of Gary’s experience compromised about half of his awareness.  The other 
half was the actual article that Gary was reading and comprehending.    
      At times, Gary’s worded experience was more visual than at other times.  The 
visualness of Gary’s worded experience seemed to fall on a continuum where at times it 
was not visual at all (the above beeps, for example) and at other times it was substantially 
visual.  Below is an example of two somewhat visual worded experiences (occurring 
simultaneously with an inner seeing) that fall somewhere in the middle of the continuum:    
Beep 6.1 – Gary was at home eating breakfast.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was 
having three simultaneous experiences.  One of these experiences was wondering if 
people he knows are affected by the fires in southern California.  This was experienced as 
innerly seeing a neighborhood that he knows and has been to in California; this area is 
seen to be in flames.  He is not sure what specific neighborhood he was innerly seeing, 
but the houses in the inner seeing were familiar and it was a specific place that he has 
been.  He was confident that the neighborhood was not actually affected by the fire; that 
is, he was representing the California fires by imaging a familiar California neighborhood 
and superimposing the flames. The inner seeing was fairly clear, in color, and there was 
motion in the picture (i.e., the flames were moving).  The second experience was feeling 
bad for the people in the fire.  This experience clearly involved words, although Gary
could not recall the exact words during the interview.  There was no auditory quality to 
the words.  These words were occurring a bit faster than speech and seemed somehow to 
move from left to right.  There also may have been some visual quality to the words, but 
the exact nature of this visual quality was difficult to discern.  The third experience was 
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wondering if the beeper was going to sound while he was thinking about the fire.  This 
was experienced as words, but with no auditory quality.  The words were moving a bit 
faster than actual speech, the words may have been moving left to right somehow, and 
there may have been a visual quality to the experience, but Gary was not certain of this.   
This was also a thought process similar to previous beeps.  Thus there were two worded 
experiences occurring simultaneously during this sample.  All three of these experiences 
were equally present in his awareness.  
      The following is a summary of Gary’s most visual worded experience accompanied
by an inner seeing:  
Beep 6.3 – Gary was attending a support group and was talking about coin collections.  
At the moment of the beep, Gary was innerly seeing a coin book that he owns.  There was 
little detail to this inner seeing, and the inner seeing was out of focus.  Gary could discern 
that the book was open and almost white in color.  The coins were not very detailed and 
looked like round disks that were a little darker than the book.  There were about 45 coins 
that he was innerly seeing in his experience.  He could also see about five empty holes in 
the book that did not have coins.  These holes were a bit darker than the book and coins.  
This inner seeing filled his visual field.  Gary was also seeing words scroll across the 
middle of the inner seeing.  The words were something very similar to “when am I going 
to get the rest of the quarters that are being issued this year?”  These words were in focus.  
The words were similar to the words that scroll at the bottom of some television news 
channels, but were vertically in the middle of his image and were moving faster.  The 
verbal part of this experience was similar to previous beeps in that the words did not have 
an auditory quality, moved faster than normal speech, and moved from left to right.  
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However, the worded part of this experience was clearly visual and the words were 
clearly seen moving from left to right when others were typically more vaguely visual.  
Inner Seeing
      Gary experienced inner seeing on 22 percent of his samples.  Six of Gary’s samples 
potentially had occurrences of inner seeing, however only two of these were clear and 
convincing.  The other four inner seeings were present on day five and all occurred while 
working on a crossword puzzle.  All four of these inner seeings lacked substantial detail 
which is grounds for increased skepticism.  Below are two examples from day five:      
Beep 5.2 – Gary was eating breakfast and just beginning a crossword puzzle.  Gary was 
thinking of words that could go in the crossword puzzle, specifically in the “1 Across” 
and “1 Down” section.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was imaginarily seeing words 
for both “1 Across” and “1 Down” superimposed on the blank crossword puzzle he was 
actually looking at.  At the time of the expositional interview, he could not recall what the 
words were, but he seemed to indicate that he could have written them down had he 
known the interviewers wanted that detail.  The imaginarily seen words were in capital 
block letters as if he had written them.  He was not focused on the entire puzzle, just the 
upper left corner where “1 Across” and “1 Down” were.  Gary’s lack of detail (i.e., which 
words he was imagining) suggests that there should be some skepticism regarding the 
accuracy of Gary’s report at this beep.   
Beep 5.3 – Gary was again working on a crossword puzzle.  He had completed some of 
the puzzle, but was now going back and trying to fill in the blank spaces.  At the moment 
of the beep, Gary was imagining a word superimposed on the crossword.  He was 
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envisioning one word in the middle of the puzzle.    He was not sure what the word was 
or if it was going across or down.  Gary’s lack of detail in describing this beep is grounds 
for some additional skepticism.   
Feelings
      Gary experienced feelings on 14 percent of his samples.  Here is a summary of his 
clearest experience of a feeling, coupled with an experience of a worded thought:   
Beep 5.4 – Gary was outside of his house checking the landscaping and sprinkler system.  
He was checking for wet dirt where water had come out of the sprinkler, signifying that 
the sprinkler was working.  The dirt was in fact wet in the appropriate areas.  At the 
moment of the beep, Gary felt relieved that the dirt was wet and the sprinkler system 
appeared to be working.  This relief was experienced as a tingling on the surface of his 
upper torso that included his chest and his back.  Also, somehow related to the relief, 
Gary was thinking that he was glad the sprinkler worked, that the crew seems to have 
done their job properly, and that they set up the system properly.  This experience was 
similar to past experiences in which Gary was thinking in words that had no auditory 
quality.  
Unsymbolized Thinking 
       Gary experienced unsymbolized thinking on eight percent of his samples.  Here is his 
clearest experience of unsymbolized thinking:  
Beep 3.2 – Gary was in the kitchen getting ready to make a bowl of cereal.  He was 
looking at various boxes of cereal.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was trying to 
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determine which type of cereal he was going to eat.  This was a mental process that did 
not contain words or images.
Lack of Variability in Content
      Another notable feature of Gary’s experience is that the content of his awareness 
often remained the same or similar from across a day’s samples.  For example, on day 
three, Gary was aware of being late on two occasions (3.3 and 3.5).  On day four, Gary
was thinking about his wife’s eye problems or a closely related topic during on four out 
of five beeps (4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5).  On day five, Gary was aware of a crossword puzzle on 
four out of six beeps (5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6).  
Discussion 
Gary’s non-auditory verbal experiences are rare among other people sampled.  It is 
difficult to determine for certain why this form of experience is common for Gary.  One 
possibility that is consistent with a degenerative view of inner experience is that Gary has 
lost the ability to have inner experience that is auditory in nature.  He may have had 
genuine inner speech in the past, but now must experience inner speech with no auditory 
component and a substitute visual component.  It is also possible that Gary has always 
had this form of experience, although it is rare.  
Possible evidence for a theory of degeneration of Gary’s experience may also be 
present in his inner seeings.  When Gary did report an inner seeing, it typically lacked 
substantial detail.  Furthermore, only one of Gary’s possible six inner seeings was in 
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color.  The others were in black and white, although four of the inner seeings were related 
to crossword puzzles that were black and white in reality.  
Gary’s consistency of content across beeps is also unusual.  Typically participants 
report a high degree of variability in the content of their experience from beep to beep.  It 
is possible that Gary was fabricating the content of his beeps and did not bother to change 
the content on every beep.  This seems unlikely as Gary showed no evidence of being 
untruthful, although he had a tendency to utilize generalizations at times.  For example, 
when asked detailed questions about his non-auditory verbal experience he would often 
refer to the fact that that is just how he thinks.  Another possibility is that this lack of 
variability of the content of Gary’s experience may also be due to a degenerative process 
associated with his dementia.  
Although Gary had some initial difficulties with the DES process and sometimes 
spoke in generalizations, his reports of his inner experience starting on day three were 
fairly convincing.  He exhibited virtually no cognitive impairment, and although some of 
his experience lacked details and he was inconsistent in his reports at times, it was fairly 
convincing overall that Gary was accurately reporting his actual momentary inner 
experience.  
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CHAPTER 11
IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “HENRY”
Henry was a 72 year-old male who was recruited from a support group in Las Vegas, 
Nevada.  He has a high school diploma and attended college briefly.  He was diagnosed 
with VaD in 2001 after having a stroke.  He obtained a score of 29 on the MMSE, losing 
a point on delayed recall, suggesting mild or no cognitive impairment.  
Henry was not familiar with the DES process prior to this study.  During the initial 
meeting, Henry was given a “practice beep” to help familiarize him with the DES 
process.  He seemed to understand the DES process well from the outset, although he was 
led fairly easily by the interviewers regarding the details of his experience.  This beep 
seemed to contain properties of inner speech; however, because this beep was used for 
practice purposes only, it will not be included in analysis.  
On the first full sampling day (day one), Henry had substantial difficulty 
understanding what was meant by “the moment of the beep.”  Henry’s definition of the 
moment of the beep seemed to encompass several seconds near the moment of the beep.  
He recorded and spoke about what he was doing and experiencing for many seconds 
around the beep for all six beeps that were discussed.  Therefore, he was not able to 
report his experience with the specificity that is required for the DES method to be useful.  
He also relied on generalizations about himself and his relationship with his wife when 
discussing the beeps and was easily led when given suggestions.  During the interview, 
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the interviewers’ attempted to refine Henry’s understanding of what is meant by “the 
moment of the beep” so that he would hopefully narrow his attention to the precise 
moment of the beep for the next sampling.  Therefore, the content of the beeps collected 
for this day will not be analyzed.  
Henry collected beeps the morning of the interview on day two.  Prior to the 
interview, Henry seemed to be confused about the moment of the beep.  He stated that he 
now understood that the researchers were interested in the “impact” of the beep (i.e., his 
reaction to the beep).  The procedure was further explained before the interview began.  
The samples from this day were taken with great skepticism and therefore were will not 
be analyzed due to Henry’s lack of understanding of the process.  Furthermore, Henry
continued to discuss experiences occurring many seconds before and after the beep.  
Finally, Henry may have been fabricating his experience at times, for example during 
beep 2.5:
Beep 2.5 – Henry was talking to Todd, one of the interviewers, before the interview 
began, when the beep sounded through Henry’s earphone.  Henry, according to Todd’s 
observation, may have been talking about Thanksgiving or what Todd was currently 
doing in school.  During the subsequent interview, Henry stated that at the moment of the 
beep he was saying, “Todd, what are you doing in school?” and that the beep came 
between the words “Todd” and “what.”  However, although Henry asked Todd about 
school, Todd’s recollection is that Henry did not ever ask “Todd, what are you doing in 
school?”  Henry may also have been aware of being in a happy mood at the moment of 
the beep, but he again discussed his general happy mood when asked rather than his 
experience at the moment of the beep.  When Dr. Hurlburt, the other interviewer, 
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inquired whether this mood was experienced bodily and/or mentally, Henry seemed to 
agree that it was bodily and mental, as if following Dr. Hurlburt’s suggestion.  
      Henry collected the beeps from day three on the morning of the interview for day 
three.  He appeared to have taken few notes and referred to them very little during the 
interview. He often changed his reports of his inner experience and was easily led.  All of 
these factors indicated the need for substantial skepticism and will not be analyzed.  Here 
is an example from this day:
Beep 3.3 – Henry was at home eating lunch with his wife and they were discussing going 
out later that evening with friends.  Initially, Henry reported that he was saying “What 
clothing are you going to wear?” out loud to his wife, stating that the beep had come 
between “you” and “going.”  He later stated that he had specific clothing in mind that he 
was going to wear and that at the moment of the beep he was asking for approval from 
his wife about what he was going to wear that night.  It was difficult to discern whether 
this was a change in his report about his experience (from being about his wife’s clothing 
to being about his own clothing) or whether the question about his wife’s clothing was 
actually a part of his consideration of what he should wear.  We tried to differentiate 
those aspects without success.  He also reported a desire to move that was similar to a 
previous beep. We asked to see Henry’s notes for this beep; they simply stated “eating 
lunch, getting ready for affair for today.” 
      To increase Henry’s chances of success, the researchers interviewed Henry
immediately after he was beeped on day four.  Henry wore the beeper in his home while 
the interviewers waited outside.  As soon as the beeper sounded Henry came outside and 
notified the interviewers and the interview then took place.  Nevertheless, Henry
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continued to have difficulty reporting his experience and focusing on the moment of the 
beep.  It appeared to the researchers that after four sampling days and one practice beep 
that Henry was not going to be able to give reliable reports of his inner experience.  It 
was also clear that Henry was becoming somewhat frustrated with the interviewing 
process.  For these reasons, sampling with Henry was terminated.  
Discussion
There are many possible explanations for why the interviewers could not gather 
reliable data from Henry:
1. An obvious difficulty throughout sampling was Henry’s inability to narrow the 
moment of the beep to a specific enough time frame to report momentary experience.  
This was clearly a challenge for Henry and was certainly a contributing factor to the low 
reliability of Henry’s reports.  It cannot be determined, however, if this was the sole 
reason for Henry’s difficulties.  
2. It is also possible that Henry has inner experience but cannot communicate it 
properly.  It is difficult to discern if this is the case although he did not exhibit any 
problems with communication outside of DES.  Although Henry did not seem frustrated 
at an inability to describe his experience, he was often frustrated at the highly detailed 
questions inherent in the DES procedure.  He also did not openly state that he could not 
describe his experience.  It is still possible that Henry used generalizations and 
confabulations because these were simpler ways to describe his inner experience.  
3. It is possible that Henry could not adequately remember what was occurring at the 
moment of the beep.  Henry reported no difficulty remembering his inner experience.  
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Evidence against this possibility can be seen in the fact that the reliability of Henry’s 
reports did not improve even when he was interviewed immediately after receiving 
beeps.  However, it is possible that Henry’s memory, especially for details, faded so 
quickly that immediate interviewing showed no benefits.  
4. It is possible that the beep disrupted Henry’s inner experience to the point that he 
could not retrieve it.  This may help explain why Henry did not improve upon immediate 
interviewing after samples.    
5. It is possible that Henry does not have inner experience or his inner experience is 
unclear and/or undifferentiated.  Individuals who do not have inner experience or have 
unclear or undifferentiated inner experience often have a range of difficulties similar to 
Henry’s.  Because Henry appeared to have adequate cognitive abilities to peform the 
DES task successfully this appears to be a likely explanation.  
197
CHAPTER 12
IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “IRVING”
Irving was a 97-year old male living in an assisted living facility in Pennsylvania.  
Although he did not have a diagnosis of dementia, he exhibited some mild memory 
impairment during sampling.  The interviewer met with Irving approximately 2.5 weeks 
prior to the first sampling day to explain the procedure and gain consent.  At the 
beginning to the first sampling day Irving stated that he remembered who the interviewer 
was, but could not remember some of the specifics of the initial meeting.  He received an 
MMSE score of 27, missing a point each for orientation, attention and calculation, and 
recall. This score is indicative of mild cognitive impairment and is well above average for 
Irving’s age.  
Irving was not familiar with the DES procedure prior to being involved in this study.  
He was sampled on 6 days, most of which came within a 2 week period.  In total, 24 
samples were collected.  During the first 3 sampling days, the interviewer waited in the 
hall of Irving’s assisted living facility while he wore the beeper in his apartment.  When 
the beeper sounded, Irving called the interviewer on his phone prompting the interviewer 
to walk down the hall to Irving’s room and immediately interview him.  During the last 3
sampling days the interviewer remained in Irving’s apartment with him while he wore the 
beeper, sometimes sitting quietly and sometimes engaging Irving in conversation while 
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he was wearing the beeper (see below).  For every beep, Irving was sitting in a chair in 
his living room, at times reading the newspaper.    
Irving seemed to understand the task very well during the first sampling day.  He was 
typically confident in his reports and seemed able to distinguish among before, after, and 
at the beep.  However, during the first day the typical thoroughness of questioning was 
lessened slightly as Irving appeared distressed at times with overly detailed questioning.  
Also, Irving was given options for answers frequently rather than truly open-ended 
questions to help acclimatize him to the procedure and not overwhelm him.  This 
lessened rigor in the interview procedure and evidence from later days of sampling are 
grounds for substantial skepticism regarding Irving’s reports from this day.  Here are two 
samples from day one: 
Beep 1.2 – Irving had just glanced at the newspaper where he had read an article about 
the New York governor’s sex scandal.  He was not reading the newspaper at the moment 
of the beep.  Irving stated that at the moment of the beep he was innerly seeing the 
governor making his public announcement that he was involved in the scandal and his 
wife was standing next to him.  Although Irving believed that the governor was talking in 
his experience, he was not hearing any words (i.e., his mouth was moving but there was 
no sound being made in Irving’s experience).  This seeing was exactly the same as the 
announcement he had seen the previous evening on television, although it is not clear if 
Irving was seeing a television screen in his experience.  Irving was confident in his 
description of the inner seeing and described many details.  For example, the governor 
and his wife were viewed slightly to the side, the governor’s wife was on the governor’s 
right, he could see the governor from about the bottom of the neck up, he could see his 
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wife from about the middle chest up.  Irving could not tell what they were wearing, 
although the inner seeing was very clear.  However, because of the variation in 
interviewing for this day and later evidence, this beep should be taken with substantial 
skepticism.    
Beep 1.4 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment.  The previous evening, Irving’s 
son and wife had visited him and mentioned that they were having a dinner for him soon 
and would invite many people.  Irving reported that at the moment of the beep he was 
wondering who was going to be at his dinner.  This wondering appeared to have no 
symbols.  Also, within this same experience, Irving was somehow thinking of his son.  It 
is not certain how his son was present in this experience, but Irving was fairly certain that 
his son was in this experience.  Irving also may have been remembering his son and wife 
visiting the previous night, but he was not certain if this was in his experience and if it 
was it was much less prevalent than the wondering.  Irving was slightly inconsistent 
during the interview for this beep, but once the discussion of what was before, after, and 
at the beep occurred, Irving became much more consistent.  Nevertheless, Irving’s 
account was not very believable when considering the lack of rigor of the interview and 
evidence from later sampling days.     
Irving seemed to have substantial difficulty on the second sampling day that he did 
not exhibit on the previous sampling day even though these sampling days occurred on 
consecutive days. He specifically had three consistent difficulties during this sampling 
day.  First, Irving was not able to limit his focus to the moment of the beep.  For all 
samples on this day he described what was in his experience at and around the beep but 
could not reliably discern exactly what he was experiencing at the beep from what was 
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near the beep.  Second, Irving consistently described external reality rather than his 
experience.  Third, Irving was often inconsistent in his descriptions.  There appear to be 
three possibilities for this change:
1. Irving’s abilities fluctuated from the first to the second sampling day. 
2. Irving was over-confident his first sampling day and was not actually reporting his 
inner experience very accurately.  After receiving some training in truly observing his 
inner experience and increasing his awareness of his task, his ability seemingly declined 
as his attempts to observe his inner experience became more forthright. 
3.  The interviewer did not lead/aid Irving as much on the second day.  Taking away 
this leading had a substantial impact on Irving’s ability to perform the task.  
Although option one is possible, options two and three appear much more likely.  
Regarding option two, as sampling continued, Irving had a difficult time distinguishing
reality from inner experience and narrowing his focus to the moment of the beep.  
Regarding option three, the interviewer aided Irving much less on the second day than the 
first, asking more open-ended questions rather than giving Irving multiple options.  
Irving also did not respond to the beep on two occasions during the second sampling 
day when the interviewer happened to be with him when the beeper sounded.  On the first 
occasion, the headphone was out of his ear, so he appeared not to hear the beep (and 
stated he did not hear the beep when asked).  On the second occasion, Irving was talking 
when the beep sounded.  The interviewer called Irving’s attention to the beep before 
Irving was finished talking, so it is not clear if he would have noticed the beep once he 
stopped talking. Irving spoke continually throughout the sounding of the beep with very 
little pause.  The beep was sounding approximately 30 seconds before the interviewer 
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notified him.  For these reasons, very little could be discovered about Irving’s inner 
experience on this day, although a great deal was discovered about his ability to 
participate in the DES process.  Below is a sample from day two:
Beep 2.2 – When asked about the moment of the beep, Irving said that he was thinking 
about a vacation he took with his wife and children many years ago.  He then proceeded 
to tell a very long story about the actual vacation.  When asked again what exactly was in 
his awareness at the moment of the beep he said “more or less the first part of the trip.”  
When asked if he was thinking about a specific aspect of the first part of the trip at the 
moment of the beep he stated that he may have been thinking about the part of the trip 
when his son went across a particular state line (the interviewer is not sure which one, 
although Irving knew which one it was).  Irving stated that this was very close to the 
beep, but was not sure if it was exactly at the beep.  He then said that he was thinking 
more about the excitement of his children during the trip at the moment of the beep.  He 
stated that the excitement part of his experience and the state line part were close to one 
another and occurred close to the beep.  Irving was fairly certain that he was not 
experiencing any symbols at the moment of the beep.  Throughout this beep, Irving
appeared to rely heavily on external reality.  It was difficult to determine to what extent 
Irving was discussing the actual trip and to what extent he was discussing his inner 
experience.  
Irving exhibited the same difficulties during day three that he did on day two.  
Approximately half an hour after initially setting up the beeper for Irving, he had not yet 
called the interviewer in from the hallway.  The interviewer went to Irving’s room to 
check to make sure nothing was wrong with the beeper or Irving.  When the interviewer 
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approached Irving the interviewer could hear the beeper sounding.  Apparently, the 
beeper sounded either just before or after the interviewer entered the room as it sounds 
for only one minute.  Irving did not respond to the beep.  The beep ended very shortly 
after the interviewer approached him.  Irving gave no indication of being aware that the 
beep sounded and the beeper was simply reset by the interviewer.
Irving called the interviewer for the second beep (3.2).  Irving stated that at the 
moment of the beep he was thinking about seeing Barack Obama’s minister on television 
the night before.  Irving then went on to discuss the minister himself, what he was 
wearing, the effect it will have on Obama in the election, his concern about ending the 
war in Iraq, and other issues.  When Irving was repeatedly asked what he was 
experiencing at the moment of the beep, he was very inconsistent, but always mentioned 
something in relation to Obama’s minister or an issue surrounding him.  Eventually, 
Irving stated that he was uncertain exactly what he was experiencing at the moment of 
the beep but that it had something to do with the minister.  
Irving did not call the interviewer for beep number three (3.3).  The interviewer again 
checked on the beeper.  Irving was looking at the interviewer as he approached.  The 
interviewer asked Irving if the beep had sounded and Irving said that it had not.  The 
interviewer was actually right beside Irving bending down to listen for the beep when it 
sounded.  Irving stated that he was thinking about a trip he took with his father in 1933 
and then explained various details of the trip.  The interviewer attempted to make a 
distinction between what Irving was experiencing at the moment of the beep and the 
reality of the trip.  Irving again was not certain exactly what he was experiencing at the 
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moment of the beep, but that it had something to do with getting ready to go on the trip.  
He was again unable to describe the form of his experience.  
It appeared at this point that there was the possibility that Irving was creating stories 
about his inner experience rather than actually describing his inner experience despite 
repeatedly being instructed to describe inner experience at the moment of the beep.  First, 
Irving has reported thinking about something substantial at every sampled moment so far 
except for beep 1.3 where he reported no inner experience.  During this beep, the 
interview for 1.2 had just ended and the interviewer was still in the room.  Second, it 
seems unusual that Irving would have been thinking about a trip with his father from 
1933 when he was in the midst of interacting with the interviewer (beep 3.3).
For sampling day four, the interviewer remained in Irving’s apartment with him while 
he wore the beeper.  For most of this day, the interviewer sat in a chair approximately 12 
feet to the left of Irving, but still slightly in front of him.  The interviewer may have been 
in Irving’s peripheral vision.  Irving could easily turn his head to see the interviewer.  
Irving notified the interviewer when the beeper sounded.  Throughout this sampling day, 
Irving sat in a chair in his living room.  
Because Irving seemed to be thinking about something substantial at nearly every 
beep, the interviewer asked Irving after the interview for beep 4.3 if he was trying to 
think of things while wearing the beeper.  He stated that he was attempting to think of 
things and was instructed that he was not to do so.  He was encouraged to simply behave, 
both internally and externally, as if he were not wearing the beeper.  Irving stated that he 
was not attempting to think of anything for beep 4.4.  Still, this beep was similar to others 
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in that it was very similar to an actual event that had happened in the past and had 
substantial content:  
Beep 4.4 – Irving reported not attempting to think of anything in particular prior to this 
beep.  At the moment of the beep Irving was reportedly thinking about a meeting that he 
had earlier in the day.  The meeting was for residents of his assisted living program.  
Irving was innerly seeing a man (Steve) next to him asking a question about a model 
cottage in an adjacent facility.  Steve was on the right side of the inner seeing while the 
man running the meeting was on the left side but in the distance.  This was the same 
perspective that Irving had in reality.  There were other people in the inner seeing that 
were attending the meeting but Irving could not describe any details about these people or 
how many there were.  The inner seeing itself was fairly clear and it was either in black 
and white or had very little color. Irving may have also been hearing Steve talking in his 
experience.  He was talking very loudly, but was difficult to understand (both in real life 
and in his experience).  Irving was not certain of the exact words Steve was saying.  
The interviewer again remained in the room while Irving wore the beeper for 
sampling day five.  Irving was reminded that he was not to be trying to think or 
experience anything in particular.  At beep 5.1, Irving again reported an experience that 
seemed like it could have been a story rather than his actual inner experience.  Because 
Irving’s only report that did not seem to involve the possibility of a story occurred while 
in the midst of conversation (beep 1.3), the interviewer engaged Irving in conversation 
after the end of the interview for beep 5.1 until the end of the interview for beep 5.5 in 
order to determine if Irving would still report story-like content in his inner experience 
during conversation, to assess Irving’s ability to process the beep in the midst of 
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conversation, and to investigate if Irving could accurately describe what was occurring 
externally at the moment of the beep. Therefore, beeps 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 occurred in 
the midst of conversation and had fairly drastic effects. 
Beep 5.2 – Irving was just given the MMSE.  Irving had just said “I appreciate that I’m 
as good as I am” referring to his cognitive ability.  The beep sounded slightly after he 
finished this sentence.  Irving did not respond to the beep but rather kept having a 
conversation with the interviewer with small periods of silence in between talking (a few 
seconds).  The beep continued to sound during the conversation and Irving did not
respond.  Eventually, Irving recognized the “chirp” of the beeper while he was talking 
about 4 minutes after the beeper initially sounded.  
Beep 5.3 – Again, Irving did not respond to the beep while he was talking.  When the 
beep sounded, Irving simply continued to talk with no pause in his talking. Eventually 
Irving reported hearing the chirp sound.  The interviewer did not hear the beep this time 
so it is uncertain how long it took for Irving to recognize the chirp.  This seemed to be the 
same thing that happened during beep 5.2.  However, the interviewer cannot determine 
how long the beeper was going off.
      It appears that talking often interferes significantly with Irving’s ability to process the 
beep, but not always:    
Beep 5.4 – Irving was telling a story about a sexton he knew when he was younger who 
liked to tell stories.  This time, Irving immediately recognized the beep even though it 
sounded while he was talking.  At the moment of the beep, Irving was reportedly innerly 
seeing the sexton standing outside of a church door on the steps.  Irving stated that the 
inner seeing was clear and the sexton was only a few feet away from the perspective of 
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the inner seeing and Irving could see most of his body.  He was wearing trousers, but 
Irving could not describe them.  Irving may have also seen himself in the inner seeing, 
but only reported this when specifically asked.  Irving may have been standing a little to 
the left of the inner seeing while the sexton was talking.  Irving could not hear what the
sexton was saying in his experience.  Irving frequently intertwined reality with his inner 
experience during this interview.  For example, when directed toward his inner 
experience Irving seemed to describe it and then continued to discuss reality.  Irving also 
said that the inner seeing was in the summer, but later said that this was an external fact 
and not necessarily part of his experience at the moment of the beep. 
Beep 5.5 – This beep occurred immediately after the end of the interview for 5.4.  Irving
had just said “I can see him standing and talking.”  There was a pause in the conversation 
when the beep sounded and Irving heard it and responded to it.  Irving was just getting 
ready to tell the interviewer more about the sexton, but it was not clear if this was in 
Irving’s experience or not.  Irving was not sure what, if anything, was in his awareness at 
this beep.  It is the DES procedure to omit interview of beeps that occur when other beeps 
are being examined.
      Due to a conflict in Irving’s schedule only two beeps could be collected for day six: 
Beep 6.1 – Irving began this interview by discussing his son and his wife in general and 
how they own a house in Ocean City, New Jersey and how his family is currently in 
Ocean City, New Jersey.  When questioned specifically about the moment of the beep, 
Irving stated that he was wondering what his son was doing today (the day of the 
interview).   Specifically, he was wondering if he was running on the boardwalk or if he 
was repairing something.  When questioned further, Irving stated that he was wondering 
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at the beep if he was running, but later said that this came a little bit after the beep.   Near 
the end of the interview, Irving stated that this experience came a little before the beep.  
Irving also stated that at the moment of the beep he was innerly seeing his son repairing 
something.    This inner seeing was unclear and difficult to describe, although his son 
seems to have been holding a hammer (Irving later added a saw to the inner seeing).  
Finally, Irving stated that he was not sure which of the above was exactly at the moment 
of the beep, saying that he did not think that he did very good with this beep and that 
what occurred at the beep “slips my mind.” 
Beep 6.2 – Irving was sitting in his chair.  After approximately 35 minutes, the 
interviewer asked Irving if the beep sounded (it was set for a maximum of 30 minutes).  
Irving said it had not.  Irving was then asked if he was hearing little beeps (i.e., chirps) 
and he said no.  The interviewer listened to the beeper and it was in chirp mode, signaling 
that Irving had missed the beep.   Irving did not appear to be asleep during this beep, but 
was not watched closely.  
Discussion
There were numerous reasons for skepticism regarding Irving’s reports:
1. Irving misunderstood the procedure somewhat, especially during the first four days 
of sampling.  Specifically, Irving believed that he was to attempt to think of something 
while wearing the beeper.  When this was discovered, Irving was repeatedly instructed 
that this was not part of the procedure.  Still, the nature and extent of the content of 
Irving’s reports did not change.  It is possible that Irving did have substantial content in 
208
his inner experience, but it appears likely that the extent of the content would change if 
he was no longer attempting to think of something substantial.  
2. Irving had difficulty answering open-ended questions about the details of the 
content of his experience.  He often appeared confident when given options, but was 
often inconsistent.  He had even more difficulty answering questions about form unless 
given options.  
3. Irving was frequently inconsistent in his responses in general.  
4. Irving often intertwined descriptions of actual events with descriptions of inner 
experience.  It is very difficult to discern to what extent Irving was describing inner 
experience versus external reality, but it is clear that the two often overlapped.  
If Irving’s interviews are taken as valid, one of the most consistent features of his 
experience was remembering events that have occurred in his life, mostly recent events, 
whether they were interactions he had with others, things he had read about in the 
newspaper, or thing he had seen on television.  Irving reported no instances of inner 
speech, but did frequently report inner seeings, many of which may have had limited 
color.  Irving may have had limited occurrences of unsymbolized thinking and feelings, 
but did not report sensory awareness.    
However, the above list of difficulties suggests that Irving’s reports cannot be taken at 
face value.  Here are some possibilities for interpreting Irving’s responses.  These are by 
no means definitive conclusions, but hypotheses based on the evidence:   
1. Irving may have not entirely understood what was meant by “inner experience.”  
His reports were almost always more focused on external reality rather than inner 
experience.  Irving often answered questions about inner experience in an appropriate 
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manner, but was inconsistent, could often not describe details, needed options to be able 
to answer, and typically returned to describing external reality as soon as he felt he 
adequately answered a given question about inner experience.  
2. Irving may not have entirely understood what was meant by “moment of the beep.”  
Irving’s reports were often but not always somewhat general temporally, although he 
could usually answer appropriately when directed to the moment of the beep and given 
options and/or close-ended questions.   
3. Irving may have been fabricating his reports. He may actually not have had inner 
experience, may not have been able to process the beep, may not have been able to recall 
inner experience even when interviewed immediately, and/or may not have understood
the task at all.  Therefore, he thought of real-life stories to tell and answered inner 
experience questions as realistically as possible.  Evidence for this hypothesis includes 
the substantial content of his reports, inconsistencies in his reports, inability to get to 
exactly the moment of the beep, and an inability to describe details.  However, Irving 
appeared to be giving substantial effort and appeared to take the process seriously, 
making this hypothesis seem unlikely.     
4. Irving may have no inner experience.  It appears common for people with no inner 
experience to have difficulty reporting inner experience and often avoid stating that they 
have no inner experience, reporting reality in its place.  Furthermore, Irving’s difficulty 
with details and inability to answer open-ended questions may be further evidence for 
this.  This appears to be a likely possibility given the fact that although Irving has some 
cognitive impairment it cannot entirely explain his inability to produce a single reliable 
report.  
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5. Irving was somehow thinking about what he reported at or near the beep, but could 
not describe it very well, either due to a misunderstanding of some step or all of the 
procedure, has weak inner experience that is difficult to report, or forgot details nearly 
instantly.  Irving could answer some questions about his experience, but typically not 
detailed ones.  He also needed options or closed-ended questions regarding the specifics 
of his experience.  He typically was very confident about the general topic he was 
thinking about at the moment of each beep, but was not nearly as confident regarding 
form or details of these experiences.      
One of the most interesting findings sampling with Irving was the difficulty that he 
had responding to the beep during conversation despite only minor hearing difficulties.  
He responded to the beep on only one out of four occasions while engaged in 
conversation.  He consistently was able to respond to the beep when not in conversation, 
although he did miss three beeps while not in conversation (one while sleeping, one when 
the head set came out of his ear, and one under normal circumstances).  It is possible that 
he had exhausted his cognitive resources during conversation in a way that did not allow 
him to respond to the beep.  It is also possible that he could not hear the beep for some 
reason while talking.  However, on some occasions he did not respond to the chirps even 
after the conversation had ended.  When asked after the conversations if he was hearing 
chirps, he sometimes responded that he did hear them and other times said that he did not 
hear them.  
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CHAPTER 13
IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “JUNE”
June was an 84 year-old female living in an assisted living facility in Pennsylvania.  
She received a score of 23 on the MMSE, which is indicative of mild to moderate 
cognitive impairment and is below average for a woman of June’s age and level of 
education (Master’s degree).  Although she did not have a diagnosis of dementia, she did
exhibit some memory impairment.  She was highly verbal and spoke very well, 
exhibiting no linguistic or memory impairment in casual conversation.  However, June
did exhibit some memory impairment if she was asked specific questions that required
episodic memory.  The interviewer met with June approximately 2.5 weeks prior to the 
first sampling day.  Upon arriving at the first sampling day, June stated that she 
remembered who the interviewer was, but could not remember some of the specifics of 
the meeting or the interviewer’s name.  During this sampling day, June collected six 
beeps and was then interviewed after all six were collected.    
June had substantial difficulty understanding the DES process on the first sampling 
day.  On a few occasions June said things like “what I came up with for this one” or 
“what I thought to write for this beep.” The interviewer then asked if June responded to 
the beeps by inventing a thought.  She initially said yes, but quickly recanted saying that 
she did not quite understand the interviewer’s question.  
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Another key difficulty on the first sampling day was June’s inability to understand the 
difference between discussing generalizations and focusing on the moment of the beep.  
For example, for the first beep June said that she was concerned about a friend who is ill.  
The interviewer acknowledged that she was concerned in general about her friend, but 
asked her if she was experiencing concern at the moment of the beep.  June said she was 
sometimes experiencing concern and said that she was not at other times. The interviewer 
attempted to explain avoiding generalizations and the difference between generalities and 
the moment of the beep in a variety of ways, but June did not seem to understand and 
stated that she was not certain if she understood or not.  
Throughout the interview, June repeatedly discussed generalizations and external 
reality rather than her momentary inner experience.  Several attempts were made to 
clarify the DES process, inner experience, and the moment of the beep.  It was not clear 
to what extent June understood DES on the first day but it was clear that she was not able 
to give reliable reports of her inner experience on this day.  
Due to June’s difficulty during day one, the sampling procedure was changed from 
the standard procedure used on day one.  June wore the beeper while in her apartment at 
her assisted living facility while the interviewer waited in the hall.  When the beep 
sounded, June called the interviewer and was immediately interviewed after the beep.
However, between the first and second beep of this day it was discovered that June
did not understand the DES procedure at all.  After beep one the interviewer became 
suspicious that June was not responding to a beep at all.  She had seemed to not 
understand the difference between “moment of the beep” and what she thinks in general 
(see day one description).  Now on day two, after preparing the beeper and reiterating the 
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instructions to June, she called the interviewer within 5 minutes to signal that the beep 
had sounded.  When interviewed, June continued to discuss her general experience.  She 
began the interview with the statement “all morning I have been thinking” and then 
described wanting to contact a friend in the western U.S.  June continued to seem 
perplexed by questions regarding the moment of the beep.  
After the interview for beep 2.1, the interviewer instructed June to call him when the 
beeper sounded.  June asked “What am I supposed to be thinking about now?”  The 
interviewer again explained that she was not to think about anything specifically, that the 
interviewer was interested in her naturally occurring experience, and that she should 
make no effort to think about anything but just continue as if the beeper were not present.  
June again called the interviewer within 5 minutes after the interview for the first 
beep ended.  Upon beginning the interview for this beep the interviewer asked June if the 
beep had sounded and she said that it had not.  June apparently believed that her task was 
to create thoughts, and when she had created a thought she was to call the interviewer.  It 
is not clear what June thought the function of the beeper was.  The interviewer explained 
the method to June again.  Still, she did not seem to entirely understand.  June then 
explained that she was having a bad day, that she had not slept well, and that she was 
frustrated and could not concentrate.  June estimated that this occurs about once every 2
weeks.  At this point sampling day two was ended.    
For the third sampling day, the interviewer stayed in the room while June wore the 
beeper.  She seemed equally confused on this day regarding the DES procedure as she 
was on the previous days.  After the DES procedure was reviewed and the beeper was set 
up, June immediately began talking about what she had been thinking all day long.  She 
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then seemingly tried to think of things to tell the interviewer prior to the beep’s sounding.  
This continued despite multiple explanations of the procedure by the interviewer.  
Eventually, June seemed to realize that she was to wait for the beep to identify a moment.  
However, when she was interviewed after the beeper sounded it seemed that June still 
could not understand what was meant by “the moment of the beep” as she would talk 
about what she was thinking in general throughout the day.  She was again instructed that 
she did not have to try to think of anything in particular as she seemed to misunderstand 
this aspect of the process and continued to misunderstand after repeated explanations.  
For the first beep, the interviewer heard the chirp sounding (the interviewer did not 
hear the beep prior to the chirp).  When asked if she heard the chirps, June stated that she 
did.  When asked if the actual beep had sounded she said that it did.  June and the 
interviewer were having a conversation while the beeper was sounding.  June was again 
reminded of the DES procedure.  After this incident, June sat quietly, waiting for the 
beep.  
June then responded to two beeps.  Here is a description of one of those responses: 
Beep 3.2 – At and before the beep sounded, the interviewer and June were talking about 
her granddaughter.  Specifically, June had just finished saying that she thought her 
granddaughter would get married shortly after graduating from college.  Throughout the 
interview for this beep, June spoke in generalities.  She often responded to questions 
about her momentary inner experience with statements such as “that’s what I was 
thinking about the whole time” or “Well, really, that’s what’s been on my mind.”  She 
was also very inconsistent with her reports and was easily led throughout the interview.  
She began the interview by saying that she was thinking about her granddaughter going 
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to Mexico.  She then elaborated, saying that she was thinking about what she would be 
experiencing when she got there.  She then stated that she was thinking about the people 
who live in Mexico and that she would be anxious to speak with her about her opinion 
about Mexico.  When asked which of these was in her experience at the moment of the 
beep, she said that all of them were.  When asked how those were in her experience, she 
stated that she had been thinking about these things all day.  When asked if she was 
having an inner seeing, she said that she absolutely was, but could not describe the inner 
seeing.  When asked if she was innerly speaking, she said that she absolutely was, but 
could answer no further questions about form.  It appeared that she simply did not 
understand what was meant by “the moment of the beep,” did not understand what was 
meant by “inner experience”, or often confused reality with inner experience and could 
not reliably answer questions about form. 
For the fourth beep, the interviewer and June were in the midst of conversation.  June
was not sure what, if anything, was in her experience at the moment of this beep.  
It was clear that June was having substantial difficulty engaging meaningfully in the 
DES procedure after 3 days of sampling even though she was interviewed immediately 
after the beeps occurred.  Therefore, the fourth day consisted of many variations to the 
DES procedure to try to determine the exact nature of June’s difficulty with DES.  
To begin sampling day four, June was instructed to undergo the DES process as 
usual, but, at the moment of the beep, instead of reporting inner experience June was 
simply to report what she was seeing.  This experiment was done to help determine if 
June could get to the moment of the beep while focusing on a supposedly easier task 
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(reporting external vision as opposed to inner experience).  It also allowed the interviewer 
to verify the accuracy of June’s report as she would be reporting on external phenomena.  
When the first beep sounded, it took June approximately 20 seconds to respond to it.  
Her initial response, after 20 seconds, was “do I turn it off?” After being re-instructed, a 
new random interval was initiated.  When the beep sounded, June reported that she was 
seeing a man talking to a woman on television.  She first said that she was not sure which 
of the two (or both) were on the screen at the moment of the beep, but later said that the 
man was on the screen.  June stated that she was not seeing anything else.  She could 
describe some details, but the characters were still on the screen so she may have been 
relying on that information.  
June was indeed watching “Just Shoot Me” at the moment of that beep, and a man 
and woman on the show were talking.  The interviewer is unsure exactly who was on 
screen right at the moment of the beep as the screen shots were switching back and forth 
fairly rapidly.  Nevertheless, June’s report was either entirely accurate or very close to 
being entirely accurate.  
The interviewer was talking to June at the moment of the next beep while her eyes 
were directed toward the television.  The interviewer paused when he heard the beep 
sound and after approximately one second June notified the interviewer that it was 
sounding.   It was unclear if June was responding to the beep or to the interviewer’s 
pause.  At first, June stated that one of the characters on the television had just gotten up 
and run from a table in a restaurant.  She then stated that one character was sitting and 
eating while another was standing nearby and talking.  
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June was looking at the television at the moment of this beep.  She seemingly 
described the correct sequence of events (one character standing and talking, the other 
sitting and eating, and then the standing character walking or running away), although the 
interviewer was focused more on June than the television during this beep.  Again, June’s 
description was at least close to being accurate, although June was unsure what point in 
the sequence the television program was in when the beep went off.  
It was still not certain, however, that June was responding to the beep itself.  The 
interviewer’s pause and instant questioning did not allow for much interpretation on 
June’s part regarding what was to be done when the beep sounded.  However, it did seem 
that June was able to narrow the moment of the beep down to at most a few seconds.  
For the next experiment June was asked to think about either one or both of her 
granddaughters and to continue thinking about them until she was notified by the 
interviewer.  The interviewer waited approximately ten seconds then asked her to 
describe her thoughts.  This was done in order to: 1. simplify the procedure for June by 
eliminating the beeper.  Perhaps there was something about the beeper that destroyed 
June’s inner experience, was too distracting, caused misunderstanding, etc.; and 2. to 
attempt to see if June could report inner experience under fewer demands (i.e.,
purposefully creating inner experience rather than trying to catch it “on the fly”).  June
could not exactly describe what she was thinking, but rather talked about her youngest 
granddaughter in general.  The interviewer decided that this experiment was set up 
somewhat poorly and may have been a bit too broad for June and therefore decided to 
move on to a clearer variation of this procedure.  
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June was then instructed to think about her youngest granddaughter.  She was told 
that the interviewer was going to snap his fingers rather than use the beeper (i.e., the 
finger snap would simulate the beep). When the interviewer snapped his fingers she said, 
“I just think she is very courageous.”  June then began to discuss various aspects of her 
granddaughter’s life and personality, such as the fact that she is in her twenties, that she is 
in love, that she gets very good grades, and that June is happy for her.  When asked if she 
was thinking of all, some, or none of these things at the moment of the finger snap, June
stated that she was thinking of all of them “because we’re just so proud of her.”  When 
questioned further, June stated that she has great admiration for her granddaughter and
that she is very energetic.  When questioned, she said that these things were also present 
at the moment of the beep.  The interviewer then began asking June about form, using 
both open-ended questions and providing options.  After the first form question June
stated, “She’s a very attractive young lady” and continued to talk about her 
granddaughter.  After the second form question, June stated that “I really think about 
them” (them meaning both of her granddaughters).  
It was clear that June was not describing her momentary experience.  In fact, it is 
likely that she was not describing her experience at all.  This modified procedure 
suggested that June either has virtually no understanding what is meant by “moment of 
the beep” (or finger snap in this case), or has no understanding of what inner experience 
is, or has no inner experience at all.  Perhaps there are other options as well.  Her 
previous descriptions, as well as this one, suggest that she was describing generalities 
rather than experience at the moment of the beep, although she had shown some evidence 
for understanding the “moment of the beep” concept during the television experiment 
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described above.  This is evidenced by both the content (i.e., multiple topics in 
awareness, easily led into descriptions of new content, etc.) and language of her 
descriptions (discussing what she has been thinking during the day or previous few days,
the inability to describe form, etc.).  Furthermore, June continued to discuss reality (i.e.,
“She is a very attractive young lady.”) rather than inner experience.  
The interviewer then asked June if she could visualize her granddaughters if she tried, 
and June stated that she could.  June was then instructed to form an inner seeing of either 
or both of her granddaughters.  June said that this was difficult to do and then started 
talking about her eldest granddaughter living in the eastern U.S.  She was asked 
repeatedly if she was having an inner seeing of her and June repeatedly said “yes.”  When 
she was asked to describe the inner seeing she would discuss the granddaughter in reality, 
and did not provide any details that would suggest an inner seeing.  
Interestingly, June often used the word “see.”  For example, the interviewer asked her 
to describe the details of the image (the interviewer did not use the word “see”) and June
stated, “I can see them getting excited about it,” and continued discussing her 
granddaughter and her friends in general.  When asked, she said that she was not having 
an inner seeing.  This happened on two occasions (i.e., June using the word “see,” going 
on to talk about her granddaughter in general, and then saying that she was not describing 
an inner seeing).  
At some point either during or after this portion of the interview, the interviewer gave 
the following paraphrased example of an inner seeing:
“Right now, I am visualizing my parents’ garage in my head.  I’m seeing it as if I’m 
looking at it from the back of the house.  It’s a sunny day, sometime in the afternoon.  I 
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can see part of a tree in the upper left hand corner of the image.”  June was then asked if 
she could visualize something like that, and she said that she thought she could.  She was 
then asked to visualize the house that she lived in for most of her life.  When asked to 
describe the inner seeing, she described the house in general and various circumstances 
surrounding the house.  For example, she said that “It was a very nice house.  It had four 
bedrooms,” and then went on to talk about people that used to visit.  The interviewer 
asked about the visual characteristics of her inner experience, giving examples to 
distinguish this from reality, but June continued to talk about the reality of the house and 
memories that she had involving the house.  It seemed clear that either June was not 
having a visual experience at this point or that she could not describe it at all.     
Finally, June and the interviewer returned to the initial procedure where June was to 
describe what she was seeing at the moment of the beep.  June seemed to perform best in 
this scenario, so further investigation was done.  
When the beep sounded the next time she stated that she was seeing a couple of guys 
talking on television.  However, June was clearly describing what was on the television 
while she was talking.  When the beep had sounded a commercial was on television that 
did not involve men talking.  By the time she started describing what she was seeing 
when the beep sounded the show had come back on.  She stated “there were a couple of 
guys talking, and look, there they are.”  When asked if she was certain that was what she 
was seeing at the moment of the beep she said that she was.  This is more evidence that 
June could not get to “the moment of the beep” or perhaps perform the DES task in 
general, although it was explained many times in a variety of manners.  
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During the next beep, June was watching a commercial.  She said that she was seeing 
a golden retriever in the commercial at the moment of the beep.  There was a golden 
retriever on the television near the beep, but the interviewer thought that it was on a 
second or two before the beep, not at the beep. She stated that she was focused on the dog 
and was not really seeing anything else.  The dog on the commercial was computerized, 
so the interviewer asked if it was a real dog or a computerized one and June stated that it 
was definitely real.  Then, the television program came back on and two men were 
talking and shaking hands.  When this came back on, June stated that she was seeing two 
gentlemen talking and shaking hands at the moment of the beep.  June was asked again if 
she was seeing these men specifically when the beep first sounded, and she said yes.  
Throughout this sampling day, June was engaged in conversation with the 
interviewer.  This conversation was detailed, appropriate, and provided no evidence of 
cognitive impairment, except in instances when June was attempting to remember details 
and times of upcoming appointments.  However, when the discussion turned to DES-
related topics, it was clear that June had substantial cognitive impairment, evidenced by 
many phenomena:
1. June exhibited substantial variability in responding promptly to the beep.  To 
various beeps she responded instantly, after a delay of a second or two, or after 
approximately 20 seconds.  She demonstrated no evidence of hearing loss.  Up until and 
including the most recent sampling day she had not once asked the interviewer to repeat 
himself during conversation and always seemed to understand what the interviewer was 
saying in casual conversation.  Nevertheless, June clearly had some difficulty responding 
to the beep in a timely manner.  Delayed reactions did not seem to be directly associated 
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with June’s being involved in other activities.  For example, it took June approximately 
20 seconds to respond to the first beep.  At the time, June and the interviewer were 
engaged in light conversation, but there were one or two significant pauses in the 
conversation during the 20 second period that would have allowed her to respond to the 
beep if she was indeed distracted by talking or listening during the conversation.  At other 
times, June responded much faster even in the midst of conversation.  June’s difficulty 
seemed to lie in processing the beep itself, processing the beep adequately but having 
trouble physically responding to it, or both.  
2. June had substantial difficulty describing what was occurring externally at the 
moment of the beep.  June did an adequate job of describing what she was seeing during 
the first beep, described what was at and somewhat near the beep during beep two, and 
did not describe it at all during the next to last beep.  
3. June had little if any ability to describe any aspects of inner experience that might 
be occurring at the moment of the beep.  She almost always referred to her experience in 
generalities and could not, for example, distinguish between something she had thought 
during the day or proceeding days and the content of some experience that might have 
been occurring at the moment of the beep.  This evidence suggests that June could not
consistently narrow her attention to a moment, or that she did not understand the concept 
of “moment of the beep,” or that she had no inner experience whatsoever.
4. June had substantial difficulty understanding what was meant by inner experience.  
When asked about her inner experience, her responses were almost always mixed with 
external reality.  When asked specifically about the form of her experience, she would 
inevitably refer to content, usually the content of external reality.  It is possible that June 
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has inner experience but cannot describe it, that she has no inner experience and therefore 
there is nothing to describe, or that she does not understand what the interviewer means 
by “inner experience.” 
5. June could not engage in an adequate discussion of inner experience when the 
beeper was removed and June was asked to imagine familiar people and places in her life.  
Again, June described having numerous experiences during this exercise, including many
suggested by the interviewer.  She also described reality rather than inner experience and 
relied on generalities rather than her in-the-moment experience.  This again suggests that 
June cannot describe inner experience, that she has no inner experience, or that she does 
not understand what is meant by inner experience.  
6. June may not have understood the language involved in the DES process.  Her 
understanding of the purpose of the beeper, the moment of the beep, and inner experience 
varied drastically.  She often felt confused when discussing these concepts and answered 
questions about these concepts that often do not reflect an understanding of them (e.g. 
describing reality when asked about inner experience, describing what she was currently 
seeing when asked about what she was seeing at the moment of the beep, etc.).  This 
difficulty persisted despite four days of repeated description and explanation of all of 
these concepts, using direct definitions, metaphors, and visual prompts.    
For sampling day five, more variations on the standard DES procedure were used.  
For the first beep, June was simply to describe exactly what she was doing at the moment 
of the beep, whether it was talking, hearing the interviewer talk, getting ready to talk, 
hearing music, etc.  After this was described to June, the interviewer asked “Do you 
understand?”  June said “No, not really, but let me tell you about what I’ve been thinking 
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today.”  The interviewer then re-explained the procedure and June stated that she 
understood, although she still appeared uncertain.      
Before the first beep, the interviewer had asked June about her granddaughters.  June
spoke about one of them for about 4 minutes.  After this, she began talking about the 
other granddaughter.   Shortly afterward, a woman came into June’s room to take out the 
trash, interrupting the conversation.  After she left (about 2 minutes later), the interviewer 
asked June “What were we talking about?”  June thought for a few seconds and said “Oh 
yes, my sons.”  In reality, the conversation involved her granddaughters, although there 
had been a discussion of her sons earlier in the meeting.  
In the period leading up to the first beep, June had been talking about her sons 
hunting, how they love going out in the forest, and how they loved swimming.  At the 
moment of the beep, June was saying “They turned out to be fine young men, and 
they…”  June did not respond independently to the beep, but the interviewer notified her 
that the beep was sounding almost instantly after it began sounding.  The beep came right 
around “and they.”  June stated that at the moment of the beep she was talking about her 
sons and “keeping track of them.”  She then continued to talk about her sons.  June was 
not able to report the exact words at the moment of the beep, and although she was 
correct that she was talking about her sons, she was not able to accurately say what 
exactly she was talking about at the moment of the beep.
June was then instructed to try to pay attention to either what she was saying or what 
the interviewer was saying at the moment of the beep.  She was asked to report the exact 
words and subject of the conversation at the moment of the beep if possible.  
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At the moment of the second beep, the interviewer was talking about the DES 
method.  June had asked what the interviewer was looking for in his study.  The 
interviewer was stating that he was not looking for anything specific, but that studies in 
psychology often are looking for something specific.   At the moment of the beep, the 
interviewer was saying “people are looking for something specific.”  It is not certain 
exactly where the beep came in this phrase, but it was definitely during this phrase.  June
could not describe the exact words that were being spoken.  She stated that, at the 
moment of the beep, the interviewer was talking about what people are thinking.  
The interviewer explained the procedure again to June.  She then said “I’m trying to 
tell you what I’m thinking” and then described what she had been thinking lately.  It 
appeared in this instance, and at other times, June believed that her task is to simply tell 
the interviewer what she has been thinking recently in general.  The procedure was 
explained again, and June seemed to understand.  
At the moment of the third beep, June and the interviewer were talking about the 
importance of travel.  The interviewer was saying that people who have never traveled 
tend to think that the world is very similar to the area in which they have lived, but when 
they do travel they tend to appreciate differences in other cultures.  The interviewer was 
specifically saying “When you go somewhere, you appreciate it.” The beep occurred 
within this statement.  June alternately stated that, at the moment of the beep, the 
interviewer was saying “you should appreciate it” and “I should appreciate it.”  When 
asked about the general subject that was being discussed at the moment of the beep, June
stated that the interviewer was saying that he would like to travel.  
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June exhibited some memory problems between the third and fourth beeps.  Earlier in 
the meeting, the interviewer told June what sports he had played in high school.  A 
similar subject arose again and June again asked what sports the interviewer played in 
high school.  Also during this period, June stated that she thought that when her sons go 
hunting they are more interested in partying than hunting.  This was the third time that 
she made this statement during the interview. 
At the moment of the fourth beep, June was saying “I was born and raised in 
Scranton.  And my husband was in the service, and he came out and we were married and 
lived in Chambersburg.  From there we moved to York.  After he got out of the 
service…” The interviewer did not hear the beep, but June’s first visible reaction came 
just after “service.”  However, June said that she was talking and then noticed the sound 
and seemed to think that it may have been sounding a bit before that.  Still, she first 
noticed it very close to the word “service.”  June stated that the exact words that she was 
saying at the moment of the beep were “I lived in Scranton.”  She stated that the subject 
was where she was living and what she was doing, which was generally true.  
June exhibited two more instances of memory problems after this beep.  The 
interviewer and June had discussed the street that June lived most of her adult life on at 
least two occassions during previous meetings (Maple Avenue).  The interviewer asked 
her what the street was and June could not remember at first, but after about 15 seconds, 
said Maple Avenue.  June also wanted a list of the interviewer’s relatives who grew up in 
York as she might know them from being a school nurse and wanted to look them up in a 
yearbook.  The interviewer wrote the interviewer’s name (Todd) and the names Mike, 
Randy, and Linda.  Shortly after this, June became confused and believed that the 
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interviewer’s name was Randy.  June seemed to exhibit more memory problems than in 
the past during casual conversation on this day, but did not report having a “bad day.”  
For sampling day six, the interviewer used a beeper with an external button that 
would allow the interviewer to control when the beep sounded.  The button was on the 
end of a long wire so that the interviewer could sit well across from June while still 
operating the beeper.
A series of activities were performed using this beeper.  For the first activity, the 
experimenter held ten index cards.  Written on each card in large writing was a single 
number from 1 to 10.  The cards were held in front of June in a stack so that she could 
only see the card that was on the top of the stack.  The interviewer removed the card 
facing June, placing it at the bottom of the stack revealing a new card and a new number.  
This was repeated fairly quickly (about three every two seconds).  June was asked to 
identify which number she was seeing when the beeper sounded.  The interviewer varied 
the amount of time between beeps so that June would not see a pattern in the timing of 
the beep (approximately 5 to 20 seconds between beeps and 6 to 50 cards).  
For the first three trials, the cards were in order from 1 to 10.  June began by calling 
out the numbers that she was seeing before she heard a beep (i.e., “one, two three”).  The 
interviewer reminded June of the procedure and gave her two examples.  June was then 
accurate on three subsequent trials.  The cards were then scrambled.  The interviewer re-
explained the procedure to her.  June was accurate on the first trial.  She then said “nine” 
before a beep sounded.  She was then accurate on the next two trials.  The cards were 
shuffled again and June was accurate on the next two trials.  She then said “five” before 
the next beep ever sounded.  She was accurate on the next two trials.  On the following 
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trial June called out the correct number before the beep.  She then pressed the white 
button on the beeper (which resets the beep), apparently to make it sound (but the 
interviewer is not entirely certain of the motivation).  She also pressed the white button of 
the beeper on the next two trials.  She was accurate on the next trial, but then called out a 
number in the absence of a beep, then pressed the white button on the next two trials. 
The task was then re-explained to June and the headphones were removed and the 
onboard speaker was used to deliver the beep so that the interviewer could hear the beep 
clearly and ensure that June was actually receiving the beep.  On the next two trials 
before the beep sounded, June again called out a number and then pressed the white 
button.  The interviewer explained to June that she should wait for the beep and not touch 
the white button until told to do so.  She then called out a number without any beep at all.  
The instructions were then thoroughly re-explained to her.  She stated that the interviewer 
was confusing her and that she did not entirely understand.  June then did the next ten 
trials accurately (i.e., she identified the correct numbers at the moment of the beep) even 
when beeps came very close to a transition in the cards.  June kept holding the white 
button down for a period of time to stop the beeper even though she was told repeatedly 
to press it very quickly and then release.  
This demonstration suggests that:
1. June could perform the task at times, but her ability varied substantially.
2. June may have had difficulty understanding the task.  This was especially evident 
at the beginning, when June began calling numbers out before the beep occurred.  This 
was also suggested when June would respond to a number before hearing the beep, and 
then press down on the white button.  
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3. June may have difficulty with inhibition given her calling out of numbers before 
the beeper sounded.  She also could not inhibit pushing the white button on the beeper 
when instructed not to do so.  
4. June may have had some problems with learning and these problems may be 
related to memory.  Even after repeated instruction, June often made mistakes with the 
procedure.      
June’s second task was to tell the interviewer what she was seeing on the television at 
the moment of the beep.  June was instructed to focus only on what she was seeing rather 
than the content of the conversation on the television because this would make June’s 
reports easily verifiable and allowed her to focus only on a small part of her external 
environment.  However, in an attempt to simplify the task, the interviewer may have 
made it even more difficult, as it is likely that June does not watch television in this 
manner in her everyday life (i.e., rather than just watching and understanding what is 
occurring, trying to focus on exactly what she is seeing on a moment-to-moment basis).  
Immediately after this task was explained to her, she began to tell the interviewer what 
she was currently seeing on television, trying to update as the scenes on the television 
rapidly changed.  The instructions were then re-explained.  
For the first beep, a man was talking on the Florence Henderson Show about 
performing at a fair in Seattle.  The camera angle was a fairly close shot of only the man.  
At the moment of the beep, June did not initially react.  It is not certain if June heard 
and/or processed the beep, and if so, to what extent.  After about two seconds, the 
interviewer turned to her and asked what she was seeing on the television at the moment 
of the beep.  She said “they were just having a conversation.”  When June was asked if 
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there were both Florence Henderson and the man, or just one or the other on the screen at 
the moment of the beep June stated that it was both of them.  Both of them were on the 
screen while June was describing this beep, but not at the beep.  When asked who was 
talking at the moment of the beep, June said the man was.  She could not describe any 
other details without relying on actually looking at the man on television as she described 
the scene.  
The interviewer re-explained the procedure before the next beep, emphasizing 
freezing the visual scene at the moment of the beep.  At the moment of the beep, there 
was a commercial with a child of about 7 years of age talking about autism.  June
accurately stated that there was a little boy talking about autism at the moment of the 
beep.  The interview was then interrupted by the entrance of a staff member.  She spoke 
with June and the interviewer for approximately 3 minutes and then left.  June was asked 
if she remembered what had been on the television at the moment of the beep and she 
stated that she did not remember.        
Upon returning attention to the television, a new male guest was talking about his 
experience as a psychic.  June spontaneously stated that it was the same man that was 
being interviewed before the commercial, but this was not true.  
For the next beep, June again did not respond.  After several seconds, the interviewer 
turned toward her.  June said “I turned it off,” which was accurate.  June had not turned 
off the beeper instantly, but it was very shortly after the beep began to sound.  The 
procedure was again re-explained to June.  
For the next beep, the same male psychic was talking with Florence Henderson about 
an experience he had of talking to his grandmother after her death even though he had 
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never met her.  The camera showed only him.  June again did not respond initially until 
the interviewer looked at her.  She then turned off the beep after the interviewer looked at 
her and stated that the man was explaining something about his grandmother.  She said 
that she was seeing them in conversation.  When asked if she was seeing both or one of 
them, she said she was seeing both of them at the moment of the beep.  When this 
question was asked, both of them were on the television.  June was directed to the 
moment of the beep, but still stated that she was seeing both of them.  
June then seemed a bit distressed.  She stated that “I don’t know if I’m just getting old 
or my mind’s not working, but T.V. doesn’t make sense to me.”  
There are three potential explanations for these results:
1. June continued to have difficulty understanding the procedure.  The nature of this 
misunderstanding will be discussed at the end of this day’s summary.
2. June could not adequately “freeze” her experience, as she often confused what she 
was seeing while describing the beep with what was occurring at the moment of the beep.  
3. June did not have any awareness of what she was seeing, and therefore could not 
respond adequately to the beep.  
June’s third task followed her request to switch to a television channel that plays easy 
listening music.  This channel had music accompanied by still pictures, sometimes of the 
musician, other times of nature scenes.  The pictures lasted about 20 to 40 seconds before 
switching to the next picture.   June was asked to attempt to memorize what she was 
seeing in the picture.  She was then to describe what she had seen in the picture as soon 
as the television switched to a different picture.  The first picture was in black and white 
and showed a man from chest up smirking somewhat.  Around his face was a saxophone.  
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When the picture changed, the interviewer asked her to describe what she had just seen.  
She stated that there was a horn of some sort.  When asked if he was holding the horn or 
not, she said he was (this was not accurate; the horn was somewhat suspended to frame 
his head).  When asked if he was playing the horn, she said he was not (which was true).  
June stated, when asked, that his hair was dark (true).  She said he did not have much of 
an expression (could be considered true), that he was sitting down holding the horn (the 
sitting down could not exactly be discerned from the picture), and that it was in black and 
white (true).  
The same procedure was used for the next picture.  It was of a man sitting down, 
holding a guitar, looking away from the viewpoint of the camera.  The picture was 
“browned out” so that the picture appeared to be largely in brown and white.  June was 
mostly correct in her description, although she had to be prompted with questions.  She 
was slightly inaccurate when she said he was looking at the guitar rather than away from 
the viewpoint of the camera.  She could not accurately name the instrument.  She said it 
was a banjo or some kind of stringed instrument.  It is unlikely that this was due to lack 
of knowledge of musical instruments as June’s father was a musician and she has always 
had a strong love of music.  When asked if there was color, June said there was some 
color, but the colors were not bright, which was accurate, although she did not mention 
that everything had a brownish hue.  
This suggests that:
1. June can form memories long enough to describe them somewhat accurately, 
although with some mistakes.
2. June may have benefited from trying to memorize the picture.  
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3. The beeper may be significantly distracting for June as she was largely successful 
in this task when no beeper was involved.  
4. What occurs after the beep may distract June.  Because there were only still 
pictures being shown rather than continual discussion or switching of camera angles on 
the television show, this task may have been a bit easier for June.  
For the fourth task, June was read a list of one syllable nouns that was about twelve 
words long and was asked to identify which one was said right before the beeper 
sounded.  Again, the interval between beeps was varied so that she could not get used to a 
pattern.  
June did not understand this task.  It was explained twice, and June said she would 
give it a try.  For the first five trials, the words were read at a moderate pace, about two 
per second, stopping when the beep sounded. June was accurate in all of these trials.  
However, this may not represent her ability to respond to the beep as she simply needed 
to repeat the last word that she heard.  Nevertheless, the procedure may have helped as an 
introduction to the next task.  
The speed was then increased to as fast as the interviewer could read the words 
accurately, about three to four a second.  June got the first trial correct.  On the second 
trial, she could not remember.  She was correct on the third trial.  The interviewer then 
continued to read words after the beep sounded.  On the next three trials, June was one 
word late (i.e., she identified the word that came just after the beep).  On the next trial, 
she identified the word that came four words after the beep.  June was then correct on the 
last three trials.  June was asked if she could identify any of the words from the list about 
5 minutes later as they were read several times.  She could not.  The interviewer told her 
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that they were all one syllable nouns and the first one was chair.  Still, June could not 
identify any of the words, although she was not initially asked to remember them.  
June’s fifth task was a return to the task of describing what was on television when 
the beeper sounded.  June immediately began to describe what she was seeing, even 
though no beep had sounded.  The procedure was re-explained three times.  June stated 
that she was not certain if she understood, but would do her best.  
The first beep for this task occurred during a commercial for John McCain.  June did 
not initially respond to the beep.  After a short period (about two seconds), the 
interviewer asked her what she was experiencing at the moment of the beep.  At the 
moment of the beep, John McCain was shaking hands with someone.  When asked, June
said she did not know what was at the moment of the beep, that her mind was 
“somewhere else.”  For the second beep, guests were being introduced on the Dr. Phil 
show.  At the moment of the beep, a woman was on screen being introduced.  About a 
second after the beep, the camera switched to another person.  June stated that they were 
discussing something but was not able to report what she was seeing at the moment of the 
beep.  Again, June did not respond until the interviewer prompted her shortly after the 
beep began.  
For the next beep, Dr. Phil was on the television, although they switched to another 
person about a half second after the beep.  When asked what she was seeing on the 
television at the moment of the beep, June stated that they were having a controversy of 
some kind (which was true), but that she did not know what they were talking about and 
did not know what she was seeing at the moment of the beep.  
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June then stated that she was feeling somewhat confused and the interview was 
ended.  
Discussion
The following are important issues that arose over the course of 6 days with June: 
1. It is impossible to accurately investigate June’s inner experience due to her 
inability to describe inner experience, focus on the moment of the beep during the 
standard DES procedure, and otherwise meaningfully engage in DES.
2. It is possible that June has no inner experience or very little inner experience.  
However, because she could not engage in the standard DES procedure in a meaningful 
way, this is difficult to answer.  However, other reasons for her difficulty were apparent, 
so this can only remain a speculation.  
3. June can do the following:
a. June can have seemingly normal conversation.  The only abnormalities occur 
when issues of recent memory are discussed.  Otherwise, she speaks quite well on a full 
range of topics.  
b. June can hear the beeper.  She can respond to it, but in a very inconsistent 
manner.  She would usually not respond to the beeper until prompted additionally by the 
interviewer.  
c. June can discuss generalizations about her experience, although it is impossible 
to discern if these generalizations are accurate.  
d. June may be able to communicate the general topic she was thinking of at a 
given moment, but this seems unlikely due to her inability to engage in the process.  
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e. June can report what is occurring in her external environment at the moment of 
the beep, although this reporting is inconsistent.  She has accurately reported the topic of 
conversation, numbers see was seeing on a card, words that were just said to her, and 
what was on the television at the moment of the beep.  However, June also was 
inaccurate many times in all of these situations.  
f. June can form memories (pictures on music channel) and immediately describe 
them with minimal detail and some inaccuracies.  
Perhaps the most important question is why June had such substantial difficulty with 
DES?  There are many potential reasons for this:
1. No or little inner experience – Individuals with no or very little inner experience 
often have substantial difficulty with DES.  
2. Lack of understanding of the purpose of the beep/beeper – June repeatedly asked 
questions regarding the purpose of the beep/beeper.  She also was frequently confused as 
to what to do when the beep sounded.  
3. Problems with inhibition – At the outset of sampling days, June frequently simply 
began discussing what she was experiencing either throughout the day, the day before, or 
at that moment rather than waiting for the beeper.  Furthermore, June frequently called 
out numbers on the number naming task prior to the beep, suggesting difficulty with 
inhibition.  
4. Inability to “freeze” experience – June would often discuss her ongoing experience 
(internal and external) rather than freezing it at the moment of the beep.  
5. Distraction after the beep – June had more difficulty with tasks where information 
was presented after the beep.  Specifically, in the word naming task, she was much more 
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accurate when the interviewer stopped reading words at the beep compared to when the 
interviewer kept reading words.  Of course, in the former case, June may have been 
responding to the cessation of the list rather than the beep itself.  
6. Weak memory trace – June may not have been able to remember her experience 
long enough to communicate it post-beep.  
7. Beeper destroys experience for June – June’s experience may have been 
completely destroyed by the beeper, making it difficult if not impossible to report.  
8. Difficulty learning new tasks – June simply could not learn the DES procedure.  
Perhaps this is due to a deficiency in learning.  
Another way to conceptualize June’s difficulty is to break down the processes that 
occur when one is involved in the DES procedure.  The following is not meant to be an 
assertion that this is the definitive way that DES occurs, but it is one way to divide the 
process.  These steps do not necessarily occur in this exact sequence and may overlap:  
1. There is a welter of inner and outer processes ongoing in and around the person.  
Some may have more or less of this welter; some may have no inner or outer awareness.  
In June’s case, she is aware of her external environment at times.  It is impossible to 
discern if she has inner experience.  
2. Out of that welter, the more-or-less-normal person selects or transforms some part 
or parts to be “experienced” as DES defines the term.  That is, they determine what is 
before the footlights of consciousness.  This is a continuous and idiosyncratic stream of 
experiences. If June can do this, she cannot communicate it or it gets disrupted by the 
beep or she cannot remember long enough to communicate, etc.  It is also not readily 
apparent if June has inner experience.  
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3. At some moment, in the welter, the beep sounds in the real physical environment. 
4. Vibrations are collected by the pinna.  
5. Collected vibrations are transduced, converted into neural impulses.  June appears 
to have no problem with this as she exhibited no hearing problems throughout sampling.  
6. Impulses are interpreted.  The beep becomes part of awareness.  This is somewhat 
unclear in June’s case.  She typically did not respond to the beep instantly or 
independently.  Sometimes she responded to the beep, although typically she did not 
respond and needed to be notified by the interviewer to respond to the beep.   
7. The participant then reports what was ongoing in experience just before the beep 
came into awareness.  June cannot do this.  Although she can sometimes report external 
experience, she can never report momentary inner experience.  
Still, it is impossible to definitely state why June is having problems with the DES 
procedure.  However, speculations can be made:
1. Hearing itself is not an issue for June, although efficiently processing the beep may 
be.  
2. It is possible that June has no inner experience.  Very often, individuals with no 
inner experience have substantial difficulty understanding the questioning involved in 
DES, including the concept of inner experience.  However, it is also possible that June 
could not answer adequately due to cognitive difficulties.  This is unlikely though 
because June appeared to have enough cognitive ability to get much closer to 
successfully engaging in DES.  Therefore, a lack of inner experience is at least a likely 
partial explanation for June’s problems with DES.    
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3. Problems with inhibition cannot entirely explain June’s difficulties.  Although 
inhibition was a problem at times throughout sampling, it does not explain why June 
could not understand “moment of the beep” or understand the function of the 
beep/beeper. 
4. Inability to freeze inner experience may be a problem, but again, it cannot account 
for everything.  June could freeze external experience under the right circumstances.  
5. Memory problems were present, but do not account for all of June’s problems with 
DES.  If memory was the only difficulty, it is likely that a substantial variation in June’s 
ability to respond to the beep would be observed as a function of the length of time since 
instruction.  June had difficulty whether the instructions were given to her just before the 
beep sounded or if the beep sounded after a substantial period of time since instruction.  
One alternative explanation is that June’s working memory is so poor that memory is 
substantially deficient within seconds.  June’s ability to engage so meaningfully in 
conversation suggests that this is not the case.    
6. June was almost always confused by what her task was in DES, the point of the 
beeper/beep, the meaning of “moment of the beep,” and the meaning of “inner 
experience.”  There was a definite problem in comprehension and learning with DES that 
was not apparent in casual conversation.  It is possible that the task was too unusual 
and/or unnatural for her to understand.  
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CHAPTER 14
IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “KAREN”
Karen was an 88-year-old Caucasian female.  She lived alone, but received assistance 
from her daughter and son-in-law.  She was not diagnosed with a cognitive disability or 
neurodegenerative disease, but she did appear to exhibit some cognitive deficiencies.  She 
scored a 21 on the MMSE, missing all items related to working memory and attention.  
This score suggests that moderate cognitive dysfunction is indeed present, specifically in 
the areas of working memory and attention.  A total of 14 beeped experiences were 
discussed over the course of 3 days.  
Four beeps were discussed on the first sampling day.  Karen was not able to wear the 
earphones with the beeper due to wearing hearing aids in both ears.  Therefore, the beep 
was delivered through an external speaker.  The volume of the speaker was adjusted to be 
comfortably loud, but using the external speaker rather than the earphone may have 
complicated the process for her.  
On the first day, Karen had substantial difficulty understanding her task as a 
participant in this study.  Upon inquiring about the first beep, Karen stated that she wakes 
up at night thinking about different things, such as her children.  Specifically, she stated 
that she wonders why her son had to die so young.  Karen was not wearing the beeper at 
the time of this experience, and therefore clearly misunderstood what the interviewers 
were asking.  Furthermore, this indicated that Karen did not initially have a clear 
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understanding why the interviewers were in her house, why she wore the beeper the 
previous day, and what function the beeper served.  
Karen’s daughter stated that when the beeper would sound, Karen would look to her 
for instruction.  This further indicated that Karen did not understand the purpose of the 
beeper.  Eventually, it appeared as if Karen began to gain a limited understanding of the 
function of the beeper and the function of the interview.  For example, she began talking 
about her inner experience at or around the moment of the beep.  
It is extremely unlikely that Karen’s reports were about experiences actually ongoing 
at the moment of the beep on the first sampling day.  First, since it seems that she did not 
understand the function of the beeper at the time of the interview, it is highly unlikely 
that she understood its function while wearing the beeper the previous day.  Second, she 
often described her inner experience by referring to self-generalizations.  For example, 
during the description of the first beep she stated that when she sits in her chair she often 
worries about people breaking into her home.  Although it is possible that she was 
thinking about this topic at the moment of the beep, she seemed to present it as a self-
generalization.  Third, Karen was quick to agree with the interviewers when they made 
suggestions regarding her inner experience.  For example, when the interviewer asked her 
if she was thinking about a key to the screen door in the first beep, she confirmed this 
hypothesis.  Likewise, when the interviewer suggested that she was feeling afraid during 
this beep, she agreed with this as well.  This could be indicative of a misunderstanding of 
the procedure, a lack of a firm grasp on the memory of her experience, an absence of 
inner experience or lack of clarity in her inner experience for which she tries to 
compensate, or a general cognitive malleability.  Fourth, it seemed clear that Karen was 
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unable to focus on the moment of the beep.  She described her experience at the moment 
of the beep in a manner that suggested she was describing a few seconds of experience 
rather than a moment.  For example, when describing the third beep, she stated that she 
was thinking about questions a man was going to ask her.  She stated that she was 
thinking about several questions in a sequence rather than one in particular that would 
have been caught at the moment of the beep.  Likewise, during beep one, she described 
thinking about people breaking into her house, wondering what to do if this even 
occurred, and feeling afraid.  Although multiple awareness is not uncommon, in this case 
it appeared to be due to either a misunderstanding of the task or an inability to focus and 
report her inner experience at a particular moment.  Fifth, Karen appeared to have the 
belief that her inner experience had to be congruent with reality.  For example, on the
fourth beep, Karen was describing an inner seeing of her great-grandson.  When asked for 
the colors in the inner seeing she said that she would go get the picture to show the 
interviewers.  It is entirely possible that Karen was having the inner experience of the 
picture in her room, but this may also indicate that she was describing the picture rather 
than her inner experience.  Sixth, it did not appear that Karen recorded information in her 
notebook that was relative to each beeped moment.  She seemed to record generalizations 
about herself or what she was experiencing in general around the moment of the beep 
rather than at the moment of the beep.  Finally, Karen was somewhat tangential during 
the interview process on the first day of sampling.  She often seemed more interested in 
talking about things she was interested in, such as her family and the television shows she 
enjoys, rather than her inner experience at each beep.  
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In sum, this interview allowed the interviewers little insight into the nature of Karen’s 
inner experience, if any inner experience exists.  However, the first day of sampling is 
primarily used for training and often does not yield reliable reports of inner experience.  
Nevertheless, Karen did exhibit more difficulties than is common on the first day of 
sampling. 
Four beeps were discussed on the second day of sampling.  On this day Karen
continued to have difficulty understanding the task and focusing on her experience at the 
moment of the beep.  Her reports were also unreliable due to the use of generalizations 
and the ease with which she was led by the interviewers. 
During Beep 2.1, Karen described inner experience that seemed to be vaguely around 
the moment of the beep, but was not able to focus on the beep.  She described watching 
television and watching a news report about earthquakes, but could not describe exactly 
what was on the television at the time of the beep.  Rather, she spoke in general about 
what was on television at and around the beep (i.e., earthquakes).  This was similar to the 
first day of sampling when Karen spoke in generalizations about external reality (i.e.,
watching television about earthquakes) rather than inner experience.  
At the beginning of Beep 2.2, Karen seemed unsure of what to describe and had to be 
prompted by her daughter to report her awareness at the beep.  She initially stated that 
she was not thinking of anything at the moment of this beep.  Shortly later she stated that 
she was wondering why the television show at this beep was so much different from the 
one during Beep 2.1.  Ultimately, Karen reported that she could not remember what was 
happening at this beep.  
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At Beep 2.3 she was watching television, but could not recall which program was on 
television at the moment of the beep.  She stated that she was confused as to why a 
different program was on and was aware of this at the moment of the beep.  She could not 
describe how this confusion was experienced however.  She also said she was confused 
about the images on the television changing too fast. Again, these reports seemed to be 
generalizations about external reality.  Furthermore, it was difficult to tell whether Karen
was actually confused at the moment of the beep or was experiencing confusion at the 
moment of the beep as she was often contradictory in her reports about this and was 
easily led.  
At Beep 2.4, Karen said she was still sitting in her chair.  She had trouble again 
describing the moment of the beep.  She said that she was waiting for a television 
program at the beep and it was dinner time and she had a good dinner.  Eventually Karen
verified that she was watching television at the moment of the beep and wondering if the 
next program was coming on.  She also stated that she was a little bothered after the 
interviewer suggested the possibility of being bothered.  When asked if she experienced 
being bothered in her chest, she said she is not allowed to feel bothered in her chest 
because that may negatively affect her pace maker.  She then said she was thinking about 
eating dinner at the moment of the beep.  Karen’s inconsistency during her reports 
suggests that she was not at all able to describe inner experience at the moment of this 
beep.  
At Beep 2.5 Karen was watching a childrens’ program but was not too focused on the 
program.  She said she was wondering if she wanted to watch the program or change it.  
Due to Karen’s difficulties with DES and the length of the interview, the interview was 
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terminated at this point without further questioning.  Therefore, the report of this beep 
can not be taken to be reliable. 
The procedure was changed on the third day because Karen had had substantial 
difficulties with the procedure on the previous two days.  On this third day, the 
interviewer sat with Karen in her living room while she wore the beeper so that he could 
immediately interview her when the beep sounded.  This reduced the length of 
retrospection required for Karen to remember what was in her experience at the moment 
of the beep.  This procedure also allowed the interviewer to know what was occurring in 
the external environment at the moment of the beep (because the beep was delivered by 
an external speaker), allowing him to verify any comments that might be made about the 
external environment at the moment of the beep.  Karen sat in her chair during the entire 
sampling day and either read or engaged in conversation with her daughter or the 
interviewer.  Six samples were discussed on the third sampling day.  
Although this reduction of retrospectiveness seemed to help somewhat, Karen’s 
reports were still highly unreliable and her ability to focus on the moment of the beep 
also remained tenuous.  Karen seemed more convincing about the content of her 
awareness in general as it occurred near the moment of the beep, but little else.  She 
could not reliably answer questions regarding the specifics of the content or form of her 
experience, and continued to be easily persuaded as she was during other interview days.  
She also could not orient her self to the moment of the beep exactly.    
When asking questions about form throughout Karen’s interviews, she responded in a 
way that suggested that she did not understand the question.  Almost every time she 
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would return to talking about the content of the beep or reality as it related to her inner 
experience.     
Below are two examples of the six samples taken from day three that are 
representative of that day: 
Beep 3.1 – At the moment of the beep, Karen was in the act of talking about people from 
Pennsylvania and their idiosyncratic language.  Before asking about Karen’s inner 
experience, which is is the usual DES procedure and had been the procedure on the first 
two sampling days, the interviewer asked Karen what she was doing when the beep 
sounded.  This question allowed the interviewer to determine if Karen had the ability to 
accurately report her behavior at the moment of the beep (which was observed by the 
interviewer and therefore verifiable).  Karen was able to respond correctly in general 
(discussing if people from Pennsylvania have a language of their own) but could not 
identify her exact words or where within those words the beep fell.  Then the investigator 
inquired about Karen’s experience at the moment of the beep.  Karen frequently changed 
her reports about her inner experience at the moment of the beep, but her reports always 
had something to do with Pennsylvania and/or people who live in Pennsylvania.  She 
alternately agreed with many of the suggestions the interviewer made regarding her 
experience at the moment of the beep (how people in Pennsylvania dress, thinking about 
children in Pennsylvania, trying to explain to her daughter the different cultures in 
Pennsylvania).  Karen could not focus on the exact moment of the beep, nor could she 
answer any questions related to form.  Therefore, her reports of this experience did not 
seem trustworthy. 
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Beep 3.2 – Karen was reading.  She reported that she was thinking about the wedding in 
Jerusalem she was reading about at the moment of the beep.  When asked a question 
about the form of this experience, she stated that she was thinking about her daughter’s 
wedding.  She then returned to saying that she was thinking about the wedding in the 
book.  Next, she said she was thinking about both.  These changes all occurred within a 
minute of one another and were largely influenced by details in the interviewer’s 
questions.  The interviewer repeatedly tried to orient her to the moment of the beep.  
Karen stated that she could not orient herself to the exact moment, but could comment on 
what was in her awareness near the moment of the beep (within a few seconds).  She also 
stated that she was comparing her daughter’s wedding to the one in the book near the 
book.  This inconsistency makes her report of this sample unreliable.  
Discussion
It seems clear from sampling with Karen for three days that she could not adequately 
complete the task.  Her difficulties occurred on a variety of levels (i.e., difficulty focusing 
on the moment of the beep, focusing on external reality rather than inner experience, not 
being able to answer questions about form, etc.).  The majority of these difficulties may 
be directly related to Karen’s cognitive difficulties, specifically with working memory 
and attention, as demonstrated by the MMSE.  Although Karen improved somewhat 
when memory demands were reduced by interviewing her directly after the beep, she still 
was not able to adequately complete the task, suggesting cognitive deficits other than 
memory interfering with her ability to do the task.  Below are some speculations 
regarding Karen’s inner experience and ability to perform the DES task: 
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1. Although it appears to be an unlikely possibility, Karen may not have understood 
the DES task.  Although Karen had difficulty understanding the task at first, she seemed 
to understand it fairly well on the third day of sampling.  
2. Karen may not have been able to narrow her focus to the moment of the beep, and 
thus could not give reliable reports.  This appears to be a likely partial explanation for 
Karen’s difficulties.  She often directly reported that she could not report what was 
occurring in her inner experience at the moment of the beep, but instead what was near 
the moment of the beep.  Her reports also fluctuated frequently, suggesting the possibility 
that she was reporting on a time frame significantly larger than a “moment.”  
3. Karen may not have inner experience.  This is a significant possibility.  Individuals 
who seem to have difficulty understanding the DES procedure and reporting inner 
experience often seem to not have inner experience.  Karen’s inability to discuss form 
and the fact that she was easily led by the interviewers is often possible evidence for a 
lack of inner experience.  
4. Karen may lack inner experience in some way.  It is possible that Karen has some 
inner experience, but that it lacks clarity and/or differentiation or is rarely present.  This 
would likely make the DES procedure quite difficult.  Again, the fact that Karen could 
not adequately discuss form and was easily led suggests that her inner experience may be 
lacing in some way.     
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CHAPTER 15
IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “LILLY"
Lilly was a 92 year old woman who was diagnosed with AD in 2001 and has a 
Master’s degree.  The interviewer met her and her daughter at an assisted living facility in 
Ohio designed specifically for individuals with AD where Lilly lives.  Lilly and her 
daughter were very willing to be engaged in the study.
After briefly explaining the DES procedure, both Lilly and her daughter signed the 
consent form (Lilly’s daughter has power of attorney for Lilly).  Lilly had significant 
difficulty signing the document as she is legally blind and exhibited some substantial 
short term memory impairment during the early stages of this initial meeting, such as 
forgetting the interviewer’s name and the content of a very recent conversation.    
Lilly was then given the MMSE.  She received a score of 19, suggesting the presence 
moderate dementia.  She had the most difficulty with time orientation, only knowing the 
season but not the year, date, day of the week, or month.  She also had significant 
problems with delayed recall.  When asked if she remembered the three words the 
interviewer had her repeat approximately one minute prior, she said that she did not even 
remember that the interviewer had her repeat three words.  Lilly did very well with 
attention and calculation, spelling “world” backward with relative ease, although she later 
forgot that she had done so.  Lilly could not write a sentence or copy a design, but this 
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may have been at least partially due to Lilly’s vision impairment.  Therefore, Lilly’s 
MMSE score may slightly underestimate her cognitive ability.  
Lilly then immediately underwent the DES process in the presence of the interviewer 
and her two daughters.  While she wore the beeper, she conversed with her daughters 
while the interviewer waited nearby.  
At the first beep, Lilly and her daughters were discussing a television commercial that 
one of their relatives was recently in.  Lilly stated that she was paying attention to what 
her daughters were saying at the moment of the beep, but could not recall what they were 
saying.  When asked what she was experiencing at the moment of the beep, Lilly did not 
think that she was experiencing anything, but was not certain.  
After this beep, the interviewer asked Lilly to visually imagine her childhood house.  
After she stated that she was innerly seeing it, the interviewer asked Lilly to report what 
she was seeing in her picture.  She said that the picture was not very clear, although it 
was not fuzzy.  She could not describe exactly how it was not clear.  She was seeing the 
front corner of the outside of the house so that she could see both the front and side of the 
house.  There seemed to be two doors and two windows in her inner seeing.  The house 
was “sort of green.”  At one point she said that she was seeing a garage of a faded rust 
color, but later did not indicate that this was in her inner seeing when asked.  Later, 
Lilly’s daughter volunteered that what Lilly was describing was not accurate, that it 
sounded like a conglomeration of houses: her childhood house, a house she lived at as an 
adult, and her sister’s house.  This is not evidence against the validity of Lilly’s 
description as she very well could have combined these places in her inner seeing.  
However, she had many inconsistencies throughout the description which suggests that 
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she may have not been innerly seeing at all or if she was it was not very detailed or clear, 
or was transient.   
The interviewer and Lilly’s daughters heard the second beep before Lilly responded.  
It seemed to be sounding for about 5 seconds when it was brought to Lilly’s attention.  
This is interesting in that Lilly exhibited no or very little hearing problems for the hour 
the interviewer spent with her.  When the interviewer asked what she was experiencing 
right before he brought the fact that the beeper was sounding to her attention, she stated 
that she was thinking that she had forgotten she had the beeper on.  The interviewer 
pointed out that this must have come after the beep.  When asked what was in her 
experience just prior to the beep, Lilly stated that she did not know.  Although Lilly’s 
auditory processing appeared intact, Lilly did not seem to be processing the beep on this 
occasion, at least enough to elicit a response.  
On day two, Lilly did not remember the interviewer, although they had spent 
approximately 2 hours together 5 days earlier.  She also did not remember anything about 
the DES process.  Nevertheless, Lilly was very willing to engage in the study after it was 
described again to her.  
In order to minimize distractions, sampling occurred in Lilly’s room.  The interviewer 
sat with Lilly throughout the process.  There were some minimal distractions as the door 
to Lilly’s room remained open and some noise in the facility could be heard, but this 
noise was minor and did not seem to distract her.  However, between the second and third 
beeps, a resident of the facility came into Lilly’s room.  The interviewer called this to a 
staff member’s attention, but she said that it was normal and Lilly was not distracted by 
him, although he stayed in the room for the remainder of the session.  
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Prior to the first beep, the interviewer turned Lilly’s beeper on and off to ensure that 
she could hear the beeper.  Every time the beeper was turned on, Lilly stated that she 
could hear it.  She also appeared to have fairly normal hearing during conversation.  
Nevertheless, Lilly did not respond at all to the first beep (beep 2.1).   The second beep 
(beep 2.2) also did not elicit a response.  It occurred while Lilly was talking to the 
interviewer, saying something like “Some kids (beep) at the Montessori School…”  In 
both cases, the interviewer allowed the beeper to beep continuously for approximately 1
minute, but Lilly still did not respond.  
Beep 2.3 also occurred while Lilly was talking (saying something like “It’s good for 
the children.”).  When asked she stated that she was puzzled at the moment of the beep.  
When asked what she was puzzled about, she stated that she was puzzled about the 
questions that the interviewer was asking.  This seems unlikely because the interviewer 
was not asking her any questions at the moment of the beep, although she could have 
been ruminating about the questions that the interviewer asks and the purpose of the 
study.  When asked, Lilly stated that there were no words or images in this experience, 
that she was just puzzled.  She later stated that she was wondering what the beep meant 
when it sounded, but this was clearly a reaction to the beep.  
Lilly could not remember what she was experiencing for the fourth beep (beep 2.4).  
At this moment, Lilly was sitting quietly while the interviewer was answering a question 
posed by the gentleman in Lilly’s room.  It is notable that it took Lilly about 5 seconds to 
respond to this beep.  
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Discussion
Sampling with Lilly was suspended after the second day.  It did not appear possible to 
learn anything about her inner experience using the DES method.  However, the obstacles 
experienced with Lilly may have lent some insight into difficulties using DES on 
individuals with moderate dementia.  First, on three out of six occasions Lilly did not 
respond to the beep at all.  This is especially interesting because Lilly had good hearing 
and if she did have hearing problems they were relatively minor.  It appeared that the
processing of the beep became compromised in a manner that did not involve hearing 
directly.   A lack of this ability is a major obstacle to engaging effectively in the DES 
procedure as processing and responding to the beep is perhaps the most basic ability 
needed to engage in DES.  Second, severe memory problems made sampling with Lilly
nearly impossible.  The training process would be very difficult (if not impossible) as 
Lilly could not remember what the beeper was for, or that she even underwent the 
process previously.  It is possible that some implicit learning took place, but even this is 
not enough to overcome her severe memory problems.  It is likely that this would be a 
difficulty that would be hard to overcome with people at her stage of dementia.  Third, 
Lilly also had difficulty remembering what was in her experience at the moment of the 
beep even though she was interviewed immediately after the beep.  This again is a very 
basic ability that is needed to begin to engage in the DES process.   In spite of all of 
Lilly’s cognitive difficulties it is still quite possible that she lacks inner experience based 
on the results of some of the other participants in this study.  However, this is a 
speculation given that Lilly was nowhere near producing reliable reports of inner 
experience.   
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CHAPTER 16
ACROSS PARTICIPANTS RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Ability of Older Individuals to Participate in DES
This study was designed to investigate the inner experience of older individuals with 
and without cognitive impairment.  There have been no prior DES studies of older 
individuals and therefore there was no guarantee than any of the participants would be 
able to produce reports of momentary inner experience that the researchers would take to 
be reliable.  In order to discover anything about an individual’s inner experience via DES 
he or she must first have the cognitive, linguistic, and sensory abilities to understand the 
task, hear and respond to the beep, and describe momentary inner experience.  Table 7 
briefly summarizes each participant’s MMSE score, diagnosis, and DES performance: 
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Table 7
Participants’ ability to do DES                                                        
Participant MMSE/Diagnosis Ability to Perform DES?
Anna 30/None Yes
Benjamin 30/None Yes
Clara 30/None Yes
Dolly 30/None Yes
Ellen 30/None Some
Fay 30/None No
Gary 29/VaD Yes
Henry 29/VaD No
Irving 27/MCI No
June 23/MCI No
Karen 21/Nonea No
Lilly 19/AD No
aAlthough Karen had no official diagnosis she had clear cognitive impairment and at 
least had MCI although there was the possibility of the presence of another age-related 
neurodegenerative disorder.  
      
      DES Performance and Diagnosis
      As can be seen in Table 7, four of the six non-diagnosed participants (Anna, 
Benjamin, Clara, and Dolly) had no more than typical problems producing reliable 
reports of momentary inner experience.  Benjamin and Clara were especially adept at 
DES.  Benjamin was able to narrow his conception of “moment of the beep” to a very 
small period of time and was very detailed in his descriptions.  Clara was able to produce 
reliable reports from the first day of sampling to the last.  Anna and Dolly’s ability to 
peform the DES task successfully was fairly typical. Therefore it is clear that at least 
some older individuals can participate in DES adequately.
However, Ellen and Fay, two individuals who had no diagnosis of age-related 
cognitive impairment and no observable cognitive impairment (MMSE of 30) had 
substantial difficulty engaging successfully in DES.   Although some younger individuals 
cannot engage successfully in DES it would be unlikely that two out of six would not be 
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able to do so.  Ellen produced questionable although not uniformly unreliable reports 
during all six of her sampling days even though she did not have an age-related 
neurodegenerative diagnosis, scored a perfect 30 out of 30 on the MMSE, and did not 
exhibit any obvious cognitive, linguistic, or sensory impairments in casual conversation.  
She was frequently contradictory in her reports and had an especially difficult time 
describing the form of her experience.  Her reports were often disorganized and she 
routinely became frustrated with the persistent questions of the interviewers.  Ellen’s 
DES difficulty could represent some underlying cognitive impairment that is common in 
normal aging.  For example, her disorganization could represent problems with executive 
function, a common area of deficit in normal aging even for individuals who show no 
impairment on the MMSE (Royall et al., 2000).  
Fay’s reports were entirely unreliable throughout all sampling days even though she 
scored a perfect 30 on the MMSE and exhibited no apparent cognitive impairment.  This 
pattern continued even when she was interviewed directly after the beep.  Her reports 
exhibited substantial inconsistency, she seemingly could not narrow her focus to the 
moment of the beep, and she often reported external reality rather than inner experience 
when interviewed.  These problems continued even when Fay was interviewed 
immediately after the beep (thus reducing potential problems with memory).  Because 
Fay exhibited no noticeable cognitive problems outside of DES, a cognitive explanation 
for her difficulties is not easy, although it is possible that DES is sensitive to a cognitive 
impairment that is not readily observable via the MMSE or in casual conversation.  It is 
also possible that the struggles of both Ellen and Fay are due to some aspect of their inner 
experience.  This possibility is discussed in more detail below.  
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Only one of the six individuals with cognitive impairment was able to engage 
successfully in DES.  Gary, a 70 year-old male with a diagnosis of VaD and a 29 on the 
MMSE had some substantial difficulties during the first 2 days of sampling but produced 
consistent and seemingly reliable reports starting on the third day of sampling.  Thus the 
presence of an age-related neurodegenerative diagnosis does not categorically rule out the 
use of DES.  However, the other five impaired individuals did not produce a single 
reliable report.  
Henry, like Gary, had a 29 on the MMSE (suggesting very little or no cognitive 
impairment) and a diagnosis of VaD.  However, unlike Gary, Henry could not produce 
any reliable reports on any of his samples.  He frequently reported generalizations about 
himself and his inner experience rather than momentary inner experience, and his reports 
were easily influenced by the interviewers.  His reports were nearly always either directly 
contradictory or inconsistent.  He also could not seem to narrow his focus to the moment 
of the beep, frequently reporting what occurred a few seconds before and after the beep.  
Thus two individuals, both with a diagnosis of VaD and both with a score of 29 on 
the MMSE, differed greatly in their ability to engage in DES adequately.  This is perhaps 
not surprising because the cognitive effects of VaD are highly variable (Poore et al., 
2006) and they are dependent on where in the brain the vascular event or events have 
occurred (Roman et al., 2004; Cummings & Benson, 1992).  It is not known where Gary
and Henry’s cerebrovascular events had occurred.  The variability between the adequacy 
of Gary’s and Henry’s reports could be due to cognitive impairment related to VaD, 
cognitive impairment not related to VaD, or some other factor that did not involve 
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cognitive impairment at all.  For example, Henry may have had difficulty engaging in 
DES even prior to his cerebrovascular event.  
Because diagnosis of VaD is often brought about by a specific event (i.e., a stroke), 
diagnosis often happens before pervasive cognitive impairment occurs.  This potentially 
makes investigation of the inner experience of individuals with VaD more fruitful than 
with AD.  Furthermore, although the cognitive symptoms of VaD are highly 
heterogeneous among individuals, there tends to be less memory impairment in VaD 
compared to AD, although there also tends to be more executive functioning deficiency 
in VaD compared to AD.  It is possible that participation in DES is highly sensitive to 
problems with memory functioning but not as sensitive to problems with executive 
functioning, although this is highly speculative.  Further use of DES with both diseases is 
necessary in order to come to a firm conclusion on these issues.  
The two individuals with MCI (Irving and June) could not give adequate DES reports.  
Irving apparently never reported momentary inner experience and had substantial 
difficulty following instructions required in DES.  Sometimes he did not respond to the 
beep at all.  June also could not follow DES instructions and often had difficulty 
responding to the beep.  Her difficulties with DES appeared more substantial than 
Irving’s despite the fact that she could interact very well socially with only occasional
signs of memory impairment.  In responding to DES beeps, she often described external 
reality as opposed to inner experience, and frequently became frustrated with consistent 
attempts to probe inner experience.  On one hand these results are not surprising, as 
individuals with MCI are susceptible to numerous cognitive impairments such as 
memory, executive function, and linguistic problems (Petersen, 2003) that would likely 
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have an adverse affect on DES.  However, given June’s lack of cognitive, linguistic, and 
social disturbance on the MMSE and in everyday conversation it is surprising that she 
had such significant difficulty with DES and was never close to producing a reliable 
report of inner experience.  This again suggests that the ability to perform DES is highly 
sensitive to cognitive disturbance.
Although Karen was not diagnosed with an age-related neurodegenerative disorder 
she received the second lowest score on the MMSE (21) of all individuals in this study.  
This score suggests moderate cognitive impairment.  Karen had particular difficulty with 
the attention and working memory sections of the MMSE, and her difficulties could be 
seen clinically, even though they had not been diagnosed.  Because attention and working 
memory are important when engaging in the DES process, it is not surprising that Karen
could not produce reliable DES reports.  Karen’s problems with DES occurred on a 
number of levels such as difficulty focusing on the moment of the beep, discussing 
external reality rather than her inner experience during interviews, and having particular 
difficulties with questions about form.  
Therefore, the two individuals with MCI and the one individual with at least MCI 
could not produce a single reliable report of inner experience via DES.  This is a very 
small sample, so it does not, of course, rule out the possibility that some individuals with 
MCI might be able to participate adequately in the DES process.  These three individuals 
seemingly had enough verbal fluency, working memory, attention, and conceptual ability 
to perform the DES task but still could not produce a single reliable DES report.  The 
likelihood that individuals with MCI are able to engage in DES meaningfully compared 
to individuals with AD is much greater as there are, by definition, fewer cognitive deficits 
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and a higher level of functioning in MCI compared to AD.  Still, because none of these 
individuals produced a single reliable sample it is possible that very few individuals with 
MCI can peform the DES task successfully because even some older individuals with 
apparently no cognitive impairment had significant problems doing DES.  Therefore, it is 
likely that only a small percentage of individuals with MCI could peform the DES task 
adequately.  
Finally, Lilly had by far the most difficulty with DES.  Lilly was diagnosed with AD 
in 2001 and received a score of 19 on the MMSE suggesting moderate dementia.  Lilly’s 
cognitive deficiencies made it impossible for her to learn the DES process as she often 
could not remember recent conversations.  She also could not maintain any memories of 
what occurred at the moment of the beep even when interviewed immediately after the 
moment of the beep.   
It is unwise to generalize from a single case, but Lilly had such substantial difficulty 
with DES that it suggests that individuals who are impaired enough to receive a diagnosis 
of AD may not be able to peform the DES task successfully.  DES requires cognitive 
skills that are likely to have been depleted even before the earliest clinical stages of AD.  
For example, DES requires the use of episodic memory (i.e., remembering one’s 
momentary experience from the near past), organization and inhibition (i.e., making 
distinctions between what was in inner experience at the moment of the beep rather than 
near the moment of the beep, what was actually in one’s awareness rather than one’s 
preconceptions about inner experience, and distinguishing between what was in one’s 
inner experience and what was in one’s environment that was not in inner experience), 
and language (i.e., being able to report adequately what was in one’s inner experience at 
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the moment of the beep).  All of these factors may have had a role in Lilly’s difficulty 
with DES.  However, Lilly’s memory impairment was most noteworthy.  For example, 
during the administration of the delayed recall portion of the MMSE where individuals 
are asked to recall three words that were read to the participant about a minute prior, Lilly
did not remember that the interviewer read three words to her.  This extreme 
degeneration of memory clearly interfered with the DES procedure as this individual 
could not remember the DES procedure and repeatedly inquired about the reason the 
interviewer was asking her questions.    
It is significant that even though she had mild to moderate AD, Lilly received a 
diagnosis of AD approximately 7 years prior to engaging in DES.  Perhaps if she engaged 
in DES shortly after diagnosis she would have been able to meaningfully participate in 
the procedure.  Clearly more research with individuals diagnosed with AD is important to 
fully answer this question, specifically with individuals who are in the very early stages 
of the disease. Even though only one individual in this study had AD she was so far away 
from successfully engaging in DES that it seems possible that very few individuals with 
enough cognitive impairment to be diagnosed with AD could adequately engage in DES.  
Still, this conclusion is highly tentative as Lilly is the only individual with AD to ever try 
DES.   
It is clear that there was a high amount of variability across participants in their 
ability to produce reliable reports of momentary inner experience.  This variability is not 
surprising as there is substantial variability in cognitive abilities across older individuals 
and this variability increases with age (Christensen, 2001; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004).  
This variability is also expected because individuals in this study had a wide range of 
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type and extent of cognitive impairment.  Furthermore, DES requires some basic 
cognitive abilities that are commonly impaired in both normal aging and in individuals 
with age-related neurodegenerative disorders such as episodic memory, learning, and 
expressive language ability.  Therefore, some difficulties in performing the DES 
procedure adequately are expected even in the unimpaired participants.  
However, it should not be assumed that the variability in the production of reliable 
reports is entirely explained by variability in cognitive abilities across these participants.   
For example, Gary received a 29 on the MMSE and was diagnosed with VaD but seemed 
to be able to produce reliable reports of momentary inner experience by the third day of 
sampling.  However, Ellen and Fay each scored a perfect 30 on the MMSE, did not have 
a diagnosis of a neurodegenerative disorder, and did not exhibit any cognitive impairment 
outside of DES.  Nevertheless, Ellen could not consistently produce reliable reports of 
inner experience while Fay was entirely unable to produce reliable reports.  The MMSE 
is somewhat of a crude instrument in terms of detecting cognitive impairment so it is 
certainly possible that Fay and Ellen have cognitive impairment, but they exhibited no 
signs of cognitive impairment other than their DES performance.  
Likewise, Henry, who had the same MMSE score as Gary (29) and the same 
diagnosis (VaD), could not produce a single reliable report of inner experience.  Both of 
these individuals displayed no cognitive impairment in casual conversation although both 
of their spouses observed some mild to moderate impairment in their husbands.  
Therefore, what separates older individuals who can peform the DES task successfully, 
who can do it with some difficulty, and who cannot seem to do it at all remains unclear.  
Some possibilities include subtle deficits in cognitive functions such as memory, 
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executive functioning, and language, sensory problems that make processing the beep 
difficult, and a degradation of some or all aspects of inner experience itself.  There may 
be other possibilities, but further investigation is needed to determine this.  
DES and MMSE score 
It is also likely that DES is extremely sensitive to cognitive impairment. Although 
more research with older individuals needs to be done to make a definitive conclusion, it 
appears that the ability to peform the DES task successfully may go from one hundred 
percent to zero percent at some point around an MMSE score of 29 or 30.  Therefore, the 
MMSE may be a useful screening tool in ruling out individuals who cannot peform the 
DES task successfully.  The four individuals who could peform the DES task successfully 
with no more than normal difficulties had MMSE scores of 30.  The one individual who 
experienced only slightly more difficulty had a score of 29 on the MMSE.  Shiela 
produced some reliable reports and had an MMSE score of 30.  The other six individuals 
produced no reliable samples.  The MMSE scores of these individuals were 30, 29, 27, 
23, 21, and 19.  Therefore the four individuals with the lowest MMSE scores could not 
peform the DES task successfully and no one with a score lower than 29 could peform 
the DES task successfully.  This suggests that only individuals who score in the high 20’s 
or 30 on the MMSE can peform the DES task successfully while those in the mid-
twenties and below may not be able to peform the DES task successfully.  
DES and memory disturbance
Because memory deficits are known to be common in the population from which the
participants in this study were drawn, whenever a participant had such substantial 
difficulty producing reliable reports via DES an attempt was made to minimize the DES 
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memory requirements by altering the standard DES procedure to interview participants 
immediately after each beep.  These individuals included Fay, Henry, Irving, June, 
Karen, and Lilly.  However, interviewing immediately after the beep produced no 
improvements in DES performance: not a single participant appeared to benefit from this 
alteration.  This significantly reduces the probability that failure in prolonged long-term 
memory storage was a reason for these individuals’ inability to engage in DES.   
Failure or delay in responding
At times some participants (Irving, June, and Lilly) were delayed in responding to the 
beep or did not respond to the beep at all.  Irving, June, and Lilly showed few or no signs 
of problems with hearing.  Irving wore a hearing aid and demonstrated some hearing 
problems but they were mild.  All of these participants, at times, had more difficulty than 
would be expected responding to the beep in relation to their level of hearing.  One 
explanation for this is that there is some difficulty with central auditory processing 
(CAP).  
CAP refers to one’s ability to process auditory information independent of the ability 
to hear (Davignon & Leshowitz, 1986).  CAP is largely controlled by auditory 
association areas in the cortex.  CAP difficulties are present in elderly individuals at an 
increased rate of approximately 50 percent compared to non-elderly individuals (Strouse, 
Hall, & Burger, 1995).  CAP typically decreases somewhat during the fifth and sixth 
decades, but often declines sharply in the seventh decade (Humes & Christopherson, 
1991).  Difficulties with CAP in older individuals and with individuals with AD are often 
cited as at least partial explanations for difficulties with auditory memory and auditory 
learning (Lund, 1997).    
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Older adults with mild to moderate cognitive deficiencies often show a slowed pre-
conscious brain response to auditory information (Pekkonen et al., 1999). Older 
individuals, and even more so individuals with AD, often have deficiencies in 
communication between the cerebral hemispheres.  This may cause auditory information 
from one ear to be processed inefficiently in the opposite hemisphere (Pekkonen et al., 
1995).  EEG responses to a tone that modulates from 875 to 1175 Hz are different even in 
middle adulthood compared to early adulthood (Poulsen, Picton, & Paus, 2007).  
Difficulties with CAP and its underlying biological abnormalities could both help 
explain the problems that some individuals in the current study.  Lilly and Irving both had 
incidences where they did not respond to the beep at all.  June consistently had delays in 
her responses.  It is certainly possible that these individuals have problems with CAP that 
translate to the successful processing of the beep despite relatively normal hearing, 
especially since they each exhibited some cognitive deficiencies.  
Aging deficits in hearing are often frequency-specific.  That is, age-related hearing 
loss begins with high frequencies, such as 2,000 hertz and higher (Helzner et al., 1995).  
In one large study with over 2,000 participants with a mean age of 77.5 years, 77 percent 
exhibited hearing loss with frequencies over 2,000 hertz (Helzner et al., 1995).  Still, 60 
percent of these individuals exhibited hearing loss between 500 and 2,000 hertz.  
However, the 500 to 2000 hertz frequencies were tested at 25 decibels, approximately the 
sound of a whisper or a quiet library.  It is impossible to tell exactly where the volume of 
the beeper was set with each participant, although it was either at the maximum level or 
near the maximum level in those participants who had difficulty responding.  Still, in 
each of these cases, the decibel level of the beep was at least 60, which is the level of 
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normal conversation and much louder than those tones used in the study above.   
Although it is possible that those individuals who had difficulty responding to the beep 
had hearing loss that affected the 700 hertz frequency it is unlikely as hearing loss at such 
a frequency would likely be readily apparent in normal conversation.  
Deficiencies in attention and inhibition could also help explain some of the problems 
that some participants had responding to the beeper.  Substantial deficits with attention 
and inhibition are well documented in AD (see Perry & Hodges, 1999 for a review).  
Specifically, deficiencies in switching attention seem to be the first that are evident and 
the most substantial in AD (Norman & Shallice, 1987).  Attention deficits can be seen in 
normal aging as well (Pignatti et al., 2005).  Although only 1 participant in the study was 
actually diagnosed with AD, the others who had difficulty responding to the beep all 
experienced some cognitive impairment that could be a pre-cursor to AD or other form of 
dementia.  
DES requires one to not only pay attention to the beep itself, but to switch attention 
from what was being attended to before the beep, to the beep, then to inner experience 
that was occurring before the beep.  Although this may not explain situations in which 
participants did not respond at all, it certainly could explain instances in which response 
to the beep was slow.  Furthermore, this slowness could help explain inaccuracies, 
inconsistencies, and other difficulties exhibited by many of the individuals with cognitive 
impairment in the current study. 
A general slowing in cognitive processing is well documented in normal aging and 
significantly in AD.  Some propose that many of the cognitive deficiencies associated 
with AD are due to a general slowing in processing speed (Baddeley et al., 2001).  
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Because DES requires instant, immediate retrospection, any slowing in cognition could 
make this process more difficult.  If participants were experiencing a general slowing of 
cognitive processing, this could not only explain a delayed reaction to the beep, but also 
difficulty performing the task adequately. 
Although there is some conflicting research, it appears that reaction time is also 
compromised in individuals with AD, VaD (Mendez, Cherrier, & Perryman, 1997), and 
normal elderly individuals, and is often viewed as a sign of a decrease in executive 
functioning (DiFabio et al., 2005).  Muller, Richter, Weisbold, and Klingberg (1991) 
found that individuals with mild dementia showed a 23 percent increase in response time 
to visual stimuli (flashes) and a 34 percent increase in time to respond to auditory stimuli 
(clicks) compared to normal elderly controls.  However, healthy controls did not show 
increases in RT in these two conditions compared to healthy younger controls, although 
they did have a 49 percent increase in RT in when asked to respond to complex visual 
stimuli (i.e., participants respond only when a four digit display showed all zeros).  DES 
is a task that requires participants to react to the beep quickly.  Therefore, a deficiency in 
reaction time in older individuals and individuals with mild AD could compromise the 
success of undergoing the DES process.  
Learning difficulties are also common in AD, and to a lesser extent, normal aging.  
Specifically, auditory learning is compromised in normal aging, perhaps due to 
deficiencies in working memory (for a review, see Lund, 1997).  Individuals who had 
difficulty in this study appeared to benefit little from repeated exposure to DES, 
suggesting that learning was not adequately taking place.  However, this lack of learning 
could be due to a variety of things, such as inflexible pre-suppositions, the absence of 
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inner experience, and/or the lack of differentiated inner experience.  Nevertheless, 
learning difficulties could also be a partial explanation for the difficulties these 
individuals experienced.    
Summary
To summarize, the following things were learned about the ability of older 
individuals with and without cognitive impairment to perform DES:  
1. Some older individuals are easily able to peform the DES task successfully.    
2. There is substantial variability among older individuals with apparently intact 
cognitive functioning regarding ability to peform the DES task successfully.  Many 
individuals in this group could peform the DES task successfully with no problems while 
some could not produce a single reliable report.    
3. Some individuals with VaD can peform the DES task successfully while some 
apparently cannot.  Because some individuals with VaD are able to peform the DES task 
successfully it may be fruitful to explore the inner experience of this population in the 
future via DES.   
4. Individuals with MCI likely have significant difficulty engaging successfully in 
DES and none in this study could produce a single reliable report.  It is likely that only a 
small percentage of individuals with MCI can peform the DES task successfully although 
more research is needed in this area.    
5. Individuals with AD may not be able to peform the DES task successfully.  The 
level of cognitive impairment that is needed for a diagnosis of AD may be too much to 
overcome to peform the DES task successfully but more investigation is needed to make 
a definitive statement.  
269
6. The ability to peform the DES task successfully is related to MMSE score.  It 
appears that only individuals who score in the high 20’s and above on the MMSE can 
peform the DES task successfully, but this conclusion is tentative due to small sample 
size.  
7. Eliminating a time delay between the beep and the interview has no beneficial 
effect on the reports of those who had difficulty doing DES, suggesting that memory 
impairment is not the only obstacle to this population in terms of engaging in DES 
successfully.   
8. Based on older individuals’ ability to peform the DES task successfully, DES may 
be useful as a very sensitive instrument to detect cognitive impairment; more research is 
needed in this area.  
9. Some cognitively impaired individuals periodically have difficulty responding to 
the beep quickly or at all.  There are many potential explanations of this.  Further 
investigation is needed to make a conclusion as to why this might happen.   
The Inner Experience of Older Individuals Who Could Peform the DES Task Successfully   
This study had two goals: to explore the use of DES with older individuals 
(discussed above), and to explore the inner experience of older individuals with and 
without cognitive impairment, to which we now turn.  We will approach this by 
considering first the characteristics of inner experience of those individuals who could 
perform the DES task and then speculating about the characteristics of inner experience 
of those who could not perform the DES task.
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Six of the twelve participants produced some apparently reliable reports of inner 
experience.  Table 8 gives the frequencies of forms of experience across these six older 
individuals as well as the frequencies found in a group of younger individuals:    
Table 8
Percentage of characteristics across older and college-age 
individuals                                           
Characteristic Percentage in Older Percentage in Youngera
Feeling 20   26
Feeling Fact of Body 2 <3
Inner Seeing 14 34
Imageless Seeing 1 <3
Inner Hearing 0 <3
Inner Speech 16 26
Just Doing 3 <3
Just Talking 1 <3
Laughing 1 <3
No Inner Experience 2 <3
Sensory Awareness 21 22
Unsymbolized Thinking 39 22
Unvocalized Inner Speech 4 <3
Worded Thinking 14 <3
Multiple Awareness 30 4b
Number of samples 133
Total number of 
characteristicsc
209.5
Characteristics per sample 1.58
aPercentages taken from Hurlburt and Heavey (2008)
bValue comes from Hurlburt and Heavey (2008) but was not reported (personal 
communication)
cTotal number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly experienced (in 
this case, Feeling Fact of Body, Just Doing, Just Talking, Laughing, No Inner 
Experience, and Multiple Awareness), and counts uncertain instances as .5.  
      The following discussion of these characteristics must be regarded as highly 
speculative.  There were very few participants in this study (six were able to participate in 
DES effectively), and this was by no means a random sample from the population of 
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older individuals.  Nevertheless, it may be instructive to compare and contrast these 
individuals’ experiences to those reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).
Similarities between older and younger adults
Some of the older individuals in this study (Anna and Dolly, and to a lesser extent, 
Clara and Benjamin) apparently have inner experience very similar to that of younger 
individuals, including high clarity and differentiation of form and a wide range of form 
and content in inner experience.  The five most common forms of inner experience that 
have been found in younger individuals (inner seeing, inner speech, unsymbolized 
thinking, feeling, and sensory awareness; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008) were also the five 
most common in the current population (inner seeing and worded thinking were tied for 
fifth in frequency).      
Unsymbolized thinking
However, there were differences between the inner experience of the older
individuals in this study and the younger individuals in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) 
study.  For example, unsymbolized thinking occurred in 39 percent of samples in this 
study compared to 22 percent in the college students in Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). 
Gary was the only individual of the six who could produce reliable reports who 
experienced unsymbolized thinking in less than 33 percent of his samples (8 percent) and 
less than the average of the younger individuals.  Unsymbolized thinking was the most 
common form of experience in three of the six individuals who could produce reliable 
reports (Clara, Dolly, and Ellen).  Therefore, a high rate of unsymbolized thinking may 
be more common in older individuals than in younger individuals.  
       Symbolic experience
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       There was a relatively low frequency of symbolic experience in the current study.  
As discussed above, the most common form of inner experience was by far unsymbolized 
thinking, and the two symbolized forms of inner experience, inner seeing and inner 
speech, occurred less frequently in this sample than in the Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) 
sample of young adults.  
The frequency of inner seeing among our older adults was 14 percent, a much lower 
rate than in younger individuals (34 percent).  Clara’s 26 percent was the highest 
frequency in this study, less than the average of the younger individuals.  Clara and Gary
were the only people in this study to have inner seeings in more than 20 percent of their 
samples.  Dolly and Benjamin had no experiences of inner seeing.  This suggests that 
inner seeing may be somewhat uncommon in the majority of older individuals.  
Furthermore, the visual symbols themselves—the things innerly seen—were, in the 
majority of the older-adult samples, less detailed than the symbols of younger adults: the 
older adults’ inner seeings lacked detail, clarity, and/or color.  Anna was the only 
participant that consistently had inner seeings that were clear and fully detailed on a 
consistent basis.  Clara had clear and detailed inner seeings on nine occasions but they 
lacked color, all being either in black and white (eight of the nine inner seeings) or brown 
and white (one of the nine inner seeings).  Ellen reported three inner seeings but had 
substantial difficulty describing details in two of them, leading to speculation that either 
these were not seeings at all or that they were seeings with the symbolic aspect 
substantially weakened.  She was very unsure if there was an inner seeing at all in the 
third instance.  Gary reported six inner seeings but only two of the reports were clear and 
convincing and only one of them was in color (the others being in black and white).  The 
273
other four occurred on the same day, all while Gary was doing a crossword puzzle and 
the inner seeings were all said to be of the crossword puzzle but lacked detail.  
Older individuals in this study also had a substantially lower frequency (16 percent) 
of the other major form of symbolic experience (inner speech) compared to younger 
individuals (26 percent).  Clara had the highest frequency of inner speech (30 percent).  
Gary and Benjamin did not have any occurrences of inner speech.  However, Gary and 
Benjamin had verbal experiences that were not inner speech.  Gary experienced worded 
thinking during 69 percent of his samples.  Benjamin experienced unvocalized inner 
speech during 28 percent of his samples and worded thinking during five percent of his 
samples.  Benjamin was the only individual to experience unvocalized inner speech.  
Clara and Ellen also experienced worded thinking on 11 and 7 percent of their samples, 
respectively.  Worded thinking was experienced in 14 percent and unvocalized speech in 
four percent of the overall samples.  Worded thinking and unvocalized inner speech were 
each present in less than three percent of samples in Heavey and Hurlburt’s 2008 study of 
young adults.  
It is notable that worded thinking and unvocalized inner speech are similar to the 
more common inner speech but are missing the inner perceptually direct access to the 
symbols that is usually present in inner speech.  Worded thinking is essentially the 
presence of words in experience that are not spoken and do not have auditory qualities.  
Benjamin’s unvocalized inner speech was very similar to inner speech except that it 
occurred very quickly and had no auditory qualities.  Therefore, the relatively low 
frequency of inner speech and high frequencies of worded thinking and unvocalized inner 
speech represent the tendency of older individuals in this study to have verbal 
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experiences where the symbolic aspect, a typically present feature sometimes assumed to 
be ubiquitous, is partially or completely absent.  
Thus both symbolic forms of inner experience (inner seeing and inner speech) were 
less common in this sample compared to younger individuals.  When symbolic 
experience did occur in either form, it often lacked the inner perceptual details, clarity, 
and particular aspects that are common in younger adults.  Inner seeings frequently 
lacked color.  This was the case in the majority of Clara’s and Gary’s inner seeings.  
Irving also reported some black and white inner seeings although his reports were 
deemed unreliable.  Inner words frequently lacked the perceptual characteristics of 
speech.  This suggests that older individuals may not have as much fully detailed
symbolic experience as younger individuals.  Fully detailed symbolic experience (i.e.,
inner seeing and inner speech) occurred in 60 percent of Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) 
college-aged sample but only 30 percent of this sample, or substantially less when one 
subtracts the questionable occurrences and the black and white inner seeings.  It is 
possible that symbolic experience becomes less detailed as individuals move into old age 
but a similar study to the current study that is longitudinal in nature would be needed to 
verify this speculation.  
      Multiple awareness
      Multiple awareness was much more common in this sample (30 percent) compared to 
Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) younger sample (4 percent).  Although all of the 
participants experienced multiple awareness in this study by far the most were
experienced by Benjamin and Anna.  Benjamin had multiple awareness in 79 percent of 
his samples while Anna had it in 54 percent of her samples.  The two lowest frequencies 
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of multiple awareness were Clara and Dolly with nine and six percent, respectively.  Thus 
the lowest percentage in this study was higher than the average rate of four percent in 
Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) study of young adults.
The greater frequency of multiple awareness in this study might be related to the lack 
of details in symbolic experience also found in this sample.  Both may represent a lack of 
focus of inner experience.  It is possible that the scope of inner experience of older 
individuals is broader in a sense and therefore contains more things but less detail.  This 
high amount of multiple awareness may also represent problems with executive 
functioning and inhibition as these problems are common in older individuals (Pignatti et 
al., 2005; Treitz, et al., 2007).  For example, if older individuals lack inhibition more 
information may be present in their inner experience at a given moment.  These are, of 
course, just speculations.  More research regarding the high frequency of multiple 
awareness in older individuals would be worthwhile to aid in answering these questions.
Content  
      Clear content themes emerge only rarely in samples of young adults (Hurlburt & 
Heavey, 2006).  By contrast, four of the older individuals in this study had consistent 
content-based themes in their inner experience or a lack of variability in the content of 
their inner experience.  That is, by comparison to younger adults, the older adults seemed 
to have more repetitive or narrowly focused content.  Clara had frequent samples that 
were negative, family-related, about death, and beeper-related.  Ellen also had frequent 
content that was emotionally negative.  Benjamin had a substantial number of samples 
where his inner experience was related to traffic.  Gary often experienced recurring 
content within sampling days.  He had two experiences involving being late on day three, 
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he was thinking about his wife’s eye problems or a closely related issue on four of five 
samples on day four, and he had content related to crossword puzzles on four of six beeps 
on day five.  This could suggest a lack of range of content in the inner experience of 
some older individuals or an obsessive quality to their inner experience.  Further research 
would need to be done to make a stronger conclusion about this however.      
      Summary    
      Below is a summary of the findings and implications regarding the inner experience 
of individuals in this study who could produce reliable reports:  
1. Some older individuals have “normal” inner experience that is clear, differentiated, 
and varied in form and content.  The five most common forms of inner experience in the 
general population were the five most common in this study.   
2. There was a very high frequency of unsymbolized thinking that nearly doubled the 
frequency of younger individuals in another study.  The three most common forms of 
experience were unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness, and feeling.  These are all 
non-symbolic experiences and may represent a lack of symbolic experience in older 
individuals.        
3. There was a low frequency of inner seeings.  The inner seeings that were present 
typically lacked detail or some aspect that is typical of inner seeings, such as color, 
clarity, or detail.          
4. There was a low frequency of inner speech while there was a high frequency of 
worded thinking and unvocalized inner speech.  These two forms of experience are 
similar to inner speech but both lack auditory qualities.
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5. The symbolic experiences that were present typically lacked a common aspect, 
lacked detail, or were unclear.  Because there was a relatively small amount of symbolic 
experience in the first place this may represent a lack of fully-formed symbolic 
experience in older individuals.                   
6. Multiple awareness occurred at an extremely high rate.  This may represent a lack 
of focus in experience or a problem with inhibition.  
7. Some individuals had repeated themes in the content of their inner experience that 
possibly suggests a lack of range of content in inner experience or an obsessive quality to 
the inner experience of older individuals.    
The Inner Experience of Older Individuals Who Could Not Peform the DES Task 
Successfully 
Six individuals could not produce a single report of inner experience that the 
researchers judged to be reliable: Fay, Henry, Irving, June, Karen, and Lilly.  Although 
these individuals could not produce reliable reports of inner experience, speculations can 
still be made about their inner experience, or lack thereof, based on their unique 
difficulties.  These speculations must be regarded as highly tentative.  
It is likely that none of these individuals had inner experience as that understood by 
DES.  That is, they may have no inner speech, no inner seeing, no experienced feelings, 
and so on.  This was particularly likely for Fay (she exhibited no apparent cognitive 
impairment and received a 30 out of 30 on the MMSE but was never even remotely close 
to producing a single reliable report of inner experience) and for Henry (he also exhibited 
no apparent cognitive impairment, although his spouse casually suggested that he has had 
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a decrease in cognitive functioning, and his MMSE score of 29 suggested no or slight 
cognitive impairment).  Even if Fay and/or Henry did have some level of cognitive 
impairment it would not fully explain their inability to produce a single reliable report.  
One explanation is that these two individuals had no inner experience: they could not 
possibly produce a reliable report of inner experience because there was nothing to 
report.  Supporting this possibility is the fact that both of these individuals frequently 
discussed external reality when asked about their inner experience.
      Irving and June may also not have had inner experience or lacked some important 
aspect of inner experience such as clarity, detail, and/or differentiation.  Both of these 
individuals had more difficulty with DES than might be expected given their cognitive 
impairment.  Irving had a score of 27 on the MMSE which suggests mild cognitive 
impairment.  This is consistent with casual observation of Irving.  It seems that his 
cognitive impairment might have led him to have some difficulty with DES, but it does 
not seem that his cognitive impairment alone was sufficient to render him unable to 
produce at least some reliable report of inner experience.  Thus it may be likely that 
Irving had no inner experience or that his inner experience was somehow substantially 
lacking.  June had a lower score on the MMSE (score of 23) and exhibited some memory 
impairment at times, but often exhibited no cognitive impairment for extended periods of 
conversation.  However, June was not at all close to giving a single reliable report and 
often spoke of external reality rather than inner experience.  Thus, like Irving, the gap 
between June’s cognitive abilities and her ability to peform the DES task successfully is 
likely due to a lack of inner experience or lack of some important aspect of inner 
experience.  This speculation is not only based on the gap between Irving’s and June’s 
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cognitive impairment and their ability to peform the DES task successfully but also the 
fact that many individuals in this study with very little or no cognitive impairment 
seemed to have either no inner experience or lack an important part of inner experience.  
Therefore, it would appear likely that individuals with more cognitive impairment would 
have even less fully formed inner experience.  Still, this is speculative given that neither 
of these individuals could produce any reliable reports of inner experience.   
      Karen and Lilly were the most cognitively impaired individuals in this study as 
judged by the MMSE.  Karen received a 21 on the MMSE and exhibited significantly 
more impairment in casual conversation than Irving or June.  Likewise, Lilly had a 19 on 
the MMSE and appeared severely impaired cognitively.  Cognitive explanations for the 
difficulties of these two individuals are more viable than with the others but can be used 
potentially as the sole explanation only for Lilly.  Lilly had so much cognitive 
impairment that it would not have mattered if she had inner experience or not, she 
probably would not have been able to peform the DES task successfully.  Karen may 
have had enough cognitive impairment that she could not peform the DES task 
successfully regardless of her inner experience.  Still, these two individuals may not have 
inner experience or may have been missing common aspects of inner experience and it is 
perhaps most likely that they did not have the cognitive ability or the inner experience to 
complete the task.  A lack of inner experience with these two individuals appears to be 
likely as even some older individuals whose cognitive functioning is intact have shown a 
lack of inner experience in this study.  However, because reports of inner experience 
could not given by these individuals this is speculative and is discussed further below.  
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      Even though problems with inner experience are a likely explanation for the problems 
of many of these individuals to peform the DES task successfully, there are numerous 
potential cognitive factors that may have impeded the ability of some individuals in this 
study to peform the DES task successfully .  One of these is a disturbance in memory.  A 
certain level of memory ability is required to peform the DES task successfully.  One 
needs, at the very least, to be able to remember the instructions as well as keep one’s 
inner experience in memory from the time of the beep to the time of the interview.  
      Memory difficulties interfered with Lilly’s ability to peform the DES task 
successfully as she could not even remember the purpose of the beeper or the interviewer.  
Karen also exhibited some memory impairment, both on the MMSE (she missed all 
working memory items) and in casual conversation.  However, it was not nearly as severe 
as Lilly’s and did not appear to be severe enough to entirely destroy her ability to peform 
the DES task successfully, although it is possible.  June and Irving also had some 
memory difficulties in casual conversation but they did not seem to have difficulty 
remembering things related to DES.  Henry missed 1 point on the delayed recall section 
of the MMSE but otherwise did not evidence memory impairment.  Henry’s spouse 
reported that he did have some cognitive impairment, although it was not clear if this was 
memory-related or not.  Fay had no evidence of memory impairment.  Therefore, it 
appears that memory had a large effect on Lilly’s ability to perform DES and may have 
played a smaller role in the ability of the others mentioned above.  
      However, one piece of evidence against a prolonged storage impairment as a primary 
cause of these individuals’ difficulties with DES is that shortening the time between the 
interview and the sample had no beneficial effects whatsoever.  If difficulties with 
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prolonged storage was a primary reason for the problems with DES than reducing the
duration of the storage in this manner should have produced better results.  This 
shortening of time would not necessarily help if the primary difficulty is with working 
memory or encoding.  
      Another factor that could have contributed to the difficulties experienced by these 
individuals is that they may have had some dysfunction in the realm of executive 
functioning.  Substantial deficits with attention and inhibition are well documented in AD
and these two abilities are part of executive functioning (see Perry & Hodges, 1999 for a 
review).  Specifically, deficiencies in switching attention seem to be the first that are 
evident and the most substantial in AD (Norman & Shallice, 1987).  Attention deficits 
can be seen in normal aging as well (Pignatti et al., 2005).  Although only 1 participant in 
the study is actually diagnosed with AD, the others who had difficulty all experienced 
some cognitive impairment that could be a pre-cursor to AD or other form of dementia. 
DES requires one to pay attention not only to the beep itself, but to switch attention from 
what was being attended to before the beep, to the beep, then to inner experience that was 
occurring before the beep.  Although this may not explain situations in which participants 
did not respond at all, it could explain instances in which response to the beep was slow.  
      Many of the individuals in this study also had difficulty narrowing their focus to the 
moment of the beep.  For example, Karen frequently reported things that were near the 
moment of the beep, but not at the moment of the beep.  She also missed all MMSE 
questions directly related to attention.  Fay did not exhibit cognitive impairment but often 
discussed things that occurred near the beep rather than things that occurred at the 
moment of the beep.  This was also a problem for Henry.  Irving and June appeared to 
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have more significant problems than the others in this area.  It is not clear if this was a 
problem for Lilly as she could not even learn the task of DES.  Therefore, problems with 
executive functioning evidenced by an inability to narrow one’s conception of the 
moment of the beep appear to be a possible partial explanation for difficulties 
experienced by all 6 participants, but most significantly Karen, Fay, and Henry.  
      A general slowing in cognitive processing is well documented in normal aging and 
significantly in AD.  Some propose that many of the cognitive deficiencies associated 
with AD are due to a general slowing in processing speed (Baddeley, et al., 2001).  
Because DES requires instant, immediate retrospection, any slowing in cognition could 
make this process more difficult.  If participants are experiencing a general slowing of 
cognitive processing, this could not only explain a delayed reaction to the beep, but also 
difficulty performing the task adequately.  
      Although there is some conflicting research, it appears that reaction time is also 
compromised in individuals with AD, VaD (Mendez et al., 1997), and normal elderly 
individuals and is often viewed as a sign of a decrease in executive functioning (DiFabio, 
Zampieri, Henke, Olson, Rickheim, & Russell, 2005).  Muller et al. (1991) found that 
individuals with mild dementia showed a 23 percent increase in response time to visual 
stimuli (flashes) and a 34 percent increase to respond to auditory stimuli (clicks) 
compared to normal elderly controls.  However, healthy controls did not show increases 
in RT in these two conditions compared to healthy younger controls, although they did 
have a 49 percent increase in RT in when asked to respond to complex visual stimuli (i.e.,
participants respond only when a 4-digit display showed all zeros).  DES is a task that 
requires participants to react to the beep in a similar manner that is required in auditory 
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reaction time tasks.  That is, when testing reaction time, individuals are often asked to 
respond as quickly as possible to a sound, often a beep or tone.  In DES, participants are 
also required to respond to a beep as quickly as possible, although the response is quite 
different (instant introspection).  A deficiency in reaction time in older individuals and 
individuals with mild AD could compromise the success of undergoing the DES process.  
Irving and June exhibited slow reaction times to the beep and therefore cognitive slowing 
and reaction time could have played a part in their difficulties.  However, this does not 
seem to explain their difficulties entirely.     
      Difficulty learning is also common in AD, and to a lesser extent, normal aging.  
Specifically, auditory learning is compromised in normal aging, perhaps due to 
deficiencies in working memory (for a review, see Lund, 1997).  Individuals who had 
difficulty in this study appeared to benefit little from repeated exposure to DES, 
suggesting that learning may not have been adequately taking place.  Some individuals 
did not seem to understand DES and therefore could not produce reliable reports, 
possibly because of an inability to learn DES.  Lilly had the most difficulty learning DES 
although it is not clear if this was due to problems with memory, learning, some other 
cognitive factor, a lack of inner experience, or some or all of these factors.  Unlike the 
other individuals, Lilly’s inability to peform the DES task successfully and learn DES 
could be explained entirely by her cognitive deficiencies as they were substantial.  
However, it is also possible that Lilly had no or little inner experience and that this could 
have further impaired Lilly’s ability to peform the DES task successfully and it is likely 
that she had neither the ability to learn or the inner experience to peform the DES task 
successfully .  
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      Difficulty learning is also a possible partial explanation for Irving’s difficulties.  At 
first, Irving believed that he was supposed to try to think of something for the beep.  
After it was explained to him that this was not the case his reports did not change very 
much.  It did not appear that he was reporting inner experience but was either making up 
stories or reporting memories.  June also largely misunderstood the task at first and was 
often confused about the purpose of the beeper and the beep and may have not 
understood what is meant by “inner experience.”  Irving and June’s difficulties could be 
due to a problem with learning although both appeared to have enough cognitive ability 
to understand the task, and so therefore a lack of inner experience is more likely.  There 
was very little evidence for Henry, Karen, and Fay not understanding DES, so although it 
is a possible partial explanation for some participants it could only potentially fully 
explain Lilly’s problems with DES and cannot fully explain the difficulties of any of the 
other individuals.  
      There is also a possibility that some participants had relatively normal inner 
experience but simply had trouble communicating it due to linguistic disturbances.  Some 
mild linguistic disturbances are often present in individuals who age normally and are 
more common in older individuals with neurodegenerative disorders.  However, no 
individuals in this study, aside from possibly Lilly, exhibited noticeable linguistic 
impairments outside of DES so this appears to be an unlikely explanation.  
      A final possibility is that individuals had difficulty processing the beep due to 
problems with central auditory processing (CAP), discussed previously.  CAP refers to 
one’s ability to process auditory information independent of the ability to hear (Davignon 
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& Leshowitz, 1986).  CAP difficulties are common in older individuals (Strouse et al., 
1995), especially in the seventh decade of life (Humes & Christopherson, 1991).  
      Difficulties with CAP could help explain the problems that some individuals in the 
current study, specifically Lilly, Irving, and June, had responding to the beep. Lilly and 
Irving both had incidences where they did not respond to the beep at all.  June
consistently had delays in her responses.  It is certainly possible that these individuals 
have problems with CAP that translate to the successful processing of the beep despite 
relatively normal hearing, especially since they each exhibit some cognitive deficiencies. 
      Therefore, there are many cognitive, linguistic, and sensory problems that could have 
contributed to these individuals’ difficulties with DES.  However, the only case in which 
cognitive explanations could possibly entirely explain an individual’s inability to perform 
DES is Lilly.  There is a small possibility that Karen’s difficulties with DES could be 
given an entirely cognitive explanation but this is unlikely given the fact that she was not 
close to producing a reliable report.  The inability of the other four individuals to peform 
the DES task successfully far exceeded their cognitive impairments.  Therefore, based on 
this information and the results from participants who could produce reliable reports, it 
seems that a lack of inner experience (or some aspect of inner experience such as clarity, 
detail, and/or differentiation) is a key factor  in the difficulties experienced in all six 
cases.  
       The following is a summary of possibilities explaining the inability of six individuals 
in this study to produce a single reliable report of inner experience. 
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      1. These six individuals may have no inner experience, thus making it impossible to 
produce reports of inner experience.  This is a strong possibility for all six of these 
individuals and is perhaps most apparent in the cases of Fay and Henry.   
      2. There is a lack of clarity, detail, and/or differentiation in the experience of these 
individuals.  Again, this is a strong possibility in all six individuals but more obviously in 
Fay and Henry.  These problems were present in Ellen’s inner experience and therefore 
there is some evidence from one individual who could produce some reliable reports.  
       3. Memory impairments could have interfered with some individuals.  Lilly had 
obvious memory-based impairments that were moderate to severe.  This seemed to affect 
her ability to peform the DES task successfully but a lack of inner experience is also a 
likely cause of her difficulties with DES.  Memory problems were not clear in the other 5
participants although they may have complicated doing DES, especially for Karen.    
       4. Problems related to executive functioning may have played a role in difficulty 
producing reliable reports.  This is a fairly strong possibility with Karen but does not 
entirely explain the difficulties experienced by any of the individuals.      
      5. General cognitive slowing and a slowing of reaction time could have interfered 
with reliable reports and with individuals’ ability to respond to the beep quickly.  This 
may have been a factor for Irving and June but does not explain their difficulties entirely.    
      6. An inability to learn DES and a lack of understanding of DES is a possible partial 
explanation for the difficulties experienced by Lilly, Irving, and June.  
      7. Normal experience but an inability to communicate experience is a possible partial 
explanation that only appears applicable to Lilly.  
287
      8. Problems with CAP could partially account for the difficulties experienced by 
Lilly, Irving, and June.  
      9. None of these cognitive problems could entirely explain the difficulties 
experienced by any of the individuals with the exception of Lilly.  It appears likely that a 
lack of inner experience or some important aspect of inner experience was present in all 
of these individuals.  
      Although only one of these individuals had AD these findings can be related to the 
initial speculations made based on the first-person accounts of individuals with AD.  The 
first-person accounts of individuals with AD suggest that individuals with AD have 
symbolic experience, unusual sensory experiences that involve strong colors or 
sensations, and a high frequency of emotional experiences.  These hypotheses were not 
supported, although at least some older individuals do have symbolic experience even 
though it appears to be less frequent in this population.  It is not surprising that the 
findings do not support these speculations as the observations upon which the 
speculations are based were not geared towards looking specifically at inner experience 
and were not systematically gathered.        
Diagnostic and Treatment Implications 
      Researchers, caregivers, and affected individuals have all emphasized the importance 
of gaining a better understanding of age-related neurodegenerative disorders as this could 
aid in interacting more effectively with individuals with these disorders (Gurbrium, 
2000).   The importance of detecting AD in its earliest stages has become even more 
important in recent years due to the development of interventions that are best begun in 
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the earliest stages of AD (Wetter et al., 2005; Desai & Grossberg, 2005; Gomez-Isla & 
Hyman, 2003; Petersen & Morris, 2003; Cummings, 2003; Mohr, Dastoor, & Claus, 
1999; Frodl et al., 2002; Morris & Becker, 2004b; Parasuraman, 2004; Leifer, 2003).  
The inability of impaired individuals in this study to produce reliable reports of 
momentary inner experience via DES suggests that DES is often a very sensitive measure 
of age-related cognitive impairment, much more sensitive, for example, than the MMSE.  
Many individuals that show very little or no impairment via the MMSE or clinical 
observation could not produce a single reliable report via DES.  It appears that by the 
time the MMSE score drops from 30 to 29 or so, the ability to perform DES drops from 
about 100 percent to zero percent.  This is perhaps not surprising as there is substantial 
literature showing that individuals often experience subtle age-related neurological and 
cognitive changes well before tests such as the MMSE can detect them (Kawas et al., 
2003; Snowden et al., 1996).  This suggests that DES might provide a sensitive diagnosis 
of cognitive impairment for this population before standard instruments such as the 
MMSE can detect subtle age-related cognitive changes.  
      It is possible that DES is not only sensitive to subtle age-related changes in 
experience that are related to cognitive impairment, but it may also differentiate between 
individuals who will and will not eventually develop an age-related neurodegenerative 
disorder.  Because differences in the MMSE can often differentiate between individuals 
who will and will not develop AD up to 6 years before diagnosis (Small et al., 2000) it is 
possible that DES can detect this difference even earlier than the MMSE. 
      DES may also eventually be used to differentiate between AD and VaD as it is often 
difficult to differentiate diagnostically between AD and VaD (Braaten et al., 2006).  
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However, one of the two individuals with VaD could peform the DES task successfully 
whereas the one individual with AD was not at all able to peform the DES task 
successfully.  It is possible that individuals with VaD can often peform the DES task 
successfully whereas those with AD can rarely or never peform the DES task 
successfully due to subtle differences between the diseases.  This would be diagnostically 
useful as it could help distinguish between the two diseases when a differential diagnosis 
is needed.  Likewise, the inner experience of individuals with VaD may be different from 
those with AD.  For example, the inner experience of individuals with VaD could be 
substantially disorganized as executive functioning is important to intellectual and 
behavioral organization and this may not be as apparent in those with AD.  Such a 
difference would also be diagnostically useful.       
      To investigate further the diagnostic validity of DES and the above diagnostic 
possibilities, it would be worthwhile to engage individuals in a longitudinal study where 
they undertake DES intermittently over a period of several years as they transition into 
older age.  It is possible that DES could identify subtleties in momentary inner experience 
and/or the ability of individuals to report their momentary inner experience that may be 
more sensitive than cognitive measures such as the MMSE.  For example, Clara had inner 
seeings that were black and white but exhibited no cognitive impairment.  It is possible 
that this lack of color represents degeneration in her inner experience that foreshadows a 
decrease in cognitive functioning.  But it is also possible that her inner experience has 
been black and white throughout her life, and also possible that her experience is actually 
in color but she learned to talk about it as if it were black and white.  Likewise, Fay and 
Ellen both had substantial difficulty reliably reporting their inner experience in spite of 
290
perfect scores on the MMSE.  It is possible that this difficulty could predict future 
cognitive impairment.  If so, DES could have diagnostic utility with older individuals in 
terms of predicting cognitive impairment.  A longitudinal study could go a long way in 
either verifying or refuting the diagnostic utility of DES in this area.  
      Treatment implications for older individuals with cognitive impairment based on the 
results of this single study are very limited.  Because five of the six individuals with 
cognitive impairment could not peform the DES task successfully little could be learned 
about their inner experience.  At this point only speculations can be made.  One 
speculation is that the presence of symbolic experience decreases as individuals age.  
Therefore, older individuals might benefit from exercises involving induced visualization 
or inner speaking to help maintain symbolic speech to protect against the effects of aging.  
Also, it is possible that a lack of experience or undifferentiated experience led to 
difficulties producing reports of inner experience.  If this was the case, it may be possible 
to produce a method to help individuals maintain clear experience.  However, the benefits 
of such treatments are extremely speculative.    
Limitations of the Current Study
      The current study was not longitudinal and was therefore not able to track changes in 
inner experience over time.  It is difficult to determine if some features of inner 
experience in this study were due to the aging process or were always present in these 
individuals.  For example, it is possible that Clara has always had inner seeings that are in 
black and white and that the absence of color was always present and is not due to aging.  
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine if problems completing the DES task for some 
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individuals (such as Fay and Ellen) are due to age or if the problems would have been 
present if the individual was sampled decades earlier.  
      The current study used a very small and non-random sample.  DES is a highly labor 
intensive procedure, partially due to its iterative nature; DES usually has small sample 
sizes.  The procedure was even more labor intensive than typical DES studies due to the 
fact that for parts of the procedure for half of the participants the interviewer was with the 
participant for several hours while the participant wore the beeper.  
      Because DES is largely a qualitative method that investigates inner experience it is 
difficult to represent the findings that DES produces in quantitatively and statistically 
meaningful ways.  The only way that samples of inner experience can be given 
quantitative and statistical meaning is to code experiences based on form and content and 
then to calculate the frequencies of the form and content of experience.  Further statistical 
analysis, such as investigating significance levels, can be done only with larger samples.  
For example, in this study only one member of the impaired group could produce reliable 
reports.  Therefore, an analysis of a statistically significant relationship between 
frequencies of form or content of experiences between the impaired and unimpaired 
group is impossible.  
      Although a lack of theoretical grounding has traditionally been a hallmark of DES, 
there is still the limitation that the current study did not advance any specific theory.  
Many DES researchers believe that a lack of theoretical grounding is a strength of DES 
as it helps reduce potential presuppositions that could adversely affect the accuracy and 
value-free nature of the DES interview.  Also, the current study was exploratory in nature 
and did not seek to investigate a specific theory about aging or cognitive degeneration.  
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Still, theoretically grounded research with this population using DES in the future could 
be beneficial.  
      Another potential limitation of the study is that there was a wide range of cognitive 
dysfunction in the sample, both in terms of quantity and quality of cognitive dysfunction, 
and there was not a clear delineation between the impaired group and unimpaired group.  
Although this has the advantage of allowing a glimpse at a broad spectrum on individuals 
it makes it difficult to make a comparison regarding the inner experience of two more 
cognitively homogeneous groups.  However, even if there were diagnostically 
homogeneous groups in this study (i.e., an AD group, a VaD group, etc.), these diagnoses 
are highly heterogeneous themselves and therefore the meaningfulness of comparisons 
between and among groups might still be tenuous.  
      Likewise, individuals in this study were not eliminated based on the presence of other 
psychological disorders.  Although this provides a more realistic sample it does present 
the possibility that some of the findings of the study could be due to other psychological 
problems rather than simply normal aging, MCI, VaD, or AD.  Although none of the 
individuals in the study reported any psychological problems that were not related to age 
this question was not specifically addressed.  
      Finally, only one individual in the impaired group (Gary) could produce reliable 
reports of momentary inner experience.  This makes it extremely difficult to discover the 
nature of inner experience of older individuals with cognitive impairment.  However, 
even though these individuals often produced unreliable reports, the nature of their 
difficulty allowed some speculation about the nature of their inner experience, such as 
lacking inner experience or having largely undifferentiated inner experience.  
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Suggestions for Future Research 
      Perhaps the most important suggestion for future research is that a longitudinal study 
that tracks the inner experience of young individuals as they transition into old age might 
be very informative.  A longitudinal design would answer an important question: were 
abnormalities in reporting inner experience and inner experience itself found in this study 
due to age-related cognitive dysfunction or due to prior characteristics?  Although 
numerous discoveries were made regarding the inner experience and the ability to report 
inner experience of individuals in this study, it is impossible to determine if these 
discoveries are due to the age of the individuals in the study.  If the inner experience and 
reporting ability of individuals could be tracked through time as individuals move into 
their older years the effects of age on inner experience and reporting could be clearly 
discerned.  This would be very important as information regarding the development of 
inner experience as a function of age could be very useful in the understanding of the 
special needs of older individuals and could inform both treatment and diagnosis.  
      It is probably useful for future studies in this area to attempt to focus on participants 
with MMSE scores of 30.  It seems that individuals below 20 or even in the low or mid 
20’s on the MMSE cannot engage meaningfully in DES, but more research should be 
done before a definitive statement is made on this issue.  Nevertheless, the current study 
suggests that once MMSE scores enter the low or mid 20’s, DES may be too difficult for 
the participant.  
      It might also be useful to focus on individuals with VaD and MCI instead of 
individuals with AD.  Although a definitive statement cannot be made regarding the 
exclusion of individuals diagnosed with AD it appears that focusing on individuals with 
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VaD and MCI may be much more fruitful.  Individuals with VaD are often diagnosed 
much earlier in the process of their disease due to the clear presence of a cerebrovascular 
event.  Because individuals with AD are often diagnosed after significant cognitive 
impairment has already taken place, individuals with AD may have difficulty engaging 
meaningfully in the DES process.  Individuals with MCI are not as impaired cognitively 
as individuals with AD and thus may be a better target for future research.  
      Also, altering methodology via the suggestions made earlier could also be useful and 
could limit some of the difficulties in methodology experienced throughout this study.  
For example, utilizing cognitive tests such as the MMSE to predict performance with 
DES and eliminating individuals who will clearly be unsuccessful with DES based on 
cognitive tests could help increase the efficiency of future studies.  Also, simplifying 
instructions for some individuals, especially those with cognitive impairment, may be 
useful as an aid to initially decrease anxiety.  Some participants appeared anxious and 
overwhelmed when given the standard DES instructions and some individuals may have 
dropped out of the study after the introduction but before the first sampling day for this 
reason.  Still, those who were given a significantly simplified explanation of DES (Lilly, 
June, and Irving) could not peform the DES task successfully at all.  Therefore, it may be 
the case that the simplicity of the introduction to the DES task does not significantly 
affect performance on DES, although more research is needed to make a firm conclusion 
about this.  Altering questions to make them more closed-ended may also increase 
comfort in the early stages of DES training in some individuals, especially those with 
cognitive impairment.  This was apparent with Karen and Irving, although closed-ended 
questions did not seem to produce any more accurate reports than open-ended questions.  
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Finally, if individuals have hearing aids, it may be necessary to use external speakers 
rather than the headset that is typically used.  Although this did not allow any of the 
individuals in this study to produce reliable reports it eliminates the possibility that 
difficulties are entirely due to hearing problems.  This also may be beneficial if the 
interviewer is with the participant as the interviewer can verify any reports of external 
behavior that the participant may give as the interviewer can hear the beep clearly as 
well.  It is actually sometimes useful to directly ask about external behavior at the 
moment of the beep in this situation as it could help establish the participant’s ability to 
narrow their focus to the moment of the beep.  
       It is important to note, however, that none of the alterations improved the actual 
quality and reliability of the reports.  Because many of the participants in the study had 
impairments in memory it seemed logical that interviewing these individuals immediately 
after the beep would produce better results than a delay of several hours.  However, this 
was not the case.  It did not appear that any of the participants who were interviewed 
immediately after the beep benefited meaningfully from the reduction in time between 
beeps and interviews.  
      The DES methodology was manipulated in a variety of ways to try to obtain reliable 
reports of inner experience but ultimately none of them worked toward this end although 
some of them may have made the participants more comfortable.  This suggests that if an 
individual cannot produce reliable reports via standard DES procedure then alterations, 
including limiting the delay between the beep and the report, will not signifantly help.  
Still, this is only a tentative conclusion and more research with this population is needed 
to make any sort of definitive statement about this issue.  
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      Finally, it appears that further investigation with this population using DES is 
worthwhile.  The current study has raised numerous questions that are not only 
interesting but potentially important to understanding the nature of cognitive 
degeneration in older individuals that would aid in diagnosis, and perhaps even the 
treatment of older individuals with cognitive impairment.  Further investigation into this 
population could help confirm or disconfirm findings and speculations made based on 
this study and could continue to produce unique, interesting, and ultimately important
findings.  
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARIES OF SAMPLES
Letters denoting forms of experience contained in each sample follow the 
summaries and are as follows: 
F – Feeling
FFOB – Feeling Fact of Body
I – Inner Seeing
IH – Inner Hearing
IS – Inner Speech
JD – Just Doing
SA – Sensory Awareness
U – Unsymbolized Thinking
WT – Worded Thinking
M – Multiple Awareness
? – denotes uncertainty about form with accompanying explanation
      Any form code that is in parentheses was not counted in the overall analysis, typically 
due to lack of reliability in the participant’s report.  
Anna’s Samples 
      Samples from day one were not included in the analysis due to the substantial 
unreliability that is normal on the first day of sampling but they are included here.  
Beep 1.1 – Anna was at her computer, reading a blog that somehow referred to Rosie 
O’Donnell.  Anna initially stated that at the moment of the beep she was “remembering 
remembering” that Steve (her comedy mentor) once told Anna that Rosie O’Donnell was 
nice to him when he was a beginning comedian at a club in Boston.  Anna later backed 
off the statement that she was “remembering remembering”, that she likes to say that 
when she gets old she doesn’t remember, but that she merely remembers remembering, 
but that that wasn’t really true of this event: she was actually remembering what Steve 
and said.  Anna also stated that she was thinking about various characteristics that have 
been attributed to Rosie; that she is crazy, rude, and fat.  Anna also said that Donald 
Trump was somehow in her awareness at the moment of the beep (only after suggested 
by one of the interviewers), but could not describe how.  Anna also described that at the 
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moment of the beep she was feeling angry in reaction to these reported negative 
characteristics of Rosie O’Donnell.  This anger was experienced as a tightness near her 
diaphragm.  Anna at times said that all of the above experiences were present 
simultaneously, and at other times said that they were sequential, but very close together 
and difficult to tease apart.  As is common on the first sampling day, Anna was often 
inconsistent in her descriptions of her experience at the moment of the beep; she would 
sometimes change what she had originally reported or add descriptions of experiences 
when suggested as possibilities by the interviewers.  It is likely that some parts of Anna’s 
descriptions were present at the moment of the beep, and some were not, but it is 
impossible to discern at this early stage of sampling with Anna.  She did not appear to 
have visual or verbal experience at this beep and may have been having some 
unsymbolized and/or emotional experience at this moment, but since this is the first 
sample, the interviewers cannot be entirely certain of this.        
Beep 1.2 - Anna was watching Six Feet Under on TV, but had withdrawn from the show 
in favor of a “potpourri” of thoughts about fidelity.  This process had begun a few 
moments before the beep and had involved thoughts about fidelity, infidelity, how we 
take words and make them into rules and laws, why fidelity is important, and how 
fidelity/infidelity had played out in her own life.  By the moment of the beep, she had 
“formulated” the word “fidelity”; the word seemed to be specifically present to her but 
was not spoken, heard, or said.  There was, besides the formulated word, a “bloom” of 
thoughts, many simultaneouls thoughts or ideas all related to the concept of 
fidelity/infidelity.  The process was not emotional; it was more cognitive/curious. This 
was Anna’s first sampling day, and much or all of that description is of questionable 
accuracy.  
Beep 1.3 – Anna was watching television and her dog and cat had just jumped on her lap.  
The animals caused her to shift her attention from the television to the animals.  At the 
moment of the beep, Anna was mostly seeing the animals.  There may have been 
numerous other things in her awareness as well:  the startled looks on the animals’ faces, 
the startledness of the animals being in the same place even though they hate each other, 
Anna’s own startledness at the animals jumping on her lap, the feeling of the animals on 
her, how strange it was to have two animals that hate each other on her lap at the same 
time, isn ‘t it cute, and knowing that she would have fur all over her, but Anna was 
primarily just looking at the animals.  Anna’s descriptions at this beep are typical of the 
first sampling day.  They were inconsistent and often seemed to be influenced by the 
suggestions of the interviewers.  It is possible that Anna was experiencing a variety of 
things at this moment, but it is also common that participants report having a variety of 
experiences at the moment of the beep the first sampling day, and this variety decreases 
as training continues.  
Beep 2.1 – Anna was sitting.  She had recently turned off the television.  She was having 
no inner experience at the moment of the beep.
No Inner Experience 
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Beep 2.2 – Anna was sitting at the computer while a song by a female singer was 
playing.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was feeling sad, experienced primarily as a 
lump in her throat and also probably as a feeling of heat behind her eyes and cold on her 
forehead.  She was not certain about these two aspects of the experience, but said that she 
was 70 percent sure that they were there.  The sadness was about being old, about the 
things that she had done when she was younger (as at the time when this particular song 
might have been popular). Also, although Anna wasn’t paying particular attention to the 
music that was playing, she was somehow aware of the music and this music may have 
brought on the experience of sadness. 
Beep 2.2 – Anna was sitting at the computer while a song was playing.  At the moment of 
the beep, Anna was feeling sad, experienced primarily as a lump in her throat and also 
probably as a feeling of heat behind her eyes and cold on her forehead.  She was not 
certain about these two aspects of the experience, but said that she was 70 percent sure 
that they were there.  The sadness was about being old, about the things that she had done 
when she was younger (as at the time when this particular song might have been popular) 
Also, although Anna wasn’t paying particular attention to the music that was playing she 
was somehow aware of the music and this music may have brought on the experience of 
sadness. 
F – sadness, conceptual (recognition) and physical (lump, heat, and cold)
Beep 2.3 - Anna was watching a television report about a man who held teenage girls 
captive in a cave and repeatedly raped them; just before the beep he was being 
interviewed and didn’t seem to think that he had done anything particularly wrong.  At 
the moment of the beep, Anna was reacting incredulously (disbelieving shock).  This 
reaction probably included gasping, simultaneously leaning back, and rolling her eyes, 
but it was not clear if Anna was experiencing those reactions either physically or 
mentally at the moment of the beep.  She was incredulous/shocked, and the bodily 
reaction was ongoing, but whether the bodily reaction was experienced at that moment is 
not clear.  
F – incredulous/shocked (physically and/or mentally)
Beep 2.4 – Anna was online and was completing writing an email.  She was hitting the 
“send” button at or near the moment of the beep.  Anna initially reported that at the 
moment of the beep, Anna knew that the beep was coming.  This was a conceptual 
knowledge that the beep was about to sound. She recognized the oddness of knowing the 
beep was coming before it actually came; possibly, she said, she has such experiences 
frequently but forgets them when they don’t come true.  RH wondered whether it was 
possible that she had some neural reaction to the beep that caused the thought process 
before she actually apprehended the beep.  Anna was equally happy with that 
explanation.
U? (presence uncertain) - knowing beep is coming
Beep 2.5 – Anna was at the computer and had just finished typing an email, but had not 
sent it yet.  This email involved requesting payment from a long-time client who owed 
her money. At the moment of the beep, Anna was frustrated/pissed-off about not getting 
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paid on time.  This frustration/pissed-off experience was very strong and clear.  It was 
experienced partly as many undifferentiated ideas flooding her mind. It was also 
experienced as heat in the area of her breastbone.  This heat was about the size of an 
opened hand and was internal, under the surface of the skin.  The mental part of the 
frustration was more present in her awareness than the heat.  Anna was also afraid of 
losing him as a client and did not want to word her email too strongly, wanting to be 
cautious.  This feeling of fear/caution seemed to somehow come from the feeling of 
frustration and was mostly or entirely a mental process.  
F – frustration, mental (ideas) and physical (heat)
F – fear/caution
M 
   
Beep 3.1 - Anna was tiredly walking down the hall dragging her feet noisily on the 
carpet.  She was thinking, if put into words, something quite like, “Pick up your feet—it 
sounds like an old lady.”  However, there are no words, images, or other symbols 
experienced in that thinking.  Despite the lack of words, the sense of the thought was very 
explicit: “pick up your feet” is a more accurate rendition of the experienced thought than 
would be “I should pick up my feet”; and “it sounds like an old lady” is more accurate 
than “I sound like an old lady.”  Anna was also looking down at a pile of clothes and 
thinking that she should put her dirty clothes there.  Also, Anna was tired at the moment 
of the beep.  This tiredness was primarily experienced as heaviness of the eyelids and 
dryness in the eyes, although these sensations do not fully describe the experience of 
tiredness.  Anna was not particularly paying attention to the feeling of tiredness, but it 
was still in her awareness.  That slight awareness is similar to the experience of the 
Melissa Etheridge song in Beep 2.2. 
U – pick up feet
U – clothes
SA – tiredness
M
Beep 3.2 – The following account should be taken with substantial skepticism.  The 
earpiece to the beeper fell out of Anna’s ear some time before this beep and her partner 
Linda had to notify her that the beeper was sounding.  This is likely to significantly 
increase the difficulty of accurately apprehending experience at the moment of the beep.  
Anna was fairly convincing regarding her experience at this moment, but it is very 
unlikely that she is describing her experience at the exact moment of the beep since she 
had to be notified that it was going off by Linda.  It is possible that the following is a 
description of Anna’s experience at the moment of Linda’s notification, but this is likely 
much less precise than the moment of the beep.  
Anna was laying on the bed talking with her partner Linda.  Linda was talking about 
getting a pilot’s license.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was thrilled.  This was a very 
strong emotion, experienced primarily as eyes widening, inhaling, and a fluttering feeling 
in the stomach.  Goosebumps on her arms occurred immediately after these sensations, 
and the beep (or Linda’s notification that the beep was sounding) occurred very close to 
when the goosebumps began.  This thrilled experience comprised the majority of Anna’s 
301
awareness (90 percent according to Anna).  The remaining part was comprised of 
disappointment/self-pity—that she herself was too old to get a pilot’s license.  This 
disappointment/self-pity may have included the experiencing of a muffledness at this 
moment.  This muffeldness was almost like having cotton around her ears and involved a 
withdrawing from the conversation.  Anna was not paying close attention to this aspect of 
her experience at the moment of the beep. Since the last two parts of this experience were 
such small parts of Anna’s experience, since they were both mentioned near the very end 
of the interview on this beep, and since Anna was not reacting to the beep itself (or at 
least it does not seem she was reacting to the beep itself), a very high level of skepticism 
is appropriate regarding these particular aspects of her experience is appropriate.  
No Form/Not Included in Analysis
Beep 3.3 – Anna was lying on the bed and talking to her partner Sarah about the progress
that Sarah’s academic department has made.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was 
feeling proud of Sarah for helping the program progress so much.  This pride was 
experienced physically as a release of tension that is somehow similar to sighing, 
although actual sighing was not taking place at this moment.  The feeling of pride may 
have included a feeling of pride in herself for being partnered with a woman who was 
achieving such an accomplishment; it was not clear whether Anna actually recalled 
feeling that at the moment of the beep, or was presuming that it was there.
F – pride (physical)
Beep 3.4 – Anna was talking with Sarah.  Sarah had said shortly before the beep that 
Anna hadn’t changed very much since they met.  Anna was in the process of saying “I 
wasn’t the P.T.A. lady when I met you”, meaning that she had changed a lot prior to 
meeting Sarah, and was laughing at that thought.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was 
recalling how she has changed over her life.  This recollection consisted of the inner 
seeing of numerous freeze-frame pictures of herself (Anna estimated about 50 of them) 
that were experienced in extremely rapid succession like fast time-lapse photography.  
Anna could describe some of the inner seeings.  One inner seeing was of an actual 
photograph of her when she was about 19 years old taken from the side and wearing a 
full-length white polka dot on blue dress.  One of the last inner seeings was of Anna as 
the P.T.A. lady that she was before she met Sarah.  The inner seeings often showed Anna
having a facial expression that was indicative of her emotional state at that phase of her 
life.  For example, one showed a very fearful expression as she was generally being very 
anxious at that stage of her life.  The inner seeings also showed Anna as she was at that 
particular time of life, with variations in a number of aspects of her physical appearance.  
Many of the inner seeings were of Anna’s face from an extremely close range that 
showed Anna’s face from just above her eyes to about her chin.  There was also a 
knowing that her children were there related to some of the pictures.  There may have 
been other knowings around or during the experience of the inner seeings, but this is 
highly speculative as it wasn’t discussed in detail.  It wasn’t clear if the inner seeings 
proceeded in chronological order or not.  It should be noted that Anna did not mention 
this freeze-frames until well into the conversation about this beep and that when she first 
mentioned them she used many subjunctifiers.  However, after this initial uncertainty, 
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Anna was very confident about the existence and nature of these freeze-frames.  Anna
was also aware of her laughter.  The laughter blended in with the recollection of change.  
I – many inner seeings
M
Beep 4.1 – Anna was playing a card game at the computer. Earlier that day, she was 
playing Canasta with some friends.  One of her friends (Jan) made a mistake and 
repeatedly criticized herself and her Canasta partner for it.  At the moment of the beep, 
part of Anna’s experience was a mixture feelings and thoughts related to the incident that 
were somewhat homogeneous in that they were all mixed together to form a mostly 
uniform experience. The predominant part of this experience was Anna’s questioning of 
whether or not she was too tough on Jan.  The word “tough” or “too tough?” was present 
to Anna visually and was experienced as a grayish/pinkish/beigeish color that had 
jaggedy edges, was not overwhelmingly large, was flat, was pliable, and was clear.  Anna
was very specific about the jaggedy edges of the experience; when drawn, she 
commented that the drawing was too jaddedy and that the jags weren’t sharp enough.  
Anna knew that the visual experience meant the word “tough” or “too tough?” at the 
moment of the beep.  There also may have been a cognitive component to this experience 
where Anna was questioning if she was too tough on Jan.  Also at the moment of the 
beep, Anna was experiencing doubt/indecision about whether she did the right thing in 
confronting Jan.  This was experienced as an “icky”, sour, almost nauseous feeling in the 
upper chest and throat region.  She was also simultaneously thinking cognitively that she 
did the right thing by confronting Jan. Also at the moment of the beep, but not as 
predominant, was the thought that Jan was a jerk.  This thought was not in words.  There 
may also have been the experience of simultaneously loving Jan but thinking she’s 
annoying as well, but this was not entirely clear.  
I – tough
F – indecision/icky
U – jerk
M
Beep 4.2 – Anna had finished writing her description of beep 4.1.  She had just sighed 
and turned her attention back to the computer with relief.  At the moment of the beep, 
Anna was experiencing relief/accomplishment at getting all of her experiences down in 
the notebook for beep 4.1.  This was experienced as the release of the ideas/experiences 
of beep 4.1 (see below) and/or the words associated with the ideas/experiences of beep 
4.1. from herself into the external world.  The ideas/words were somehow visually 
present but not explicitly seen.  There also may have been an experience of getting ready 
to not think, but it is not certain the extent to which (if at all) or how this was present at 
the moment of the beep.  
F (w/ visual component) – relief
U? (presence uncertain) – getting ready not to think
M? (presence of U uncertain)
Beep 4.3 – Anna was watching Dateline on television and was eating a salad.  At the 
moment of the beep, Anna was chuckling at something someone had said on Dateline, 
303
was feeling queasy from eating the salad too fast, and was experiencing a twinge in her 
left knee.  Anna was primarily focused on the television.  It is not clear the extent to 
which Anna was experiencing the chuckling at the moment of the beep or if she was 
simply chuckling and not aware of it.  The queasy feeling also had a sense of fullness to 
it.  The twinge in the knee was experienced as a mild-moderate, brief, sharp, electrical 
shock in the joint.  
Laughing
SA – queasy/full
SA – twinge
M
Beep 4.4 – Anna was playing poker on the computer.  She was thinking about going to 
California next week.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was cognitively wondering if 
she could arrange going to California with the interviewers so to not break DES 
arrangements.  She was also experiencing a feeling of mild anxiety about possibly 
breaking DES arrangements.  The anxiety was very mild and was experienced both 
physically and mentally.  The physical experience was located in the upper chest, neck, 
and head, was well below the skin, and was similar to the heat of blushing, but not 
exactly.  There was a rising to this experience, as it originated in the upper chest and rose
to the head.  The mental component of the anxiety was not explicit, but somehow 
affected Anna cognitively, although Anna was not entirely sure about this component of 
the anxiety.
U – wondering about arrangements
F – anxiety
Beep 5.1 – Anna was preparing dinner.  She was in the process of looking at different 
foods that would make up dinner.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was thinking that 
she would put the turkey in first, then the yams, then make the salad.  This process came 
in sequential order, but was extremely close together.  There were no words or inner 
seeings in this experience.  Anna then realized that she may not have bought onions.  This 
realization was experienced as a sharp intake of air, like a gasp, and a slightly negative 
feeling.  Anna then innerly said to herself “Did I buy onions?”  This was experienced as 
if she was saying it out loud.  The beep came right after Anna had finished innerly saying 
“Did I buy onions?” but the entire process occurred extremely quickly, and was therefore 
very close or at the moment of the beep.    
U – order of cooking
F – onion gasp
IS – onions
Beep 5.2 – Anna was setting the timer on her oven.  She was in the process of using the 
oven keypad to get the appropriate time (1 hour and 30 minutes). At the moment of the 
beep, she was tapping the keypad 30 times in quick succession to get the minute part of 
the display to 30 and was very close to 30. Anna was focused on this process.  She was 
feeling the physical sensation of tapping the key pad on the end of her finger, seeing her 
fingers tap on the keypad, hearing her fingernails make a clicking noise on the keypad, 
and seeing the timer display change as she pressed the numbers on the keypad.  
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SA– sensation of tapping
SA– seeing finger tap
SA– hearing finger tap
SA– seeing time change
M
Beep 5.3 – Anna was at the computer playing poker.   Anna’s friends/family were in the 
next room laughing.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was primarily trying to decide if 
she would give her friend Barbara a haircut before dinner or after dinner.  Although there 
were no words in this experience, the question “before or after?” is the best way to 
describe the experience.  Anna had already thought about and/or understood that haircut 
and dinner part of the situation prior to the beep, and was now posing the question before 
or after to herself.  Anna was also hearing the laughter of her friends/family.  There was 
something nostalgic and pleasant about hearing the laughter that tinged her experience of 
hearing it.  Anna was also idly seeing the numbers of the cards on the computer screen, 
although it is not clear if these numbers were in Anna’s experience or not.  
U – before or after?
F?/SA?(form uncertain)– nostalgic hearing
M
Beep 5.4 – Anna was cutting her friend Jane’s hair and was simultaneously having a 
conversation with her.  Anna was talking, but she had no idea what she was saying—the 
words were apparently just rolling out of her on autopilot, as were the actions of cutting 
the hair.  Rather than pay attention to either of those activities, at the moment of the beep, 
Anna was innerly seeing a vegetable chopper that she owns.  The inner seeing was very 
sharp and was floating with no background like a hologram or a projected image.  The lid 
of the imagined chopper was down, she could see the transparent plastic bottom and the 
top part of the chopper. Anna was somehow aware of the chopper from different angles, 
but was not actually seeing it from different angles at the moment of the beep.  Anna’s 
interest in this seeing was in the mechanics of how the chopper works rather than in how 
the chopper looks.  
I – chopper
Beep 5.5 – Anna was tossing a salad and talking with her friends.  One of her friends had 
just asked Anna if she grew the vegetables for the dinner in her backyard.  Just prior to 
the moment of the beep Anna had sarcastically said “I hand picked all the veggies” and 
everyone was laughing, including Anna.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was aware of 
the colors in the salad, an instance of sensory awareness.  She was also experiencing a 
very slight pleasure at the way the colors in the salad looked.  Anna may have 
experienced this pleasure partially as a vibration in her vision, but she was very unsure 
when talking about this aspect of her experience.  Also in Anna’s awareness was both the 
experience of her own laughter and the laughter of her friends. 
SA – colors in salad
F (w/ possible visual component)– pleasure
JD?/SA? (form uncertain) – laughing 
M
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Beep 6.1 – Anna was at the computer watching a jackpot wheel spin.  She had just 
finished ordering a prescription on the phone.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was in 
the process of thinking that she had just gotten the prescription filled and that she could 
check it off her list of things to do.  Anna was innerly saying to herself in her own voice 
“check it off the list” with the understanding that the “it” was getting her prescription 
filled.  Anna was also experiencing the lingering taste of coffee in her mouth from a sip 
she had about 15 seconds prior to the beep.  She was also hearing the girls (Linda and 
Rosalynn?) shout back and forth between the upstairs floor and the ground floor.  
IS – check it off the list
SA – taste of coffee
SA – hearing shouting
M
Beep 6.2 – Anna was at the computer playing poker on the second floor of her house.  
Anna’s partner Linda was down stairs talking to Anna and doing the dishes.  Linda was 
talking about alternative personalities and this was somehow related to Linda currently 
being in therapy.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was feeling apprehension which she 
was experiencing as a fluttering feeling in her chest and throat that was just below the 
skin.  She was also hearing Linda talk and hearing the sound of the dishes that Linda was 
doing.  She also may have been aware of a 2 that had just come up on the screen while 
she was playing video poker.
F – apprehension
SA – voice, 
SA – dishes
SA ? (presence uncertain) – 2
M  
Beep 6.3 – Anna was on the computer.  At the moment of the beep, Anna was in the 
process of planning.  She was thinking that if she left her house at 12:30 that she would 
have time to drop them (the daughter and perhaps the other daughter or a friend) off at 
Buffalo Exchange going to UNLV.  Anna was thinking in her own voice “If I leave by 
12:30, I can drop ‘em off before.”  Anna understood that she was dropping them off at 
the Buffalo Exchange before going to UNLV and did not verbalize that part of the 
thought.    She was also feeling her finger tapping the mouse button.
IS – If I leave…
U – Buffalo Exchange/UNLV
SA – mouse
M
Beep 6.4 – Anna was at the computer working on an article she is writing.  She was 
reading a part of the article where she had written about a helicopter-carrying ship.  At 
the moment of the beep she was re-reading “which would divide and slide open and 
allow a helicopter pad to be raised to deck level.”  At the moment of the beep, Anna was 
innerly seeing the scene she was re-reading.  She was innerly seeing a colorful scene 
including the deck of the ship splitting and the helicopter pad rising.  There was no 
helicopter on the pad.  Anna was also in the process of gradually changing the 
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perspective from which she was seeing the image.  The perspective started from above 
and then went below the deck, as if she had gone through the deck of the ship.  The 
image under the deck was of the elevator.  There was also a light green light under the 
deck.  From this perspective she was primarily interested in how the elevator worked.  
Also at the moment of the beep, Anna was thinking about what was in Harold’s 
imagination (Harold is a character in the book).   There were no words in this thought, 
but rather the understanding of the concept.  Anna was also seeing an after image of the 
last few words she was reading.  They appeared as if they were coming toward her off of 
the computer screen and were fading away.  
I – boat w/ helicopter pad
U – Noah’s imagination
I – afterimage of words
M
Beep 6.5 – Anna was having difficulty getting the lid on a to-go cup of coffee.  At the 
moment of the beep, Anna was innerly speaking in her own voice “Damn to go cup, lid 
doesn’t fit.”  She was also feeling the pressure on her hand as she was trying to screw the 
lid on the cup.  
IS – damn to go cup
SA – hand pressure 
Beep 6.6 – Anna was sitting in the garage waiting for the girls (again, I’m not sure 
exactly who the girls are), who she was going to take with her in the car.  At the moment 
of the beep, Anna was innerly saying in an angry tone “those girls had plenty of 
warning.”  She was also feeling exasperation that she was experiencing as tightness in her 
upper chest.  There may also have been a sense of being taken for granted, being 
unappreciated, and that she was so good while they were so bad although it is not clear 
how or if this was in her experience.  She may also have been aware of the heat in the 
garage.  
IS – plenty of warning
F – exasperation
F?/U? (form and presence uncertain)– granted/unappreciated/so good vs. so bad
SA? (presence uncertain) – heat
Benjamin’s Samples
      Samples from day one were not coded due to typical unreliability of reports on the 
first day.  
Beep 1.1 – Benjamin was cleaning a birdbath in his yard.  A sparrow had begun tweeting 
a second or two before the beep and this tweeting continued through the beep.  The 
sparrow was very close to Benjamin, within a few feet of him.  At the moment of the 
beep, Benjamin was recognizing that the sparrow was close to him.  This was just a 
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recognition with no apparent symbols.  Benjamin was also hearing the sparrow tweet at 
the moment of the beep.  
(?) – recognition of closeness of sparrow
(SA) - hearing sparrow
Beep 1.2 – Benjamin was in his yard talking to his sister Max and his neighbor Linda.  
They were talking about the maximum time that could exist between beeps as it had not 
sounded for a long period of time.  Benjamin had just said before the beep that he thought 
that it had been over the maximum amount of time since the beep sounded.  He then 
looked at Linda who had a puzzled look on her face.  At the moment of the beep, 
Benjamin was looking at Linda and may have been expecting her to say something via 
interpretation of her expression.  He was not entirely certain if this was occurring at the 
beep or slightly before the beep.  Benjamin was also aware of the puzzled look on 
Linda’s face at the moment of the beep.  
(?) – expectation of other speaking; noticing puzzled look
Beep 1.3 – Benjamin was coloring a white stripe of glue that he used to fix his birdbath 
to match the color of the rest of the birdbath.  Before the beep, Benjamin had realized that 
the crayon he was using might not last.  He then thought something similar to “You know 
this wax crayon might not last on here.  Well then I’ll have to try something different like 
paint.”  This thought was in words and the beep definitely came at some point during the 
second sentence, mostly likely at the beginning part of the second sentence but Benjamin
was not entirely certain about this.  He was also not certain of the exact wording of the 
experience.  The experience had all of the qualities of external speech except that it 
probably occurred faster than external speech, but again, Benjamin was not entirely 
certain.
It is also likely that this experience did not have vocalized qualities based on later 
sampling with Benjamin.  
(Unvocalized Inner Speech?) (form uncertain)– birdbath coloring     
Beep 2.1 – Benjamin was in his house playing Sodoku on a hand held electronic device.  
He was having some difficulty with the game, but had just figured out many of the 
numbers.  At or very near the beep, Benjamin had five overlapping experiences.  First, 
Benjamin was innerly saying “I got it now,” referring to figuring out the numbers on 
Sudoku.  This was experienced internally as if he was externally speaking, but the words 
came significantly faster and did not have qualities such as volume and pitch.  Second, 
just after this inner saying had begun, Benjamin became aware of his sister Laura
speaking on a phone in another room in the house.  Right at the beep, Benjamin was 
hearing Laura speak, but was not comprehending what she was saying.  Third, a 
motorcycle was approaching on the street in front of Benjamin’s house.  Benjamin was 
hearing the sound of the motorcycle at the moment of the beep.  Fourth, Benjamin was 
aware of the smell of chicken being cooked.  Finally, Benjamin was faintly aware of the 
sound of traffic passing by his house.  The sound was a whooshing sound.  
Unvocalized Inner Speech – I got it now
SA – hearing Venus
SA - hearing motorcycle
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SA - smelling chicken
SA - hearing traffic
M
Beep 2.2 – Benjamin was listening to classical music on the radio but was not aware of 
the music at the moment of the beep.  Benjamin was mulling over who the composer of 
the music he was, trying to think of many possibilities.  At the moment of the beep, 
Benjamin was thinking that it was Rossini.  The word “Rossini” was definitely present at 
the moment of the beep, but it had no auditory or visual qualities. It also was not 
experienced as being spoken, but was simply present in Benjamin’s awareness.  There 
also may have been a wondering what the title of the piece was that was connected to the 
Rossini experience, but Benjamin was not entirely certain.  Benjamin was also aware of 
someone yelling somewhere in front of his house.  The Rossini experience began slightly 
before the yelling, but both appeared to be present at the moment of the beep.
Worded Thinking - Rossini
U? (presence uncertain)  – title of song
SA – screaming 
M
Beep 2.3 – Benjamin had just finished writing his response to 2.2.  Just moments before 
the moment of the beep, he had heard an unrecognizable sound like that of an engine.  
Just a split second just before the moment of the beep, Benjamin had innerly said, “Is that 
a vehicle?”  This was similar to previous beeps in that it was just like external speech 
except that it was faster, but it was before the beep.  It is also very likely that this 
experience did not have vocal qualities such as volume, pitch, and inflection.  
Simultaneously, Benjamin heard a car horn, which was still sounding at the moment of 
the beep and was in Benjamin’s awareness at the moment of the beep.  At the moment of 
the beep, Benjamin was innerly saying “Is that on South Street?” Again, this was just 
like external speech except that it was faster and did not have vocalized qualities.  The 
beep seemed to come immediately after he finished “street.”  Benjamin also believed that 
he was smelling dinner and had knowledge that dinner was soon, but this may have been 
just before and after the beep with the sound of the car horn temporarily eliminating these 
two experiences from awareness.  The knowledge that dinner was coming soon was not 
in words.  If these two things were present at the moment of the beep they were at a very 
low level.
Unvocalized Inner Speech – Is that on South Street?
SA – car horn
SA? (presence uncertain) – smell of dinner
U? (presence uncertain)– knowledge of dinner being 
M
Beep 3.1 – Benjamin was in his library writing a note.  He was stuck and was trying to 
find words that he wanted to use.  At the moment of the beep, Benjamin was trying to 
find a way to say something similar to achievement or accomplishment.  He was looking 
for a way to try to accurately communicate this.  There were no actual words present in 
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his awareness.  Benjamin also may have been hearing the swooshing sound of nearby 
traffic but he was not certain.  
U – searching for words
SA? (presence uncertain) – swooshing of traffic
M? (presence of SA uncertain)
Beep 3.2 – Benjamin was still in his library writing and was still having some difficulty.  
At the moment of the beep, Benjamin may have been innerly saying “Not so easy.”  This 
experience was just like external speech, but occurred very fast, almost instantaneously 
and did not have vocalized qualities such as volume or pitch.  However, Benjamin was 
not entirely certain that this experience was present at the moment of the beep and 
believes that he may have created it upon thinking about what he was experiencing at the 
moment of the beep.  Benjamin was also hearing the sound of footsteps walking on a 
nearby stairway.  Benjamin was also hearing the whooshing of the traffic.  This was 
present, but was not as strong in his awareness as the sound of the footsteps.  
SA – hearing footsteps
SA – hearing traffic
Unvocalized Inner Speech? (presence uncertain) – not so easy
M
Beep 3.3 – Benjamin was discussing with his sister Tracy the battery power left in a 
clock in his garage.  Benjamin was saying “The second hand is twitching.  I guess there’s 
not enough power to advance it.”  The beep came between the words “power” and “to.”  
Benjamin was not particularly aware of anything at this beep.
Just Talking
Beep 3.4 – Benjamin had just finished writing the summary to beep 3.3.  He was outside 
near his garage.  He had just asked Tracy is she had found the battery to replace the old 
one in the clock.  She said “Mmm, hmm.”  The beep came between the “mmm” and the 
“hmm” and Benjamin was hearing this.  However, primarily in Benjamin’s awareness at 
the moment of the beep was the fact that the sunlight was bright.  The sunlight itself was 
not in awareness, but the fact that it was bright was.  Benjamin was also hearing one or 
more sparrows tweeting and the sound of traffic nearby.  
U – brightness
SA – hearing “mmm.hmm”
SA – hearing sparrows
SA – hearing traffic
M
Beep 3.5 – Benjamin had just walked to the front of his house near the street.  A car 
turned from a nearby intersection onto the street in front of his house.  The driver was a 
girl who faintly smiled at him.  Just before the moment of the beep Benjamin thought 
“Don’t think I know her.”  This was immediately followed by “Can’t stay here, too loud” 
which occurred at the moment of the beep.  This experience was in reference to the 
volume of the traffic.  Both thoughts were like external speech but occurred much faster 
and had no vocalized qualities.  Benjamin was also hearing the traffic.
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Unvocalized Inner Speech – can’t stay here
SA – hearing traffic
M
Beep 4.1 – Benjamin was paging through a National Geographic in his house.  He 
stopped at a page with an article about honeybees.  Also on the page was an 
advertisement that had a map of the United States with pictures of various fruit and/or 
vegetables in different states representing what was grown in that state.  At the moment 
of the beep, Benjamin somehow knew that he was going to read the article about the 
bees.  This experience was not in words and images, but was just knowledge.  Benjamin
was also hearing a male voice on the television, but was not comprehending what he was 
saying or hearing any individual words.  He was also hearing his sister Tracy talking.  He 
also was not comprehending what she was saying or hearing any words in particular.  
Benjamin was also hearing a truck pass on the street in front of his house.  Benjamin was 
also looking at the map when the beep sounded.  Specifically, he was looking at the state 
of Washington which had a cherry and an apple in it.  Benjamin was not sure if the state 
of Washington and/or the cherry and the apple were in his awareness, but he thought that 
it was possible.
U – knowledge of reading
SA – hearing man on television 
SA – hearing sister Tracy
SA – hearing truck 
SA? (presence uncertain) – seeing Washington and/or apple and cherry
M
Beep 4.3 – Benjamin had just finished writing his response to 4.2.  At the moment of the 
beep, he was quickly going over it to make sure that there were no major errors.  He was 
not comprehending what he was reading.  He was also hearing his sister Stephanie 
talking on the phone.  He was not comprehending what she was saying or hearing any 
words in particular.
SA – hearing sister Max 
Beep 4.5 – Benjamin was walking through his kitchen to go outside.  At the moment of 
the beep, Benjamin was innerly saying, “Gonna go sit on the glider.”  The words 
occurred very fast, almost instantaneously.  It was as if Benjamin was speaking the words 
and the words were definitely present.  However, there were no vocalized qualities to the 
experience.  The words had no volume, no pitch, and either no or flat inflection. The 
experience was apparently “spoken but not auditory.”  Benjamin also may have been 
hearing his sister Stephanie laugh at the moment of the beep, but the laughing may have 
ended just before the moment of the beep.
Unvocalized Inner Speech - gonna go sit on the glider
SA? (presence uncertain)  – hearing Stephanie laugh
M? (presence of SA uncertain) 
Beep 5.1 – Benjamin was sitting outside on his glider.  He was reviewing notes written 
by an acquaintance who is in ill health.  At the moment of the beep, Benjamin was 
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thinking about the health of this man.  There were no words or images accompanying this 
thought.  This thought was not strong in Benjamin’s awareness, but it was definitely 
present.  Benjamin was also faintly aware of the sound of sparrows tweeting.  There may 
have been more than one, but Benjamin was not certain.  He was simply hearing the 
sparrow(s).  
U – health of man
SA – hearing sparrows
M
Beep 5.2 – Benjamin was still on the glider reading notes.  His sister had found a small 
figurine of a sad looking dog.  She gave it to Benjamin to look at.  At the moment of the 
beep, Benjamin was chuckling, but this was not in his awareness.  He was hearing the 
sound of sparrows and one car whooshing by in front of his house.  This was barely in his 
awareness, but Benjamin believed that it was indeed in awareness.  
SA – hearing sparrows
SA – hearing car 
M
Beep 5.3 – Benjamin was walking through his living room.  Benjamin stated that he was 
telling his sisters Max and Venus that the interviewer had told him to disregard beeps that 
occur when he is writing notes for the previous beep, then there was a two second pause, 
the beep sounded, “and that was it.”  The interviewer asked him is there was anything in 
his awareness at the moment of this beep.  He paused for a few seconds, and then said 
that he was aware of the presence of Max and Venus.  The interviewer, being skeptical 
due to the pause, asked Benjamin if this was in his notes and he said no.  The interviewer 
asked Benjamin why this was not in his notes if he was aware of it at the moment of the 
beep.  This caused Benjamin to be more skeptical of this being in his awareness.
No Inner Experience
Beep 5.4 -  Benjamin was in his house writing about a genealogy report.  Benjamin had 
written the sentence “Set one part of the record straight.”  He was contemplating 
changing this to “To help to set the record straight.”  At the moment of the beep, 
Benjamin had made the tentative decision to go with “to help to set the record straight” 
but this decision was not final yet.  There were no words present in this experience.  
Benjamin was also hearing his sister Judy laughing and a car accelerating.
U – to help to set the record straight
SA – hearing laughing
SA – hearing car 
M
Beep 6.1 – Benjamin was standing in his garage cleaning a knife.  At the moment of the 
beep, was looking at the knife and was  aware of it.  This was the primary part of his 
awareness.  Benjamin was also aware of feeling chilly, mostly in his hands, but 
throughout his body.  Benjamin was also hearing the sound of a motor.  
SA – knife
SA – chilly
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SA – hearing motor
M
Beep 6.2 – Benjamin was in his garage.  He was thinking about cleaning the earpiece of 
the beeper. He was considering possible ways to clean it.  At the moment of the beep, 
Benjamin was thinking about water and alcohol as a means of cleaning the earpiece.  This 
experience was not in words.  Benjamin was also noticing the colors outside as he viewed 
them through the garage window.  He was noticing mostly green, but also pink, white, 
and yellow.
SA – colors outside
M
Beep 6.3 – Benjamin was listening to the radio.  A Schumann symphony had just begun.  
Just prior to the moment of the beep, Benjamin thought “Good, nice music.”  This 
experience was in words, as if he was speaking them, but had no vocalized qualities such 
as volume, inflection, and pitch.  It also occurred almost instantaneously.  Although this 
experience occurred just prior to the moment of the beep, it was somehow still present at 
the moment of the beep.  At the moment of the beep, Benjamin was also aware of the 
taste of a lemon drop in his mouth.  He was also hearing the symphony.  He may have 
also been aware of the sound of the television, but Benjamin believed that this was 
unlikely.
Unvocalized Inner Speech – good, nice music
SA – taste of lemon drop
SA – hearing symphony
SA? (presence uncertain)– hearing television
M
Beep 6.4 – Benjamin was thinking about the lemon drop in his mouth.  At the moment of 
the beep, he was wondering if he was really aware of the sweetness of the lemon drop.  
Benjamin was also hearing the sound of a car that had just past by and the Schumann 
symphony still playing.  Benjamin was not 100% certain that he was hearing the 
Schumann symphony, but he was fairly certain.  
U – wondering about sweetness
SA – hearing car
SA? (presence uncertain) – hearing symphony 
M
Clara’s Samples
      Although beeps from day one were counted in the analysis, they should be taken with 
some additional skepticism as Clara was not initially familiar with the DES process.  
Participants often require at least a day to become acclimated to DES and produce 
reliable reports of momentary inner experience.  
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Beep 1.1 – At the moment of the beep, Clara was waiting for the beep of the beeper to go 
off.  She was wondering if it was going to go off and what it was going to sound like.  
This was a thought process or a mental event that contained no words or images. 
U - waiting for the beep; wondering what the beep would sound like
Beep 1.2 – Clara was lying in bed and was wondering about the internal mechanism that 
causes the beeper to go off and how the beeper works in general.  At the moment of the 
beep, Clara was innerly seeing the beeper.  She saw the beeper with the clip on it and 
appeared largely as the beeper appears in reality.  This seeing was in black and white, 
with the beeper being a light gray.
I – image of beeper
Beep 1.3 – Clara prefaced this beep by saying that it “will give you problems.”  She was 
trying to decide what headstone she wants for her husband’s and her grave.  At the 
moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing a headstone.  It was a double headstone 
that was rectangular in shape.  Her husband’s name and the date of his death were on one 
side of the headstone, although by the time of the interview Clara had forgotten which 
side it was on.  The inner seeing was in black and white and the headstone was a grayish-
black marble.  
I – headstone
Beep 1.4 – At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing a room at a Las Vegas 
casino where family members recently stayed.  She was seeing the room as if she was 
standing in the doorway.  There were three windows, a television, and a bathroom in the 
room she was seeing.  This was experienced in black and white.
I – room at the Wynn
Beep 1.5 – Clara was expecting three relatives.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
innerly seeing all of them.  All of the family members were facing her.  Her sister-in-law 
was in a wheel chair and was being pushed by her sister-in-law’s son.  This seeing 
included only these individuals and had no environmental surrounding.  It was also in 
black and white.  
I – family members
Beep 1.6 – Clara was knitting and had made a mistake.  At the moment of the beep, she 
was having an inner seeing of herself ripping the blanket she was knitting.  The inner 
seeing was in motion and she was seeing her hands rip the blanket just as she would see it 
if she was actually ripping the blanket.  This experience was in black and white. 
I – ripping blanket 
Beep 2.1 – At the moment of the beep, Clara was drinking coffee and was aware of 
waiting for the beeper to sound and wondering if it would sound.  This was a mental 
process that did not contain any words, images, or symbols, nor did it contain any 
emotional or physical experience. 
U – waiting for beeper to go off
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Beep 2.2 – Clara was knitting.  She was thinking “Why am I knitting this baby blanket, 
it’s stupid.”  The beep sounded on the word “stupid”.  This sentence was spoken in 
Clara’s own inner voice and had qualities resembling external speech.  This phrase was 
experienced has having a critical tone and contained a feeling of stupidity.  This feeling 
was not separable from the phrase, but was contained within the phrase. 
IS – the phrase ending in “stupid” 
Beep 2.3 – Clara was calculating how many balls of yarn she needed for knitting.  She 
was using a pencil and paper to do the calculation.  At the moment of the beep, Clara was 
writing the number “5” on her paper, which was the solution to her calculation.  
JD – writing “5”
Beep 2.5 – Clara’s friend Joan had sent her a picture of Wayne, Clara’s recently deceased 
husband.  Clara was in the process of writing a thank you note to Joan, and paused while 
she considered what to write.  At the moment of the beep, Clara was somehow 
visualizing Wayne’s face as it had been shortly before he died.  However, there was no 
actual face being innerly seen, although it was understood to be a seeing phenomenon.  
There was also a feeling of sadness that was connected to this visual experience; this 
sadness was somehow experienced in her head.  She was also thinking/feeling irritated at 
Joan for sending the picture—an irritation that, if expressed in words (which it was not) 
might be something like, why did she send it, she should mind her own business, I don’t 
want a picture like this, butt out!  This negative thinking/feeling, contrasted with her 
general sense that she should say thank you for sending the present, had brought the letter 
writing to a temporary halt.     
Imageless Seeing – visual experience of husband’s face without image
F – sadness
F – irritation
M 
Beep 2.6 – Clara was sitting in her apartment and looking out the window. She had 
moved to Las Vegas approximately within the past year.  At the moment of the beep, she 
was wondering why she was not adjusting to living there better than she has been.  This 
was experienced as an unworded thought process that was accompanied with the definite 
presence of the word “adjusting,” although no spoken words or images of the word were 
actually experienced.  
U?/WT? (form uncertain)– wondering about not adjusting   
Beep 3.1 – Clara had just picked up the mail and was looking at it.  She was looking at 
the word “Kim” in the return address.  At the moment of the beep, she was innerly saying 
the word “Kim” in her own voice.  This word was a single word and not part of a 
sentence.  Also at the moment of the beep, Clara was wondering why Kim had sent a card 
and was surprised that she sent the card.  This experienced thinking did not contain 
symbols.
IS – Lois
U – wondering/surprise
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Beep 3.2 – Clara was thinking about a conversation she had had with her daughter and 
grandson at a restaurant the night before.  At the moment of the beep, she was thinking 
about the conversation the night before in general.  Clara was focused on the 
conversation as a whole, not on some specific part of it.  This experience contained no 
images or words.  At the same moment, Clara was also thinking of the word “Sara.”  The 
phone was ringing, and Clara was thinking the name of the person she suspected was 
calling.  Although Clara is sure that this word was in her experience, it was not spoken, 
heard, or seen.  
U – dinner conversation
Worded Thinking – Donna
M
Beep 3.3 – Clara was going to have a friend over for dinner and was mentally going 
through a menu of things she might cook.  At the moment of the beep, she was thinking 
about what she was going to cook.  She was thinking about cooking stir fry with shrimp, 
with the focus of her awareness on the shrimp.  She is not sure if this focus was occurring 
exactly at the beep or very near the beep.  This experience contained no words or images.
U – stir fry/shrimp
Beep 3.4 – Clara was experiencing pain and numbness in her hand due to arthritis.  At the 
moment of the beep, she was aware of the fingers of her right hand being in a curled 
position and a numbness throughout each of the fingers.  She was also frustrated by the 
pain which was an intense emotional experience.  Clara stated that she felt like she 
wanted to cry, although the literal experience of wanting to cry was not in her awareness.  
She was not sure if this part of the experience was in her head or contained in her body.  
SA – pain in fingers
F – frustrated by pain
Beep 3.5 – Clara was sitting in her front yard watching traffic and thinking about an 
experience she had had the previous week.  She had been at the DMV, and because she 
had a walker, she had been instructed to go to the beginning of the long line of people.  
At the moment of the beep, she was innerly seeing a long line of people.  This line was 
on her right and the people were facing largely away from her at a diagonal, left to right.  
There was no background.  This seeing was clear and detailed, but in black and white.  
I – line at DMV
Beep 3.6 – It was almost lunch time and Clara was wondering what she was going to 
have for lunch.  At the moment of the beep, she was thinking about food.  She knew that 
she was going to have to have something to eat, but was not sure what.  She was also 
trying to determine what she was going to have.  There were no images or words in this 
experience.
U – food 
.
Beep 4.1 – Clara was in the kitchen cooking.  At the moment of the beep, she was innerly 
speaking the sentence “Why am I having to cook today?”  The beep was simultaneous 
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with the word “cook”.  This inner speaking had the qualities of speech and was said in a 
somewhat neutral tone, although it was an interrogative statement.  
IS – cooking
Beep 4.2 – Clara was in the kitchen.  At the moment of the beep she was innerly saying 
“Now I have to do the dishes.”  The beep came between the words “to” and “do.”  Clara
was also aware of feeling compelled to do the dishes.  However, this feeling did not seem 
to be separate from the words and did not exist independently from the words.  
IS – dishes
F? (presence uncertain) – dishes
Beep 4.3 – Clara was standing in her living room.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
thinking about whether to clean the bathroom or to dust the living room.  This was a 
wondering about the next course of action she would take that contained no words, 
images, or symbols.  It was a “mental thought.”
U – clean or dust
Beep 4.4 – Clara was looking at towels in her bathroom.  At the moment of the beep, she 
was wondering what towels to put out.  This was a wondering that was similar to the 
wondering that occurred in Beep 3.6 (wondering what to have for lunch).  This was an 
interrogative mental process with no words.  
U – towels
Beep 4.5 – Clara was standing in the living room after she had finished cleaning.  At the 
moment of the beep, Clara was innerly saying to herself “Why am I so slow getting 
things done now.  Is it part of old age or having less to do?”  Clara was sure that words 
were present, but she was not sure whether or not these words were experienced vocally.  
Either the words were present and were heard vocally or the words were present without 
any vocal qualities.  Clara was also sensing an emotion of frustration.  This frustration 
was a mental process and was not independent of the verbal experience.  
IS?/WT? (form uncertain) – slow
F– frustration
Beep 4.6 – Clara was walking into the bedroom and was looking at clothes with the 
intent to change.  At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly saying “I better change 
clothes”.  Clara was not sure where in the sentence the beep came.  
IS – clothes 
Beep 5.1 – Clara was in her bedroom getting dressed.  At the moment of the beep, she 
was thinking about going outside to sit because it was so nice out.  She was aware of the 
desire to sit outside, the fact that it was nice out, and the link between the two.  This was 
a mental process with no words or images.  
U – going outside
Beep 5.2 – Clara was sitting outside knitting.  She was innerly speaking in her own voice 
“Flowers, leaves, and green grass in March.”  The beep came on the word “grass.”  She 
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was also innerly seeing a small group of flowers standing in a dirt bed.  She was not 
certain what kind of flowers they were, but they were small and similar to pansies and 
viewed from a perspective that was within a few feet.  The inner seeing was in black and 
white.
IS – grass
I – flowers
M
Beep 5.3 – Clara was outside knitting.  She was innerly speaking in her own voice “Why 
am I living alone?  Some of the relatives think it’s strange that I can do it.”  The beep 
occurred on the word “alone.”  She was also aware of being angry at the moment of the 
beep.  This anger was a mental process with no symbols or physical sensation.  The inner 
speaking was more prominent in her awareness than the anger.  Clara estimated a ratio of 
85 to 15 between the inner speaking and the anger.   
IS – alone
F – anger
Beep 5.4 – Clara was outside knitting.  She was innerly speaking in her own voice 
“Should I go to the high school reunion or shouldn’t I?  Who will be there?”  The beep 
came on the words “high school”.  
IS – high school
Beep 5.5 – Clara was outside knitting.  She had saw a television news program earlier in 
the day regarding the sodium content of different Chinese dishes.  She was mentally 
comparing the sodium content of the different Chinese dishes she and her relatives ate the 
previous day.  At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing the letters “Na”.  
These letters were meant to stand for sodium.  The “N” was capitalized and larger than 
the “a” which was lower case.  The letters were dark on a light background.  This 
experience was similar to the flowers inner seeing in beep 5.2, but different in the sense 
that it was experienced as a more natural process.  The letters were thin as if written by a 
pen.  She was not aware of the comparison or anything other than the letters at the 
moment of the beep.
I – Na
Beep 5.6 – Clara was outside knitting.  The previous day she had gotten copies of 
pictures of her brothers.  These copies contained four pictures on approximately an 8x11 
inch sheet.  At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing this sheet that was very 
similar to how it exists in reality.  This experience was very clear. Clara could make out 
the details in each of the four pictures (such as who was in each picture, the positions of 
the people, and some of the surrounding details).  This experience was in brown and 
white (as the reproductions were in real life).  Also at the moment of the beep, she was 
also innerly speaking in her own voice “The picture of my brothers were reproduced and 
they came out better than the originals.”  Clara was not sure if this was the exact phrase 
she was innerly speaking, but she was certain that the beep came on the word 
“reproduced.”  
I – pictures
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IS – reproduced 
Beep 6.1 – Clara was thinking about the shootings that occurred at Virginia Tech earlier 
that day.  At the moment of the beep, she was thinking, “How useless it was. (pause) The 
poor parents.”  The beep came during “the poor parents.”  These words were in her 
awareness, although they weren’t spoken, heard or seen.  The entire phrase occurred all at 
once.  That is, the phrase “the poor parents” appeared simultaneously, not in a sequence 
where “the” came first, “poor” second, and “parents” third.  
Worded Thinking – the poor parents
Beep 6.2 – Clara was staring at a picture of her and her husband.  At the moment of the 
beep, she was not aware of any inner experience other than the seeing of the picture.  She 
stated that she had been staring at the picture for approximately 20 minutes, as if she had 
been locked on to the picture.  Clara found this weird and surprising; she believed she 
had never done this before.  She attributed it to the shock of the Virginia Tech killings.
JD – staring at picture
Beep 6.3 – Clara was thinking about the shootings that occurred at Virginia Tech earlier 
that day.  At the moment of the beep, Clara was thinking “all those people that were 
killed.”  This experience was similar to that of 6.1.  There were words in her awareness, 
although they weren’t actually heard or seen.  They also occurred simultaneously, not in 
sequential order like they would if the words would be spoken aloud.  
WT – people killed
Beep 6.4 – Clara had just finished a phone call.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
wondering whether or not she should go out with Mary (the friend who just called).  This 
was a cognitive process that most likely contained no words or images; Clara did allow 
the possibility that there were words involved, but she could not be sure.  
U – go out or not
Beep 6.5 – Clara was thinking of how she could talk a family member into letting her 
have her car for the weekend while the daughter was out of town.  At the moment of the 
beep, Clara was innerly speaking “Can I talk Lisa into letting me have the car this 
weekend when they go out of state?”  The beep came near the word “car.”  Clara was 
producing this speech internally in what was experienced as her own voice.  
IS – car
Beep 6.6 – Clara received a call from her grand-daughter prior to the beep.  At the 
moment of the beep, she was wondering how her grand-daughter was going to fly out of 
New York back to Iowa because there was bad weather in New York.  She was also 
experiencing worry at the moment of the beep, although she was not sure how she was 
experiencing this worry.  The wondering and the worry occupied approximately equal 
parts of her awareness.
U – flight
F – worry 
M
319
Dolly’s Samples
      Although beeps from day one were counted in the analysis, they should be taken with 
some additional skepticism as Dolly was not initially familiar with the DES process.  
Participants often require at least a day to become acclimated to DES and produce 
reliable reports of momentary inner experience.  
Beep 1.1 – Dolly was on her computer, working on designing a brochure.  At the moment 
of the beep, she was feeling frustrated: she did not like the design even though she had 
been working on it for a long time, and would have to change it again.  This frustration 
was experienced as a pressure that pushed inward in the middle of her torso below her 
heart.  This was a somewhat intense emotional experience.  
F – pressure in torso
Beep 1.2 – Dolly was using color blocks on a piece of paper to work on her brochure.  At 
the moment of the beep, she was thinking why making the brochure was so hard today 
and was experiencing frustration.  She did not think there were words associated with this 
experience but was not entirely sure. This was more of a mental experience than a 
physical feeling.  
U?/F?(form uncertain) – frustration/feeling of difficulty
Beep 1.3 – Dolly was turning her arm to look at her watch.  At the moment of the beep, 
she was thinking that she needed to take a break.  This experience was not in words.  
Dolly was also feeling frustrated near the beep, but was not sure if she was experiencing 
frustration at the moment of the beep.  
U – take a break
F?(presence uncertain) – frustration 
Beep 1.4 – Dolly was on the phone with a friend.  At the moment of the beep, the friend 
was talking about her relationship.  Dolly was mostly withdrawn from the conversation, 
tracking just enough of it to know when it would be her turn to respond.  At the moment 
of the beep Dolly was wondering why her friend is still in the relationship that she always 
complains about.  Dolly was not certain if there were words in this experience, but she 
thinks there were not words.  This was a clear experience of which she was certain.  
U – relationship   
Beep 1.5 – Dolly was writing an email; typing but not paying any attention at all to what 
she was typing.  At the moment of the beep, she was thinking that she was ready to give 
up for the day.  Dolly believes this was a cognitive event, but was not entirely sure.  The 
experience was very clear.  
U - give up
Beep 1.6 – Dolly was on the computer and had just glanced at the layout of her brochure 
on the table.  At the moment of the beep, she was experiencing satisfaction at her 
brochure.  
U?/F? (form uncertain) – satisfaction   
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Beep 2.1 – Dolly was sitting outside drinking coffee.  At the moment of the beep, she 
was innerly saying “I enjoy the outside quiet.”  This inner speaking had the same 
characteristics as external speech. The beep sounded right after the word “quiet.”  Dolly 
was also enjoying the external quiet as well as the internal quiet at the moment of the 
beep, but it was difficult to say how this enjoyment took place.  She also said she was 
experiencing inner quiet even though she was speaking to herself; even so, she 
understood this inner speaking to be somehow quieter than her inner chatter had been 
earlier.  
IS – quiet
F – enjoyment
M
Beep 2.2 – Dolly had just finished reading the phrase “to enjoy the humorous moments in 
life.”  After reading this, Dolly said out loud “Yes, if I find humor in problems they won’t 
seem so bad.”  The beep came between the words “problems” and “they.”  This speaking 
occupied a substantial portion of her experience.  Also at the moment of the beep, Dolly
was experiencing some kind of mental realization, like an “a-ha” moment, that if 
expressed in words would be something like: Right! I do take things too seriously!  This 
realization was experienced in her head, from the top of her head to the middle of her 
chest, and was more of a mental experience than a physical experience.  The description 
of this “a-ha” experience seemed to be being done via reconstruction rather than a direct 
memory of the experience, and therefore we are more skeptical of this feature of her 
experience than others.  
F?/U? (form uncertain) – a-ha experience  
Beep 2.3 – Dolly was standing at her sink, holding a pot, and looking out the window.  
None of that was in her experience at the moment of the beep.  At the moment of the 
beep, she was having an inner conversation with herself, innerly saying “Do I want 
another cup of coffee?” and answering, “No, not really.”  The beep occurred just after the 
word “really.”
IS – coffee
Beep 2.4 – Dolly was outside meditating.  At the moment of the beep, she was having no 
inner experience.  [In general, she said that part of the purpose of this meditation is to 
quiet the mind.]  
No Inner Experience- meditating
Beep 2.5 – Dolly was walking around the house attempting to determine what she should 
do.  She was innerly saying “I have so much to do, where should I start?  Unload the car.”  
The beep came between the word “unload” and the word “the.”  Her eyes were aimed at 
the stacks of papers and boxes that awaited her actions, but those objects were not in her 
attention at the moment of the beep.
IS – unload the car
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Beep 2.6 – Dolly was trimming the rose bushes just outside of her house.  Although she 
was engaged in the act of pruning, being careful to get things right and not get stuck by a 
thorn, etc., that action was not in her experience. At the moment of the beep, she was 
looking at the line of rose bushes and enjoying their beauty.  This was largely a visual 
experience.  
SA – rose bushes
Beep 3.1 – Dolly was making a to-do list and was about half way finished.  At the 
moment of the beep, Dolly was thinking that she had a lot to do before she left.  Dolly
stated initially was a verbal thought that contained words, but the words were not heard 
or spoken.  But subsequent discussion led the interviewers to believe that that statement 
may have reflected Dolly’s presuppositions, and that the thought was more likely 
unsymbolized.  There also may have been things “rattling around” in Dolly’s mind, and 
as she wrote them on her list, they exited her mind, but she was not sure if this was in her 
awareness at the moment of the beep.  When surveying her situation in responding to the 
beep, Dolly recognized herself as feeling overwhelmed, reflected in an increased heart 
rate and breathing changes, but this was not in her awareness at the moment of the beep.
U– a lot to do
FFOB – overwhelmed 
Beep 3.2 – Dolly was sitting at the computer doing research on video cameras she was 
considering buying.  She was looking at different models of cameras on her computer 
screen.  At the moment of the beep, Dolly was wondering what camera to buy.  This was 
a mental process that contained no words or images.  She was also aware of what was on 
the computer screen.
U – wondering
Beep 3.4 – Dolly was at the computer writing an email to her sister.  At the moment of 
the beep, Dolly was in the act of typing.  She was tightly focused on typing and was not 
sure what was in her inner experience at the moment of the beep if anything.  She may 
have been thinking of the word she was typing but was not sure.
JD – typing
Beep 3.5 – Dolly had just walked into the kitchen.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
thinking “What should I fix for lunch?”  This experience was as if Dolly was internally 
speaking in her own voice.  The beep came somewhere in the vicinity of the word “fix.”  
IS – lunch
Beep 3.6 – Dolly was writing a check.  At the moment of the beep, she was thinking 
about all the bills she would have to pay the next month while she would be traveling.  At 
the moment of the beep she was making a distinction between bills that had to be paid at 
the end of the month and bills that had to be paid at the beginning of the month, but it 
was not clear how and if this distinction was present in her awareness.  There were no 
words or images in this experience.  When surveying her situation in response to the 
beep, Dolly could recognize anxiety in her body.  But that was not present in her 
awareness at the moment of the beep.
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U – bills 
FFOB – anxiety
Ellen’s Samples 
      Ellen’s samples from day one were not included in the analysis due to unreliability
but are presented here.
Beep 1.1 – Ellen was visiting a group home and was speaking with a man that has a 
terminal illness.  The man was talking and somewhere near the beep, he was choking on 
his food.  Ellen reported that near the moment of the beep  she was wondering how much 
it costs to stay in the group home and was wondering what his room was like.  She also 
stated that she was also worried about his choking, but she was not sure if this was at the 
moment of the beep.  Ellen was also not sure if she was having a “deeper” thought at the 
moment of the beep. She was also not sure if the merger between Daimler Benz and 
Chrysler had been trashed.  
Difficulty Apprending Experience  
(U?/F?) (form and presence uncertain) - wondering, worrying, merger
Beep 1.2 – Ellen was speaking with the same man.  He had been talking about his 
grandchildren and how recently they visited.  She reported that near the moment of the 
beep she was concerned and sad.   Ellen reported that she may have first thought that his 
grandchildren do not visit him often and that this led to the experience of concern and 
sadness, but she was very uncertain about this.  She initially described this experience as 
an image, although she said that there was nothing visual present in her awareness.  Dr. 
Kevorkian may also have been in her awareness at or near the moment of the beep, but 
this was not described further.    
Difficulty Apprending Experience  
(F?/U?/I?/Imageless Seeing?) (form and presence uncertain) – concern and sadness        
Beep 1.3 – Ellen was still speaking with the same man.  He had mentioned that his 
quality of life was low and that he would rather die sooner than later.  She reported that 
near the moment of the beep she was accepting this idea.  She believed that this 
acceptance was an acceptance of the logic of the man’s statement. As with other beeps, 
Ellen had difficulty distinguishing the form of this acceptance.  She believed that it was 
most likely that the experience was either emotional in nature or was a thought process 
that did not contain words.    
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
(F?/U?) (form uncertain)– acceptance
Beep 1.4 – Ellen was driving and listening to the Dr. Laura radio program.  She had 
realized that Dr. Laura had misunderstood the caller.  She believed that near the moment 
of the beep she was experiencing annoyance regarding Dr. Laura’s misunderstanding but 
was not entirely certain.  
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Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
(F?) (presence uncertain) – annoyance
Beep 1.5 – Ellen reported that near the moment of the beep she was thinking, will they 
(the experimenters) ask me what happened just before the beep.  She was not sure if this 
experience came before the beep or if it was a reaction to the beep.  She was also not sure 
of the form of the experience. 
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
(Form Unknown)  - what will experimenters ask?
Beep 1.6 -  Ellen was about to go to the veterinarian.  She reported that near the moment 
of the beep she was thinking that she should call before going to make sure they had the 
pills she needed.  Ellen was not questioned about this beep, but reported it at the end of 
the sampling interview.  
(Form Unknown) – needing to call veterinarian (insufficient interview) 
Beep 2.1 – Ellen was listening to the news on the radio.  The radio had just announced a 
potential terrorist plot in London.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was thinking “They 
picked London again.”  Ellen thinks that the beep came after the word “again,” but she 
was not entirely sure.  At first, Ellen seemed quite certain that this experience contained 
words but that it had no auditory component (i.e., she was not internally speaking the 
above phrase or innerly hearing it).  With regard to questions of form, Ellen repeatedly 
said that her thought was a reaction to the news on the radio.  After further questioning, 
Ellen was certain that she was innerly speaking the above phrase.  The interviewer 
repeatedly stressed that it was possible to have words with or without auditory qualities, 
but by the end of the discussion, she was certain that she was innerly speaking and did 
not know why she said she was not at the beginning.  Nevertheless, Ellen’s uncertainty 
and inconsistency is grounds for substantial skepticism regarding both the nature and 
presence of this experience.   
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
IS?(form uncertain) – London 
Beep 2.2 – Ellen was taking apart an old pair of running shoes and noticed that there was 
a heel pad in only the left shoe.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was wondering if the 
having the heel pad in only one shoe had a negative effect.  There may have been a mild 
worrying or concern associated with this experience, although she was not certain.  This 
was a “mental thing” that contained no words, images, or emotional components.  
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
U – heel pad
U?/F? (form and presence uncertain) - worry/concern 
Beep 2.3 – Ellen was sorting through a number of papers related to a car she had 
purchased.  She was searching for a particular piece of paper and was looking at a sales 
slip.  It was difficult to pinpoint Ellen’s experience at the moment of the beep.  At first 
she stated that she was worried and that there was tension in her upper body, but she 
could not state where.  She then thought that this worry was in her head, experienced as 
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tightness behind her eyes.  She later said that she may have been somehow experiencing 
tension, but this was not in her awareness at the moment of the beep.  She stated at this 
point that what was in her awareness was that it was not self-evident that this was the 
paper that she needed, that she was frustrated with herself and concerned that she would 
have to continue searching.  She reported that there were no words or images in this 
experience.  At this point, Ellen was very frustrated by the questioning process.  
Therefore, questioning about this beep was stopped.  A clear understanding of Ellen’s 
experience at this beep could not be discerned.   
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
F?/U? (form uncertain)– sale’s slip (tension, frustration, concern)
Beep 2.4 – Ellen was trying to recollect the place where she took some courses many 
years ago.  She was trying to find the telephone number of her friend who might know 
and was looking at a list of telephone numbers.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was 
experiencing three things simultaneously.  First, she was asking or wondering if her 
friend would know.  This was a “mental process” with no words, images or emotions.  
Equally as prominent in her awareness was the asking or wondering if her friend was 
there.  This also had no words, images, or emotional content and was a “mental process”.  
She was also asking “Should I use the cell number?”  This experience was a bit less 
prominent than the other two.  Ellen was 80-90 percent sure that this experience was in 
words.  At first she said that the words were not in her own voice, but shortly later said 
that they were.  She was not sure why she initially said they were not in her own voice.  
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
U – will the friend know?
U – is the friend there?
IS? (form uncertain) – should I use the cell number?   
M
Beep 3.1 – Ellen was at a funeral service and was sitting behind Margaret, a woman Ellen
knows.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was visualizing Margaret sobbing.  This inner 
seeing was of Margaret the way Ellen had seen Margaret a few days earlier. Margaret
was seen from about the chest up; that was the portion of Margaret that Ellen had actually 
seen earlier, since Margaret had been sitting behind a table.  The imaged Margaret was 
facing Ellen and seemed to be located about five feet away from her.  This was a still 
picture.  There was some color to the picture (Margaret’s hair was blonde) but Ellen was 
not confident in the presence of other colors.  Other specific details could not be 
described.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen also knew why Margaret did not say any 
words at the funeral (because it was too emotional for Margaret).  This knowledge did not 
contain any words or images.  
Difficulty Apprehending Experience? 
I – woman sobbing
U – knowledge
Beep 3.2 – Ellen was standing inside a funeral home talking to Paula.  Ellen had just 
finished saying something to Paula and noticed that the woman was no longer 
“connecting” with her.  Ellen stated that at the moment of the beep she knew that the 
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woman was not interested in talking to her, was thinking that she was overdoing it as 
usual, was feeling self-conscious, and was experiencing tightness in her throat or mouth.  
Ellen also reported that she may have been aware of the fact that other people were near, 
but because she was very unsure about whether this was in her awareness or not at the 
moment of the beep, it does not seem like a reliable report.  Ellen also stated that the 
experience that the woman was no longer interested in her was both a feeling and a 
thought.  She had substantial difficulty describing the form of this experience and often 
went back and forth in her explanations.  Therefore, Ellen’s report on the form aspect of 
this experience is not very believable.  Ellen stated she then thought that she was 
overdoing this (i.e., talking too much), but again was not sure if this was in her awareness 
at the moment of the beep, and therefore should be met with skepticism.  The form of this 
experience was also not explained, but it was a familiar self-judgment.  She stated that 
she then experienced tightness in her throat or mouth and the feeling of self-
consciousness.  These experiences may have come in the above sequential order.  They 
were all reactions that seemed familiar.  In general, Ellen had difficulty focusing in on the 
moment of the beep.  She also changed her answers quite frequently and often made 
contradictory statements regarding her experience at this beep.  Therefore it is difficult to 
discern what, if any, of Ellen’s description was actually in her awareness at the moment 
of the beep.   
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
U?/F?/SA? (form uncertain) – entire experience
M? (not sure if one or many experiences) 
Beep 3.3 – Ellen was backing out of a parking space in a parking lot.  Another car was 
going to pass her, driving toward her from her right.  She was looking at this car.  Ellen
initially stated that at the moment of the beep, she was determining if she should wait or 
pull out, but she wavered in her certainty as to the existence of this experience at the 
moment of the beep.   She also said that she was judging or criticizing herself, telling 
herself to just make a decision as to whether to pull out or not and to quit dawdling.  She 
stated that this self-judging was automatic and that there were no words in any of these 
experiences.  The only aspects of this beep that Ellen seemed confident in were the actual 
external events occurring at the beep and that there were no words in her experience at 
this beep. Ellen went back and forth in her descriptions of what was in her awareness at 
the moment of the beep.  This raises skepticism about any and all of the specific contents 
reported at the moment of this beep.       
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
U? (form uncertain) - pulling out decision
U? (form uncertain) - self-criticism 
Beep 4.1 – Ellen was watching a quiz program on the television.  There was a question 
with choices for the answer presented on the screen.  Ellen was looking at the choices on 
the screen.  One of the answers was “L’il”.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was 
recognizing that “L’il” was the correct answer.  This recognition was not in words, but 
was a thought process. There was also an ongoing angst or generalized anxiety that made 
her jumpy.  It seemed mostly mental/emotional, mostly in her head.  As far as Ellen could 
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tell, she was not directly experiencing this at the moment of the beep, but it was 
nontheless occurring somehow.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
U – L’il
F? (presence uncertain) – angst 
M? – (not sure if F is present) 
Beep 4.2 – Ellen was shopping and was looking at a white jacket.  At the moment of the 
beep she was comparing the weight of the fabric in the jacket to the weight of the fabric 
in a pair of pants that she already owned that might go with the jacket.  There was a 
knowledge that the jacket was heavier than the pants and that they would not go well 
together.  At first, Ellen stated that she was innerly seeing the two items; later she said 
that there was nothing visual about the experience; later still, she said the experience had 
a visual component even though she was not innerly seeing anything.  She did not seem 
to have access to how the comparison was being made, and yet she was in the act of 
comparing, as if everything (color, weight, jacket, pants) was somehow implied in some 
organic whole.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
Imageless Seeing?/I?/U? (form uncertain) – jacket/pants comparison 
Beep 4.3 – Ellen was standing in the kitchen.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was 
having three experiences.  First, Ellen was wondering if she got five beeps already.  
There were no words in this experience; it was a thought process.  Second, she was 
wondering if the beeper was working.  Again, this was a thought with no words.  Third, 
she was hearing an almost inaudible sound and was wondering if it was coming from the 
beeper.  Ellen was not sure if these experiences occurred simultaneously or if they were 
in very close sequential order.  These experiences were distinctly different but tightly 
connected in that they were all about the same subject.  There did not appear to be 
anything wrong with the beeper, it simply had appeared to have a longer than normal 
delay between beeps.    
Difficulty Apprehending Experience? (not certain of sequential nature)   
U – five beeps
U – is beeper working
U – inaudible sound     
M? (not sure if overlapping or not) 
Beep 5.1 – Ellen was on the phone to Cox cable.  She was looking at and specifically 
seeing the clock, which read 4:50.  At the moment of the beep, she was acknowledging 
the fact that if Cox is open until five, then she will not make it!  She was somehow 
assessing how long it would take to drive there, somehow recognizing that she would 
take I95, but there was nothing specific in her awareness about this.  There were no 
words or images in this experience.  She was also annoyed that she wasn’t going to make 
it, but the annoyance was not apparently being experienced directly.  The annoyance was 
part of the acknowledgment that she wouldn’t make it and was the reason for the 
exclamation point that was somehow known to part of that thinking even though the 
thinking was not in words. 
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U – not going to make it
Beep 5.2 – Ellen was reading the New York Times.  She was about to rip the first column 
of page 1 so she could show it to Louise, a friend Ellen knows through a class they take 
together.  At the moment of the beep, there was some internal pressure to start the ripping 
process.  Also at the same time, Ellen was remembering Louise’s telling her that she was 
not going to be in class Friday.  Ellen was remembering the gist of what Louise had 
said—that she would be leaving for Europe on Tuesday—but there were no symbols in 
this experience; it was a recalling without words or images.  Ellen was also thinking that 
she had better cut the newspaper with scissors.  There were also no symbols associated 
with this experience.
U – pressure to rip
U – Mary Ann
U – scissors
M
Beep 5.3 – Ellen was watching the McNeil report on television.  A senator was on the 
television talking about leaving Iraq.  He had made a comment regarding what other 
countries would think if we left Iraq to Al-Qaeda.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
thinking that it was a ridiculous argument/stupid statement.  She was being critical of the 
statement’s meaning.  There were no words or images in this experience. There was also 
a feeling of agitation/irritation about this comment ongoing in her body (when assessed at 
the beep) but not in her experience at the moment of the beep. 
U – stupid statement
FFOB - agitation/irritation
Beep 5.4 – Ellen was talking with her friend Louise on the phone.  Ellen had asked what 
Louise was doing and Louise said she was watching M*A*S*H.  At the moment of the 
beep, Ellen was recognizing that M*A*S*H was on now and that maybe she should 
change the channel to watch it.  There were no words or images in this experience.  Ellen
was also feeling insecure that Louise did not really want to talk to her.  This was an 
underlying concern that Ellen was aware of at the moment of the beep.  Ellen was not 
sure if this was experienced in her body, and if so, where in her body it was experienced.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience? (not sure of if experienced in body or not)   
U – change channel
F – insecurity
M
Beep 5.5 – Ellen’s dog was whining.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was feeling quite 
strongly irritated about the dog being spoiled.  Ellen initially said that this irritation was 
throughout her body, but later said that it was more mental than physical.  She was also 
trying to decide if she should get the dog a treat.  There were no words or images in this 
experience.  The irritation had begun before she considered getting the dog a treat, but 
both were present at the moment of the beep.  Although the exact form of the irritation is 
uncertain it appeared that Ellen was somehow experiencing irritation at the moment of 
the beep.
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Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
F? (form uncertain)– irritation  
U – treat
Beep 5.6 – Ellen was watching Jeopardy.  The question involved a novelist from 
Minnesota.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was trying to think of the novelist from 
Minnesota.  At first, Ellen said she was thinking the words “novelist from Minnesota,” 
but she had some difficulty describing the nature of this experience.  At first she was not 
sure if she was hearing the words or saying the words internally; then she was not certain 
or even if the words were present at all; she later said that she was saying the words to 
herself.  Due to Ellen’s difficulty accessing her experience additional skepticism is 
needed for this sample.  
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
U?/IS?/IH? (form uncertain)- novelist from Minnesota
Beep 6.1 – Ellen was driving, but apparently little or no attention was devoted to this 
task.  At the moment of the beep she was thinking, “I think I would call myself a liberal 
democrat.”  At first, Ellen could not discern whether or not this thought was in words; 
perhaps “a liberal democrat” was in words but the rest of the thought was not.  
Eventually, Ellen believed that the entire sentence was present in words, but these words 
were not heard or spoken and all the words were in her awareness simultaneously rather 
than being spoken in a sequence.  Although Ellen was certain of this by the end, her 
initial uncertainty leaves room for skepticism.  
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
Worded Thinking?/IS? (form uncertain)– liberal democrat
Beep 6.2 – Ellen was listening to the McNeil report on the radio and looking at a tote 
bag.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen was wondering if she dropped her eraser upstairs 
where she stores her tote bag.  This wondering did not contain words.  Ellen was also 
visualizing the spot where she leaves her tote bag.  She was innerly seeing the bottom 
part of the corner of her bedroom wall and part of the floor.  She may also have been 
innerly seeing the tote bag leaning against that wall, but was not sure.  She saw 
something against the wall, but it was not very vivid.  The entire inner seeing was dark 
and unclear. The thought seemed to have started before the inner seeing, and then 
continued so that both thought and inner seeing were present at the moment of the beep.   
This example is considered not clear because although Ellen is convincing that she was 
experiencing an inner seeing at the moment of the beep she had some uncertainty about 
one of the substantial details of the inner seeing (i.e., the presence of the tote bag). 
Difficulty Apprehending Experience? (not sure if tote bag in inner seeing)  
U – eraser
I  - bottom corner of wall 
Beep 6.3 – Ellen was having a conversation on the phone with her friend Jane.  Jane had 
just said something regarding a 14.99 percent interest rate.  At the moment of the beep, 
Ellen was thinking that 14.99 for a couple of hundred of dollars does not sound right.  
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There were no words in this experience.  This experience was a process of inner 
calculation.  
U – interest rate
Beep 6.5 – Ellen was talking on the phone with someone at Cox cable company.  At the 
moment of the beep, Ellen was wondering where she had left her water bottle.  She did 
not believe that there were words present in this wondering but was not entirely certain.  
Also, Ellen originally stated that at the moment of the beep she was wondering if Cox has 
a record of whether or not she returned the remote.  The wondering about the Cox record 
experience did not contain any words or images.  However, on further reflection Ellen
decided that the wondering about the Cox record experience had ended just before the 
moment of the beep.  
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
U? (presence uncertain)  – water bottle
Beep 6.6 – Ellen was watching the Lehrer report on the television.  The person on the 
television had said that John McCain had lost some people close to him on his campaign 
and referred to these people as a “band of brothers”.  At the moment of the beep, Ellen
was considering the words “band of brothers” and the idea that McCain had lost them.  
She was echoing the words “brothers left” internally, but she was not saying or hearing 
these words.  Fay also may have been feeling empathic (“humanistic”) towards John 
McCain, and she may have been feeling some kind of reaction to her own brother’s 
having left her years ago, but it was not clear to Fay or to us whether or not this was 
actually in her awareness at the moment of the beep.  
Difficulty Apprehending Experience  
WT –brothers left
F? (presence uncertain) – empathy
M? (not sure if F is present) 
Fay’s Samples
      All of Fay’s beeps are worthy of substantial skepticism.  It seems unlikely that any of 
Fay’s reports reflect her inner experience to a meaningful extent.  Therefore, forms are 
not given at the end of each summary.  Even in the few instances that a guess could be 
made regarding the form of Fay’s experience, her reports are still substantially unreliable 
so it would be misleading to give report such guesses.  
Beep 1.1 – Fay reported that near the moment of the beep she was thinking about a 
church that she used to attend but is now closed.  She also mentioned that she may have 
been envisioning that it was run down, but she was not at all certain about this.  Other 
possibilities at this moment reported by Fay were thinking about a meeting she had the 
previous night, thinking about how to get to the church, and thinking about what the 
church might look like.  
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Beep 1.2 – Fay was sitting at breakfast reading Atlantic Magazine.  At the moment of the 
beep, she was looking at a picture of Poncho Barnes, a female aviator that she initially 
believed was a movie star.  There were many reported possibilities of the contents of 
Fay’s inner experience at or near the moment of this beep.  These reported possibilities 
were an awareness of movie stars trying to look sultry, that sultriness has changed over 
the years, that these old pictures might be valuable, that Charles Lindberg did not like 
female pilots, noticing the cigarette being smoked in the picture, being critical of 
smoking, and being fascinated by the picture of someone looking sinful.  Some of these 
possibilities were suggested by the interviewers that Fay confirmed as possibilities and 
some were created by Fay without suggestion by the interviewers.  
Beep 1.3 (reported 5th as Fay accidentally skipped it earlier in the interview) – Near 
the moment of the beep, Fay reported that she was wondering why the beeper was not 
sounding.  She may have also been thinking that it was not set right and/or that maybe 
something was wrong with the beeper.  
Beep 1.4 – Fay was at a thrift store and was about to try on some shorts.  Near the 
moment of the beep, Fay believed that she was hoping that the shorts would fit her and 
may have been wondering if the shorts would fit her.
Beep 1.5 – Fay was at her rental house.  Near the moment of the beep she may have been 
experiencing frustration about having to re-paint parts of the house, thinking about 
having to re-do the paint, and/or thinking about putting water in the refrigerator to keep it 
cold.  
Beep 1.6 – Near the moment of the beep Fay believed that she may have been thinking 
about putting the paint bucket and paint brush away and getting ready to leave.  She also 
suggested that she may have been wishing she had started an hour earlier.  
Beep 2.1 – Fay was at her rental property.  She reported having three experiences at or 
near the moment of the beep.  She frequently wavered regarding which of the three 
components was in her awareness.  Fay reported that she was innerly seeing herself 
holding a broom and moving from the front door of her property toward a dust bin.  This 
seeing reportedly contained movement.  However, Fay was not sure of the viewpoint 
from which the seeing was being perceived, making the interviewers skeptical about 
whether an actual inner seeing was involved.  Fay also reported that at or near the 
moment of the beep she was innerly seeing a property manager whom she had not hired.  
The inner seeing reportedly was of her face, from the front, in color with medium clarity.  
The face was expressionless.  Finally, Fay stated that she was innerly seeing the property 
manger she had hired.  This was reportedly a full-body image from the front.  
Beep 2.2 – Fay was at her rental property.  She noticed that there were stones on a 
walkway.  Fay stated that at the moment of the beep she realized that she should sweep 
the stones and that this was one more thing that she needed to do.  She could not describe 
the form of this experience other than stating that it was not in words (Fay suggested that 
she doesn’t think in words).  It is notable that when asking Iris about the form of her 
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experience and giving her examples of possible forms during this beep, she stated “I 
don’t quite get all of these distinctions.”  
Beep 2.3 – This beep was caused by Fay turning the beeper on and off.  Fay stated that at 
or the moment of the beep she was remembering that one interviewer told her about 
running the headset cord under her shirt for added stability.  Further details of this beep 
were not clear.  
Beep 3.1 – Fay was watering plants at her rental property.  At the moment of the beep, 
she was thinking about a conversation she had with Beth, a woman she knows, about the 
Alzheimer’s research project in which Fay is involved.  Beth was telling Fay that Beth 
has symptoms of Alzheimer’s Disease.  When Fay was asked about her awareness at the 
moment of the beep, Fay continually referred to numerous facts about the conversation.  
When given several options regarding the form of her experience at this beep, she said 
that she was visualizing the woman.  This report requires some skepticism because 1. she 
did not mention visualizing the woman until the option was presented and 2. she 
continually referred to how Beth actually looks rather than the visualization she was 
reportedly having and 3. she used multiple subjunctifiers when describing this beep (I 
guess, probably, etc.).  Fay eventually stated that she was visualizing the woman from the 
front.  The woman was probably by herself and was wearing a black bathing suit.  This 
was a head-to-toe image.  Fay’s report of visualizing the black bathing suit is one 
example of how she often used external reality to describe her inner experience:  she 
stated that she was visualizing her in a black bathing suit she usually sees the woman 
wearing a black bathing suit.  Likewise, she stated that the beep was clear because “I’ve 
seen her quite a few times in the last year.”  Fay also reported hearing the woman talk in 
the inner seeing.  She could not report what exactly was taking place in the conversation 
at the moment of the beep.  She was not hearing the woman speak word for word, but 
was rather recalling the gist of the conversation (the woman talking about her symptoms 
of Alzheimer’s Disease).  Again, Fay’s description of this aspect of her experience was 
frequently subjunctified and often seemed to refer to the reality of the conversation rather 
than her experience of it.  
Beep 3.2 – Fay was looking at a zucchini plant at her rental house.  Fay’s experience at 
the moment of this beep was difficult to discern.  She repeatedly intermingled 
background knowledge, realities of the external world, and often shifted her reports of 
what was occurring in her inner experience at the moment of the beep.  Fay described 
having a feeling of anticipation/accomplishment regarding the large size of the zucchini 
at the moment of the beep that was more of a mental process than a physical sensation.  
She also reported visualizing the zucchini on the plant being ready to harvest.  The leaves 
were “enormous” and there was another smaller zucchini on the plant.  She also said that 
she was noticing that the bloom itself getting very large.  She states that she may also be 
thinking of the zucchini growing.  
Beep 3.3 – Fay was thinking about her conversation with her handyman. Again, when 
Fay was repeatedly asked about her experience at the moment of the beep, she would 
recount most if not all of her actual conversation with him rather than her actual inner 
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experience . She initially stated that at the moment of the beep she was remembering the 
conversation mostly by visualizing him.  However, when questioned for the details of this 
experience, she did not or could not give any details of this visualized handyman, 
referring instead to how he actually looks (i.e., he has grey hair, is usually wearing blue 
jeans, etc.).  The interviewers were left being highly skeptical of the existence of the 
visualization at the moment of the beep.  She also stated that she may have been hearing 
him talk.  She could not recall exactly what he was saying or if there were specific words 
present in her experience.  She thinks she may have been aware of the gist of the 
conversation at this beep.  Finally, Fay stated that it was possible that in “the recesses of 
her mind” she was thinking that he was not perfect, that he was better than some, and 
thinking of other handymen’s short comings but because she could not seem to describe 
what was prominent in her experience, much less what was in the recesses of her mind; 
and also because she had so much trouble sticking to her inner experience on this 
particular day (as well as others), it is difficult to know how or if at all these aspects were 
a part of her experience.
Beep 3.4 – A few days earlier, Fay and her husband had had a conversation about going 
to Victorville.  Now, Fay was thinking about reasons why she had been against her 
husband’s planned trip to Victorville and how she had not wanted to go on the trip.  In 
this instance again Fay repeatedly described the actual conversation with her husband and 
could not focus on a particular moment.  Fay stated that at the moment of the beep she 
was thinking about various aspects of the conversation, mostly her reasons for not 
wanting to go.  These reasons included it being too hot, staying in a crowded house, and 
the travel distance required, especially when only staying for the weekend.  It was very 
difficult to discern which of these experiences, if any, were in her awareness at the 
moment of the beep.  When asked about her inner experience, she repeatedly referred to 
the actual facts of the trip rather than her inner experience, suggesting that what she 
described as being in her inner experience may not have been in her experience at all at 
the moment of the beep.  Fay also had substantial difficulty describing how she 
experienced these things.  
Beep 3.5 – Fay was thinking about Samantha, a woman Fay knows, and Samantha’s 
unhappy marriage.  While questioned about her inner experience at the moment of the 
beep, Fay consistently and repeatedly described the actual situation surrounding the 
marriage and apparently could not focus on one particular moment or aspect of her 
experience.  She described various aspects of Samantha’s actual marriage rather than 
Fay’s inner experience.  These things included Samantha’s unhappiness, the unhappiness 
of Samantha’s and her husband’s relatives, and Samantha’s incorrect pre-conceptions that 
her husband had a great deal of money.  Because Fay could not seem to distinguish 
between her own experience and the facts of Samantha’s marriage, we are highly 
skeptical about Fay’s reports about her experience at this beep.    
Beep 4.1 – Fay was reading an article in AARP magazine about the state of health
insurance coverage in the United States.  When asked “What was in your experience at 
the moment of the beep” numerous times and in a variety of ways, Fay often focused on 
external realities or inconsistent descriptions of what she was experiencing at or near the 
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beep. Initially when asked this question, she described the contents of the article.  When 
asked again she described Medicare.  When she was directed to her inner experience, she 
said she was thinking about her own health care coverage, thinking about uncovered 
people, thinking about the article, and thinking about someone who cannot afford health 
care coverage for his family.  The description of her inner experience was very 
inconsistent and subjunctified, however, and should be met with skepticism.    
Beep 4.2 – Fay was chopping tofu.  She had recently had a conversation with Mary, a 
woman Fay knows, about Mary’s father and procedures to have elderly people who can 
no longer function on their own being declared incompetent.  Again, Fay provided 
inconsistent, subjunctified descriptions of what was occurring in her experience at or near 
the beep, but could not answer detailed questions about her experience in the least.  Fay
first stated that she was thinking about procedures for getting elderly people declared 
incompetent, but could not answer any detailed questions about this experience (i.e.,
questions of form or what was specifically in her awareness at the moment of the beep).  
She then said she was thinking more about Mary’s father, but again could not describe 
this experience at all.  She then said she was thinking about her own father’s situation in 
1992.  All were advanced as descriptions of what she was thinking about at the moment 
of the beep.  The fact that all were distinctly different and were not apprehended as being 
simultaneous leads to the conclusion that none (or at least not all) were actually 
descriptions of her experience.
Beep 4.3 – Fay was reading an article in Newsweek about John F. Kennedy.  The article 
debated whether he was a great president or a spoiled rich boy who was not a great 
president at all.  When asked about her inner experience, Fay instead described the article 
itself and events in JFK’s presidency.  She sometimes said things that could be 
understood to be descriptions of inner experience.  For example, at one point she said that 
at the moment of the beep she was reading and understanding the article; later she said 
she that at the moment of the beep she was debating whether JFK was a great president or 
not; later she said that at the moment of the beep she was thinking that maybe the article 
was right—JFK was a spoiled rich boy.  Largely though, she described the actual article 
or actual events in JFK’s presidency when asked about her experience at the moment of 
the beep.        
Beep 4.4 – Fay was cooking.  Fay offered a variety of descriptions of her experience at 
this beep:  thinking about taking Subway sandwiches to church on Wednesday, thinking 
about turning tofu to get the sauce on all sides of the tofu, thinking about having had 
Subway sandwiches on the previous Sunday night, thinking about how Subway 
sandwiches are healthy and not greasy like Kentucky Fried Chicken or McDonald’s, and 
thinking about an incident at Subway on Sunday night when a man was kicked out for 
drinking alcohol.  She could not zero in on any one of those as being the thought that was 
occurring at the moment of the beep, nor did she say that all were occurring 
simultaneously.  When asked for details of any particular thought, Fay typically shifted to 
providing a new thought or unrelated detail.  For example, Fay initially said that she was 
visualizing the alcohol-drinking incident at Subway.  When asked about this 
visualization, she described how Subway actually looks.  Fay did not appear to be 
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describing her experiencing at this beep, but rather the external reality of the Subway 
shop.  
Beep 4.5 – Fay was playing Scrabble with her husband.  She responded in a variety of 
ways when asked about her inner experience at this beep.  The word “tap” was on the 
board and Fay was considering making the word “tape” and “gloved” off of this word.  
When asked about her experience, Fay explained game strategy–the importance of rack 
management, of “closing the board” when you are ahead, of “opening” it when you are 
behind, and of getting bingos.  All were advanced as if she were describing her 
experience at the moment of the beep, which almost certainly was not the case.
Beep 4.6 – Fay was still playing Scrabble.  At the moment of the beep, she was 
considering a play to make.  She was considering putting a “q” on a double letter score 
and getting a double word score so that she could get 40 points for the “q”.  She was 
checking various locations on the board for where she could put the “q” and recalled that 
there were at least two locations.  Still, Fay could not answer specific questions regarding 
her inner experience at this moment.    
Beep 5.1 – Despite the fact that we were present in Fay’s house, in the next room waiting 
for her to report that the beeper had sounded, it was difficult to determine what was in her 
experience at the moment of the beep because her accounts of her experience varied from 
one portion of her account to the next.  As best I can understand it, Fay was thinking 
about two violation letters that she had signed earlier that morning in her role on a 
neighborhood committee.  This thinking was described at various times in her account as 
being glad that the association chairman of the committee was back, that the assistant 
chairman is difficult to deal with, that the assistant chairman has her own agenda, that 
one of the letters would mean that the resident had to go to another committee, that one of 
the letters would simply be a notice, that one of the violators had a long history of
violation, a file an inch thick, and so on.  Fay’s account made it appear, as each one of 
those topics was being described, that that topic had been present in her awareness at the 
moment of the beep.  However, there was no sense of multiplicity or overlap.  When 
asked whether any of this, for example, the board chairman, was visual, she said “Yes, I 
can see him”; but when reminded that the object of this study is not to determine what 
she can see but what, if anything, she was seeing at the moment of the beep, she was 
unclear. 
Beep 5.2 – Fay was playing Scrabble on her computer.  She was looking at the screen 
and was about to put an “A” and a “K” next to a “Z” that was already down on the board.  
At the moment of the beep, Fay was thinking about playing the “A” and the “K” on the 
“Z”, was thinking that this was probably her best play and that it would probably 
maximize her points.  Fay initially said that she was thinking about playing the “K” on 
the “Z” and the “A” on the “Z” but later said that she had already made the decision to 
play the “K” and the “A” on the “Z”.  
  K
ZA
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Beep 5.3 – Fay was playing Scrabble on her computer and at the moment of the beep Fay
apparently somehow thinking about the word “slotter.”  Fay’s descriptions of this thought 
process were inconsistent, so it is impossible to know exactly what was in her awareness 
at the moment of the beep, but the general idea was wondering whether or not “slotter” 
was a word; that she would play it and find out whether or not the computer would reject 
it or not; that she could remember that the word had been played in some past Scrabble 
game, but she couldn’t remember the outcome of the protest.  These sub-thoughts may 
have all been parts of the same thought process that were all present at the moment of the 
beep, or they may have been explicit thoughts that were in the vicinity of the beep but not 
simultaneous, or they may have been ways of describing her activity, none or which was 
actually present in her experience at the moment of the beep.  We pressed her on those 
issues.  For example, we asked twice if there were words in her experience at the moment 
of the beep and both times described external reality (i.e., the words on the Scrabble 
board and that she didn’t know if “slotter” was a word or not) instead of answering 
directly about her experience.  Thus Fay’s reports of her experience seemed discursive or 
wandering; however, there did seem to be limits on how far that wandering could go.  For 
example, Fay confidently and believably said that she was not, at the moment of the beep, 
thinking of other computer Scrabble systems and their ways of responding to incorrect 
words, but may have been thinking about that near the beep.  This may be evidence that 
Fay has some reliable access to her experience at the moment of the beep.  However, the 
investigators’ overall impression was that Fay did not, even when interviewed 
immediately after the beep, distinguish adequately between what was in experience at the 
moment of the beep and what were the characteristics of the situation surrounding her at 
the moment of the beep.   
Beep 5.4 – Fay was playing Scrabble on her computer.  She was thinking about playing 
the word “VENOM”.  There were two different O’s on the board that she could play this 
word through. Both gave her a double word score, but one also put the “V” on a double 
letter score.  At the moment of the beep, Fay may have been noticing that the “V” could 
go on a double letter score, but Fay was not confident or consistent in her reports of her 
experience at this beep.  Fay at another point stated that the other option (the non-double 
letter score option) may have been in her awareness as well.  After discussing the beep 
for some time, Fay stated that she may have been congratulating herself at the moment of 
the beep for finding the play using the double word score.  She was inconsistent in her 
description of this self-congratulation.  This experience was described alternately as a 
feeling of happiness, and an awareness that she is good and/or smart. This feeling was 
described as a mental process, but Fay could not describe the experience of this process 
further.  Fay also did not describe this feeling until directly asked about emotion.  She 
also said at one point that the feeling was more prominent in her awareness than the 
noticing of where to play the “V”, but typically described the noticing as prominent.  This 
may be evidence for undifferentiated experience as she could not consistently state which 
experience was prominent at the moment of the beep.  Fay was able to rule out some 
experiences that were occurring prior to the beep, suggesting some differentiation and an 
ability to focus on the moment of the beep.  
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Beep 5.5 – Fay was playing Scrabble at her computer.  She was looking at a rack with all 
consonants.  Fay was again inconsistent in her descriptions regarding her experience at 
the moment of the beep.  She at one point during the interview that she was wondering 
what to do (i.e., whether she should play the rack or exchange her letters), but later said 
that she thinking of a series of specific plays she could make.  She also stated at one point 
that she was thinking that she doesn’t have many prospects with the board and tiles she 
had to work with.  Fay stated that all of these experiences were in her experience 
simultaneously, but the inconsistency of her report and inability to describe these 
experiences in detail suggests that this may not have been the case.  
Gary’s Samples
      Beep 0.1 was a practice beep and was not recorded in the analysis as it was used for 
training purposes only.  Beeps from day one were also not scored or analyzed as Gary
forgot to bring his notebook to the interview.  Beeps from day two were not used as Gary
was uncertain of the procedure and collected some of them two days prior to the 
interview.  Therefore, only days three through six were used in the final analysis.  
Beep 0.1 - Gary was just outside of the DES lab talking with one of the interviewers
about where he and his wife could go while Gary was wearing the beeper.  It was a sunny 
day and the discussion involved walking a short way across campus.  At the moment of 
the beep, Gary was concerned about his wife getting sunburned.  He was innerly seeing 
her, somehow from the front, side, and back at the same time, although this was not fully 
investigated.  In the inner seeing she was in a green muumuu that she used to wear often.    
Gary said that she was wearing a hat in the inner seeing, but only agreed after one of the 
interviewer suggested this possibility.  This suggests that the hat may not have been in his 
awareness at the moment of the beep.  It was sunny in the inner seeing without much 
background.  Gary was also thinking about being interested in being a participant in the 
study and hoping that he could help.  Gary did not initially describe this experience as 
occurring in words, but when it was suggested he said that he was thinking in words 
something similar to “I’m interested in being a subject in this study and I hope to be of 
some benefit to the study.”  Because Gary did not suggest that this experience was in 
words until suggested by the interviewers, this report should be taken with high 
skepticism.  Gary thought that he may have been innerly speaking the words, but that 
they weren’t heard.  This was not fully investigated, however, as this beep was meant to 
demonstrate the process and not frustrate the participant.
(I) – wife sunburned
(IS?) (presence uncertain) – being in study 
Beep 1.1 - During this beep it appeared that Gary was arguing with his wife about the 
budget.  Since neither of them work very much, they have to be careful about their 
budget.  Gary was not able to report any inner experience at the moment of this beep.  It 
may be that no inner experience was occurring at this beep, that inner experience was 
occurring but Gary could not remember without the aid of his notebook, or Gary did not 
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entirely understand the task, as is common on the first day of sampling.  Gary admitted 
that he did not understand the depth of the task throughout the training exercise.    
Beep 1.2 – For this beep Gary stated that he was riding in the car with his wife at one 
point and may have been feeling sad because he can no longer.  He went on to explain 
that he attempts to be a backseat driver when riding with his wife.  At one instant it 
appeared that while he was riding with his wife he was innerly seeing a street map of the 
way home.  It was not clear if this was occurring at one of the beeps or not.  Gary was 
asked to re-create this inner seeing. The re-created inner seeing was of unlabeled streets 
represented as black lines on a light background.  Only the streets that Gary was traveling 
on were in the inner seeing.  There was also a square that represented his house.  
Although the streets were unlabeled, he understood which street was which.       
Beep 2.1 (two days prior to interview) – Gary was cleaning up dog poop in his back 
yard.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was experiencing pain in his joints.  This pain 
was present in about 6 of his joints.  Gary was not sure which joints had the pain, but he 
referenced his shoulders, elbow, knees, and hips.  Gary eventually said that his lower 
back had the most pain.  This pain was a dull ache.  Gary was also thinking about the 
ramifications of a TIA he had five days prior to the interview.  He was thinking “How 
serious is this?  Will this lead to complications?”  These words, or words similar to them, 
seemed to be present to Gary at the moment of the beep.  There was no voice associated 
with the words.  They came much faster than if he were speaking them out loud, but still 
occurred in sequence.  
(SA) – pain
(WT) – ramifications of TIA
Beep 2.2 (two days prior to interview) – Gary’s descriptions of the beep varied 
substantially.  He was also frequently uncertain about the contents of his awareness at 
this moment. Gary was sitting at his desk doing paperwork for his elevator business.  At 
the moment of the beep, Gary was somehow thinking of a particular business item he was 
working on, but was not sure which one.  He was somehow trying to be accurate about 
his work, but it was not clear whether this accuracy was in his awareness at the moment 
of the beep.  He was also wondering if his customer would question any potential 
problems with the item or if they would not worry about it and have a problem later.    
Beep 2.3  – Gary was cleaning his car seats.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was 
thinking something similar to “Is this really a stroke or TIA or is this going to go away 
and not come back or is it going to get worse?”  As in beep 2.1, these words occurred 
very quickly and were not audible or spoken, but were somehow present to Gary.  Gary
was also paying attention to cleaning the car seat, which comprised about an equal part of 
his awareness as the thought.  
(WT) – stroke
(JD) – cleaning
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Beep 2.4 – At the moment of the beep, Gary was still wondering whether the incident 
Saturday was a TIA or a stroke.  He did not think that he was thinking about this for the 
entire 20 minutes between beeps, but the beep caught him thinking about similar things.  
Beep 3.1 – Gary was in his home reading the newspaper.  He had just turned to a page 
with an article about a pastry chef with an accompanying picture and had just read the 
caption to the picture.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was wondering if his daughter’s 
roommate knew the pastry chef or if she worked with him.  This thought was in words, 
but had no auditory qualities.  Although specific words were present, Gary agreed that 
there were many ways that the experience could be described that were equally as 
accurate (i.e., has my roommate’s daughter ever worked with or known the pastry chef, I 
wonder if my roommate’s daughter has worked with or knows this pastry chef, etc.).  The 
thought was experienced very quickly (less than a second) and was almost simultaneous 
with the beep (Gary could not discern whether it occurred a moment before, a moment 
after, or at the exact time of the beep).  
WT - daughter’s roommate and pastry chef
Beep 3.2 – Gary was in the kitchen getting ready to make a bowl of cereal.  He was 
looking at various boxes of cereal.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was trying to 
determine which type of cereal he was going to eat.  This was a mental process that did 
not contain words or images.
U – deciding cereal 
Beep 3.3 – Gary was getting ready to leave with his wife, but his wife was on the phone 
with the medication company.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was thinking that they 
had to leave right now or they were going to be late.  This experience was similar to 3.1 
in that words were present but there was no auditory quality to them, the experience 
could be described equally well using a variety of words, and it occurred very quickly.
WT – late
Beep 3.4 – Gary was riding in the passenger seat of his car talking to a client on his cell 
phone.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was talking, but this was not in his awareness as 
it was “automatic.”  Gary was thinking “when are you going to be ready for our 
installation?”  The “you” referred to the client he was talking with (Gary asked this exact 
question to his client a couple of seconds after the beep).  This experience was similar to 
that in beeps 3.1 and 3.3 in that there were words present but no auditory qualities and 
that it happened very quickly.  It was different in that those exact words best describe the 
experience.  Gary also may have been innerly seeing two workers bending to lift an 
indiscernible object (most likely a rail or panel of some sort) that began to form just after 
the above experience (Gary is not sure when exactly the beep came in this sequence).  
The men were about five to six feet apart and viewed as if Gary was standing about five 
feet away from them.  There was not much of a background and there were no edges to 
the inner seeing.  The inner seeing was in black and white.  There are two reasons for 
skepticism regarding this report however:  1. Gary did not mention the inner seeing until 
the possibility of an inner seeing was suggested.  2. Gary often answered questions about 
the details of the inner seeing by saying “They would be…” and “It would be…” as if he 
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was not describing an actual inner seeing, but an inner seeing like it would have appeared 
were he having an inner seeing at that moment. 
WT – ready for installation
I? (presence uncertain) – two men lifting
M? (presence of I uncertain)
Beep 3.5 – Gary was in an elevator.  At the moment of the beep, he was thinking “Oh 
darn, we’re late, I wish we could get started a little earlier.”  This experience was similar
to 3.1 and 3.3 (it contained words but there was no auditory quality to the words and it 
happened very quickly).  The “Oh darn, we’re late” part of the experience contained 
those specific words, but the rest of the experience could be described just as accurately 
using variations in the wording.  Gary may also have been experiencing mild irritation at 
the moment of the beep.  This was a mental process.  It was not clear if this was a 
separate experience from the experience above or if it was somehow contained within the 
experience above.  Gary did not mention this aspect of his experience until the very end 
of the description and did so off-handedly, but believed it was present at the moment of 
the beep when questioned.  This increases skepticism regarding this particular component 
of the beep.   
WT - late
F? (presence uncertain)– irritation   
M? (presence of F uncertain) 
Beep 4.1 – Gary was eating breakfast.  At the moment of the beep, he was thinking about 
his wife Alice’s eye problems, about the seriousness of her eye problems, the possible 
consequences of her eye problems, and was worried about their seriousness.  This was 
experienced as one long sentence that went something like “I wonder how serious Alice’s 
eye problems will be and if she will be okay and what the doctor will say and what the 
consequences might be…”etc.  This sentence occurred faster than external speech and 
although it did not have any auditory qualities, it did have characteristics of speech, such 
as pauses and inflections at appropriate places.  He also reported that it was as if the 
words were being spoken but the auditory part of the speech was taken away, but later he 
reported that there may have been something visual about this experience, like the words 
were moving across his visual field from left to right one at a time, but there was no 
actual seeing of the words and it was not like reading.  The interviewers were unable to 
resolve this seeming inconsistency. It was clear that there were words, and that these 
words were sequential, that the sequence was faster than would occur if spoken aloud, 
and that there was some inflection and rhythm to the words but how all that was 
conveyed was not clear.  Gary also may have been experiencing some concern for his 
wife’s condition in addition to that expressed in the above experience, but this was not 
clear and if it were present it was very slight.  
WT (w/ possible visual component) – eye problems
F? (presence uncertain) – concern
Beep 4.2 – Gary was gathering things that he needed to leave his house and was talking 
to Alice.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was wondering if he had everything that he 
needed to leave, if Alice had everything she needed to leave, and was thinking about a 
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doctor to whom he owed money.  These thoughts were similar to the experience in 4.1, in 
that they were in words, perhaps somewhat like speech but with no auditory component, 
and were faster than regular speech, but also perhaps somewhat visual.  The experience 
was different from 4.1 in that the sentences seemed to interrupt each other, and the entire 
rate might have been a bit faster.  For example, before Gary could complete thinking “Do 
I have everything I need?” another thought, such as, “Does Alice have what she needs?” 
would interrupt the first thought.  Then a third, also worded, thought would interrupt the 
second before it had completed, and so on.  The impression was of a jumble of thoughts, 
all incomplete.  
WT (w/ possible visual component; series of thoughts) – needing things to 
leave/doctor
M
Beep 4.3 – This beep was skipped because it came while Gary was writing his response 
to beep 4.2
Beep 4.4 – Gary was in the doctor’s office waiting for Alice to be called.  Alice was 
talking to him about her hospice nursing experience, and although he had a general sense 
of what she was saying, he was not paying any or at least much attention to her.  At the 
moment of the beep, he was thinking a series of worded thoughts: “How serious is her 
Alice’s condition?” “What is the doctor going to say?” ”What’s  his diagnosis?”  The 
characteristics of these thinkings were similar to 4.1: worded thoughts, perhaps speechy 
but perhaps visual, that followed one another, that were sequential, and that had some of 
the rhythm and inflection characteristics of speech.  The sentences were shorter than the 
one long sentence as in 4.1; the sentences were complete (not jumbled as when they 
interrupted each other in 4.2).  Gary also may have been experiencing some concern 
about the situation the was more than the experience above. The concern at this beep was 
greater than in 4.1.  It was not physical and it is not entirely clear if it was present or not.  
WT (w/ possible visual component; series of thoughts) – diagnosis
F? (presence uncertain)– concern
M? (presence of F uncertain)
Beep 4.5 – Alice had just come out of the doctor’s office back out into the waiting room.  
Just prior to the beep she had told him that the doctor said that she will need eye surgery 
before the end of the year.  At the moment of the beep, Gary felt a cold chill on the 
outside of his body as if the temperature in the room had dropped.  There was also a 
tingling sensation to the chill.  The chill and tingling were present from his waist to the 
top of his head.  This was an emotional reaction to Alice’s news that she would need 
surgery.  Gary was also thinking a series of worded thoughts: “Oh, my gosh!” ”What’s 
going to happen?” ”I hope it turns out okay!” Thank God we have the best doctor.”  This 
experience was a series of worded thoughts similar to 4.1 and 4.3.
SA -  chill
WT (w/ possible visual component; series of thoughts) – surgery-related issues
Beep 4.6 – Gary and Alice were having lunch at a restaurant and Gary was doing a 
crossword puzzle.  Alice had just asked Gary whom he was going to vote for in the 2008 
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election.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was thinking “I don’t know yet, I haven’t 
made up my mind.”  This experience was somewhat simpler than those described above, 
so Gary could be more certain of the details.  The quotation is the exact or close to exact 
words.  Gary could also distinguish that he thought a comma between “yet” and “I” rather 
than a period because the pause was shorter than it would have been for a period.  
However, Gary still could not say whether these words were spoken or seen, even though 
he seemed to understand the question, to understand the importance of the distinction, 
even to be fascinated by it.
WT (w/ possible visual component) – voting 
Beep 5.1 – Gary was eating breakfast and reading the newspaper.  He was reading an 
article about possibly deleting the motto “In God We Trust” from U.S. currency.  At the 
moment of the beep, Gary was thinking something very similar to “how are other people 
and religions going to react to this newspaper article?”  This was experienced in a similar 
manner to previous beeps; there were words present, there was no auditory quality to the 
experience although the experience did have aspects of speech (such as the question mark 
at the end being implicit in the experience), the words were sequential, but a bit faster 
than if actually spoken.  This aspect of Gary’s experience comprised about half of his 
awareness.  The other half was the actual article that Gary was reading and 
comprehending.    
WT – religions and newspaper article
Beep 5.2 – Gary was eating breakfast and just beginning a crossword puzzle.  Gary was 
thinking of words that could go in the crossword puzzle, specifically in the “1 Across” 
and “1 Down” section.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was imaginarily seeing words 
for both “1 Across” and “1 Down” superimposed on the actual blank crossword puzzle he 
was looking at.  At the time of the expositional interview, he could not recall what the 
words were, but he seemed to indicate that he could have written them down had he 
known we wanted that kind of detail.  The imaginarily seen words were in capital block 
letters as if he had written them.  He was not focused on the entire puzzle, just the upper 
left corner where “1 Across” and “1 Down” were.  Gary’s lack of detail (i.e., which 
words he was imagining) suggests that there should be some skepticism regarding the 
accuracy of Gary’s report at this beep.   
I? (lack of detail) – crossword 
Beep 5.3 – Gary was again working on a crossword puzzle.  He had completed some of 
the puzzle, but was now going back and trying to fill in the blank spaces.  At the moment 
of the beep, Gary was imagining a word superimposed on the crossword just like in 5.2, 
but this time he was in the middle of the puzzle and was only envisioning one word.  He 
was not sure what the word was or if it was going across or down.  Again, Gary’s lack of 
detail in describing this beep is grounds for some skepticism.   
I? (lack of detail) – crossword 
Beep 5.4 – Gary was outside of his house checking the landscaping and sprinkler system.  
He was checking for wet dirt where water had come out of the sprinkler, signifying that 
the sprinkler was working.  The dirt was in fact wet in the appropriate areas.  At the 
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moment of the beep, Gary felt relieved that the dirt was wet and the sprinkler system 
appeared to be working.  This relief was experienced as a tingling on the surface of his 
upper torso that included his chest and his back.  Also, somehow related to the relief, 
Gary was thinking that he was glad the sprinkler worked, that the crew seems to have 
done their job properly, and that they set up the system properly.  This experience was 
similar to past experiences in which Gary was thinking in words that had no auditory 
quality.  
F – relief
WT – glad sprinkler system works
Beep 5.5 – Gary was doing a crossword puzzle.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was 
again trying to find a word that fit a space in the crossword similar to beep 5.3.  
I? (lack of detail) - crossword
Beep 5.6 – Gary was doing a crossword puzzle.  At the moment of the beep, Gary’s 
experience was very similar to5.3, and 5.5.  
I ? (lack of detail)– crossword
Beep 6.1 – Gary was at home eating breakfast.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was 
having three simultaneous experiences.  One of these experiences was wondering if 
people he knows are affected by the fires in southern California.  This was experienced as 
innerly seeing a neighborhood that he knows and has been to in California, and this area 
was in flames.  He was not sure what specific area he was innerly seeing, but the houses 
in the inner seeing were familiar and it was a specific place that he has been.  The inner 
seeing was fairly clear, in color, and there was motion in the picture (i.e., the flames were 
moving).  The second experience was that he was feeling bad for the people in the fire.  
This was an experience that clearly involved words, but there was no auditory quality to 
the words.  These words were occurring a bit faster than speech and seemed to move 
from left to right somehow.  There also may have been some visual quality to the words, 
but the exact nature of this visual quality was difficult to discern.   (i.e., words present but 
not auditory, the words occurring faster than speech, etc.).  The third experience was 
wondering if the beeper was going to go off while he was thinking about the fire.  This 
was experienced as words, but with no auditory quality.  The words were moving a bit 
faster than actual speech, the words may have been moving left to right somehow, and 
there may have been a visual quality to the experience, but Gary was not certain of this.   
This was also a thought process similar to previous beeps All three of these experiences 
were equally present in his awareness.  
I – fire
WT (w/ possible visual component) – feeling bad for people
WT(w/ possible visual component) – beeper sounding
M
Beep 6.2 – Gary was in a group meeting.  Members of the group were talking about the 
World Series of baseball beginning later that day.  Gary was thinking something very 
close to “Oh, I had forgotten that the World Series started today.”  The exact words were 
present, but Gary could not quite remember exactly what they were.  This experience was 
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similar to previous beeps in form.  They were sequential and a little faster than speech.  
They also seemed to have a visual quality and were moving left to right, but it did not 
seem that Gary was actually seeing the words.  They also seemed to come automatically 
to Gary, rather than being purposefully produced. 
WT (w/ possible visual component) – World Series
Beep 6.3 – Gary was still attending the group.  The group was talking about coin 
collections.  At the moment of the beep, Gary was innerly seeing a coin book that he 
owns.  There was little detail to this inner seeing, which was also out of focus.  Gary
could discern that the book was open and almost a white color.  He could also see round 
disks that represented coins, which were a little darker than the book.  There were about 
45 coins.  He could also see about five empty holes in the book that did not have coins.  
These holes were a bit darker than the book and coins.  This inner seeing filled his visual 
field.  Gary was also seeing words scroll across the middle of the inner seeing.  The 
words were something very similar to “when am I going to get the rest of the quarters 
that are being issued this year?”  These words were in focus.  The words were similar to 
the words that scroll at the bottom of some television news channels, but were in the 
middle and were moving faster.  The verbal part of this experience was similar to 
previous beeps (6.1, for example), in that the words did not have an auditory quality, 
moved faster than normal speech, and moved from left to right.  However, whereas in 6.1 
the worded part of Gary’s experience may have been vaguely visual, the worded part of 
this experience was clearly visual and the words were clearly seen moving from left to 
right.  
I – coin book
WT? (form uncertain) – words scrolling 
M
Henry’s Samples
      Henry had such difficulty describing his momentary inner experience on day one that 
the beeps could not be written up in any meaningful way.  Also, because Henry’s reports 
were very unreliable forms will not be speculated as it is unlikely that his reports 
represent his momentary inner experience.  
Beep 2.1 – Henry was sitting in the passenger seat of his car (his wife was driving).  The 
car was coming out of the garage and the door was closing near the moment of the beep.  
Near or at the moment of the beep, Henry may have been experiencing something 
between anxiety and eagerness in his body that he described as a “drive” or wanting to 
move.  This involved his entire body and was due to his desire to get to his support group 
early.  He also may have been experiencing happiness.  At first he stated that his 
happiness was general (i.e., “I’m always happy.”), but also stated that he was 
experiencing happiness somehow (both bodily and mentally, after these possibilities were 
suggested by the interviewers) at the moment of the beep.        
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Beep 2.2 – Henry and his wife were pulling into the parking lot to attend the support 
group.  Henry may not have remembered exactly when the beep came for this sample.  
He was not certain if the beep came when he was in the parking lot or on the street.  
Beep 2.3 – Henry was in his support group discussing the Thanksgiving holiday and what 
people did for Thanksgiving last week.  This discussion had just begun and Henry may 
have been talking.  He may have been talking with the group leader about the cold season
in San Francisco or about Thanksgiving.  At or near the moment of the beep, Henry may 
have been experiencing relaxation, the conversation, and the group leader smiling.    
Beep 2.4 – Henry was still in his support group.  The group was reading a map of the 
United States and discussing where people lived/grew up and where they went for 
Thanksgiving.  It is unclear exactly what Henry was doing at the moment of the beep (at 
first he said he was tracing his finger along Route 15 on the map, but later said his hands 
were folded at the moment of the beep).  At the moment of the beep, Henry may have 
been experiencing a happy mood, but when asked he said that he is generally happy and 
did not talk about this experience specifically at the moment of the beep.  
Beep 2.5 – Henry was talking to Todd, one of the interviewers, before the interview 
began, when the beep sounded through Henry’s earphone.  Henry, according to Todd’s 
observation, may have been talking about Thanksgiving or what Todd was currently 
doing in school.  During the subsequent interview, Henry stated that at this moment of 
the beep he was saying, “Todd, what are you doing in school?” and that the beep came 
between the words “Todd” and “what.”  However, although Henry asked Todd about 
school, Todd’s recollection is that Henry did not ever ask “Todd, what are you doing in 
school?”  Henry may have been aware of being in a happy mood at the moment of the 
beep, but he again discussed his general happy mood when asked rather than his 
experience at the moment of the beep.  When Dr. Hurlburt, one of the interviewers 
inquired whether this mood was experienced bodily and/or mentally, Henry seemed to 
agree that it was bodily and mental, as if following Dr. Hurlburt’s suggestion.  
  
Beep 3.1 – Henry was relaxing in his dining room and was talking to his wife.  The two 
of them needed to do errands in the near future.  At the moment of the beep, Henry may 
have been saying “We better get started to go, Kate.”  He stated that the beep came just 
after he completed the sentence, but changed the exact wording of the sentence in his 
report.  He also did not appear to have written this statement in his notes.  He also may 
have been feeling some momentum in his body as he moves to get up out of his chair, but 
it was unclear if this was at the moment of the beep as Henry did not mention this until 
late in discussing this beep.  Henry reported that there was nothing in his experience at 
this beep.  
Beep 3.2 – Henry was sitting on a couch at a friend’s house.  He had just looked at his 
watch.  At the moment of the beep he was feeling anxious/eager to leave.  This was 
experienced as a feeling of movement or wanting to move.  It was experienced bodily 
from the top of his head to his stomach area.  There may have also been something 
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mental about this experience, but this was difficult to discern.  He may have been starting 
to get up from the couch at the beep.  
Beep 3.3 – Henry was at home eating lunch with his wife and they were discussing going 
out later that evening with friends.  Initially, Henry reported that he was saying “What 
clothing are you going to wear?” out loud to his wife, stating that the beep had come 
between “you” and “going.”  He later stated that he had specific clothing in mind that he 
was going to wear and that at the moment of the beep he was asking for approval from 
his wife about what he was going to wear that night.  It was difficult to discern whether 
this was a change in his report about his experience (from being about his wife’s clothing 
to being about his own clothing) or whether the question about his wife’s clothing was 
actually a part of his consideration of what he should wear.  We tried to differentiate 
those aspects without success.  He also reported a desire to move that was similar to a 
previous beep. We asked to see Henry’s notes for this beep; they simply stated “eating 
lunch, getting ready for affair for today.” 
Beep 4.1 – Henry was reading a newsletter from a group that he is involved with.  He had 
just finished reading the last paragraph.  Henry initially described many potential 
experiences that were occurring at the moment of the beep: thinking about charity work 
he has done, thinking about two members of the group that had died recently, 
remembering his shock upon one of the member’s deaths occurring very suddenly, and 
how he is alive but he could have just as easily died.  When it was suggested that he 
could be thinking about the dead member in pictures, Henry agreed that he was having an 
inner seeing.  However, by the end of the interview it seemed that Henry was simply 
reading and not having any experience at the moment of the beep, although he may have 
been experiencing some of the above experiences somewhere near the moment of the 
beep.
Beep 4.2 – Henry first stated that he was eating a carrot and discussing shopping with his 
wife.  He then stated that he was eating a carrot and reading.  At the moment of the beep, 
it seemed that Henry was just reading with comprehension. 
Beep 4.3 – Henry was talking to his wife.  At first, Henry said that was laughing at the 
moment of the beep and walking out of the bedroom.  He later said that he was saying 
“okay dear” to his wife at the beep.  It seemed that Henry was not having any inner 
experience at this beep.
Beep 4.4 – Henry was glancing through a brochure of Lee’s Liquors.  He was looking at 
the prices of different gift baskets and comparing them to pictures of what was contained 
in the gift basket.  At first, Henry stated that his eyes had just focused on a price, $24.99, 
and his eyes had not yet moved to the corresponding item, a Bailey’s Irish Crème gift 
basket.  He later said that at the moment of the beep he was laughing at how expensive 
Bailey’s Irish Crème was compared to what prices were like in the 60’s and 70’s for 
liquor.  Those two descriptions are contradictory, because the one presumes that Henry
knew what the price stood for and the other presumes that he does not know that.  When 
asked how he was remembering, he explained his real life experience from that time 
346
period.  It seems that Henry was either having no experience at this moment or could not 
explain it adequately.  
Beep 4.5 – Henry was reading through a magazine and looking for an article that would 
be interesting to read.  Specifically, he was reading a caption about a Cardinal in Viet 
Nam.  At the moment of the beep, Henry was apparently simply reading and 
comprehending.
Irving’s Samples
      Irving’s samples were deemed to be unreliable.  A very high level of skepticism 
should be used when reviewing his samples.  Because they are unreliable, forms are not 
included at the end of each of his beep summaries.  
Beep 1.1 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment.  At the moment of the beep, 
Irving may have been wondering what he was going to do this afternoon.  At first he 
mentioned that he was thinking of the different activities that he might participate in, but 
later recanted saying that he was wondering in general what he was going to do.  
Furthermore, this was not a decision making process among different activities, but 
simply a general wondering.  However, it is not entirely clear whether any particular 
activities were in his awareness or not at the moment of the beep.  There were no symbols 
or emotion in this experience.  It was reported as simply wondering but substantial 
skepticism is warranted for this sample.  
Beep 1.2 – Irving had just glanced at the newspaper where he had read an article about 
the New York governor’s sex scandal.  He was not reading the newspaper at the moment 
of the beep.  Irving stated that at the moment of the beep he was innerly seeing the 
governor making his public announcement that he was involved in the scandal and his 
wife was standing next to him.  Although Irving believed that the governor was talking in 
his experience, he was not hearing any words (i.e., his mouth was moving but there was 
no sound being made in Irving’s experience).  This seeing was exactly the same as the 
announcement he had seen the previous evening on television, although it is not clear if 
Irving was seeing a television screen in his experience.  Irving was confident in his 
description of the inner seeing and described many details.  For example, the governor 
and his wife were viewed slightly to the side, the governor’s wife was on the governor’s 
right, he could see the governor from about the bottom of the neck up, he could see his 
wife from about the middle chest up.  Irving could not tell what they were wearing, 
although the inner seeing was very clear.  However, because of the variation in 
interviewing for this day and later evidence, this beep should be taken with substantial 
skepticism.    
Beep 1.3 – This beep occurred seconds after the interview for 1.2 ended.  The headphone 
had just fallen out of Irving’s ear and he had just put it back in.  Although Irving seemed 
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uncertain at first, he eventually stated that he was pretty certain that nothing was in his 
awareness at the moment of the beep. 
Beep 1.4 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment.  The previous evening, Irving’s 
son and wife had visited him and mentioned that they were having a dinner for him soon 
and would invite many people.  Irving reported that at the moment of the beep he 
wondering who was going to be at his dinner.  This wondering appeared to have no 
symbols.  Also, within this same experience, Irving was somehow thinking of his son.  It 
is not certain how his son was present in this experience, but Irving was fairly certain that 
his son was in this experience.  Irving also may have been remembering his son and wife 
visiting the previous night, but he was not certain if this was in his experience and if it 
was it was much less prevalent than the wondering.  Irving was slightly inconsistent 
during the interview for this beep, but once the discussion of what was before, after, and 
at the beep occurred, Irving became much more consistent.  Nevertheless, Irving’s 
account was not very believable when considering the lack of rigor of the interview and 
evidence from later sampling days.     
Beep 1.5 – Irving was reading a newspaper article about a local bridge that recent had 
large concrete pieces fall from it.  It was not clear what was in Irving’s awareness at this 
beep.  At first, he said “the first thing that comes to mind is that it’s a catastrophe.”  He 
then discussed the actual condition of the bridge and the government’s lack of response.  
When asked again about the moment of the beep Irving asked what he had said 
previously.  When the interviewer stated that he said that he may have been thinking that 
it was a catastrophe, Irving stated that he was not certain if that is what he was thinking 
and was not certain what his experience was at the moment of the beep.  Irving was 
confident that he was thinking something and had somewhat withdrawn from the actual 
process of reading.  
       
Beep 2.1 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment thinking about a story a man told 
him at lunch about making an illegal turn in his car.  Irving told the interviewer a long 
story about this conversation and initially stated that he was thinking about the incident 
with the man at the moment of the beep.  He later stated that at the moment of the beep 
he was trying to stop thinking about the situation, that he was about to “turn it off” in his 
mind.  Irving thought that he was aware of trying to stop thinking about the situation at 
the moment of the beep, but was not certain.  Irving was fairly certain that he had to use 
effort to end the thought, but was not certain is this was exactly at the moment of the 
beep or not.  He was also not certain if he was still thinking about the situation with the 
man he spoke with at lunch at the moment of the beep and was inconsistent on this point.  
Beep 2.2 – When asked about the moment of the beep, Irving said that he was thinking 
about a vacation he took with his wife and children many years ago.  He then proceeded 
to tell a very long story about the actual vacation.  When asked again what exactly was in 
his awareness at the moment of the beep he said “more or less the first part of the trip.”  
When asked if he was thinking about a specific aspect of the first part of the trip at the 
moment of the beep he stated that he may have been thinking about the part of the trip 
when his son went across a particular state line (the interviewer is not sure which one, 
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although Irving knew which one it was).  Irving stated that this was very close to the 
beep, but was not sure if it was exactly at the beep.  He then said that he was thinking 
more about the excitement of his children during the trip at the moment of the beep.  He 
stated that the excitement part of his experience and the state line part were close to one 
another and occurred close to the beep.  Irving was fairly certain that he was not 
experiencing any symbols at the moment of the beep.  Throughout this beep, Irving
appeared to rely heavily on external reality.  It was difficult to determine to what extent 
Irving was discussing the actual trip and to what extent he was discussing his inner 
experience.  
Beep 2.3 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment.  At or around the beep, Irving
was thinking about a woman who used to run the food service in his assisted living 
program.  He then told a detailed story about the poor quality of food and a meeting he 
had with the woman.  When Irving was asked how he was thinking about the woman at 
the moment of the beep, he stated that he did not understand how she could “go on like 
that taking advantage of us.”  He then stated that, at the moment of the beep, he was 
thinking about the woman but was not certain exactly how he was thinking about her or 
the form of his experience at this beep. 
Beep 2.4 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment.  Irving stated that he was 
thinking about his father when he had typhoid fever in the early 1920’s at the moment of 
the beep.  He then told a detailed story about his family.  At one point, Irving was 
repetitive, telling the interviewer twice within 3 minutes that he did not want to be a 
farmer because it would have been hard for his wife (this is Irving’s first incidence of 
repetitiveness so far).  It was not clear exactly how he was thinking about his father at the 
moment of the beep, but it seems that he was thinking about his father somehow at the 
moment of the beep.  Irving at one point stated that he was thinking about his mother as 
well, but later stated that this occurred after the beep.  
Beep 3.1 – Irving did not respond to this beep.  
Beep 3.2 - Irving stated that at the moment of the beep he was thinking about seeing 
Barack Obama’s minister on television the night before.  Irving then went on to discuss 
the minister himself, what he was wearing, the effect it will have on Obama in the 
election, his concern about ending the war in Iraq, among other issues.  When Irving was 
repeatedly asked what he was experiencing at the moment of the beep, he was very 
inconsistent, but always mentioned something in relation to the Obama’s minister or an 
issue surrounding him.  Eventually, Irving stated that he was uncertain exactly what he 
was experiencing at the moment of the beep but that it had something to do with the 
minister.  
Beep 3.3 - Irving stated that at the moment of the beep he was thinking about a trip he 
took with his father in 1933 and then explained various details of the trip.  The 
interviewer attempted to make a distinction between what Irving was experiencing at the 
moment of the beep and the reality of the trip.  Irving again was not certain exactly what 
he was experiencing at the moment of the beep, but that it had something to do with 
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getting ready to go on the trip.  He was again unable to describe the form of his 
experience.  
Beep 4.1 – Irving had recently read a newspaper article about a mother who discovered 
that her son had shot himself.  Irving began the interview by discussing the incident itself 
and how it reflected on young adults these days.  When re-directed to his inner 
experience at the moment of the beep Irving stated that he was innerly seeing the mother 
coming out of the house, although he could only say this when form options were 
suggested, including an inner seeing.  He had some difficulty describing the details of the 
inner seeing when asked about the details in general.  When asked specific questions 
(such as what angle, length of hair, what she was wearing, etc.) he was able to respond.  
He stated that he was seeing her from the side, that her hair was not long, that she was 
Caucasian, and that she may have been wearing a dress but was not entirely certain.  
Irving stated that the inner seeing was a little unclear and, although it was in color, the 
colors were muted.  Irving also may have been shocked by the incident at the moment of 
the beep, but could not describe this experience further.  Irving’s difficulty describing 
form, tendency to describe reality when asked questions about his inner experience, and 
lack of ability to answer some specific questions related to this beep are all grounds for 
skepticism.  It appears likely that Irving was somehow thinking of the situation that he 
read about in the newspaper article, but the specifics of this experience are questionable.     
Beep 4.2 – At the moment of the beep, Irving was recalling a scene from his childhood.  
He was innerly seeing himself at school trying to gain the attention of a teacher who was 
talking to another teacher.  In the inner seeing Irving was reaching toward the teacher’s 
dress (or possibly a sweater), but she was ignoring him and continued talking to the other 
teacher.  He could not see the other teacher in the inner seeing, but knew that she was 
there.  He also could not hear the discussion in his experience.  The inner seeing was 
fairly clear and in color.  Irving appeared to be confusing the actual event with the inner 
seeing at time, causing reason for skepticism for this experience.  For example, when 
asked about the teacher’s clothing in the inner seeing he stated that she was “wearing 
pretty nice clothing because this was in town.”  When asked about what he was wearing 
in his experience he stated that  “in all probability, I was wearing knickers” but was 
clearly referring to the actual situation (that he was probably wearing knickers because 
that is what he usually wore in that situation at that time period).  He later stated that he 
did not think that he could see them in the inner seeing.  It is very difficult to discern to 
what extent Irving was having this experience at the moment of the beep due to his 
alternation between descriptions of reality and inner experience.  It is likely that he was 
experiencing the general content that he described at the moment of the beep, but the 
details are very uncertain.  Irving also may have been experiencing wanting attention, as 
if he were re-living the actual experience.  He could not describe this wanting of 
attention.  When asked about the form of the experience of attention Irving either simply 
repeated the content of the experience or referred to the actual event. 
Beep 4.3 – Irving again began this interview describing the actual experience he had as a 
child skating with his friends and building a fire on the ice.  When directed to his inner 
experience at the moment of the beep he stated that he was innerly seeing his friends 
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starting the fire on the ice and himself standing nearby.  Irving was given no prompts for 
form prior to describing this experience.  There were about three boys in the inner seeing, 
but he was not certain.  The fire was lit.  There was color to the fire.  Irving was not 
certain if the rest of the inner seeing was in black and white or if it simply had little color 
outside of the fire.  The boys were mostly facing him in the inner seeing but he could not 
make out the details of their faces as the inner seeing was unclear.  He could describe 
some details, such as everyone in the inner seeing were wearing skates, the other boys 
were fixing the fire, and he was standing upright nearby.    
Beep 4.4 – Irving reported not attempting to think of anything in particular prior to this 
beep.  At the moment of the beep Irving was reportedly thinking about a meeting that he 
had earlier in the day.  The meeting was for residents of his assisted living program.  
Irving was innerly seeing a man (Steve) next to him asking a question about a model 
cottage in an adjacent facility.  Steve was on the right side of the inner seeing while the 
man running the meeting was on the left side but in the distance.  This was the same 
perspective that Irving had in reality.  There were other people in the inner seeing that 
were attending the meeting but Irving could not describe any details about these people or 
how many there were.  The inner seeing itself was fairly clear and it was either in black 
and white or had very little color. Irving may have also been hearing Steve talking in his 
experience.  He was talking very loudly, but was difficult to understand (both in real life 
and in his experience).  Irving was not certain of the exact words Steve was saying.  
  
Beep 5.1 – Irving was remembering an incident that occurred with a friend (James) who 
recently died.  Irving described James and the incident at length before he was re-oriented 
to the moment of the beep.  This incident involved Irving visiting James in the hospital 
while James was asleep.  Irving said is name a few times and James woke up and said 
“Irving” in a loud voice.  Irving reported that at the moment of the beep he was innerly 
seeing James in the hospital bed.  Irving stated that the inner seeing was clear with little 
color, although Ed’s face was quite red, as it was in reality.  At or very near the moment 
of the beep Irving was experiencing James’ opening his eyes and saying “Irving.”  Irving
also may have been experiencing amazement at the moment of the beep, but could not 
describe the form of the amazement.  When asked repeatedly, Irving either referred to the 
actual experience or repeated the content of the experience (i.e., “I was just amazed.”).  
Irving seemed to again be intertwining reality with his experience at the moment of the 
beep, but it is difficult to discern to what extent this was taking place.
Beep 5.2 – Irving was just given the MMSE.  Irving had just said “I appreciate that I’m 
as good as I am” referring to his cognitive ability.  The beep sounded slightly after he 
finished this sentence.  Irving did not respond to the beep but rather kept having a 
conversation with the interviewer with small periods of silence in between talking (a few 
seconds).  The beep continued to sound during the conversation and Irving did not 
respond.  Eventually, Irving recognized the “chirp” of the beeper while he was talking 
about 4 minutes after the beeper initially sounded.  
Beep 5.3 – Again, Irving did not respond to the beep while he was talking.  When the 
beep sounded, Irving simply continued to talk with no pause in his talking. Eventually 
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Irving reported hearing the chirp sound.  The interviewer did not hear the beep this time 
so it is uncertain how long it took for Irving to recognize the chirp.  This seemed to be the 
same thing that happened during beep 5.2.  However, the interviewer cannot determine 
how long the beeper was going off.
Beep 5.4 – Irving was telling a story about a sexton he knew when he was younger who 
liked to tell stories.  This time, Irving immediately recognized the beep even though it 
sounded while he was talking.  At the moment of the beep, Irving was reportedly innerly 
seeing the sexton standing outside of a church door on the steps.  Irving stated that the 
inner seeing was clear and the sexton was only a few feet away from the perspective of 
the inner seeing and Irving could see most of his body.  He was wearing trousers, but 
Irving could not describe them.  Irving may have also seen himself in the inner seeing, 
but only reported this when specifically asked.  Irving may have been standing a little to 
the left of the inner seeing while the sexton was talking.  Irving could not hear what the 
sexton was saying in his experience.  Irving frequently intertwined reality with his inner 
experience during this interview.  For example, when directed toward his inner 
experience Irving seemed to describe it, then continue to discuss reality.  Irving also said 
that the inner seeing was in the summer, but later said that this was an external fact and 
not necessarily part of his experience at the moment of the beep. 
Beep 5.5 – This beep occurred immediately after the end of the interview for 5.4.  Irving
had just said “I can see him standing and talking.”  There was a pause in the conversation 
when the beep sounded and Irving heard it and responded to it.  Irving was just getting 
ready to tell the interviewer more about the sexton, but it was not clear if this was in 
Irving’s experience or not.  Irving was not sure what, if anything, was in his awareness at 
this beep. 
Beep 5.6 – For this beep, Irving simply sat in his chair, not engaging in conversation with 
the interviewer.  Apparently, Irving had fallen asleep when the beep went off.  After 
about 35 minutes (the beeper was set for a maximum of 30 minutes), the interviewer 
asked him if it went off.  Irving woke up and said he did not hear it.  The interviewer 
listened and the beeper was in “chirp” mode.  
Beep 6.1 – Irving began this interview by discussing his son and his wife in general and 
how they own a house in Ocean City, New Jersey and how his family is currently in 
Ocean City, New Jersey.  When questioned specifically about the moment of the beep, 
Irving stated that he was wondering what his son was doing today (the day of the 
interview).   Specifically, he was wondering if he was running on the boardwalk or if he 
was repairing something.  When questioned further, Irving stated that he was wondering 
at the beep if he was running, but later said that this came a little bit after the beep.   Near 
the end of the interview, Irving stated that this experience came a little before the beep.  
Irving also stated that at the moment of the beep he was innerly seeing his son repairing 
something.    This inner seeing was unclear and difficult to describe, although his son 
seems to have been holding a hammer (Irving later added a saw to the inner seeing).  
Finally, Irving stated that he was not sure which of the above was exactly at the moment 
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of the beep, saying that he did not think that he did very good with this beep and that 
what occurred at the beep “slips my mind.” 
Beep 6.2 – Irving was sitting in his chair.  After approximately 35 minutes, the 
interviewer asked Irving if the beep sounded (it was set for a maximum of 30 minutes).  
Irving said it had not.  Irving was then asked if he was hearing little beeps (i.e., chirps) 
and he said no.  The interviewer listened to the beeper and it was in chirp mode, signaling 
that Irving had missed the beep.   Irving did not appear to be asleep during this beep, but 
was not watched closely.  
June’s Samples
      June could not meaningfully engage in DES.  Please see the chapter on June for more 
information.  
Karen’s Samples
      Karen’s difficulty with the DES procedure was substantial enough to make individual 
beep summaries largely useless.  Please see her individual chapter for more information.  
Lilly’s Samples
      Lilly could not give meaningful responses to her beeps.  For more information, please 
see the chapter on Lilly.  
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APPENDIX B
SELECTED TRANSCRIPTS
      Transcripts of excerpts from interviews with 5 participants are given below.  
Comments regarding the transcripts are in italics.    
Fay
This transcript is taken from the final day of sampling with Fay.  During this day, the 
interviewers waited in a bedroom at Fay’s house while she wore the beeper so that she 
could be interviewed immediately after the beep.  Even though this was the last day, this 
beep (5.3) is representative of Fay’s interviews in that she is inconsistent and often 
discusses external reality rather than inner experience.
Fay began the interview by stating that at the moment of the beep she was playing 
computer Scrabble and thinking about whether “slotter” was a word or not.  
Russ (interviewer): …are you, uh, right at the moment trying to figure out whether it’s a 
word? 
Fay: Yeah, I was trying to think of whether it was a word…(inaudible)…or can I just play 
it?  If it’s not then the computer will challenge it and take it away.  You can’t override 
that.  I’ve seen systems where I think you could but it seems like the current one you 
can’t.      
R: And s…and so right at the moment are you both thinking “I wonder it’s a word” and 
thinking “I’ll play it and find out”? 
F: Yeah, that’s what I was thinking.
R: Both of those things? 
F: Right. 
R: And, and, and does that seem like two separate thoughts or does that seem like two 
aspects of the same thought?
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F: Well, it’s two aspects of the same thought.
R: And are there any words involved with that, with that thinking? 
F: Well, I was going to add it onto another word that was already on the board 
(inaudible).   
Fay then briefly describes the actual playing of the word rather than her inner 
experience.  
R: But, but I guess what I’m tryin’ to figure out is, are you are saying to yourself, self,  
something like that, quote “I wonder whether that’s a word” unquote, or…
F: Yeah, I wasn’t quite sure whether it was a word or not.  I think I may have played it or, 
or it coming up in the past and whether it was good, I can’t recall.  
Again, Fay’s response does not address the question of inner experience at all.  It 
appeared that when asked about words being present in her inner experience, she took it 
to be a question about the actual word she was playing in Scrabble.  
R: And is that memory somehow present to you right at the moment of the beep?
F: Yeah, I was thinking about it, I was thinking I could play it but the system might reject 
it. 
Fay is referring to the reality of the situation, not to the question of her experiencing 
memory at the moment of the beep.  
R: And are, is there any…I’m, I’m gathering this is sort of a thought process, sort of 
thinking about I should play it and whether it’s a word, I’ll try it and see.  
F: Yeah. 
R: Is there a, anything else going on, like emotions or, mad at the system, or? 
F: Well, I was kind of trying to remember whether, you know, it had been played in the 
past, I think it has, but whether it was good or not, I wasn’t quite sure.  
Fay then discussed how much she has been playing Scrabble recently and about local 
Scrabble events.  R then asked how this remembering presented itself to her, but Fay
simply returned to saying that she was trying to remember whether it was good or not.  R 
then asked if she was trying to remember a specific time that it was played, and Fay said 
no, that she was trying to remember in general.  
R then attempted to summarize: 
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R: So it seems like you’re looking at the game on the screen. 
F: Yeah.
R: And then there’s a thought process which is going on which is about, “Well, I wonder 
whether slotter is a word, I, I know I’ve seen it played, I can’t remember whether it’s, 
whether it was good or not, I’ll just go ahead and play it, the computer will kick me out, 
some, some, some systems will allow you to challenge it, some systems won’t.  All that 
stuff seems like it’s somehow going on right at the moment of the beep, is that right?
F: Well, I wasn’t thinking so much about systems that would allow you to override 
(inaudible).
R: So that was not part of the moment of the beep? 
F: No, I would say it was not, but I was thinking the system might challenge it, the 
system challenges (inaudible). 
R: And, and that, and all of that stuff is somehow present in your thoughts?
F: Yes, I was thinking there was a distinct possibility it might get challenged off the 
board. 
R: But I’m, but I’m gathering that there aren’t, there aren’t any words that convey that.  
For example, you’re not saying to yourself “Well that’s a distinct possibility” end quote, 
and yet you somehow know that it’s a distinct possibility.  
F: Well, I knew it was a possibility that might not hold up. 
This is representative of Fay’s seeming inability to describe the form of her experiences.  
R: Okay. 
F: And I could go to my Scrabble dictionary and look it up before I played it to see 
whether it was going to hold up.  If you’re playing an actual game, you know, with live 
opponents they’re not going to let you do that.  With a computer, you can refer to the 
dictionary before you play it.  
This is indicative of Fay’s very frequent tendency to discuss reality throughout 
interviews.  
R: Okay.  And, and so, so all these, all these things, is slotter a word, I think I’ll play it, 
I’d like it over-ridden, I’m pretty sure, uh, pretty sure I’ve seen it before…do those things 
seem in anyway separate or does that all seem like part of the same thought process.  
F: I think it was all part of the same thought process.
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R: Okay.
F: I might play it and it might hold, and it might just go away, wipe it off the board.  
Todd: And can you say if all of these things, that’s part of the same process, are they all 
occurring all at once right at that moment or is it over a period of two, three seconds or?
F: It’s pretty much simultaneous. I’m thinking it may not work, but I’ll give it a shot.  
At this point the interview ended for this beep.
This beep is fairly representative of Fay’s samples, though there was much more 
consistency in this sample than in some others.  Common characteristics of her 
interviews that are featured here are:
1. Seemingly undifferentiated experience, or no experience at all, evidenced by a 
lack of form and multiple simultaneous awareness that could not be teased apart.
2. The inability to discuss the form of experience.  This may be due to the 
presence of undifferentiated experience or a lack of inner experience.
3. The tendency to discuss reality when attempting to discuss inner experience.  
This could also be symptomatic of undifferentiated experience or no experience at all.  
It is not certain if Fay’s difficulties with the interviewing process were due to 
undifferentiated experience, no experience at all, or some other factor either related to or 
unrelated to experience itself.  However, given Fay’s lack of cognitive impairment, it 
appears that these are the two most likely explanations.    
Henry
This is a transcription from the beginning of beep 4.1 with Henry that is meant to 
represent his inconsistency and general difficulty with DES even on the fourth and final 
day of sampling.  For this day, the interviewers waited outside while Henry wore the 
beeper.  When the beeper sounded, Henry notified the interviewers and the interviewers 
immediately interviewed him.  
For this sample, Henry had just finished reading the last paragraph of a letter from the 
Knights of Columbus at the moment of the beep.  Henry had just been asked what was in 
his experience at the moment of the beep:
Henry: Interesting. It was, it was the final part of his, his letter to the, to the (group 
members) of what uh, Christmas would be coming to and the (inaudible word) that we 
have as Roman Catholics and what, you know, what we should do, and things of that 
nature.  
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R: Okay.  And was all that stuff still in your mind…
H: Oh yeah.
R: In, in what way?
H: In what way?  Because you remember certain things that happen during the course of 
the year.   Like, uh, we lost a few brothers through death.  They were very young.   A few 
brothers who were quite sick.
R: And…
H: And, uh, there was a season of, uh, the first 6 months of the, of the (group) year when 
we, uh, were progressing very vigorously in the (inaudible) issues, charity work.
R: And were those things, the brothers that had died, and the charity work, were those 
things in your experience right at the moment of this beep…
H: Yes. 
R: …or is that just like background? 
H: Oh, background, back…because they past on prior, prior.  But the, uh, the charity 
work, of course, is always, is continuous…  
R: Right. 
H: is continuous, but the deaths of course were sudden.  That’s what happened.    
The above is an example of common difficulties that Henry had throughout sampling.  
First, he was inconsistent with his answer, first saying that all of what he described was 
in his experience, then quickly changing to stating that it was background when given the 
option.  Second, Henry discussed external fact (i.e., that charity work is on going but the 
deaths were sudden) rather than inner experience.  
R then explained that in reality the charity work is ongoing, but that does not necessarily 
mean that it is in awareness at the moment of the beep.  Henry stated that he was indeed 
thinking about the charity work as well as the death of the members of the group.  
R: And how did that stuff come to you right at the moment of the beep? 
H: Well, as I said, I was at the end of the para…, uh, of the, uh, letter, and, uh, as I was 
reading this, it was just like an impact, uh, just to bring back everything that we read, that 
I read, as in the last statement, it says “I hope you and your families have a wonderful and 
joyous Christmas.”  So it brings back everything of what has, has gone on in the first six
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months.  Charity work, yes.  We worked a lot.  I worked as much as I could, with my 
condition.  And the unfortunate deaths of two, two of the brothers. 
R: Okay.  And so that, the charity work part. 
H: Okay.
R: Did you, like, see a picture of the charity work, or just remember the…
H: No, just, just the memorization of what we do, because my wife and I are quite, uh, 
active in charity work.  We work with women’s resources, battered women.  I work with, 
uh, stuff with the (organization) that we do. 
R: And, and so, that’s uh, that’s a lot of stuff there.         
H: I, yes, it’s, yeah, it’s very broad.
Henry still appears to be talking about reality rather than his inner experience, evidenced 
by his generalities, his providing of context, and  his statement “it’s very broad.”  
R: And so right at the moment of the beep, what of that was in, was in your awareness?  
H: The death of my, of the two brother knights. 
This is an example of Henry’s high level of inconsistency.  A few seconds ago, he had 
been  stating that, at the moment of the beep, charity was in his awareness.  Now, when 
asked again, he does not refer to the charity work, but rather to the deaths that he 
mentioned previously.  
R: And, okay, in what, in what way was that in your awareness?
H: The shock.  The shock of the youngest one who died.  
This is the first time that Henry mentions experiencing shock.  
Henry goes on to explain the circumstances surrounding the man’s death, such as how 
long he was in the hospital and how he died.
R: What of that death was in your awareness right at the moment of the beep?  So you 
could be, you could have been feeling about it, you could have been seeing him…
H: I felt, okay.
R: …being sick, or you could have been…
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H: I felt about it because I, I’m a former cancer patient twice.  And here’s a young man 
who passed away and I’m still kickin’ and I guess it’s not my time to die.  That’s, that 
was my theory, my philosophy.  
R: And was that philosophy in your awareness right at the moment of the beep?     
H: Oh yes.  Yep.
Henry sounds extremely confident, but this is the first time he has mentioned any type of 
philosophy at all, and that philsosophy is presented in an explication of context, not of 
experience.
R: In words? Not in words?  In pictures? (inaudible question)
H: In pictures, in pictures.
R: In what way?  What kind of pictures? 
H: In what way? I could see the young man, who was, uh, was, in his coffin and I’m here, 
uh, you know, paying him the respect.  
Again, this report is inconsistent with his previous reports and is representative of many 
of Henry’s reports.  
At this point, Henry stated that all or parts of the above came just after the beep as he 
was taking stock of what he was experiencing at the beep.  At the moment of the beep, 
Henry stated that he was not having any experience and was just reading.  Nevertheless, 
this exchange is representative of many of Henry’s reports, and demonstrates the 
substantial inconsistencies of his reports and his propensity for discussing external 
reality rather than inner experience.  It also demonstrates that Henry apparently did not 
understand what was meant by “the moment of the beep” even on the fourth day of 
sampling. 
Irving
Portions of beep 5.1 are transcribed below.  This interview represents one of Irving’s 
most believable reports.  However, question still remains to what extent it is an actual 
report of his inner experience at the moment of the beep versus how Irving experienced 
the situation in reality.  
Irving was sitting in his chair in his living room when the beep sounded.  Irving began 
the interview by saying that at the moment of the beep he was remembering an incident 
with his friend (James) whose funeral  had been earlier in the day.  Irving explained that 
about 2 years ago James had been in a car accident and had had  to be moved to a full-
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care facility across the street from Irving’s residence.  Irving continued to talk about 
James in general.  The interviewer then directed Irving to the moment of the beep:  
Todd: So what is in your awareness right when the beep goes off? 
Irving: Right when it went off…
T: Yeah, right when it went off. 
I: …I was visiting him for the first time after that accident in full-care, which was then 
still off, across the road.  (A short, inaudible sentence)  And I hadn’t seen him for so long 
and he was in care and I made an effort to go over and see him to see whether he could 
converse, or…and right when it went off is when I was asking him in a low voice, he 
was, his eyes were closed, and I said “James” a couple times and all at once he opened 
his eyes and saw who I was and recognized who he, wa..who I was and said “Irving,” just 
like that.  Whatever all his dangers were, I don’t know.  He’d been hospitalized most of 
the time since and he was, at this time, I was seeing him here at full-care.  
The above is an example of one of Irving’s most believable and focused responses to 
questioning.  Usually, when Irving was asked in general about his experience at the 
moment of the beep he discussed external reality at length and would not remain focused 
on the moment of the beep.  The fact that Irving referred to the beep in his response (i.e.,
“…and right when it went off.”) showed a focus on the beep that was virtually never 
there during interviewing.  Still, it appears that Irving may very well be describing what 
actually occurred in the past rather than his experience at the moment of the beep.  In an 
attempt to discern if Irving was talking about inner experience or the actual event, the 
interviewer asked Irving if he thought that his experience/memory of the event at the 
moment of the beep was the same as it occurred in reality in the past.  Irving said that it 
was, although it may be difficult to make this distinction as his memory of the event itself 
may not be accurate.  Nevertheless, Irving’s reports of his inner experience at the 
moment of the beep almost always seemed to reflect a memory of an actual event, making 
it difficult to determine if he was talking about inner experience at the moment of the 
beep that just happened to reflect reality or if he was talking about reality and picking a 
time where the beep occurred.  The interviewer then tried to determine the exact point 
that the beep occurred in Irving’s description.  Irving stated that he was not sure, but he 
thought that it came right when James was saying “Irving.”  He later stated that he 
thought the beep occurred when James was opening his eyes, but again reverted to his 
statement that James was saying “Irving” at the moment of the beep.  Still, this reflected 
a level of specificity and consistency in answering that he typically did not display, 
although it does not necessarily suggest that Irving is actually describing his inner 
experience at the moment of the beep.  The interviewer then asked if Irving was innerly 
seeing James at the moment of the beep:
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T: And are you visualizing him in your mind when the beep went off?
I: Yes. 
T: And what are you seeing?  Can you describe that to me, right when the beep went off? 
I: I was standing looking at him.  And I said several times his name.  And, and then the, 
the beep went off when he, as he said “Irving,” I was aston…astonished at that.  
Irving is not answering the question at this point.  He is not describing what he may be 
innerly seeing at the moment of the beep, but either how the actual situation unfolded or 
his memory of the situation.  
T: So he’s laying in, in bed, is that right?
I: Yes.  He was laying in bed on his back…
T: And you’re standing…So in your mind are you just seeing him or are you seeing him 
and yourself? 
I: I’m seeing him more than myself. 
T: Is it like you’re seeing him from the perspective that you actually saw him, do you 
know what I mean?
I: Yes.  
T: Is it a clear picture?
I: Very clear.
T: Very clear.  In color, not in color?
I: What’d you say?
T: Is it in color? 
I: Not anymore than his, his complexion was quite red.  It wasn’t normal. 
Here, Irving is describing reality rather than his inner experience.  He was asked if his 
inner seeing was in color, but instead described the actual complexion of his friend.  
T: Mmm kay.  But the actual image that you’re seeing, it’s not in black and white? 
I: No.
T: It’s in color, there’s just not a lot of color in the picture, is that right?
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I: Yes, yes. He was in the hospital for so long that…
Irving’s response here gives two reasons for skepticism.  First, it was somewhat of a 
leading question, and Irving seemed to be led.  Irving did not say that there was an 
absence of color in the inner seeing, but when the interviewer suggested this Irving went 
along with the suggestion.  Second, after answering the question, Irving returns to 
describing the actual situation rather than his experience or the supposed inner seeing.  
T: Yeah. 
I: …his color wasn’t natural.  
T: He was red.  
I: Yes. 
The interviewer then returned to Irving’s prior statement that he was astonished:  
T: And you mentioned that you were astonished, I guess that he woke up and said your 
name.
I: Yes.
T: And that’s how it happened when you actually saw him, you felt astonished, right?
I: Yes. 
T: And are you feeling astonished at, when the beep goes off? 
I: Yes, I was surprised. 
T: Like just now, when the beep went off? 
I: Yes.
It seems that Irving may be describing reality here rather than inner experience,although 
he seemed quite confident.  Perhaps the biggest reason for skepticism is Irving’s response 
“Yes, I was surprised.”  This response seems to suggest that Irving may have not been 
astonished at the moment of the beep as he did not say he was astonished, he said he was 
surprised.  Furthermore, Irving answered in the past tense to a question that was in the 
present tense, suggesting that he may have been referring to the actual incident rather 
than his experience at the moment of the beep.    If Irving would have answered “Yes, I 
am astonished” there may be less reason for skepticism.  Also, it seems somewhat strange 
that Irving would be feeling astonished while remembering an event he had already 
experienced, although this is certainly possible, especially if he is immersed in mentally 
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re-living the event.  However, the biggest reasons for being skeptical of Irving’s 
amazement come when discussing the form of this experience:  
T: Is it possible to say how you were experiencing the surprised or astonishment when 
the beep went off?  So for example, for some people that might be a physical thing that 
they feel.  For some it’s just a mental…
I: I wasn’t expecting it…
T: Okay.
I: …a response like that.  I didn’t know whether he’d wake up and just go back to sleep 
or not, but I was surprised at his response.  
Irving’s response here seems to indicate the reason that he was astonished when the 
event actually occurred and does not at all answer the question about inner experience
that was being asked. 
T: And is that a physical surprise, like you’re taking a, like a deep breath or something, or 
is it more of a mental surprise, if that makes any sense? It’s a tough question, I know.
I: Well, I, I, I guess it was more shock at the response he gave and not expecting it.  We 
did, we did not have much of a conversation at all because he did not respond.  But when 
he opened his eyes he knew who I was.  
Again, this is a reason for his actual surprise, not the way it was experienced at the 
moment of the beep.  This may illustrate Irving’s inability to discuss any kind of 
unsymbolized form, a problem present throughout sampling, although the interviewer 
may not have made the distinction clear enough for Irving.   It is also an example of 
Irving’s tendency to discuss reality rather than inner experience.   
T: Mmm kay.  Anything else at the moment of this beep that you were experiencing? 
I: No, not, it wasn’t so much because I did not stay ‘cause we couldn’t converse and he 
was going back to sleep.
T: Okay, but in your experience just 10 minutes ago when the beep went off, were you 
experiencing anything else? 
I: No, I don’t think so. 
Again, in this exchange Irving is discussing reality when asked about his experience.  
This was common throughout sampling and brings rise to substantial skepticism 
regarding all of Irving’s reports as this was arguably his seemingly most reliable report.  
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June
This transcription begins in the beginning of the interview for beep 3.2.  June was 
initially asked about her experience at the moment of the beep about 15 to 30 seconds 
before the transcription begins.  She is talking about her granddaughter being in Mexico.  
One important thing to notice is how fluent, or “normal” June’s conversation is, yet she 
is not able to discuss inner experience or the moment of the beep in any meaningful way 
whatsoever.
June: Her boyfriend, uh, father, oh, I don’t know, has some kind of connection with the 
government, you know, in Mexico.  And so the mother and father and (Stacy) and her 
boyfriend were going down there for about ten days.  He had, you know, some business 
to do, so the... she was looking forward to that.  And I was just thinking about her down 
in Mexico, what she… 
Here, June is discussing reality rather than inner experience, a very common occurrence 
throughout this transcription and nearly all other interviews with June.
Todd: And so, right…
J: ...what her reaction will be when she returns.  
T: Okay.  And so, right when that beep went off, right at the moment it first went off, 
what were you experiencing or thinking of, or…
J: Well, actually that’s what I was thinking about the whole time…
June is not discussing the moment of the beep, but is rather discussing what she thinks 
about in general, i.e., “…thinking about the whole time.” This is also a common 
occurrence throughout this and other interviews. 
J: …because I just had... just had that on my mind about (Stacy) going to Mexico with 
her, uh, future in-laws, and, uh, and her friend, and, uh..., I don’t know that’s about, well, 
what I was concentrating on...
This language suggests that June is about to talk about inner experience.
T: Mmm kay.
J: ...and what she…
T: And so was that before…
J: ...was going to experience, you know, in Mexico, ‘cause she’s never been down in that 
area…
June returns to discussing reality rather than inner experience.
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J: …and uh, you know, how the people, you know, the majority of them live and so forth.  
‘Course they’re going to be getting into the, you know, into the cities…
T: Mmm, hmm.  
J: ...and uh, (inaudible) they’ll be staying with.
T: And so you were kind of, you were thinking about all that stuff before the beep?  And 
at the beep? 
J: Yeah, yeah, yeah. 
June is emphatic in her affirmative responses to the interviewer’s question, as she is at 
many points in the interview.  It seems as if June is not understanding the specificity of 
the question, and is rather interpreting it as “Were you thinking about all that stuff at 
all?”
J: That’s what I was sort of concentrating on.  I don’t know.  That’s just what came to my 
mind ‘cause I had been thinking about her all morning…
Again, June is discussing generalizations, not the moment of the beep. 
J: …all I guess and, and uh, ‘cause they were leaving this morning sometime…
Here, June returns to a discussion of reality
J: …and, uh, I’ll just be anxious for her to return, and, and hear her experiences down 
there.  
T:  Mmm kay.  So…we were... right before the beeper went off we were talking kind of 
back and forth, right?  And we were saying… we were talking about her being at (Ohio 
State) and (Andrew’s) son being at (Columbus).
J:  No, no.
T: No?
J: Irving doesn’t have a son at (Columbus).  I have a daugh…a granddaughter at 
(Columbus).  
T: Okay. There was something with somebody he knows at (Columbus) I thought we 
were talking about. 
J: They live in (Columbus).  
T: Right.
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J: They live in (Columbus).  
T: Right, but they don’t go to school there necessarily.
J: Oh no.  No, no.  His…his son…
T: Right. 
J: …who was the pilot…
T: Right. 
J: …yeah, they live in (Columbus). 
T: So we were talking about that…
J: Yes.
T: …and your granddaughter going to (Ohio State) and she’s going to finish in a year.
J: Yeah.
T: And then I said something about, well, some of us never get out, and then you said that 
she would and she might be getting married after college.
J: Yeah, I have…
T: And then the beep went off, I think right after you said that.
J: Yeah, yes.
T: And so at that point, you were thinking about her in Mexico?  Right when that beep 
went off?
J: Yes. 
T: And is there anything in particular you were thinking about her in Mexico?
J: No, I was just thinking, what, you know, how she’s going to, um, oh well, what’s the 
word I want to use?  You know, when she gets there, how those people live down there. 
June did not say what she was thinking at the moment of the beep, and now adds a new 
external content component to the story, that she was thinking about how the people live 
in Mexico, which she had not mentioned before. Although it appears in this case that 
June may be attempting to describe her experience.
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T: Uh, huh.
J: You know, the majority of them.  Have you been to Mexico?
T: Umm, for about an hour, once.
J: Oh, well, you know, it’s, un… unless you, you know, you get, I mean there are some 
lovely areas, don’t misunderstand me.  
T: Uh huh.  But there’s rough areas too.
J: But generally speaking, it’s, it’s sort of rough living.
T: Yeah. 
J: And uh, and of course a lot of them have come into United States, you know, to get 
jobs and so forth.   
It is as if the conversation is just continuing naturally with no regard for questions about 
inner experience or the moment of the beep.
T: Right.  And so when the beep went off were you thinking about, you know, when she 
gets there and how the people live…
J: Yes. 
She again gives an affirmative answer to a question about her experience at the moment 
of the beep, but there is reason to be skeptical about it because she adds a new 
component in her next response below.
T: …down there.
J: Well, I’m just anxious.  I was just thinking I’m anxious to speak to her when she 
returns…
This may be true, but it was not mentioned before.  Therefore, it seems to have no 
connection to her inner experience at the moment of the beep.
J: …you know, and get her, uh, feelings about the, about that area.  And uh, I’m sure that 
they’ll have a good time. 
June returns to discussing reality.
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J: And I, if, I don’t really know, I forget where, what, where they were staying, you 
know, where they had her, her, sss… uh, boyfriend’s, fff…uh, father had reservations 
somewhere where they were staying, you know, in a nice motel…
T: Mmm, hmm.  Right.
J: …or hotel. And uh…
T: And so were you kind of thinking about all of these things…
J: Yes! Yes, I mean, my mind… 
June again responds emphatically and affirmatively.
T: Right…
J: …was…
T: …so…
J: …I could just feel it going like this (put hand beside head and makes circular motion 
as if her thoughts were “spinning”), you, I was thinking about…
T: …right.  
J: …Mexico, ‘cause I’ve been there.
T: Right.
J: And, um, I’m just anxious to speak to her, you know…
T: Right. 
J: …and get her, um, feelings about Mexico.
T: Right.  So her going, thinking about her going to Mexico, what she’ll be experiencing, 
how the people live down there…
J: Yes, yes. 
T: …and that you’re anxious to speak to her now. Were you thinking that all right when 
the beep goes off? 
J: Yes. 
T: All of that? 
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J: Yes.  
It  is possible that June could be thinking about various aspects of her granddauther’s 
trip to Mexico, but her inconsistency, inability to answer specific questions, tendency to 
discuss reality than inner experience, and her constantly adding new content to her 
experience make it fairly clear that this was not the case.  Instead, June’s answers reflect 
a lack of comprehension and/or disregard for any questions related to momentary inner 
experience .
T: Right at that moment? 
J: Well really, that’s all I had on my mind…
June returns to discussing generalization.
J: …because I started to, I thought about it this morning and that just came to me about 
(Stacy) going down there.
T: Mmm, hmm.  
J: And um, I’m just anxious to get her reaction to that country because I know she’s never 
been down there, and um, I think it’s, uh, quite an experience for them.
T: Okay. 
J: To see how the other half lives. 
T: Right, it is interesting, yeah.
J: Yes, it is.  And uh…
June gives another strong, affirmative answer.
T: So those things, you were kind of thinking about a lot of these things not only before 
the beep went off, but all of it right when the beep went off?
J: Yes. Yes, yes, you know, I just sort of…
June gives another strong affirmative answer.  Typically, this level of certainty is 
evidence that someone is accurately describing their inner experience.  However, it is 
clear at this point that June’s certainty represents something else entirely, most likely a 
lack of comprehension of the specificity and/or meaning of the question.  It could also 
represent a mechanism designed to hide the fact that she does not know what she was 
experiencing at the moment of the beep, that she has no experience at the moment of the 
beep, or that it is simply easier to answer in a strong, affirmative manner.
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T: Right.  
J: …you know…
T: And, and are you seeing pictures of Mexico or your granddaughter…
J: (Drawn out and emphatic) Yeesss. Yes. 
T: …in your, in your head…
J: Yes. Yes.  
T: …innerly seeing…
J: Absolutely. Absolutely. Yes. Yes. 
June’s affirmative responses are very quick, as if she is either so certain about her 
momentary inner experience that it takes no consideration to respond in such a manner, 
or that she is not fully comprehending the specificity and/or depth of the question.
T: And can you say what exactly you’re seeing right when the beep went off or is that too 
difficult? 
J: (Squints eyes and puts hands to brow as if thinking hard or having a head ache) 
Suddenly, when a more specific question that requires more than a “yes” or “no” 
answer is presented, June has substantial difficulty.
J: Well….um, I think I was just thinking about talking to her when she returns.  I think 
that was on my mind, you know, sitting down and having a long chat with her, uh, when 
she returns to tell me about her experiences.  
T: Okay.  
J: Of course I know they’ll be swimming and that sort of thing too, you know… 
June returns to discussing external things rather than her inner experience.
T: Sure.
J: …but they’re going to be, um, doing some traveling down there, and, and just to 
observe how those people, some of them live…very crudely.  Oh, of course, then there 
are some beautiful homes too, you know, when you get into the cities but…it’s 
certainly…
T: And so were…
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J: It certainly isn’t United States.
T: Mmm, hmm.  And so were you thinking in words “Gosh, I really want to talk to her 
when she gets home” or seeing pictures or either of those…
J: Oh yes, oh yes, that’s what I’m, you know, that’s what I’m looking forward to, because 
I’m, she has a ca…, you know, always has a camera with her, and uh, so I’m anxious to 
see her pictures, and, and they’re (inaudible) her experiences down there. 
June seems to have misinterpreted the question.  She apparently understood it as a 
question about actual photographs rather than inner experience, totally disregarding the 
first part of the question about worded experience.
T: Okay. 
J: But I’m sure that they’ll be doing, you know, a lot of sight seeing and…taking 
advantage of all the, uh, opportunities that are, that pop up… 
T: Right.  Mmm kay.  
J: …‘cause I think it’s a place she’d probably never return to. And she was taking time 
off from her job.  You know, this is the one (that works with children).  
T: Right.
J: And, um, so I don’t think she’ll probably ever return there. 
T: Okay. (pause) Just checking my time. (pause) Okay.  So I don’t think I have any more 
questions necessarily. 
J: (gets picture of gran daughter) This, this is the one that I’m talking about…
T: Right.
J: … right there.  
T: Okay.
J: Yeah, the oldest one. 
T: Right.  Mmm kay.  (pause) So one distinction that’s really hard to make that I want to 
try and make as much as possible, and you’re doing a good, a very good job by the way, 
is exactly kind of what’s right when that beep goes off and what’s before the beep goes 
off. 
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The interviewer notices that the beep is sounding
T: Is it going off again? 
J: Mmm, hmm. It’s on now. 
June did not independently respond to the beep.  Although her hearing is fine, she did not 
notify the interviewer or otherwise perform the required task when the beep sounded.  In 
fairness, the interviewer did not give June very much time to respond on her own,
approximately one to three seconds.
T: Did it just start? 
J: Yeah, it just started. 
The next beep was then discussed, with very similar results.  Therefore, it will not be 
transcribed.  Hopefully, the following things are apparent from the above transcript:
1. June’s conversational skills are relatively normal.
2. June is not close to answering questions about momentary inner experience 
evidenced by:
a. June’s inability to answer anything beyond a yes/no question regarding 
momentary inner experience. 
b. June’s inconsistent answers, typically in the form of adding content as
the discussion continued.  
c. June’s consistent discussion of reality rather than inner experience. 
d. June’s consistent referral to general experience rather than specific 
experience.
Karen
The following is an excerpt from sample 3.2 with Karen.  This sample is perhaps the 
closest that Karen seemed to get to the moment of the beep.  For this day, Karen was 
interviewed instantly after the beep. 
At the moment of the beep, Karen was reading a book.  Apparently, at the moment of the 
beep, she was reading about a scene in the book that was taking place at a wedding in 
Jerusalem.  Karen was just asked what she was aware of at the moment of the beep:
Karen: Well, I’m thinking about some people that are getting married in…(points to 
book)
Todd: Okay.
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K: …in Jeru, in Jerusalem.  They’re Jewish people so that they have big, big weddings, 
you know?  And when, uh, a father finds a, a husband or a young man for his daughter 
he’s very happy because it’s something that’s unusual to find a…
T: Mmm, hmm.
K: …a good husband, you know?  In the meantime I was thinking about my daughter 
that, my other daughter that got married.  She had a great big wedding.
This seems to signify that she was either thinking about the wedding from the book, her 
daughter’s wedding, both, or neither at the moment of the beep.  
T: And so right when that beep went off, or like the last kind of split second before it 
went off, can you say what was in, what you were thinking of right…
K: The wedding.
T:  Okay.  And you’re thinking about the wedding, people getting married in Jerusalem    
K: Mmm, hmm.
Karen signifies she is thinking about the wedding from the book, although the interviewer 
led her in that direction.  The possibility that she was also thinking about her daughter’s 
wedding has not been excluded however.  
T: Okay.  And is that, is that related to the book that you are reading? 
K: Mmm, hmm.  
T: Mmm kay.  And so, could you tell me kind of how you are thinking about people 
getting married?  Are you thinking about it kind of in words, for example, “well these 
people are getting married” or are you kind of imagining a wedding in you mind, or?  
K: Well, I was thinking about my daughter’s wedding ‘cause she had a big wedding with 
over 300 people in the wedding and, uh, in a very ritzy…ri…ritzy hotel you know? 
Karen switches back to saying that she was thinking about her daughter’s wedding.  It is 
difficult to say whether she was actually thinking about the wedding in Jerusalem or 
actually wanted to report that she was thinking about that wedding because the 
interviewer led her in that direction.  What this switch does represent is that either a. 
Karen is truly inconsistent about her reports or b. Karen is easily led.  Either way, either 
of these possibilities are grounds for substantial skepticism.    Furthermore, Karen
continues to talk about content when asked about form, a common occurrence throughout 
sampling.  
T: Okay. And so are you reading about people in Jerusalem getting married?
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K: Mmm hmm.
T: Okay. And so you’re thinking about a wedding?
K: Yep.  
T: Okay.  And are you thinking of…are you think about the Jerusalem people getting 
married…
K: Yeah. 
T: …or are you thinking about your daughter getting married?
K: No, I…I’m thinking about these people here… (motions toward book) 
T: Right at that, right at that moment? (snaps fingers to signify beep)
K: Yeah. 
Here Karen goes back to stating that she is not thinking about her daughter’s wedding at 
the moment of the beep, but is rather thinking about the wedding from the book even 
though she had just stated that she was thinking about her daughter’s wedding at the 
moment of the beep.  This is the first time that she has excluded one of the weddings from 
her experience (her daughter’s wedding).  
T: Okay.  So it’s possible you could be reading that but thinking about your daughter’s 
wedding.
K: Yeah, uh huh.
T: Or it’s possible you’re reading that and thinking kind of about the wedding in the 
book. 
K: Yeah.
T: Can you say which one of those you were thinking about? Or are you not sure?
K: A little bit of both. 
This is the first time that Karen has said that she was thinking about both weddings.  
T: A little bit of both? Okay.  And are you thinking about, are they kind of separate, so 
you’re thinking about one and you’re also thinking about the other…
K: Yeah.
T: …or are you thinking about, like, one wedding and it kind of has aspects of both?  
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K: Well…
T: Or is that too hard to answer? 
K: It, it’s hard to answer.  Because, see, this girl here had a very simple wedding, and 
not... 
T: In the book?
K: Yeah.  
T: Okay.
K: And then my daughter had an, an enormous wedding…
T: Mmm kay.
K: … so…and my daughter got married in the same church as we got married.
T: Okay.
K: So that’s something else that I was thinking about. 
Here, Karen has added another potential aspect to her experience that she did not 
mention before (thinking about the fact that her daughter got married in the same church 
as she and her husband).  However, it should be noted that Karen may not have been 
saying that she was thinking about that at the moment of the beep, but may have been 
saying that she was thinking about it after the beep, or during the conversation, etc. 
T: And so are these again, are these things that you’re thinking about kind of near the 
beep and around it?
K: Mmm hmm.
T: So what are you thinking about right at it?  Just a split second where you kind of 
free…if you, if you could freeze what you were thinking or what you were aware of, 
what would that look like, or what would, what would that be? Or can you, I mean maybe 
you can’t say, right at that moment? 
K: Not really.
T: You can’t say?
K: No.
T: Right at the moment? 
K: No.
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T: But you kind of know, you kind of know what you were thinking about kind of around 
and near that moment?
K: Yes, uh huh.
This was again a leading question on the interviewer’s part as Karen never stated that 
she knew what she was thinking about around the moment of the beep.  Nevertheless, 
either it is true or Karen is easily led.  
T: Okay. And so do you…are you th…do you…maybe…and if you’re not sure that’s fine 
and I want you to tell me you’re not sure, but are you thinking about weddings at the 
moment of the beep? 
K: Yeah.
T: Okay.  And you’re thinking…can you say whether you’re thinking about the wedding 
in Jerusalem or your daughter’s wedding right at the moment, or not sure?
K: Not sure.
T: Okay. But you were thinking about them both kind of around the beep? 
This is another leading question that Karen affirms.   
K: Yes. 
To this point, the interviewer has suggested options while Karen simply responds yes or 
no.  This is a cause for increased skepticism as she has not offered this information on 
her own.  
The interviewer now turns to questions about form:
T: Okay.  And is there an imagining at some point?  Is there, for example, you’re kind of 
having a pi…you’re remembering your daughter’s wedding and you kind of have a 
picture in your head? Or there’s a picture of your head, or in your…(laughs)….a picture 
of your head …(laughs)…a picture in your head of the wedding in the book?  Do you 
think that there’s any pictures in your head at any time, at the beep or around the beep, or 
no, not necessarily? 
K: Well, the, the wedding there was so, oh, what would you call it…so simple…
T: Mmm hmm. 
K: …compared to what my daughter had, you know?  That wedding there was, was 
simple yet, for the Jewish people, it was something special.  
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Karen discusses reality rather than her inner experience. 
T: Okay.  And are you comparing, so are you, you’re comparing the two weddings? 
K: Mmm hmm. (Nods). 
There is reason for substantial skepticism with this response because a. the interviewer 
suggested it and b. Karen has not directly stated that she was comparing the two 
weddings to this point.  
T: Right, can, can you say if you were doing that right when that beep went off or was it 
near when the beep went off? 
K: Near when the beep went off. 
T: But you’re not sure if it was exactly there or kind of around it? 
K: Yes sir. 
T: Okay.  Good.  And is there a way to say how you were comparing them?  So for 
example, people might have kind of a tense feeling about comparing two weddings, or a 
happy feeling, or maybe they’re kind of having a picture of both in their minds, or maybe 
they’re thinking in words about “well, this wedding was really big, but this one was 
really small.” Can you say how you were kind of com…how you were comparing it?  If 
there were pictures or words or neither or not sure? 
K: Well, this wedding was such, such, such a nothing, you know? And the, the other, my 
daughter’s wedding was such a big wedding that it, it’s hard to compare both of them. 
T: Okay.  But you were kind of comparing them at the beep or around the beep? 
K: Yeah. 
At this point, Karen was asked if there was anything else in her experience at or near the 
moment of the beep, and she said no.  
Although this was one of Karen’s better (perhaps her best) sample, it is still apparent 
that Karen cannot narrow her experience to the moment of the beep.  Furthermore, her 
reports of inner experience cause reason for a very high level of skepticism.  This is due 
to their inconsistencies, the fact that Karen does not offer much information but rather 
follows with what is suggested, that Karen typically answered in the affirmative to 
leading questions, and her tendency to talk about real life compared to the moment of the 
beep.  
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